. Wodak R., de Cillia R., The Discursive Construction of National Identity

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249713041
The Discursive Construction of National Identity
Article in Discourse and Society · April 1999
DOI: 10.1177/0957926599010002002
CITATIONS
READS
982
6,661
3 authors:
Rudolf de Cillia
Martin Reisigl
University of Vienna
University of Vienna
13 PUBLICATIONS 2,063 CITATIONS
42 PUBLICATIONS 3,370 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Ruth Wodak
Lancaster University
360 PUBLICATIONS 21,051 CITATIONS
SEE PROFILE
Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:
Fascist discourse View project
Die Kinderjause View project
All content following this page was uploaded by Ruth Wodak on 26 April 2014.
The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.
SEE PROFILE
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 203
Chapter 8
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200r
In this chapter, we briefly discuss and summarise developments since 1995. We
have selected three salient events and socio-political phenomena which characterise
the period between 1995 and 200ränd which have had a strong impact on the
construction of recent Austrian national identities.
While we continue the discussion from the last chapter, it is important to
emphasise specifically that `neutrality', which was already considered to be obsolete,
has made a surprising `comeback' in the Austrian debates (see p. 202; see also Koväcs
and Wodak 2003). This development i4LJtied to recent global crises and wars
such as 9/11, the wars in Afghanista
Iraq, and
Secondly, in 1995 Austria joined the EU and has since held the EU presidency
twice. Attitudes towards the EU shifted from very positive acclamation to
disappointment and Euro-scepticism. Simultaneously, the rise of the Austrian rightwing populist party FPÖ has to be reflected on and analysed with respect to attitudes
towards the EU and globalising phenomena. In the past iit41 years, the Austrian
right-wing populist movement has served as a model for other right-wing populist
parties across Europe. Indeed, the label Viaiderisation' was coined to describe
local and regional protest movements which endorse nationalism, chauvinism,
revisionism, EU-scepticism and racist, xenophobic beliefs.
Thirdly, we compare selected debates and rhetorical patterns (in political speeches
and focus group discussions) surrounding the commemorative year 2005 with the
analyses of the same genres in 1995 (see Chapters 4 and 5). This comparison allows
us to detect continuities and differences which are, of course, related to transnational,
national and local processes as mentioned above. In this way, we are able to trace
the influence of EU accession, globalising events and crises, and the struggle for
hegemony in the political spectrum on `collective', official and individual identity
constructions.
8.1 PUBLIC DISCOURSES ON AUSTRIAN IDENTITY IN 2005
The year 2005 — ten years after the data were collected for the first edition of this
volume — was another important anniversary year for Austria. This time there were
ite sucect.-ft l
tates
0
forii%er
of.J.a..
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 204
204 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
celebrations for the sixty-year anniversary of the end of the war and the liberation,
sixty years of the Second Republic, fifty years since the State Treaty and Statute of
Neutrality and ten years of EU membership. The year was styled 'Gedankenjahr'
(`Year of Thought(s)', an inventive play on words based on the conventional
expression `Gedenkjahr' , meaning Tear of Commemoration') by the official bodies
that were co-ordinating the celebrations. This had a marked impact on many genres
of public political discourses (exhibitions, events, speeches, ceremonial occasions,
etc.). This year of commemoration provided the impetus for us to reapply and
further develop the analytical instruments we used for our previous study of the
discursive construction of national identities in general and of Austrian identities in
particular, and iiei to adapt these instruments to the new situation and draw
comparisons with 19 5. First, we collected an extensive corpus of public discourse
fragments (related to political genres, media genres in public television, and print
media genres) for the new study and carried out foc grolp dis ssions. Then we
downsized the collected data for the actual study (Wctakland
fl etillia 2008):
Finally we analysed seventeen commemorative speeches del vered in the course of
the anniversary celebrations. We looked at ways of constructing a keileeeiepast, 1—f Co b yweo vi
present and future that are relevant to ccollective identity in selected thematic areas
(Distelberger, de Cillia and Wodak 2008). The festivities of the 'Gedankenjahr' were
also `disturbed' several times by unwanted interjections. Accordingly, we chose to
examine speeches by the politicians Siegfried Kampl (BZÖ') and John Gudenus
(FPÖ). Kampl described soldiers who deserted from the Wehrmacht as `murderers of
comrades' in a speech to the Federal Council, while Gudenus came under ublic
scrutiny for questionable utterances about Nazi concentration camps,
existencrrie indirectly questioned (Engel and Wodak 2008). In the discourses
surrounding the year 1995, one anniversary was particularly accentuated: the anniversary of the ratification of the State Treaty, which was signed on 15 May 1955 by
the foreign ministers of the four signatory states and the Austrian foreign minister in
the Belvedere Palace in Vienna, and was then taken out onto the balcony and shown
to the jubilant crowds. The exclamation Austria is free!' and the so-called 'balcony
scene' and derivative forms of these were quoted and recontextualised in different
media. These manifold recontextualisations in advertising, art or as a role-play of
identity propaganda provided a starting point for an in-depth analysis of modes and
functions of changes in meaning of important and iconic symbols (Distelberger
2008). In addition, two focus group discussions on the topic of Austrian identities'
were held as part of the project, one with senior citizens in a Viennese retirement
home and one with pupils in a Viennese secondary school (de Cillia 2008). Thus,
two separate generations expressed their points of view on Austrian history and
identity. To allow comparison with the 1995 study, the focus group questions
remained largely unchanged.
In the following section we summarise several salient results from the 2005 study,
and focus particularly on commemoration. We examine continuities but also
discontinuities with 1988 (t% fifte- eaunniversary of the Nazi occupation of
Austria) and with 1995 (cf. Wg:lakandideillia 2008).
4 1 21,3
r-
-t
"ih GI,
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 205
The 'Story' Continues: 1 995-2001 205
8.1.1 Considering Commemoration
Anyone who succeeds in telling a national story in terms of a catastrophe originating from outside also succeeds in projecting onto enemies the responsibility
for any future failures, for future catastrophes. Anyone who manages to explain
their `own' story as a string of grandiose successes, to claim individual heroes for
themselves, lays the foundations for unrealistic expectations of respective cown'
positions in an unavoidably conflict-laden future.
(Pelinka 2007, p. vii)
In this short quote Anton Pelinka points to the inherent tensions found in
commemorative speeches and occasions: how do the speakers handle traumatic
occasions? Are these described as disasters or tragedies and are people or actors
thereby absolved of responsibility? Are there perpetrators, or do these 'just disappear'
(cf. Heer 2004)? Or are success stories foregrounded and, if so, who is responsible for
these? What do the respective narratives of the past mean for the present and the
future, for official and hegemonic representations of history or for their alternatives?
Is it possible, in the course of an anniversary event or even in a whole commemorative year, to reconcile opposing positions consensually or do schisms and
differences persist? Which events are emphasised, which are backgrounded and
which are utterly obscured?
Nietzsche described these tensions and stated that it was desirable to find an
equilibrium between history and oblivion (Nietzsche 1985, pp. 9-12, 1 8-1 9), to
draw the boundaries of remembrance and forgetting. This served to impede the past
so that it would not become the `gravedigger of the present', and would allow the
malleable force of a human being, `people' or culture 'to reshape and absorb past and
strange events, to let wounds heal, to replace what was lost, to recreate broken forms
from oneself' (Nietzsche 1985, p. 10). Nietzsche called for an interpretation of the
past from the power of the present (Nietzsche 1985, p. 62) and warned — in
opposition to historicism, which Nietzsche regarded as chistorical illness' (Nietzsche
1985, p. 106) — of an overkill of historical memory that inhibits life (Nietzsche 1985,
p. 62). He concluded that 'the ahistorical and the historical are equally necessary for
the health of a single person, a people and a culture' (Nietzsche 1985, p. 11). The
metaphors of health and illness used here stand out. Incidentally, these also occur
in our 2005 corpus (cf. Wodak and de Cillia 2007, de Cillia and Wodak 2007).
However, Nietzsche's plea to place memory and forgetting into a 'healthy' relationship with each other gives rise to important moral and ethical issues.
This raises the question of whether there can be any social traumas at all which
do not have a moral or ethical dimension. lt seems to be the case that decision
makers determine their own value systems, which then become official policy on
the past, and which justify and legitimate past actions post hoc (cf. Wodak et al.
1990; Ensink and Sauer 2003, pp. 5ff.). The politics of commemoration therefore
faces substantial challenges: it must ensure that enough importance is placed on
present wrongs, to counteract processes of `banalisation and normalisation'. They
must also ensure that distinctions between our various pasts are maintained, and
Page 206
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
c4.
cid
2,:aL
..eyel9474-freme
206 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
'that various narratives are not used princi • all for • oliticall o ortune ends.
Today remembering and commemoration culture have become very fashionable.
There are many ways of remembering: anniversaries, exhibitions, documentaries,
commemorative sites, memorials, speeches, films, academic and popular literature,
symposia, etc.; multiple clieux de mjmoire' (Nora, Jordan and Trouille 2001). The
term `commemoration industry' is even used, since domestic and international trips
to commemorative sites have turned into a lucrative form of tourism.
Official commemorations in the sense of the aforementioned questions about the
ritualisation of or the dealing with traumatic pasts happen in thoroughly systematic
and planned forms. There are attempts to create consensual images of history which
unify a whole `nation' (Wodak et al. 1994, Reisigl 2004. This entails a certain j(
amount of vagueness, so that no one feels left out or attacked. Taboos are formed to
avoid questions of guilt. Corresponding narratives — often as myths — are passed an
from generation to generation in the form of `collective' forgetting and `collective'
remembering (Reisigl 2007a, p. 21; Heer and Wodak 2008; Martin and Wodak
2003, p. 9).
In the discursive construction of pasts and politics of the past, there are certain
linguistic/rhetorical strategies which assume particular importance: the use of
particular sequences of tenses and temporal and spatial elements (deixis); the naming
of particular actors (and the obfuscation of others); the frequent use of passive
constructions, the use of deontic or epistemic modality; a preference for abstract
nominalisations as metonyms or other rhetorical tropes; trivialising metaphors; and
the use of specific verbs and verb classes as manifestations of acceptable or taboo
patterns of behaviour, to name just a few (for more details see Chapter 2, section 2.3;
see also Martin and Wodak 2003, pp. 7ff.). Many of these discursive strategies
are used effectively to construct catastrophes and success stories. They have clear
functions as part of a hegemonic politics of the past (cf. Manoschek and Sandner
2008).
8.1.2 Continuities, Developments and Changes
In this section we will draw a (necessarily) brief comparison between the official
politics of commemoration in the years 1988, 1995 and 2005. Our aim is to examine
whether patterns have changed or, by and large, commemoration in Austria follows
the same established patterns. Since there were significant changes in the Austrian
political landscape between 1988 and 200 any comparison must of course be
sensitive to historical context. Thus, 1988 sa the effects of the Waldheim affair' (or,
in fact, it was still in Full swing). In 199 there was a ggrand coalition' in Austria just
at the point it had finished negotiating the EU accession. In 2005 the government
consisted of a 'black and blue' (ÖVP and FPÖ) coalition. Haider's former FPÖ, now
the BZÖ, was thus a formal partner in government and not, as previously, a
vociferous Opposition Party.
At these three points in time different (but sometimes similar or even the same)
events were commemorated: the Anschluss to Nazi Germany in 1938; the end of the
3
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 207
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200F07
Second World War in 1945; the State Treaty of 1955; the accession of Austria to the
EU in 1995. Of course there was also some attention paid to the Prague Spring and
the events which took place in Paris in May 1968, and other international events (cf.
Triandafyllidou, Wodak and Krzyianowski 2009). In our comparisons we mainly
focus on official speeches as indicators of official politics of commemoration (cf.
Wodak et al. 1994; Wodak et al. 1998; Reisigl 2008rReisigl 20914 Koväcs and
1-19Wodak 2003; Benke 2003). Are there any detectable differences that are not solely
explicable by context or the personality of the speaker? In other words, can typical
discursive patterns be discerned in Austrian post-war commemorations? In addition
to giving an overview of our 2005 study in this chapter we will also return to semipublic discourse — in the form of focus group discussions — and compare our results
with those from 1995.
Our analysis shows that there are significant changes, but also established
continuities. The most significant difference is that the all-encompassing construct
of the community ofvictims is becoming increasingly institutionalised and established
in 2005, and differences between groups of victims are receding. Furthermore,
perpetrators are more frequently obfuscated, often by the use of passive constructions.
In 2005, the success story is even more often celebrated as a rebirth of Austria than in
1995. Thus, representatives of the government attempt to consign all events before
1945 to the realm of sinister metaphors as catastrophes, sickness or nightmares.
Accordingly, the `newborn child' (i.e. Austria) is as innocent as any newborn baby if
one follows this metaphorical construct (cf. Distelberger, de Cillia and Wodak 2008,
p. 38). Primarily, the shift to increased celebration of success is noticeable in 2005.
Breaks are also noticeable: in each commemorative year sudden and surprising
'unpleasant and embarrassing' (i.e. far-right, revisionist or National Socialist)
ideologies have come to light that disturbed the carefully prepared and planned
events and consensus. Finally, there was an unexpected development with respect to
Austrian neutrality: in 1995 this was almost obsolete (cf. Koväcs and Wodak 2003),
but in 2005 it was positively connoted and was seen as almost unshakeable.
