. . . 2015. 4 (32) 1.16 DOI: 10.17223/1998863 /32/12 . : PRO ET CONTRA , - . : , , , , . , , , , . [1–4], - – , [5–9]. , , . - , , . – , - , . , . : 1) , ; 2) - ( ) . , », ,« - , – ) – ( , , , , . . , , . , . , - : pro et contra 103 , , . the access problem – - ( - . ). , . ( ) , , , . . [10]. , ) . , « » - . – . . . … , : , ? ? , , , , , , ?» [11. C. 257–258]. 4 « » [12] , « » [13]. . , , ( , - , , , . , ). , . , . , . - . : « . 104 ». . , . « » [1] - , : , . , , , . , . , - ? , , . , , - . , , , , , , . » [1. . 42–43]. :« . , , , , , » [1. . 43]. , , . - , - . , , . , . , , , . )? , « » [14]. . . . [14. P. 209]. - , - : pro et contra . 105 : , , . , , . , - , . . , , . » [14. P. 207]. , « », . , - . , ( , ) , - ), , . , . . , , - , , ( ). , , , , , - , . , . - , . . – , . ( , ). , , - , . , . - : – , - ; – , . . 106 ( , , ) , . . « , » . - : ( ) , » [15. C. 18]. , . - , . . . . : «… … , , … » [16. P. 164–165]. , , – , ( ), , , , . . . - , L L1. – , . , - , . , [17–19], . - , [8–9], , , , , , - . , , , (truth-teller) – ,– . , , - : pro et contra 107 , . , - . « » « » : , , ‘ - ’ » [20. C. 447]. - , , , , . , , . , , – - , , ( « »; , , ), - , ( « »; ). « , - » [2] , : , , ( ’) . , - . , , ‘ ’ , « . ? ?» [2. . 54]. ». , - . 108 , - . : (s |- ), s – , s , – ( ) s. , :« , s, , , s», . , . « s» , , , s. « », . , , , , ) ( , - . , , . , . , - , . , , , , , - , , , ,« - ». , - : « ». , , , . . - , . , - , , , , , . : pro et contra 109 , - . . , , , . , , , , , - [21]. ( , ), , . , - , [22]. , - , , . . – ; – ; – . , , . « - », - , . , - , , , , . « , ‘ : ’ ?» [3]. , . : , , , ( , ), - , ( ), . , , ‘ ’, – - . 110 ‘ ’, , , , , ‘ , ’, ‘ ‘Sk ’, . , , , , , ’ (Buridan's Sophisms) ( S1 S2, – ’ ( ‘Sk , , ’), – , , ‘ , , , , , , - , , )» [3. C. 73–74]. , « », - , , . - , , . . : S1, S2, S3…, , : k>1, Sk k>2, Sk k>3, Sk , (S1) (S2) (S3) . , Sn , ( ) Sn+1 . (b) Sn+1 (a), . . . , , k>n Sk , (b) Sn . k>n+1 Sk Sn+1, , ! Sn . Sn, ! - - , , Sn , , (22. P. 251–252). , , Sn Sn+1 , Sn+1 Sn+2 , Sn . Sn+1 , Sn , ( Sn+2, Sn+1 , Sn Sn+2, ) Sn+1 Sn+2, - , : pro et contra 111 , « » . , . , »: S1 S2, - . , « , » , , . S1 , , , S1 , , , , S2 S2 , . , , , , , S1 , , , S1 . . , S1 , S1 - , S2 , ( ), , ». « S1, . S1 , S1 . . , , , S2 S2 , S1 , S1 , , . , S1 , . . S2, , S1 - « » [4]. , , , , - . , . . : . - …» [4. C. 121]. . – , . . - : . : , , , , , - . 112 . » [4. C. 121]. , , , « », », « - , , - , , , , . , , , « - », . , ( – . - ), , « . » [5] « » [9]. . , , , . , , . 1. ., // . . . . 38–45. 2. . . . . 2012. 2 (18). . - , // . 53–57. 3. ? // 4. . : . . . : , . // . 5. . . . . 2013. . 2013. ‘ . . 2014. 2 (49). ’ 4. . 64–77. 8. . 108– 24. : . - - , 2008. 6. . // . 2009. 2 (70). . 11–23. 7. . // . 2010. 341. . 48–55. 8. . « » // . 2011. 3 (50). . 37–53. 9. . . : . , 2011. 10. Katz J.J. The Metaphysics of Meaning. 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Ladov Vsevolod A. National Research Tomsk State University (Tomsk, Russian Federation) DOI: 10.17223/1998863 /32/12 FORMAL REALISM: PRO ET CONTRA Keywords: realism, anti-realism, relativism, ontology, epistemology, logic, paradox, selfreference, truth This article is devoted to consideration of critical arguments against formal realism presented in contemporary Russian philosophical literature. Author tries to answer the arguments by means of more accurate representation and correction of content of formal realism. The article consist of six section: Introduction; The first critical argument; The second critical argument; The third critical argument; The fourth critical argument; Conclusions. References 1. Nayman, E.A. & Syrov, V.N. (2012) Some reasons about justification of formal realism. Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya – Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2(18). pp. 38–45. 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