With respect to national self-understanding, this occurs only in very few passages
explicitly in the 2005 speeches. This is likely to be because the existence of an
Austrian nation had become a fairly unquestioned issue at the time, since even
the FPÖ broadly accepted the idea of an Austrian nation. Where national selfunderstanding is directly addressed in the speeches, politicians either characterise the
Austrian nation as a political entity easily recognised by the Austrian population
(and the opinion polls confirm this assessment) and stress the existence of a strong
Austrian self-consciousness, or they refer to potential or actual tensions between
supranational, national and regional aspects. The former is the case in Andreas Khors
speech given on 14 January 2005 during the parliamentary opening ceremony that
launched the Gedankenjahr': Austria, Ladies and Gentlemen, has become a nation
that its citizens believe in, a nation that they love' (Khol 14.1.2005).2The latter can
be illustrated by a quotation from the speech by Vice-chancellor Hubert Gorbach
(FPÖ) on 114 J...diy 2001
4-4 -the same 049
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16-
Page 208
208 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
f-
754
When, after a ten-year period of occupation, the State Treaty was signed, our
country could finally develop into that what it is now: a social, economically
successful, stable and above all also secure country.
Ladies and Gentlemen! The ten-year membership of the European Union has
finally also extensively supported this development. Our task within the EU is to
continue to acilonfidendy, especially where basic national nee are at stake, and rthil
i
yn;tlev‘...
to subordinate ourselves to the public interest of the EU where a common
performance and action is meaningful. tet-terelem&eibeemel-etteis-eneriereedi
•
'
is 1.4 Bei
4 ai2te -to
inadequate in a community; it also oes not lead to any results. After all, 5t3
• coita -the erii4
achievement and solidarity are obviously not contradictory! But Europe must also
of ®n
ho5e
acknowledge the individuality and independence of the member statränd of
re 5
course respect them.
• .....
orbach 14.1.201
Starting from the success topos, Gorbach here tries to mediate between the
national and supranational (European) identity. He does this by emphasising the
requirement for national self-consciousness and the use of the two topoi of
singularity (individuality) and autonomy. As in many similar contexts, these argumentation schemes are strategically employed as defensive arguments against the
potential threat of national identity by supranational processes.
8.1.3 `Austrian Perpetration and die `Community of Victims'
Th year 1988 was marked by the contrast between the then president Kurt
W dheim and the then Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. Waldheim characterised
himself as a victim: of wars, of the Nazis, of the foreign media, among others.
Waldheim argued that there was no way out, one just had to `do one's duty'. In an
important televised address on 15 February 1988 (in relation to a report by an
international committee of historians) he stated (cf. Wodak et al. 1994, pp. 47-59):
My fellow citizens. I have seen and experienced endless sorrow, destruction and
pain in this terrible Second World War, in this curse on my generation. [...] I was
drafted into Hitler's Wehrmacht. One has to see this without delusions and in
all truth. There were not many possibilities to avoid war service. In the NS
dictatorship hundreds of thousands and eventually millions had no other
possibility. I have great respect for the heroes and martyrs of this time. But there
were, as always in history, only a few. We others in my generation drowned in the
machinery of war.
(Waldheim 15.2.1988)
In this short extract several explicit forms of positive self-presentation are noticeable, which may serve to express solidarity with Waldheim's generation. Almost the
entire generation is constructed as a victim of war and of the `machinery of war', the
`horror of war' (by means of a fallacious topos of the victim, based on a fallacy of
hasty generalisation; see section 8.4. . One was helpless in the hands of a greater
7(6
1-5)
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16-
Page 209
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200F09
power and thus had no control whatsoever over events (note that Waldheim uses
the mechanical metaphor of `machinery' which conveys a relativising fallacy of
heteronomy or external force). Also evident is a strategy of minimisation by a topos
of small numbers as well as the strategy of trivialisation by a fallacy of comparison:
there were only few exceptions of heroes and martyrs who resisted the National
Socialist regime, and the NS war of extreme aggression and racist extermination is
framed as a 'war like all others'. This levelling strategy recurs in many interviews with
former members of the Wehrmacht (Heer 2004). The Holocaust eventually appears,
almost as a by-product of the war, in the following extract:
Above all let us never forget that along with the horror of war it also came to the
systematic and ruthless annihilation of the European Jews through the NS regime.
lt must be a sacred duty for us to do everything so that the crimes of this era are
never repeated.
(Waldheim 15.2.1988)
Here, the deportation and extermination of Jews are paradoxically added as a side
issue to the linguistically foregrounded `horror of war' (other Nazi victims such as
Roma and Sinti, political opponents, homosexuals and other minority groups are not
mentioned by Waldheim). This tater addition is introduced by the emphasising
adverbial `above all' and the appeal not to forget, which is directed to a Austrian 'Nye
group' (cf. Heer et al. 2003, Heer et al. 2008).
Unlike Waldheim, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky uses the rhetorical means of contrast and explicitly describes perpetration. He locates the roots of the `atrocities' in
Austria, although he does not name individual or `collective' perpetrators and uses
passive constructions or agency deletion to omit them (for instance, on 9 February
1988, in the TV news programme Mittagsjournal; Vranitzky is followed by the then
Vice-chancellor Alois Mock; see also Chapter 4, pp. 89ff.):
And I would like to begin with a very personal remark. And this is a personal
remark, which offers itself just in the fiftieth year since these ah since this
catastrophic event of the year 1938 for our country. Because the report [i.e. the
report by the historians' commission on the question of Waldheim's potential
involvement in NS crimes] has once again and yet again shown beside many other
things and beside many eh currently politically relevant questions that ah it is not
even half a century ago that ah on our continent, in our immediate environment,
there were wholly unimaginable atrocities and ah barely describable inhumanities
perpetrated. And eh that wring well especially in this year also to consider the
roots and the positions, to above all avoid every kind of repetition of such events
and I mean with all our energy.
(Vranitzky 9.2.1988)
And I would like to say once again very clearly: this country became strong again
after 1945 because across all political boundaries, against all understandings or
social ah differences, community and commitment to democratic institutions and
to this country were stronger than that which separates us. And we must not let
re
te
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16-
Page 210
210 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
ourselves, only fifty years after 1938, drift into polarisation. Regardless from
which side this comes.
(Mock 9.2.1988)
The leading representatives of the two parties in government thus take a different
stance: the report by the historians' commission helps Vranitzky to remind people of
the atrocities. Mock, on the other hand, resorts to a strategy of cohesivation (see
p. 38) that asks for unification instead of polarisation. He emphasises the 'success
story' made possible by consensus in the face of all social and political differences,
and thus draws on the alternative described by Anton Pelinka (above). Following
these interviews near the start of 1988, many politicians, including Waldheim, point
to the responsibility of perpetrators, especially in relation to the 'November Pogrom'
(Reichskristallnacht) on 9 November 1938 (see p. 5). However, they usually use a
rather abstract, reporting style in which passives and nominalisations are prevalent.
This is, for example, also the case in the speech by Chancellor Vranitzky on the
occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the November Pogrom:
In this night from the 9th to the 10th November the Jewish population became
the victim of a forceful and brutal act of vengeance, and on the orders of the then
government and party groups or agencies was abandoned as wild game to hate,
destruction and humiliation.
(Vranitzky 9.11.1988)
re
It is notable that, in contrast to other leading politicians, in all his speeches and
interviews in 1988 and 1995 Vranitzky emphasises that he does not wanz to 'draw a
line under' [Schlussstrich] events. He claims that one cannot finish commemorations
`on the 31st of December'. Vranitzky and the then President of the National Council
Heinz Fischer point out that there were real acts perpetrated by real people, not just
abstract events. This is evident in Vranitzky's speech commemorating the liberation
rns vnprisewett of thFOncentration camp at Mauthausen on 7 May 1995 (see chapter
91).
In 198F was Waldheim from whom other politicians sought to distance
was Jörg Haiderk-eeiel In the speech quoted in Chapter
themselves; in 1995
p. 91, for example, Vranitzky alludes to one of the many `Haiderisms' (cf. Bushisms)
— 'the orderly employment policy' [ordentliche Beschäftigungspolitik] 3 of the National
Socialist regime — and clearly distances himself from trivialising evaluations of
National Socialism.
In 2005, there are few comparable admissions of responsibility in the official
commemorations. One remarkable exception is the speech by Secretary of State
Franz Morak during the UN General Assembly on the anniversary of the liberation
of survivors in Auschwitz, where he explicitly addresses Austria's guilt (see Wodak
et al. 2008, p. 180). Morak criticises that the Austrian `we group' referred to the
Moscow Declaration of 1943 for far too long and willingly, in order to emphasise
Austrian victim status, thereby neglecting the fact that many Austrians were among
the perpetrators. However, Morak stresses that Austria has to assume moral coresponsibility', thus using a sociative formation which mitigates guilt. This rhetorical
vält
ihe
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 164
Page 211
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200r211
strategy was also applied in Vranitzky's speeches, as was the relativising emphasis on
the non-existence of the Austrian state from 1938 to 1945:
lt took a long time for Austria to grasp the complexity of its own history and for
it to understand that Austria, which no longer existed as an independent country
after the Anschluss, was not only a victim of the Nazi regime, but that there were
also Austrians among the perpetrators and that many actively supported the
persecution or at least accepted it. Austria must therefore confront its moral coresponsibility [Mitverantwortung].
(Morak 24.1.2005)
rrni5 rris
This speech shows the juxtaposition of Austria/Austrians in their dual roles of
victiPndperpetratorhis ambivalent combination is quite common among (WP
politicians and also among SPÖ politicians. Less ambiguously, the leader of the
Austrian Greens, Alexander Van der Bellen, used a speech during the opening event
of the 'Gedankenjahr' 2005 in Parliament to demarcate the Involved Austrians' in
the NS hierarchy (see Wodak et al. 2008, p. 180). He enumerated different layers
of perpetration 'from Hitler down to the last little blockleareleffwho betrayed and
denounced his neighbour' (Van der Bellen 14.1.2005).
Overall, perpetrators seem to become backgrounded in 2005. When they are
named, this usually involves mitigation and/or relativisation. Text and talk about the
actors of National Socialism is marked by agent deletion in passive constructions,
nominalisations and by the use of metaphors of catastrophe carrying a topos or
fallacy of heteronomy: language which constitutes events as `determined by nature
and drarna', unavoidable and thus not subject to human influence (see also Wodak
and de Cillia 2007, Distelberger, de Cillia and Wodak 2008).
This heteronomisation and dramatisation also becomes vividly noticeable in a
speech by Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel given on the sixtieth anniversary (27 April
2005) of the Declaration of Independence. With a series of topoi of numbers,
Schüssel lists various groups of victims. Interestingly, he first refers to the time after
1945, to the then displaced persons all over Europe, to the prisoners of war and to
the victims of rapes and looting. Only after this focus does he shift his attention to
the NS victims and explicitly mention Jews, Roma and Sinti, political opponents,
believers, sick persons and disabled persons. However, he juxtaposes these groups of
victims with soldiers (including prisoners of war) and civilians who were killed by
acts of war paratactically, thus relativising and levelling the victims. In this enumeration, the NS perpetrators are backgrounded by passivation and deleted by the use
of euphemistic verbs such as `died' and 'lost their lives' to describe the murder of
victims (cf. Wodak et al. 2008, p. 181, de Cillia and Wodak 2007, p. 125):
The victims of this horror must be named: 100,000 Austrians died in concentration camps or in captivity, most of them Jews. Many had to lose their lives due
to their political or religious convictions, and thousands of Roma, Sinti, ill and
disabled people were murdered. Fifty thousand civilians were killed, 100,000
political prisoners lost years of their lives. Two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers
Gaoter
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 212
212 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
were killed, 250,000 came back from the war badly injured or mutilated, and in
the following years 500,000 prisoners of war had to pay for this war having being
started.
(Schüssel 27.4.2005)
The naming of these National Socialist crimes leads to the euphemistic portrayal
of all those who were murdered or gassed in concentration camp . Although the
different groups are enumerated individually, Schüssel later frames t em collectively
with the metonymic formulation `victims of this horror'. He thus constructs and
establishes a `community of victims' in which clear distinctions between the different
kinds of `victimhood' (e.g. concentration camp inmates and soldiers were victims)
tend to get blurred.
The naturalising and heteronomising metaphor of the National Socialist catastrophe is also found several times in 2005 speeches (for example in the speeches
of Defence Minister Herbert Scheibner, Vice-chancellor Hubert Gorbach, Federal
President Heinz Fischer and above all Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel; see
Distelberger, de Cillia and Wodak 2008 for details). Schüssel repeatedly refers to
related historical events and actions as a `nightmare', `horror' or `dark age' and thus
characterises these as immune to human influence (cf. Wodak and de Cillia 2007).
Tand otitote
c amps
However, the preference for this naturalising metaphorical Frame in the given
political context, the commemorative parliamentary opening of the 'Gedankenjahr' ,
is certainly influenced by the social and political context in January 2005: the
tsunami in Asia and its devastating consequences (Distelberger, de Cillia, Wodak
2008, p. 39).
In 2005 the speakers were less reserved, since the commemoration of 1945/55
could also be used to speak about the 'success story'. Commemoration of 1938
in 1988, an the other hand, not least because of the Waldheim affair, led to
extreme caution in an attempt to keep the peace between the government coalition
partners (SPÖ and ÖVP). In 2005, in many cases, only victims are re embered.
It seemed no longer to be necessary for speakers to distance themselv
.g. from
Waldhei
8.1.4 The Austrian Success Story
In 1995 and 2005, very much in keeping with Pelinka's statement quoted above, it
was possible to commemorate successes in particular. The `re-birth of the Austrian
nation' was foregrounded in conjunction with the end of the war and liberation
in 1945 and the State Treaty in 1955. This could then be contrasted with the
catastrophes of the war (cf. Wodak and de Cillia 2007; de Cillia and Wodak 2007).
Even in Mauthausen, during the commemoration of the liberation of throncentration camp, Chancellor Vranitzky in 1995 included both macro-themes, embedded in a strategy of generalisation (in contrast to the 1988 speeches):
Our self-awareness, our independence and identity are irrefutably and unquestionably large enough today to allow us to deal with the truth soberly and
re Sur.44v0v9
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16-
Page 213
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200f-213
factually. We know what negative things were possible in Austria but we also
know what positive achievements Austria is capable of.
(Vranitzky 7.5.1995)
Thus Austria is generally metonymised or personified in relation to positive
recollections or facts. However, Austria is never in the subject position in relation to
negative actions or events.
President Klestil also combines positive and negative recollections on the fiftieth
anniversary of the foundation of the GÖD' (23 May 1995). This may be seen to
establish a dose relationship between catastrophe and re-birth in retrospect ('the zero
hour as a historic opportunity'):
Older Austrians who experienced that time know exactly that the battle for
Vienna [the 1945 Vienna Offensive] and the arrival of the foreign troops were tied
up with death, need, terror and sorrow. Only today do we grasp the full scope of
this `zero hour' – because it meant liberation from a barbaric political system; but
also enabled a historic opportunity: namely the re-birth of Austria according to
democratic, constitutional, social and economic principles.
(Klesti123.5.1995)
The religious as well as personifying metaphor of Austria's rebirth' is repeatedly
used in 2005, in speeches by imeng–etheri Chancellor Schüssel and President
Fischer. lt is also used, in modified form, by Green party spokesperson Alexander Van
der Bellen (Wodak et al. 2008, pp. 182f.). The metaphor was even made literal on
the occasion of a celebration in the Hofburg on 27 April 2005, to which people
whose sixtieth birthday fell on that day were invited. The anthropomorphisation of
Austria, which is popular in all speeches that draw on the imagined community of a
nation, became an extended metaphor, i.e. an allegory. As a part of this allegory,
Schüssel styled Austria as a small, innocent child in its cradle. In addition, the
religious connotations of reincarnation contributed to the discursive strategy of
perpetuation, since the concept of `rebirth' implies a certain continuity that bridges
historical breaks:
The drama of this six-year war and the trauma of the National Socialist terror
regime, however, throw sombre shadows onto the cradle of this red-white-red
rebirth, but the child lives. In midst of ruins, need, hunger and desperation lives
this small, new Austria, because on this day everyone looks ahead. The nightmare
is over.
(Schüssel 27.4.2005)
President Fischer and Chancellor Schüssel chose the same birth metaphor, a `birth
certificate' for the Second Republic, to represent two different historical occasions.
Fischer was referring to the Declaration of Independence in 1945, while Schüssel
meant the State Treaty in 1955 (Wodak et al. 2008, p. 183). This shows the recyclability of rhetorical tropes from different historical and political perspectives.
There were also differences between these two politicians in relation to the use of
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 214
214 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
the terms giberation' and `freedom'. While Fischer repeatedly refers to liberation' in
1945 and describes die following ten years as a state of `restricted sovereignty',
Schüssel refers to the `process of liberation' set down in the Moscowireeti which was
'finally at its goal' after twelve years with the ratification of the State Treaty (Wodak
et al. 2008, p. 183).
President Klestil repeatedly draws on the topos of history as a teacher in 1995: one
has to learn from history — and Austrians seem to have understood this. In addition
to the examples quoted in Chapter 4 on pp. 85-6, we add one more striking instance
of this argumentation scheme here:
H De4
Hardly any other country in Europe has had more lessons in this century than
Austria. Hardly any other country's seif-awareness was so deeply shaken before it
came out of this process involving many victims so convincingly to find freedom
and independence, democracy and wealth. This deeply fissured history lies before
us when today, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Second Republic, we take stock
and ask ourselves honestly how we deal with the legacy of that time.
(Klestil 27.4.1995)
As for our empirical data from 2005, we want to focus on just one of the
occurrences of the topos of history as a teacher. lt is remarkable for three reasons: it
is the first one that was uttered in the 2005 political speeches we analysed; it is
formulated quite indirectly; and it primarily focuses on the historical lesson that
Austrians should learn from the Austrian 'success 4 rebuilding' after 1945 rather • H
than the historical errors committed before 1945. This argumentation scheme
was used in the speech by the President of the Federal Council Georg Pehm, on
14 January 2005: 'The difference between then and now also lets us recognise how
the path we should keep to in future should look' (Pehm 14.1.2005). Here, Pehm
combines a contrastive temporal topos of comparison (then' versus `now') that serves
positive Austrian seif-presentation, with the directional metaphor of way or travel
that bridges past, present and future of rustrian `we group' that is not specified by
IN—Qh
the speaker.
All in all, the 'success story' that dominates Pehm's speech becomes more and
more prevalent in commemorative speeches held in 2005. Despite stressing the
contrast between then and now, they often simultaneously level the contrast and
distinctions between victims and perpetrators with respect to the NS past, and.
between the political antagonists. However, not all speakers engage in this simplifying dichotomy with respect to past versus present, nor in the assimilation of
perpetrators and victims. Both in 1995 and 2005, some speakers, like Vranitzky or
like the Austrian Greens' Minorities Spokesperson Terezija Stoisits in 1995, like
Fischer or Van der Bellen in 2005, manage to draw a nuanced picture.
of
8.1.5 Polarisations
lt seems that clear and unambiguous words are particularly likely when there are
polarised views. This suggests that government representatives require internal
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 215
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200J 215
Feindbilder (`bogeyman images') from whom they can and must distance themselves.
This was the case in 1988 (Waldheim) and in 1995 (Haider). Unexpectedly,
in 2005.
Initially, there were other considerations in 2005: the BZÖ was in government.
The very party that tended to trivialise commemorations of National Socialism and
of the Second World War, and even refused to take part, thus had to represent the
State whether they liked it or not. This dilemma may explain why there was so much
vagueness in the 2005 speeches, and why perpetrators sometimes disappeared
entirely. As we show in our case study of the `Kampl and Gudenus affair' (Engel and
Wodak 2008), the carefully constructed, superficial consensus was not sustainable.
There were untenable provocations that led to clear dissociations on the part of the
official speakers.
In 1995 the political objectives of the then Haider-led FPÖ were clear: discursive
strategies of exclusion, of trivialisation and of denial, interspersed with sarcasm.
These strategies were used to attack the government parties, in particular the leff.
Antisemitic sentiments were made explicit which had repercussions for the issue of
`restitution' in the 2001 regional election campaign in the city of Vienna (Pelinka
and Wodak 2002, Wodak and Reisigl 2002). Such an explicit policy of exclusion
and of distancing (from certain hegemonic narratives and positions) is of course not
possible for a party in government. Only individual party representatives seemed to
`hit the wrong note', although careful analysis of the `Kampl and Gudenus affair'
(Engel and Wodak 2008) shows the clear continuity with the `Haiderisms' and other
infamous statements from the previous era. In contrast, as a party in government, the
BZÖ had to distance itself from any opinions that were destructive towards the
Republic, which was not the case in 1995. The rhetorical principle of calculated
ambivalence was helpful in this respect: by signalling both approval and disapproval,
the audience is able to understand whichever meaning they prefer.
(
r-R
1-1- bortirtaei times'
were
coe4tructec1
8.2 THE SEMI-PUBLIC SPHERE: VOICES AND OPINIONS
In the two focus groups held in 2006, roughly half a year after the end of the so-called
Gedankenjahr% the year's commemorative events seem to have had surprisingly little
impact on the school pupils and senior citizens interviewedl N one of the participants
brought up the events without being prompted. The discussion in the group of
pupils even raises the possibility that the effect of the commemorations, if any, may
have been obfuscatory. In the otherwise very critically aware group there was little
sympathy for the restitution of property stolen by the Nazi regimef
The question was raised of why (stolen) pictures likrKlimt's Adele should be
returned when the owners did not `need' them in the past sixty years. This is shown
in the following excerpt, in which the mitigating rhetorical figure of apparent concession 'Yes, but ...' was used:
-
Yes well in a certain way it is of course true that they / that it principally is always
property and that it actually / well of course have a ri ght to it, to get it back, but
. tar
rdde
i‘a, zerg),
r,;(01e CtIA'a2ccej,
PP- 44-gf.)
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 216
216 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
well first, like M4 said, they really haven't needed it in the last sixty year, why do
the need it now all of a sudden, when it is in a museum anyway, and another point
is, I mean, in Switzerland, I don't know how many Jews had their bank accounts
there, and they all belong to some Swiss people, and those aren't some small
amounts of money, those are very big amounts of money, and those were also not
given back of course.
(SchM6, 1824)
r5)
As is clear from this excerpt, parallels were drawn by a fallacious topos of
comparison with money in Swiss bank accounts belonging to victims of the NS
regime which was never returned. Further fallacious comparisons were made with
the displacement of the Sudeten Germans after 1945, and finally with the return of
Palestine to Palestinians by Israel.
In the group of pensioners, on the other hand, the discussion took a completely
different turn. Two of the participants were themselves victims of the NS regime,
and this distinguishes this focus group discussion from all the ones held in 1995. For
instance, one participant reported that he had received a restitution payment from
the so-called 'National Fund' without having requested it. lt pained him that a
ÖVP/FPÖ government managed to institute this while previous social democratic
governments had decades to do so, but did not succeed.5 He related this to a badly
needed image makeover for a government beset by international criticism. His view
was that the duty of restitution remains as long as justified claims existed, that the
issue would in any case resolve itself in time, and that the government had by and
large met its commitments. Another participant commented that payments should
be made as soon as someone (a victim) is identified without going through a lengthy
process. Yet another participant added that payments should be made as long as there
are inheritance laws, and evidently meant by this that the inheritors of those who
profited from the crimes of National Socialism should also be made to pay.
Three further differences to the 1995 focus groups are noteworthy. We assume
that these are connected not to the specific compositions of the groups, which of
course limit comparability, but rather with social and political changes in the intervening ten years.
In 200rhere were particularly explicit references to the political and social
achievements of Austria, particularly in the group of senior citizens, but at the same
time the participants felt threatened by current political developments. Thus, in the
recent focus groups there was stronger criticism of the government and the current
political situation compared to the 1995 focus groups. Participants even reported
experiences abroad in which they felt embarrassed to be Austrian. Thus, one pupil
stated:
Sometimes Austria is a little embarrassing for me when I go to other countries,
because in part also what you hear, all the things that you get now what is in
Austria, but what well gets through also through the international media, is
partially really embarrassing. And what it says about us in the travel guides,
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16 ji Page 217
ri
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200 217
what we are known for is also not our good educational system, but Arnold
Schwarzenegger and Adolf Haider.
1361)6
rä
7(SchFb) 3&1 )
A fellow upil had similar views: 'When I go somewhere and just say es, I come
from Austr , it is slowly getting embarrassing. Because our government i becoming
more and more ridiculous and Austria is getting more and more racist, I don't know'
7580). These kinds of experiences abroad were only connoted positively in 1995.
A further difference to 1995 is probably related to die participants' critical stance
towards the composition of the government in 2006: it is their relatively strong
regional i entification with Vienna. We were not able to hold focus groups outside
Vienna in 2006, but despite this the participants brought up this topic themselves
far more frequently than in 1995. In the earlier focus group discussions it was
precisely the groups held in Vienna — in contrast to those held elsewhere — that barely
mentioned regional identity. The politically rather left-wing and green participants
were opposed to the government of the day, led by Chancellor Schüssel. Vienna,
however, was seen as an alternative to the situation in Austria as a whole. One senior
citizen thus stated that she `... likes being an Austrian / especially being a Viennese'f FL, (s eil F42 443),
A pupil reported: `I am neither really an Austrian nor born here, and I don't really
feel identified with Austria, but rather with Vienna. Because the rest of Austria, I
cif\
mean, I can't do much with that, ...lit; 1995, as indicated above, the tendency for
regional identification with Vienna was not manifested strongly.
A further noticeable difference relatertO the discrimination against and exclusion
of immigrants living in Austriarin 1995 we discovered a clear east—west and north((Ae cati
oce,
south divide, whereby differences to eastern and southern European neighbours were
pra /1).2-46s),"
seen as relatively large. In 2006, however, the construction of difference applied
almost exclusively and negatively to Muslim and Turkish immigrants. We assume
that this is an effect of the foreign but also domestic policy developments in the
intervening perioira.nd a reflection of public political discourses and (global) media
(de C176: a,t4
discourses (following 11 September 2001). Religion, in this case specifically Islam,
W0012 k. 20U)
played a central role in discrimination, as did the role of women in Islam. The pupils
mostly diagnosed this an a meta-level as a phenomenon in Austria, and almost all of
them clearly distanced themselves from it. Most of the senior citizen participants,
however, felt threatened (`we won't exist soon') as shown in the following utterance
by a participant who was complaining about changes in her district in the past
twenty years:
ru-
Now Xxx Street is gaming dens everywhere, ah, these coffee houses / full of / only
with Turkish men, who only play cards all day, in the evening maybe go home and
bang the wives, and then you see them with two, three children in the pram and
with the / no?
(SenF7, 817)
A further outcome of the analysis of the two focus group discussions is the confirmation that the theoretical assumptions of the 1998 study, the operationalisation,
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 218
218 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
especk(t9
descriptive categories and analytical instruments, have all been shown to work with
the new corpus/i3y providing countless examples, the analysis of focus group discussions confirms the results of the earlier study in terms of the construction of
national identity, ltaut.—A.1W,, - in terms of argumentative strategies and linguistic
manifestations. lt as also proved flexible because it could be applied to a different
point in time. This is expressed not only in terms of the particularly noticeable
differences between the eras (as discussed above), but also, for example, in the fact
that certain key issues problematised by the 1995 participants are no longer
problematic — for example Austria's neutrality, or the 'Kreisky era'. The latter has
evidently become, at least for those Austrians whose views might be represented by
our focus group participants, a 'golden age' in Austrian history. One senior citizen
spoke of the Kreisky era as the time when cour small country back then, then we were
somehow / given attentive ears in Europe and in the world' (SenF11, 599). Another
participant (SenF9) told of how she experienced an equation of Austria with Kreisky,
the politician standing parspro toto for the whole country:
" (Je C;(,(( Zag
pt /169)
So I was living in Kuwait and we wanted to teach the Kuwaitis what we are, what
nationality we are. We tried everything, with (xxxx), with (everything). And then
I put on a Dirndl [traditional Austrian dress], and he said, Bruno Kreisky.
1509)
+
(
SehF3
The following discussion from the pupils' group also treated Kreisky as an
important part of Austrian identity: it also very convincingly supports our conceptualisations and assumptions about an imagined community (discursive construction of a common history, a common culture and a national body in the
broadest sense, etc.):
Yes, Austrian identity means for me, well anyway my indenti / identity is / are the
characteristics that Austria has, or that I have, that distinguish me from the other
countries in the whole world of Europe. That means I have my history with my
F / Sigmund Freud, with my Mozart, and, well with: my Bruno Kreisky, — I have
my German, my Austrian, so those are just basic characteristics that I have as an
Austrian and that let me say I am an Austrian, because you don't have that, I am
different.
(SchM3, 092)
The participants showed a similar understanding of nation in the iiii,J focus
groups as in 1995. First, there is the state-based concept of citizenship which one
4/
Yecellt-
acquires by chance, by being born. Particularly the younger participants emphasised
the element of chance in determining nationali.s(And the only thing that ties me
to Austria is my Austrian passport, and that's allGilF4 . However, cultural factorsf )) Scb FLt-) 4-co)
which presuppose typical Austrian behaviour and typical Austrian mindsets, are
also to be found in the latest corpus, as shown in the following example: `... and
then I still found that we Austrians, ah:, we are as quick as the Italians, as smart as
the Swiss 1 ah accurate like the Germans used to be, a:nd 1 well, more always make
the most of the positive' (SenMF Another example draws on the stereotypically
369-
t--- 2
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 219
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200 219
comfortable Austrian lifestyle (the Thaeacian stereotype', see Chapter 3, pp. 54-5):
... and above all, I enjoy the:: quite relaxed Austrian life, that they don't have even
in many European countries' (SenFii. These presuppositions are also confirmed by
the interpretation of Austrian German as a central element of cultural commonality.
Finally, in distinguishing their own from other national groups, participants sometimes drew an the concept of common ancestry.
Furthermore, both focus group discussions have in common, perhaps even more
strongly than the groups in 1995, that the participants demonstrated strong
emotional ties to Austria without, as illustrated above, expressing uncritical flagwaving patriotism. The feelings expressed thus range from pride via luck, happiness
and gratitude for the opportunity to live in Austria, to love the country, despite
terrible and traumatic experiences in their various personal histories. This is exemplified in two further extracts:
Yes, that means, ahm, that I ((coughs)) was born in Austria, that's why I have
citizenship, ahm, that I already / ahm, that I am happy to live in Austria, where we
have the three basic freedoms, where we have democracy, ahm, yes, that I am
grateful to live in / in Austria.
(SchM1, 072h1)
There are so many good points here, ah, and especially Vienna. What it offers.
Schönbrunn, Prater, ah, the / yes the parks, everything. I am in love with my
Austria.
(SenF7, 334
8.3 WHAT REMAINS OF THE PUBLIC AND SEMI-PUBLIC
DISCOURSES IN 2005?
In his book Strategies of Remembrance, M. Lane Bruner (2002) establishes that
rhetorical and discourse-analytical investigations of national identity constructions
and politics of the Aast are more important than mere academic enquiry:
The contextual analysis of controversial speech related to national identity, and
the isolation of strategies of remembrance that it enables, is a productive move in
the eventual production of more humane systems of human governance, and the
development of more humane guidelines for the public negotiation of national
identity.
(Bruner 2002, p. 101)
In our analysis of texts from the so-called 'Gedankenjahr' 2005, and in the comparison with results from our similar studies of the commemorative years 1988 and
1995, we have uncovered many facets of modern hegemonic ways of commemorating. The risks are also evident (as described by Pelinka). The commemorations may
start to be viewed as empty rituals. They allow the (positive) self-presentation of the
governing parties at the time, or are politically instrumentalised in manifold ways.
of course there are also other functions and patterns.
44 448).
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 220
220 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
+
We noticed in our comparison between 1995 and 2005 that there were different
levels of `staging' and posturing. Of course all commemorative years are planned in
advance and are thus %tage& and `acted' (see also the concept of `performance' in
Goffman 1959). As early as 1964 the American political scientist Murray Edelman
(1964) convincingly described politics as consisting in large part of ritual and of
spectacles, at least in public (Wodak 2008).
Nevertheless there are significant differences between the extent of staging in
1995 and in 2005. The whole of 2005 was declared as a Gedankenjahr' in advance.
This had an impact almost daily, from TV ads to billboards. The extent to which the
success story was celebrated by iconic and symbolic pictures and other multimodal
semiotic materialisations, in exhibitions, celebrations, speeches, films, events,
spectacular installations," etc., was unexpected and huge, even considering that
reference to 1945 and 1955 is more likely to suggest this kind of concept than would
commemoration of 1938. Of course the magic of round numbers must be taken into
account: the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the State Treaty is more prominent
than the fortieth.
We do not at all intend to call into question the need for commemorative events
or commemoration itself. Rather, we are interested in the questions of how and with
what topics, in which contexts, we can and should remember, without collapsing
distinctions and with necessary subtlety. We have thus established that in 2005 there
were only few distinctions: the balcony scene was turned into a permanent icon; the
innocent child, Austria, was born; the perpetrators disappeared; and many of the
traumas were consigned to the realm of nature or catastrophe metaphors. The
OVP—BZO government was under a certain amount of pressure to succeed and
deliver, since the so-called crileasures against the Austrian government' from 2000
were still very much in people's minds (see section 8.4.). We would like to stress
at this point that there were certain discursive counter-actions, for example
Austria minus 2005', which encouraged alternative and differentiated ways of
commemorating,
The opposition was successfully appropriated and taken in; apart from the
unexpected provocation of the Kampl and Gudenus affair the whole year was staged
smoothly. As our analysis of the focus groups leads us to believe/fear, very little
remains.
8.4 NATIONAL POPULISM IN AUSTRIA
8.4.1 Introduction: die Rise of National Populism in Austria
i-44ec
The focus of section 8.4 is twofold: in general, Ji e. relationship of nationalism and
populism; and in particular, ferected political developments of the last two decades
that have led to an increase in national populist politics, policy and polity in Austria.
In the course of the last two decades, the political phenomenon of national
populism has become noticeable on various political occasions in Austria. lt started
to play an important role in the political arena in the 1986 Austrian presidential
GYX campaign of former UN
and Austrian People's Party ((WP)
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16 ji Page 221
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-2007 221
candidate Kurt Waldheim, who, for a long time, had kept secret his NationalSocialist past (Wodak et al. 1990). In the years of the so-called Waldheim affair',
which continued for several years after Waldheim's election as Austrian president,
every critique or snub of Waldheim was construed as an attack an all Austrians, since
Waldheim was taken Aars pro toto for Austrian society. Thus, the fallacy of hasty
generalisation was committed
A second national populist manoeuvre was carried out by the Austrian Freedom
Party (FPÖ) in 1991 and 1992, when the FPÖ initiated a `xenophobic' campaign for
a petition for a referendum entitled 'Österreich zuerst' (Austria First'; see Reisigl and
Wodak 2001, pp. 144-204). This national populist move was remarkable, inasmuch
as the FPÖ in 1991 and 1992 had not yet officially departed from its policy of greater
German nationalism; this turn was not implemented as the party line until summer
1995.
In addition to this, national populism was and is to be observed repeatedly
when Austrian populists played the national card against Europe and the European
Union, taking advantage of the fact that the attitude of many European citizens
toward the European Union is marked by complete confusion and distrust. Since at
least the mid-1980s, the European Community or Union and 'Brussels' have served
as strategically useful Feindbilder (`bogeyman images') and scapegoats for right-wing
populist parties in different West European countries (see Altermatt 1996, p. 194).
Especially after the parliamentary election in October 1999, national populism
directed against the European Union reached a climax. When the FPÖ gained the
second-highest number of votes and formed a coalition government together with
the ()VP, the other fourteen EU member states fervidly protested against the FPÖ%
participation in the government and, as a consequence, politicians of the two
governmental parties started defensive populist appeals to national unity. We will
deal with this specific national populist zenith in the following sections, after a brief
general explanation of our understanding of (national) populism and its relationship
to Europe.
19#0.04€.
8.4.2 Populism, 'National Populism' and Europe
Populism can be seen as a political mode that relates to various ideologies, not just to
one (Taguieff 2003, p. 80). It is a political style in the sense of a complex `syndrome'
(not in a pathological sense) and a functional or strategic type of political expression,
which syncretistically mixes heterogeneous and theoretically incoherent elements
that need not all emerge simultaneously (see Wiles 1969, Altermatt 1996, p. 193).
In addition to this formal, stylistic and technical definition, `populism' can, at
least partly, be differentiated with respect to content. Accordingly, `right-wing
populism' has to be distinguished from left-wing populism' with respect to the
attitude of populist politicians towards National Socialism, fascism, racism,
antisemitism and `xenophobia' and their understanding of social policy, migration
policy and security policy, although both types of populism share many features of
style, form and media.
+-(
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 222
222 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
1-4 49'
As regards content, we can furthermore identify a specific form of populism
that relates populist political strategies to a more or less extreme nationalist attitude.
This nationalist attitude, which in Austria is strongly connected with right-wing
populism, is expressed and played upon by appealing to the 'people as a nation'
in the sense of a homogeneous, essentialised point of reference for political
legitimisation and justification.8It is this specific form of culturalist populism, which
has been termed 'national populism' (see, among others, Taguieff 1984), that earns
most of the attention in the context of the present study.
With regard to the political rote of populist politicians, we can distinguish
between oppositional populism, which is the classical position of populism, and
governmental populism. Generally, populist rhetoric is a matter of external political
communication. The rhetoric of oppositional populism manifests itself in (1) the
field of political advertising, (2) the field of political control, and (3) the field of
formation of public attitudes, opinions and will. The action field of political control
is the classical place of oppositional populism, which develops as a form of protest
against governmental policy. In contrast, the rhetoric of governmental populism is
first and foremost articulated in the field of formation of public attitudes, opinions
and will. In part, itkalso emerges in the field of inter-party formation of attitudes,
opinions and will. Further, governmental populism gains a certain importance in the
field of political executive and administration, for example in the case of 'issueless
politics', in which political action is simulated by symbolic rituals (see Reisigl 2007b,
pp. 1128f.).
The nationalist form of populism employs various strategies with which
discourse analysts will already be familiar. Among them are the strategies of
demanding or presupposing national sameness, unity and cohesion. These strategies
are based on the topos or fallacy of sameness and on the topos of threat or fallacy
of argumentum ad baculum. The topos or fallacy of sameness imagines the `own'
nation as a culturally homogeneous community. The topos of threat or fallacy of
argumentum ad baculum refers to (alleged) dangers that threaten this alleged national
homogeneity. On the other hand, national populism relies on the strategy of presupposing or stressing difference. This strategy resorts to the topos or fallacy of
difference, which emphasises the dissimilarity and deviance of other nations or
nationals as well as ethnic minorities, in order to draw a rigid dividing line. Thus,
excluded are persons considered to be members of these supposedly deviant nations
or minorities. In addition, national populism makes use of a specific strategy of
singularisation, which integrates the explicit or implicit topos or fallacy of
comparison: the superiority of the own nation to all other nations and ethnic
minorities is thus overemphasised.9
Right-wing populist movements tend to have a very obscure and ambivalent
approach to 'Europe'. When it fits their political concept, even nationalist populist
politicians such as Jörg Haider, who usually indulge in anti-EU views (i.e. the
Feindbild of 'Europe') have to strategically invoke 'Europe' and a 'European identity'.
This was the case for example when hj tried to exclude groups of people not
considered 'European'.
mc hei&d. --1)--
H
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 223
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-20r223
To mention just a single example of topical interest, the terrorist attack in the USA
on 11 September 2001 had — and still has — worldwide consequences, i.e. it had —
and has — an impact on Europe and on Austria as well. Right-wing populist parties
such as the FPÖ and BZÖ try to make anti-Islamic political capital out of the
devastating attack of 11 September and to use it as a persuasive vehicle to create or
strengthen a possible European identity. About two and a half weeks after the terror
attack in the USA, Jörg Haider made the request — which undoubtedly violated
human rights laws and the Geneva Refugee Convention — that the EU should accept
only asylum seekers from Europe and that asylum seekers from other continents
should have to wait for a decision in a safe third country outside Europe, e.g. in Asia.
Haider stated cynically that it would be useful to make agreements with third
countries where asylum seekers could be `dumped' (the German 'deponiert' used by
Haider contains the metaphor of `waste disposal site') (see Der Standard 2001, p. 7).
Haider's demand was based on the prejudiced Islamophobic' assumption that it was
mainly extremist and fundamentalist terrorists emigrating from unspecified nonEuropean countries to Europe, to live here as `sleepers', who planned and carried out
suicide attacks. This example illustrates the tension between national and supranational identities. It shows that European right-wing populists usually advocating
a rigid patriotic nationalism no longer limit themselves to drawing on national
identities (e.g. Austrian identity) but resort to a European identity whenever they
consider it politically opportune.
8.4.3 The Austrian and European Political Crisis in 2000
The conflicts between the discursive construction of a national and a supranational
political identity are manifold. They affect several fields of political action and areas
of discourse. In the following, we will discuss — as an example of these conflicts — the
specific case of the so-called `sanctions' imposed between February 2000 and
September 2000 by the (then fourteen) other Member States of the EU against the
Austrian coalition government formed by the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).
These political measures were the first intervention in Internal policy and politics'
of this kind in the history of the European Community and Union. The conflict
about `common European values' was discussed extensively in the media of all EU
Member iStates, and especially by the Austrian public. In Austria, a nationalist,
chauvinist discourse evolved, drawing on a patriotic Tatherland rhetoric' claiming
that the 'EU' was `attacking Austria and demanding a 'national closing of Tanks' (see,
among others, Wodak and Pelinka 2002; Kopeinig and Kotanko 2000; Böhm and
Lahodynsky 2001; Bärenreuter 2002; de Cillia 2003; Gruber 2003). The conflict
was solved by devising an exit strategy, i.e. the Report of the `Three Wise Men',
published on 8 September 2000 (for more details see section 8.5.1).
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 225
The 'Story' Continues: 1 995-200f 225
89. The FPÖ has reportedly not taken any action against its members who have
used xenophobic statements in public; it has neither condemned nor suppressed
those statements, nor clearly apologized for them. When confronted with these
statements the authors will deny that any National Socialist intention or even
character really existed.
One of the main conclusions of the report was that it cannot be excluded that the
FPÖ might develop from a 'right-wing party with extremist expressions' (paragraph
106) and 'with radical elements' (paragraph 110) to a cresponsible governmental
party' (paragraph 106). However, such an evolution was not clear from the comparatively short record available between the FPÖ's coming into power and the
report date (paragraph 106). As the political developments since then have clearly
demonstrated, the FPÖ was not able to convincingly become a responsible governmental party (see section 8.4.4, below).
In Austria, the reactions to the report by the prominent panel of two 'elder
statesmen' and a renowned political scientist were complex and multifaceted. The
government proclaimed that the EU had found Austria to be a democratic state and
to act in compliance with common European values. The paragraphs quoted above
were hardly mentioned at all. When some govemment officials reacted to the judgement passed on the FPÖ, they tried to change it. For example, they changed the
negative connotation of the attribute 'ruhcar — with the stigmatising meaning of
`extremist', Instigating', crabble-rousing'— into a positive one.")
On the surface, the conflict appeared to have been `managed' and settled by the
report of the `Three Wise Men'; the bilateral measures were no longer much in the
headlines, which they had dominated for months. Finally, it became possible to
tadele other problems in Austria.
8.4.3.2 The Chauvinist Call for a National Closing of Ranks' («Nationaler
Schulterschluff) as a Counter-productive Reaction against the Bilateral
Measures by the EU-14
For the most part, the effects of the bilateral measures were not those aspired to by
the fourteen EU Member States. This was also confirmed by the `Three Wise Men'
in the last paragraphs of their report. There the authors maintained that if the
measures taken by the fourteen Member States were continued, they would become
counter-productive, since they had 'already' (in the period from March to September
2000) stirred up nationalist feelings in the country, as they had in some cases been
wrongly understood as sanctions directed against Austrian citizens, and not just as
bilateral measures against the Austrian government or, strictly speaking, against the
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) forming part of the Austrian coalition government
(paragraph 116) .
On the one hand, the bilateral measures had several beneficial consequences. First,
they heightened awareness of a 'European identity' and common European values,
not only in Austria, but also in the other EU Member States. Second, they mobilised
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 226
226 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
civil society both in Austria and in the other EU Member States to defend these
values. Third, the inhibition level was raised, potentially making it more difficult for
(governing) FPÖ politicians, at least temporarily, to violate principles of democracy
and human rights. Fourth, Jörg Haider resigned soon after the formation of the
coalition government as FPÖ party leader, thus temporarily attenuating the
authoritarian structure of the party and ceding more room for political action to
governing FPÖ politicians." Fifth, the political measures functioned as a catalyst that
accelerated the negotiations on reparations to be paid to forced labourers and other
victims of the Nazis, since international critique and observation put pressure on the
new government to act. Therefore, the government endeavoured to complete the
difficult negotiations, which were started by the former government, at the beginning of 200 1. Finally, the measures also seem to have expedited the Durchführungsverordnung (`executive order') signed by the Social Democrat Chancellor Victor
Klima just before he handed over the office to his successor Wolfgang Schüssel:
within two months, from 13 July 2000 onwards, bilingual (i.e. Austrian-Croatian)
place-name signs were posted in forty-seven townships and districts according to the
provisions set down in Article 7 of the Austrian State Treaty in 1955 (see Gieler 2004,
pp. 77f.). Furthermore, Article 8 of the Federal Constitution was amended by the
insertion of paragraph 2 concerning the aim of protecting minorities in Austria. All
this came to pass a mere forty-five years after the State Treaty was freie!"
On the other hand, the measures had several adverse effects. First, the alleged
`sanctions' gave rise to extreme nationalistic attitudes based on the defensive principle
of `right or wrong, my country'. Second, and this was closely related to the first
consequence, the `sanctions' aimed at weakening the new coalition government
ended up strengthening it since they had allowed the ÖVP—FPÖ government to
construct a new 'external enemy (i.e. the fourteen EU Member States) and a new
`internal enemy' (the opposition party SPÖ, which was accused of having requested
the `sanctions' from the other EU Member States). As a result, the two governing
parties managed to rally more support from the Austrian population than they would
probably have gained if there had not been such an extensive public discourse on
`sanctions'. Third, the bilateral measures and the vehement public discourse on them
very soon became an evasive red herring that allowed the new government to draw
the attention of many Austrians away from the drastic and unpopular measures
hurriedly taken or envisaged. Fourth, the new government tactically and successfully
took advantage of the `sanctions' to weaken the oppositional Austrian Social
Democrats (SPÖ): this party was accused of having been the actual originator of
the `sanctions', of having asked for the measures from cabroad' and, thus, of being
iraitors to their own fatherland' (regarding these negative effects of the `sanctions' see
also Böhm and Lahodynsky 2001, p. 23).
Very soon after the then EU-14 had announced the bilateral measures to be taken
against Austria, the new government dug up `one of the most hackneyed propaganda
phrases of WWI' (Welzig 2000), i.e. the call for a 'national closing of ranks'
C nationalen Schulterschluß% and used it as a weapon not only against the so-called
`sanctions' of the EU-14 but against any criticism about the newly formed ÖVP-
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 227
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-201-727
FPÖ government expressed by parliamentary and non-parliamentary Opposition
groups in Austria. Between March and September 2000 the government employed
this very emotive militaristic metaphor repeatedly to muster support for a national
consensus against the 'EU sanctions' and to make its own power position invulnerable to criticism by the opposition. The both nationalistic and populist slogan
fulfilled several functions in domestic, foreign and party politics.
Before addressing these political functions in the context of their macro-argumentative modes of realisation, some critical historical comments ought to be made
regarding the history of the metaphor 'national closing of ranks' in order to provide
a discourse-historical frame of reference. We want to illustrate the public discussion
in the media on the chauvinist appeal of the Austrian government with an interesting
discourse fragment, a pointed letter from a reader to the Austrian quality daily Der
Standard, written by Elisabeth Rosenmayr and published in the issue of 5 April 2000.
Out of place
Reference: Use of the phrtzse 'national closing of ranks'
Even members of the government have recurrently made more or less authentic
demands to critically reflect on political language. However, this willingness to
reflect on language use in politics should include the phrase 'to dose ranks': this
military notion describes a line of soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder to form
a bulwark of men that the enemy cannot break through. This strategy sealed the
doom of the imperial and royal army in WWI since the enemy could easily mow
down the inflexible front.
In my opinion a 'closing of ranles' is out of place to describe intelligent, democratic reactions to political criticism.
1010 Vienna
Elisabeth Rosenmayr
(Der Standard 2000)
d—rfact
Apart from the rob14 that Rosenmayr's argument did not question the presupposition of a militarist framework for political action, we accede to the author's
conclusion: the call for a 'closing of ranks' against criticism by the opposition and.
political control is out of place in a modern democracy based on rational and differentiated formation of political opinion, will and decision-making. Werner Welzig,
the President of the Austrian Academy of Sciences arrived at a similar conclusion. In
a speech delivered during the Academy's annual ceremony on 17 May 2000, Welzig,
with reason, expressed his irritation with this nationalistic phrase, which had been
used as a Pan-Germanic mobilisation formula during the First World War and had
mainly alluded to the relations between Germany and Austria. According to Welzig,
the worn-out, historically discredited propaganda slogan could not make any
beneficial contribution to shaping the political life in Austria in 2000. As Welzig put
it, this chauvinist phrase should really be (unthinkable' in a `democratic country in
the 21st century' (Welzig 2000). This is particularl the case, we would like to add,
•
because the call for
' a 'national shoulder-to-shoulder
stance' or 'national c osing of ranksrs not only reminiscent of the militarism of the
First World War, but also of National Socialist diction.
r-(15
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 228
228 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
The different functions of the nationalistic and populist request 'to close ranks'
with respect to domestic, foreign and party politics become all the more clear when
analysing the argumentative macro-structure and the most common, more or less
fallacious patterns of argumentation used by the FPÖ—ÖVP government in public
discussion in connection with the demand. Since it is impossible to extensively cover
the great number of different argumentation patterns that were used in the heated
debates in Austria between March and September 2000 in the present context, we
would like to focus on the most salient ones (see also Reisigl and Wodak 2002). The
main argumentative manoeuvres of the two governing parties can be reduced to the
following argumentation patterns.
In argumentation theory the first argumentative scheme is called `hasty generalisation' or `secundum quid' or `argumentum ad numerum' . This term describes a
manoeuvre that uses fallacious arguments that are based on the generalisation of a
non-representative sample, thus presupposing false premises. This scheme violates
the rules of induction and logic. This type of argumentation relies on the nationalistic and/or chauvinistic allegation that the so-called `sanctions' of the EU-14 were
directed not only against the Austrian government, or more specifically a coalition
government including the FPÖ, but against all Austrian citizens, under the motto,
`What you do to the Austrian government and/or FPÖ and/or ÖVP, you do to
all Austrians'. Compositio is the rhetorical standard term for this fallacious form
of generalisation, taking one part (i.e. the government), for the whole (i.e. all
Austrians). As already mentioned, in Austria this national populist figure of
argumentation had recurrently been used in the so-called 'Waldheim affair' (see pp.
60, 163-1) .This fallacy can be understood as a functional part both of the strategy
of presupposing national sameness and of a discursive strategy that emphasises
national cohesion or unification. In this sense a generalisation which encompasses all
nationals, the `nationalist contagion', only works under the presupposition that —
within the imagined national community — all are considered to be alike, and all are
considered to be addressed similarly and simultaneously when a single member of the
alleged community of the nation is attacked. Thus, everyone should stick together.
The second pattern of argumentation dominating the heated discussion about the
`national closing of ranks' was the `topos of the superior objective' (see Kindt 1992) or
the `topos of priority A over B' . This topos, which was employed for the strategic
purpose of national unification, was structured as follows: Whenever you have
to make a choice between pursuing two opposing aims (in this specific case, the
opposition's criticism of the government on the one hand, and national unity,
national solidarity and loyalty on the other), pursue the more important, the superior
aim' (in this specific case, this was the so-called 'national closing of ranks' from the
government's perspective). Quite understandably, the priorities established by the
nationalistic populist government were not accepted by the political opposition, for
ultimately this would have endangered democratic plurality and the principle of
democratic political control. However, various observers of political events and
processes at the time had the impression that a number of oppositional politicians
and also the Austrian Federal President Thomas Klestil — with their attempts to limit
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 229
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200r229
political damage vis-ä-vis other EU rember ates — implicitly joined the call for a
'national closing of ranks', at least to a certain extent.
These two main patterns of argumentation were combined with various other
topoi, of which we want to mention just four important ones.
The two main lines of argumentation were almost always associated with the
topos or fallacy of (external) threat. This pattern of argumentation was based on the
following conditional condusion rule: Ifspecific political actions or activities (in this
specific case, the bilateral measures of the other fourteen EU Member States) have
specific threateningielverefeffects or constitute an (external) threat (in this specific
case, discrimination against Austria and a threat to Austria's prestige, a procedure not
conforming to the EU Treaties), these actions or decisions should not be done or
taken (i.e. the `sanctions' should not be imposed or should be lifted) and the appropriate action should be taken in view of the given situation (i.e. a uniform 'frone
should be formed against those responsible for imposing the `sanctions').' The topos
of the external threat to Austria by the measures of die EU-14 strategically had the
unifying function of strengthening 'national solidarity'. However, often it served as a
red herring to draw people's attention away from other problems in the arena of
domestic policy and politics and/or to make problems appear less acute.'
Closely related with the topos or fallacy of an (external) threat was the topos or
fallacy of the victim. This argumentation scheme comprised a range of variants. TO
mention just two of them: (1) `If somebody (e.g. an Austrian, the Austrian government, the Austrian people) is a victim (e.g. of the so-called `sanctions'), she, he or it
earns compassion, solidarity (from the `good' patriots)'. Slightly modified, this topos
or fallacy had the form: Uwe (the Austrians) are victims, then we must unite against
the perpetrators'. (2) `If somebody (e.g. an Austrian, the Austrian government, the
Austrian people) is a victim (e.g. of the so-called `sanctions'), she, he or it cannot be
a perpetrator.' This topos often emerged in the mass-mediated debates about the
alleged `sanctions' in Austria (for a detailed analysis see de Cillia 2003 and Gruber
2003). In connection with the other argumentation schemes referred to here, it
unfolded a strong persuasive effect of intra-national solidarity.
Among these argumentation schemes was the topos or fallacy of illustrative
example. lt consisted of the exemplary, emotionalising portrayal of single negative
instances of alleged discrimination experienced by Austrians, e.g. of alleged verbal
attacks in other EU countries, of financial losses in the Austrian tourist industry (the
decrease of the number of overnight stays), of cancellations of school sports weeks in
Austria, and of cancellations of Austrian conference invitations, or of a boycott of
members of the Austrian government by other European Union politicians. This
argumentation scheme was extensively employed in conjunction with the topos of the
victim and the fallacy of hasty generalisation on 15 March 2000 in a one-off TV
programme entitled `Österreichgespräch' Cconversation on Austrial This transmission, which lasted for three and a half hours, served the political purpose of both
positive national seif-presentation and self-presentation as a victim. At the very
beginning of the broadcast, which was not a `conversation' but a well-calculated
mass-medial political spectacle, a group of Viennese pupils narrated their experiences
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16-
Page 231
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-20
231
convincing topos but only the fallacy of an argumentum ad populum. This meant that
the FPÖ very soon called for a referendum on the `sanctions' of the fourteen EU
Member States. In the end, there was no need to hold this referendum — supported
by the ÖVP — since the bilateral measures were lifted in September.
The different political functions of the aforementioned argumentation patters
may be summarised as follows.
From the perspective of party politics, the call for a 'national closing of ranks' can be
interpreted as a national populist attempt by the FPÖ to shift the Front lines of the
political conflict, i.e. the attempt to transfer the conflict to the supranational level, as
the previous internal political opponent, the government (no longer relevant due to
the FPO's new role as a coalition partner), was replaced with a new `external' enemy,
the EU-14.
From the perspective of foreign politics, the metaphorical sabre-rattling was meant
to signal national unity, unanimity and strength and to give the FPÖ—ÖVP
government a symbolic means to exert pressure on the fourteen other EU Member
States to lift quickly the so-called `sanctions'.
From the perspective of domestic politics as well as party politics, the 'national unification' would have had the function of gagging internal erkies of the government as
well as one or the other critic within the coalition parties' own ranks. Moreover, at
the level of domestic politics and party politics, the entirely inflated scenario of
a threat to Austria was a welcome distraction from the unpopular political and
economic measures taken at a frantic pace by the new government.
In view of all these political functions, the potential danger to democracy inherent
in the call for a 'national closing of ranks' — a both nationalistic and populist
manoeuvre of rhetorical mobilisation — was obvious. This danger was also evident to
the panel of `Three Wise Men'. Calls for a 'national closing of ranks' are part of an
authoritarian identity politics that imagines a homogeneous national community
and aims at enforcing `false consent' and political conformity, which inhibits the
pluralist articulation of conflicts of interests and differences of opinion, which in
turn are vital for a functioning democracy.
8.4.4 Developments of Austrian Right-wing (National) Populism after 2000
The example of the discourse about the so-called 'European sanctions' against the
formation of an Austrian coalition government with the participation of the Austrian
Freedom Party (FPÖ) illustrates some of the conflicts that exist between national and
supranational policies and politics, and shows the difficulties that can arise when
attempting to construct a 'European identity'. The specific means of conflict
management in this case had an impact on the search for common European values.
It was the first time that political `measures' were taken against a nation state and
member which seemed 'to have behaved badly', i.e. not according to values of
democracy, justice and equality. The action taken by the then fourteen other
Member States showed that the EU organisations were developing frorPürely
economic
to a political entity in search of common values for a
Md
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 233
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200 233
United States. In Austria, the attacks against the EU were most successful in 2000
during the period of the so-called `sanctions'.
From 2000 onwards, the governing Austrian right-wing populists repeatedly
transposed their seemingly radical-democratic populist standpoint to a supranational, European level. They called for various political referenda, for instance with
respect to the bilateral political measures already discussed, with respect to Turkey's
application to join the European Union, or with respect to the 'European Constitution'. Often, such claims vvere not legitimised by democratic procedures.'
Since the FPÖ had become a governing party, Jörg Haider — in his capacity as
the governor of the federal province of Carinthia — and several other right-wing
politicians in the FPÖ still managed to make the Austrian government the target of
populist criticism. The critique of their governing party colleagues undermined both
party cohesion and coalitionary discipline. In 2002, the continuous tension due to
party-internal conflicts led to the dissolution of the first coalition between the FPÖ
and ()VP. The problem, however, was not yet solved. In April 2005, the partyinternal dissent led to the split of the Austrian Freedom Party into two parties. This
split had not yet extricated the FPÖ and BZÖ from their problems, since Jörg
Haider still did not conform to the government and showed considerable destructive
potential both for himself and his political party. From 2000 to 2006 the Austrian
Freedom Party and the BZÖ lost all regional and European elections except for the
election in Carinthia in 2004, where Jörg Haider remains governor (see Picker,
Salfinger and Zeglovits 2004). As governing populists, the Austrian right-wing
parties could not fall back on typical populist principles as they did when they were
in opposition. They suffered from a crisis of credibility and a crisis of ethos (see
Pallaver and Gärtner 2006, pp. 116ff.). Their ruling policy contradicted previous
political announcements and claims.
In autumn 2006, due to the massive loss of voters in the parliamentary election,
the BZÖ disappeared from the level of national policy and politics in Austria and
became a small party that continues to play a role in the province of Carinthia.
Heinz-Christian Strache, however, the new party leader of the Austrian Freedom
Party, seems to have learned that right-wing populist rhetoric (for details see Reisigl
2002, pp. 166-74) is most successful if articulated from an oppositional perspective.
Strache perfectly copies Haider's former oppositional politics. Since April 2005, it
has been ascertained that Straches racist, ienophobic', anti-European, anti-Turkish,
anti-Islam populism verbalised from an oppositional point of view is much more
successful than the populism of the BZÖ, whose politicians aspire to reassume a
governing role. Although for the time being we can conclude that governing rightwing populism seems to be a medium-term problem in Austria, the spectre may
return in various guises, though — it should be hoped — not as powerfully as at the
very beginning of the twenty-first century. However, even if the FPÖ and BZO are
no longer in a ruling position, we are still confronted with the problem that various
right-wing and national populist claims made since the early 1990s have been and
still are indirectly adopted and at least partly integrated into governmental mainstream policy, even in times when right-wing parties assume an oppositional role.
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 234
234 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
The current restrictive asylum and migration policies, as well as the ambiguous EU
policies in Austria are just two striking cases of this dangerous implicit topical
leadership.
8.5 AUSTRIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICAL
) SINCE THE ACCESSION
+-I grA4IW6
i---i Eh tav3e lieht
rC"
do(cnettehti--1Malt
( gh Werne&
-i-1 äpiayeernent
8.5.1 Ambivalent Identities: Austria as a 'Bridge to die East', 'Brakeman' to
EU
. • or Slack Sheep' of the European Community
In the anniversary year 2005, Austria's European Union accession in 1995 was
publicly often resented as the most recent chapter of the success story of the
Second Republi After the fall of the 'hon Curtain', integration into the EU was seen
as a chance to redefine Austria's role in the European political landscape as a
country at the heart of Europe, particularly with regard to the EU
process. Correspondingly, repeated references were made to Austria's 'historical
(seif-)perception as a bridge , to the East, but there were no attempts to turn this into
a political reality. Rather, in the accession process of Central and Eastern-European
countries Austria rejected calls for early accession dates.
The topic of EU keparrseri was testemiel important during Austria's first EU
presidency in the second half of 199 . The Austrian daily Der Standard noted that
the government presented its agenda for the presidency with a `surprisingly clear
commitment to the Apetteired of the European Union' (Der Standard 2 July 1998,
quoted in Lang 2000, p. 125). Austria was the first presiding country to include
accession countries in its `tour de capitalei , which indicated a positive stance towards
4x.pafeieni(cf. Schallenberg and Thun-Hohenstein 1999, p. 53). At the heart of this
key topic was the beginning of comprehensive negotiations with the teilt six
accession countries (Estonia, Poland, Siovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Cyprus).
The then Foreign Minister of Austria, Wolfgang Schüssel, stated: `We have given the
iemeansienbroject a wake-up kiss and have filled it with life through Austria's EU
presidency (Kurier 1998d, p. 7). This view was, however, by no means universally
shared in Austria, nor did it correspond to the view from abroad. The Swiss daily
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, for instance, claimed that 'Vienna had not taken on' the
`expected pioneering role in Eastern politics' (quoted in Kurier 1998b, p. 3). Rather,
according to the essayist Karl Markus Gaus ,
eiawehet
rs
the European Union has already discovered the Easf but thetour guide, the
knowledgeable scout, the bridge builder, was not played by Austria [...] We could
have been the benevolent relative in the integration of the reformk states of
Eastern Europe; instead, we have short-sightedly endeavoured to style ourselves as
the nay-saying guards.
(Gauss 1999, pp. 177ff.)
The political scientist Anton Pelinka expressed a similar view, nutcly that Austria
went from `being a promoter to being a brakeman'. He summariserDuring the EU
F
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 235
aArt;4 -.)t
,
,N'Jul(?cx_ A41::1gyttizt,
Q P.Ge-
-it-- 12,e. eetivvv.tie 1
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200f235
ft en Cermet1-1 en(a eher, t
Ha
AtA
A
(bour rei
ri *in tie fl'est hcee'
4990i4e9)
cfhe
f-lierdate emelt
+
1
expansion we lost our image' (Kurier 1998c, p. 3).
re
Änge1ika Brechelmachhas pointe to ustrias cons stently ambivalent strategy:
on the one hand; it appeared to be an engine for
, on the other, it
demanded special conditions, such as long transitional periods for unrestricted
. The latter can be seen as a Signal principally targeted at domestic
politics (Brechelmacher 2001, p. 155). The Financial Times described Austria's
ambivalent behaviour as a `Janus-faced attitude' (quoted in Lang 2000, p. 142).
Despite this, in 2004 the Austrian government characterised the forthcoming
EU expansion as "The greatest thing we have ever done" (Preface by the Federal
Chancellor and Vice-chancellor to the brochure Europa. Wie es im Buche steht).
ept
Furthermore, the government's promotional campaign for kelemimi claimed with a 1—feg
metaphorical topos of space that Austria's geo-political position at the heart of
a unified Europe 'was where we have always belonged' (Lang 2000, p. 142).
e outsi e' motif and topos, previousl used in the campaign promoting
This
Austrian EU membershi , was also central in the
campaign: it was seen to H Cateevn e-pb
be necessary to embed t e small state in a larger political structure, which promised
advantages and protection. Austria could move from the Tringes to the centre of
Europe' through theimeamitel according to President Klestil at the beginning of the
first Austrian EU presidency (Kurier 1998a, p. 3).
The overwhelming majority of Austrians and numerous political representatives
em LQt.32 eht
were, however, rather sceptical about the EU
process. The headline
`Majority of Austrians scared of eastwards
was The Standard's editorial H
tE
contribution to the start of the Austrian E presidency on 1 July 1998 (Brechelmacher 2001, p. 113). With the exception of Hungary, the former socialist one-party
states were not welcome as new EU members in the opinion of most Austrians
(cf. Hintermann et al. 2001). Austria was also one of the countries that called for
particularly long transitional periods for the opening of national labour markets
justified their daim with a series of
(sometimes fallacious) topoi of threat. The threat of a veto against the accession of
the Czech Republic — because of the Temelin nuclear power plant near the border
with Austria — met with little sympathy from other EU countries and is in line with
a long tradition of `threats' to Austria from `the East' (Liebhart 2003, Dejanovic and
Liebhart 1999). These (sometimes fallacious) topoi of threat draw on political
constructions that originated during the Habsburg monarchy and were also very
popular in the Austrofascist Ständestaat. Thus, bridge-building metaphors have
always been used in conjunction with their opposite, the image of Austria as a
bulwark against the East (against the Ottoman Empire, against Communism). These
dichotomous topoi suggest a tension that puts into perspective Austria's strongly
emphasised claim that it is an especially important European actor, which was also
acknowledged in the EU's response to Austria's 1989 application to join the EU. The
aforementioned 'Janus-faced attitude' is still characteristic of Austria's relationship
with the EU today.
Many of the public commemorations and events in Austria relating to the anniversary year 2005 mentioned neither the ambivalent or even problematic dimensions
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 236
236 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
*ev 431-g
of Austria's role in Europe, nor its pariah status among other EU member states in
the aftermath of the ÖVP and FPÖ government coalition in 2000. The events of the
`Gedankenjahr' (the 'har of Thought(s)' held in 2005; see also section 8.1) were
almost exclusivel built up around the glorification of the communal project to
rebuild Austri . From the tribulations of war, from the deprivation and need of the
post-war years, Austria was not only rebuilt, but over the course of several decades
the Second Republic developed into an internationally recognised and prosperous
state and a respected member of the EU. From this perspective Austria's accession to
the European Union in 1995 was celebrated less as an anniversary in its own right
and more as the crowning achievement of a communal rebuilding project. The
national narrative followed a well-established pattern here too. The well-known
journalist Hugo Portisch, in an interview with the weekly news magazine Format,
described his 2005 TV series The Second Republic An Incredible Story as a Tantastic,
an unbelievable stock-take' of the Second Republic: Who could have dreamt back
then, or even before in the First Republic, what would become of this country?'
(quoted in Format 2005, p. 59).
Portisch's TV series portrayed a linear success story: starting with the misery of the
late war and Post-war years; via the withdrawal of the occupying forces; through to
Austria's role as a country at the centre of Europe, which played host to other EU
countries during its presidency following the anniversary year. Austria's temporarily
precarious situation in 2000 was not mentioned. As already pointed out in section
8.4.3, the inclusion of the FPÖ, a right-wing populist party with an unclear position
on Austria's National Socialist past, in the new government formed in February 2000
led to massive criticism from the fourteen other EU member states. The EU-14
drafted a list of measures: no official contact with a government that included the
FPÖ; no support for Austrian applicants to international organisations; Austrian
ambassadors only to be received for technical (not for political) deliberations (cf.
Kopeinig and Kotanko 2000, p. 21). These so-called `sanctions', enacted bilaterally
by the member states, were unique in the history of the EU, but in Austria — as we
observed in section 8.4.3.2 — they led
to patriotic indignation, lofty rhetoric and
a 'national closing of Tanks' (cf. Kurttn, Liebhart and Pribersky 2002). The measures
were only ended following a report by `Three Wise Men', conducted in collaboration
with the European Court of Human Rights: Matti
Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein and
in___
Marcelino Oreja drafted a report (Ahtisaari, Frow n and Oreja 2000) that confirmed
the Austrian government's adherence to common European values, particularly with
respect to minority rights (for more details see section 8.4.3.1). A `communique of
the fourteen' led to the cessation of the bilateral measures against the Austrian
government by the other EU countries after 223 days. In the ' Gedankenjahr' , the
measures that were in place for seven months and had had such a strong impact on
political discourses in Austria following the change in government were no longer an
issue. They were swept under the carpet as 'an event which was embarrassing for
ev ryone involved' ( chaufenster Geschichte 2005).
"
might have been
appropriate impetus for critical seif- 1-1 "
. '
.
‘
re ectio:official
i n . 1-towevey--,
er
—
rei
(cf.
H sthe (cdatikeniAtiv
_
i
Page 237
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
The 'Story' Continues: 1 995-2Oc7 237
wed
commemorative events shoff that Austria still has a problematic relationship with
its recent past. This is particularly the case with the `sanctions' that mark a clear break
in the success story of the Second Republic.
Collective memory consists of multi-layered connections between often
contradictory modes of understanding and competing narratives of the past. Thus,
it is ot sur rising that the dominant representations of success of the celebratory
year 005 were in fact contested by critical narratives and associated events. One
example, an 'an project for the Austrian "Gedankenjahr 2005'" designed by KarlHeinz Ströhle and Martin Strauß, aimed to counter the offici seif- resentation of
Schaufenster =
the Republic: 'Schaufenster Geschichte' (Geschichte = 'history
s owcase 's op win ow, wasinspire y the sanctions, in t e year 2000, and too
place in a large, empty shop in a Viennese inner-city location. The shop window was
covered with large-scale reproductions of Austrian and international newspaper
reports from the time of the 'samtions'. Thus, Austrian and international reports
were juxtaposed to show the differences between self and foreign perceptions, which
highlighted gaps in the official commemorative narratives (Liebhart and Pribersky
2006).
rie
49-
8.5.2 'Sound of Europe': Austria's EU Presidencies in 1998 and 2006
+
-7E° r
8.5.2.1 Austria's Second Presidency in 2006
Towards the end of the 'Gedankenjahr', the European dimension of Austria's identity
did become a topic after all. In preparation for Austria's turn to take over the rotating
EU presidency at the beginning of 2006, Austria was once again characterised
metaphorically as a country at the heart of Europe and as a suitable location for
political meetings at the highest levels (this had been an important aspect of Austrian
identity construction since the 1970s that had lost its real political meaning after the
fall of the Iron Curtain). In response, the events staged towards the end of 2005 in a
series entitled '25peaces' (Internet 2006c; cf. also section 8.3) focused on Austria's
role in Europe. For example, the 'Peace beteiligt' ('participated') project involved the
production of plaques with the inscription 'Part of Europe', which individual citizens
and institutions could display as a visible sign of their commitment to Europe.
Another project, 'Peace beflaggt' ('flagged'), involved adorning trams with the flags
of EU countries, and was a particularly noticeable means of combining the
anniversary year with Austria'slresidency, and thus an attempt to raise awareness in
the media about Austria's role in Europe. The two cars of thirteen trams on the 'D'
line, which runs past many significant tourist sites, were Imiumemid in flags of the
twenty-five EU members and the EU flag respectively. The inside of each car also
contained information bout the respective EU countries. 'Peace beflaggt' was thus
intended to be a welcome message for official visitors and tourists, and for Austrians
it was supposed to be a striking symbol of Europeanness.
Austria's second six-month turn at the EU p'residency, then, commenced in
January 2006. One goal of the presidency — given the recent negative outcomes
coLoureoi
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 238
238 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
in referenda on the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands and subsequent
calls for a period of reflection — was to summarise the results of this reflection. Europe
had to be brought closer to its citizens to strengthen confidence in the European
project. In this context, at the end of January 2006 Austria held the first high-profile
event of its presidency in Salzburg in collaboration with the European commission:
a conference on the theme of Europe's future entitled 'The Sound of Europe'. Over
300 international public figures from politics, academia, art and the media held
discussions on perspectives on the European project, and on European values,
identity and culture.
The conference logo consisted of a variation of the Austrian presidency logo (see
Logo der Österreichischen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2006), the so-called `barcode'
designed by the Durch architect Rem KohlhaFand the AMO group (see Internet
2006d).
The barcode represents an aesthetic break with the traditional symbolism of
Europe, e.g. the yellow circle of stars on a blue background. At the same time, by
alluding to product barcodes found in supermarkets, it points to the quotidian and
economic aspects of European identity. The idea to use the flags of member states to
form a barcode originated with Rem Koolhaas and AMO in 2001 (EU Barcode,
Rotterdam 2001). The aim behind this creative invention was to visualise the
diversity of Europe. The barcode is a dynamic symbol which can be easily extended:
the 2001 design that incorporated the colours of the then fifteen member states was
augmented with the colours of the ten accession states in 2004. The new symbol for
the EU was first used officially for the Austrian presidency of 2006.
`The Sound of Europe', as an event marking the starr of the presidency, drew on
well-known Austrian diches in several ways. The conference can be interpreted in the
tradition of Austria's stereotypical self-presentation and international image as a
cultural superpower (this topos of culture implies a culturalist understanding of
the Austrian nation). The motto and location of the conference point to the most
successful component of Austria's image, music, and one of the most famous
Austrians, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. This permitted a link with the so-called
`Mozart Year' 2006.
Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel referred to the famous composer, born in
Salzburg in the eighteenth century, at the beginning of his opening address, and
lauded him as a `truly European artist' (BKA 2006b, pp. 26ff.). In his speech on
27 January Schüssel also referred to the anniversary of the liberation of AuschwitzBirkenau, a `synonym for crime', which had to be included in a reflection on
European history. He quoted the composer Josef Krips, who associated Mozart with
heaven and Auschwitz with hell, and summed up by saying that all this made up
European identity. However, Schüssel did not go into any further detail, at least
concerning the negative part of this dichotomous comparison, nor its relevance to
Austria: a typical strategy for populist political speeches. Rather, he presented Mozart
as the epitome of a European, whose example could help Europe find its cultural
identity and develop a `spirit'. Schüssel's emphasis on Mozart as a role model for the
European project matches the appropriation of the composer as a central part of the
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 239
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-20r239
)e,
'tEerva f.'lfroie et (
2,c(o 3)
Bern harok et, aL.
2003)
`collective Austrian memory' (Gruber 2004, p. 49), which is underlined by the choice
of location for the conference and is also in line with the tradition of an unreflective
seif-perception of the Second Republic. Gernot Gruber detected this stance even in
the period immediately after the signing of the State Treaty. He described the Mozart
Year 1956 in the following terms: 'The newly sovereign [or confident] Austria was
able to use its Mozart cult to show itself in a good light' (Gruber 2004, p. 49).
The Austrian EU presidency was only partially successful in its attempt to do the
same. According to the Brussels correspondent of the Swiss daily Tages-Anzeiger,
Austria managed a Teel-good presidency' with `plenty of Mozart, elaborate pastries
and a baroque backdrop', i.e. in terms of typical cliches. However, despite the Mozart
anniversary year, the presidency passed without `creativity or flashes of inspiration'
according to a journalist working for the Berliner Zeitung (cf. Presseschau 2006)25
The conference title The Sound of Europe' interdiscursively alluded not only
to Mozart but also to the popular film The Sound of Music (USA 1965), which was
filmed against the backdrop of the province and city of Salzburg. The well-known
actress Julie Andrews played the lead in the story of the Trapp Family Singers, who
emigrated to the USA in 1938, and who became a symbol of the `other', non-Nazi
Austria abroad (cf. Internet 2006b; Breuss Liebhart and Pribersky 1995, p. 206).
e conference s accompanying booklet, Federal Chancellor (and thus chair of
the European Council) Wolfgang Schüssel stressed in the preface that the strength of
a society or even a whole continent always depended con its aptitude for relationships'
('The Sound of Europe' 2006, p. 8). He claimed that Europe, with its member states,
was Ike an orchestra that could only realise its full potential, and with that its added
value, its full sound, the ideal "sound" of Europe' (`The Sound of Europe' 2006,
ustria, in the person of its then chancellor, evidently saw itself as the conuctor of the orchestra, or at least as an active, central actor: 'Europe', on the other
hand, `is listening', as another version of the Austrian presidency logo claimed.
An advertisement accompanying the conference, on a DVD entitled 'Generation
Europe. Young Europeans and their Europe', underlines this intended leadership role
for Austria. Young people from all over Europe are shown together with European
Council Chair Schüssel, explaining how they imagine Europe will look in future.
The ad uses clips of the music video 'Amadeus, Amadeus', a song from the mid1980s by the only internationally successful Austrian pop star, Falco. lt thus draws
on both music as a component of identity formation and on corresponding popular
images of Austria from abroa
8.5.2.2 Austria's First Presidency in 1998
There are certain structural similarities between how Austria was presented during
the first EU presidency (July to December 1998) and during the second presidency
in 2006, particularly in terms of seif-presentation as an actor at the heart of Europe
and traditional Austrian cliches.
Austria was the first of the 1995 accession countries that took on the EU presidency, and this was proudly and repeatedly proclaimed in statements by politicians
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16 jj Page 240
240 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
(Profil 1998c, p. 26). The presidency was supposed to prove Austria's role as model
student of integration politics' (Lang 2000, p. 174). One of the goals was to establish
the country as a fully fledged member of the EU by means of a successful presidency
(Lang 2000, p. 173). Austria's assumption of the presidency was to mark its change
of roles to an active member of the EU. The then Secretary of State Benita FerreroWaldner commented that the EU presidency meant Austria was taking the final step
towards Europe (Die Presse 1998b). With movement or journey metaphors, the ()VP
politician Erhard Busek underlined the psychological importance of the presidency,
because it would further integration: Although we are moving towards Brussels, we
have not yet arrived there'. The presidency would compensate for a typically Austrian
are not only observers, we are taking part' (Kurier 1998a,
minority complex:
p. 3). Even the official logo of the 1998 presidency symbolised the integration of
Austrian and European frames of reference: a red, white and red flag which formed
(the international abbreviation for Austria) is surrounded by a
a partial letter
circle of stars. This positive visual seif-presentation conveyed a topos of space which
positioned Austria in the centre of the European Union.
The importance of Austria for European politics was repeatedly underscored
during Austria's presidency, as was the notion that the presidency took place during
a 'time of important junctions for Europe' (Schüssel 1998, p. 4). The order of
business comprised the Euro, EU keipeasief(and Agenda 2000. 16 Austria's distorted H - eh (3,vviin
notion of its importance for Europe can also be seen in the motto of the Austrir
presidency: `Make Europe fit': this mobilising sport metaphor was symbolically
realised in Austria's image campaign (Lang 2000, p. 126) when the then Foreign
Minister Wolfgang Schüssel handed out red, white and red sports shoes during his
`tourrde capitales'.
The daily Der Standard commented that the metaphorical slogan of fitness might
suggest a new era, `norf; little Austria, but for the whole of Europe'. Furthermore,
the slogan presupposed that Europe was not fit, and that Austria would change this
(Der Standard 1998a). This stance was also reflected in the attitudes of the Austrian
populace: a poll commissioned by the news magazine Profil found that 80 per cent
of Austrians were proud that `"we" would be leading the old continent for the next
six months' (Profil 1998c, p. 26). The political scientist Anton Pelinka assessed this
attitude as `a bit too keen' and suggested that Austria was `as proud as a peacock'
(Kurier 1998c, p. 3).
One area in which Austria tried to prove its importance in Europe was in the
cultural sphere. Austria tried to put across the image of an Austrian nation of arts and
culture by means of an extensive cultural programme to accompany official events
(concerts, theatre performances, exhibitions, etc.). Once again, this led to the
reproduction of classic Austrian diches (cf. Lang 2000, p. 167). Secretary of State
Ferrero-Waldner stressed that Austria would show itself from its best side, `namely its
cultural one' (Die Presse 1998a). This `soft' approach, also implemented by other
representatives of Austria, did not meet with universal approval: `a quick waltz is not
enough', according to the Süddeutsche Zeitung (quoted in Kurier 1998b, p. 3). The EU
correspondent of Le Figaro observed that 'Wiener Schmäh' (`Viennese charm') was not
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 241
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200r241
+
sufficient: 'Nothing can be achieved with Mozartkugeln [well-known Austrian
chocolates] and Lippizaners [the horses of the famous Spanish Riding School in
Vienna], as seen recently on the "Island of the Blessed''' (Der Standard 199 ).
As an opening event for its presidency, the Austrian government arranged a
'Europafest', incorporating the Vienna Symphonic Orchestra, the 'Blue Danube
Wald, the Vienna Boys' Choir, Sisi (the Austrian Empress Elisabeth), the Spanish
Riding School, ballet performances and pop star Reinhard Fendrich's song 'I am
from Austria', which is often seen as the unofficial Austrian an.them (Profil 1998c,
p. 28).17The Vienna State Opera staged Beethoven's opera Fidelio on 1 July 1998 to
mark the beginning of the presidency. This was transmitted into the other fourteen
EU capitals cas a cultural gift from Austria to all EU countries', according to Culture
Secretary Wittmann (Profil 1998a, p. 104). As Der Standard reminded its readers,
Fidelio was performed not only for the re-opening of the State Opera in 1955, but
also to mark Austria's Anschluss to Nazi Germany on 17 March 1938 (cited in Lang
2000, p. 167).
The daily Kurier (1998e, p. 2) summarised the December 1998 Viennese summit
meeting, which was held in an imperial setting, as `uneventful but pleasant' (cf.
Kopeinig 1998, pp. 20 and 57). The then Federal Chancellor Viktor Klima described
the meeting as a `summit of harmony' (Kopeinig 1998, p. 57) and leading representatives of EU countries praised it because of its atmosphere (Lang 2000, p. 167), but
found it to be largely without vision or results (Profil 1998e, p. 40, Der Standard
1998e). Austria's stereotypical preference for avoiding conflict meant that contentious issues `were passed on to the German neighbours' (Profil 1998d, p. 24), the
next in line for the EU presidency. The EU classified the Austrian presidency as a
`transitional presidency' (Der Standard1998d), and Der Standard itself used the term
Durchlauf-Präsidentschafi'18 (1998f).
reb
+
Austria's attempt to present itself as a significant European actor was not wholly
successful. Despite this, Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schüssel claimed towards the
end of the presidency that Austria had proved that it could handle the presidency
better than some larger countries (Profil 1998, p. 20).
Gyieid-aCbh -fowayoi 8.5.3
.the cif zems
H a cser cvtehiatth
-f-v a‘rek he
2-eh 4;
Versus Populism: die EU as a Scapegoat
One theme that links the two ustrian EU presidencies was the demand from all
sides for
in European and Europe-related politics: `We must
[...] avoid citizens seeing the Union as an elite project. The Union exists for citizens',
claimed Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schüssel a few weeks before the first Austrian
presidency (in his 'Speech outlining principles relating to Europe' on 15 May 1998,
the anniversary of the signing of the State Treaty in the Hofburg, quoted in
Kopeining 1998, p. 49). Attempts to foster kififfluteäivetimii were also signalled
on the presidency website by its open information policy. A further example was the
internet-based citizens' conference on the future of Europe (Schallenberg and ThunHohenstein 1999, p. 113). During its second presidency, Austria hosted a conference
on the topic of `subsidiarity' as part of its official programme. This event, entitled
oviej,)--Lijoki tc,t/Jvct%
izer)
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16 ii Page 242
242 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
`Europe begins at home', took place in April 2006 and set as its goal the
intensification of dialogue with European Union citizens. Even in 1998 the Austrian
media and political elite expected that the country would become more European
during the six-month presidency (Profil 1998b, p. 118). The presidency was
intended to be an important factor in 'political normalisation', in the sense that
Austrians should no longer perceive the European Union as something outside the
country, `but rather as a community in which we all live', according to Der Standard
(1998a). Foreign Minister Schüssel summed up the first presidency by saying that
Austria had now `mentally' joined the European Union (European Parliament
1998).
If this claim ever corresponded to reality, its effects did not last. Recent Austrian
election campaigns for the European Parliament were dominated almost exclusively
by domestic issues, Austrian interests were pitted against European interests, and
topp ofthreats to Austria or Austrian identity due to European policies were
frequently used in argumentation strategies surrounding the elections (cf. HadjAbdou, Liebhart and Pribersky 2006). Recent Eurobarometer data (cf. Internet
2008) show that Austrians are among the most EU-sceptic of Europeans. This may
be not least due to the tendency among the politicians of various parties and the
tabloid media to make 'the EU' responsible for unpopular reforms or political
measures. They thus make the EU a scapegoat, and thus reproduce a constructed
conflict between Austrian interests and an EU which is consistently characterised as
bureaucratic and unresponsive to the needs of citizens.
A recent attempt to use resentment against the EU for populist ends is the SPÖ's
`180-degree turn' (Der Standard 2008b) with respect to its party line on European
politics. The SPÖ's leadership, hitherto pro-European, suddenly and unexpectedly
supported a referendum on the EU reform treaty, should this be resurrected after the
Irish no vote (see also section 8.4.4, note 14). It further called for a referendum on
Turkey's possible accession to the EU. The SPÖ politiP Alfred Gusenbauer
(Federal Chancellor) and Werner Faymann (party leader) used the latest Eurobarometer data to justify their about-face: the data suggest that only 28 per cent of
Austrians hold a positive image of the EU and only 36 per cent think that Austria's
EU membership is a good thing. Austria is thus ranked fourth-lowest among all EU
member states (Der Standard 2008b).
The SPÖ outlined its demands in an open letter to the publisher of the Austrian
tabloid newspaper with the highest circulation and largest readership, Hans Dichand
of the Kronen Zeitung. His newspaper had been very outspoken in its criticism of the
Treaty of Lisbon. The letter claimed that there was widespread scepticism towards the
EU in Austria, as well as an atmosphere of insecurity and even rejection. The
majority of Austrians was apparently disappointed and deplored the EU's democracy
deficit and the lack of transparency in European politics. The SPÖ took these
concerns seriously, declared the letter, and would attempt 'to ensure that the EU
responded actively to the criticisms' and 'that Future changes to treaties which
affected Austrian interests would be decided by means of a referendum in Austria.'
(Der Standard 2008b).
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 243
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200J7 243
Th Federal Spokesperson of the Austrian Greens, Alexander Van der Bellen,
decried the SPÖ's U-turn on the EU as `despicable style' and noted that the message
for domestic politics was that `Faymann and Strache [the leader of the FPÖ] are
sitting hand in hand in the anti-EU boat with the Kronen Zeitung' (Der Standard
2008b).
The SPO's populist U-turn, which was evidently intended to win back voters,
seems to have been rather unsuccessful. The ÖVP took Faymann and Gusenbauer's
action as a prompt to dissolve the SPÖ—ÖVP coalition, which had been plagued for
months by internal disputes and reciprocal obstacle-building.
Beyond party-political issues, the events described above suggest that even in
--Li'llY6e eh tEbW 2008, he„.444€1.4-11.1liadoeade‚after Austria's accession to the EU, and despite all the
empty rhetoric of populist speeches, Austria has still not arrived in Europe. There
are still tensions between national and European identity narratives which frame
political acrimony and party-political functionalisation. lt seems not yet to be the
case that `we are Europe'.
NOTES
+
BZÖ = Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, Alliance for the Future of Austria', was founded in April 2005
by Jörg Haider and some of his party colleagues following a schism within the FPÖ. The _BZÖ
remained part of the government coalition until the 2006 elections.
Quotations from political speeches will be followed by the name of the speaker and the date of the
speech (see list of analysed texts in Appendix 2).
See Chapter 3, pp. 90f. for more details.
GÖD = Gewerkschaft Öffentlicher Dienst, 'Public Service Union'.
Here, the discussant seems to falsely attribute the institution of the 'Nationalfond' to the ÖVP/FPÖ
government. In fact, the National Fund had already been established in 1995 by the then SPÖ/ÖVP
coalition govemmen
lt is impossible to clett determine whether this formulation, which gives Jörg Haider the first name
Adolf, is deliberate or is an error.
One example of this kind of spectacle was the interactive installation, commissioned by the Federal
Chancellery, of the replicated balcony of the Belvedere Palace, from which the freshly signed State
Treaty was shown to the crowd below on 15 May 1955. This fake balcony was mounted on a crane
and set up in all provincial capitals. Every visitor to the crane scenes in the various capitals was
encouraged by hired entertainers to replay the historical scene of 15 May 1955, to climb the
crane, to take the position of Leoplod Figl on the balcony, amidst the cardboard reproductions of
the foreign ministers and representatives, and to proclaim that Austria is free — a statement which
Figl did not utter on the balcony, but in the hall where the treaty was actually signed (for more
details see Distelberger 2008, pp. 101-33; see also source: http://www.25peaces.at/ [10 December
2006]).
One can frequently observe that Austrian populists such as Jörg Haider, Peter Westenthaler (after the
schism of the FPÖ in April 2005, Haider and Westen haler became top representatives of the ne
Austrian party BZÖ, i.e. 'Bündnis Zukunft Österreich'
and Heinz-Christian Strache (the new leader of the A strian Freedom Party) invoke 'the people' in a
rather fallacious manner. They decide arbitrarily, or depending on given political opportunities, who
belongs to the so-called `people' and who does not (see Reisigl 2002, pp. 190£). Thus, they frequently
commit the fallacy of argumentum ad populum (see Reisigl 2007b, pp. 1129ff.). Besides the populist
concept of 'the people as nation' in a culturalist sense, there are two further major synecdochic
meanings of the collective 'the people' that can be attributed to various forms of populism (see Mäly
and Surel 2004, pp. 172-96). The concept of 'the people as dass' ('dass' in a socio-economic sense),
however, is first and foremost connected with left-wing populism. The understanding of `the people
as the political sovereign', as the basic political authority of citizens who decide who legitimately
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16
Page 244
244 The Discursive Construction of National Identity
C
fP
represents whom and exerts power within a specific political framework, usually fulfils die ftinction
of political control.
We now systematically distinguish between the terms `topor and Tallacks', in contrast to the first
edition of the present book, where this distinction was partly made, but not followed through in the
same explicit way. 'Topoi' are obligatory parts of argumentation which serve as formal or contentrelated `conclusion rules' that connect arguments with conclusions (Kienpointner 1992, p. 194; see
also Chapter 2, pp. 34ff. in this volume). They are not always articulated explicitly, but can always
be made explicit as conditional or causal paraphrases such as `if x, then y' or 'y, because x' (for more
details see Reisigl and Wodak 2001, pp 69-80). If topoi are not reasonable, we term themfallacies.
lt is sometimes difficult to distinguish between reasonable and fallacious argumentation. However,
there are rules for rational disputes and constructive arguing which allow us to discern topoi from
fallacies (see the pragma-dialectical approach of Van Eeemeren and Grootendorst 1992). These rules
include the freedom of arguing, the obligation to give reasons, the correct reference to the previous
discourse by the antagonist, the obligation to 'matter-of-factness', the correct reference to implicit
premises, the respect of shared starting points, the use of plausible arguments and schemes of
argumentation, logical validity, the acceptance of the discussion's results, and the clarity of expression
and correct interpretation. If these rules are broken, fallacies are committed. See also Reisigl and
Wodak (2009).
After publication of the Report of the Three Wise Men', leading FPÖ politicians hastened to twist
the meaning of the term '1-adkar associated with political combat and with a generally negative
stigmatising connotation. By using an argumentative definition topos, they tried to make it a new
positively connoted catchword. For this purpose they drew on the etymological Latin meaning
of `radical', i.e. ' radix' meaning 'the root' and ' radicitus' meaning 'from the root, fundamentally,
entirely'. 'Radkar thus became a positive attribute for FPÖ politicians: their approach to tackling
political issues was `deeply rooted', `profound', i.e. `getting to the root'. At the same time they ignored
and concealed the negative meaning of the term 'ludkar in everyday language (which could actually
be the only meaning referred to given the numerous unequivocal statements of FPÖ members of
government and FPÖ party officials) as well as the description of the FPÖ as being an `extranig'
party that is completely incompatible with a positive interpretation of 'mdl.car.
However, Haider, as Governor of Carinthia, started to impair his party's cohesion soon after his
withdrawal. He repeatedly attacked the policies of his governing fellow party members as if he were
a member of the opposition.
+
Regarding this fallacy — denoted with a term drawn from hunting terminology — see Schleichert
1999, pp. 51f. 'Red herring' is a technical term from hunting describing a tactic by which an
inexperienced dog is thrown off the scent of the quarry by a strongly smelling herring trailed along
on the ground to distract it from its original target.
In connection with this, Alfred Gusenbaue7! air of the SPÖ, was attacked for `champagneising with
the enemy' Cchampagnisieren mit dem Feind' . This expression alluded to the expression Traternising
with the enemy'. Also in the same context, in spring 2000 a leading FPÖ politician suggested in
public that there should be an offence such as `traitor to the fatherland' to apply to opposition
politicians who make negative remarks about Austria abroad. The then minister of justice judged this
proposal to be worthy of being considered (see de Cillia 2003, p. 247).
Most recently, in stummer 2008, two leading figures in the SPÖ, Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer and
Werner Faymann, the chairperson of the party, performed a U-turn in their EU policy due to the
decreasing success of the SPÖ in regional elections and political opinion polls. After the Irish refusal
of the 'Reform Treaty of Lisbon', they published a leiter in the biggest Austrian tabloid, the Neue
Kronenzeitung, in which they pronounced themselves in favour of national referenda whenever future
EU treaties are changed. lt is questionable whether this calculated populist manoeuvre will be
rewarded with a gain in votes. lt should be noted that this move suggests democratically problematic
implications (for in such cases a small minority such the population of Malta could feasibly block the
political development of the whole EU, probably for biased reasons of dissatisfaction with the
domestic policy of the nation state). We will return to this issue at the end of this chapter in section
72-42f 8.5.3
Cf. Ilso `Ca& d'Europe', which
on the Austrian qualities' of coffee-house culture and :),..A dreui
Gemütlichkeit ('cosiness', `pleasantness') and was conceived during Austria's EU presidency (Felber
2006) to celebrate Europe Day on 9 May 2006 (Internet 2006a).
'Agenda 2000' designates an encompassing pl
nctibegl
of reforms and actions with the purpose of
/e
• ii/H eh (aVtiej'ileil t
strengthening EU policy with respect to the EU
1003 02 pages 001-268:Layout 1 23/10/08 16 ji Page 245
The 'Story' Continues: 1995-200 245
H
50 nä
View publication stats
is a popular expression of national pride. Its title carries the topos — which was often
This
foun in our analysis of focus group discussions and interviews in our first study — that national
consciousness and pride is frequently feit abroad when people are asked about their provenance.
etc.
Among other things, the term Durchlauf can mean `passage',