презентация - Cloudwatcher

Karl Bruckmeier
14 February 2013
at Club “Economy of Merits”, Moscow
Social ecology is …
 … an interdisciplinary science of the interaction
between society and nature
 Theme: distribution, use and management of natural
resources (local to global levels)
 Aim: producing knowledge to avoid overuse of resources
or destruction of the environment
 Example: the research of Elinor Ostrom
2
Elinor Ostrom
Political scientist (1933-2012)
University of Indiana at Bloomington, USA
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
(”Bloomington School”)
Nobel prize (economics) in 2009
Interdisciplinary research about use of
common pool resources and resulting problems
(tradition of critical institutional economics)
Ostroms research ”in a nutshell”
Themes:
- ”Communities (of place)”: local groups or communities (e.g., forest users, farmers, fishermen, recreational resource users)
- ”Common pool resources”: e.g., fish, wildlife, water
- Access and property rights: institutions, rules, regulations for
natural resource use
- Problems of collective resource use: dilemmas or conflicts
between users, how to avoid these and overuse of resources
Results:
- ”Learning to cooperate”: overuse of resources can be avoided
through cooperation (adequate rules and institutions required)
- ”No institutional monoculture”: general, standardized, universal
solutions to resource use problems (”panacea”, ”cure-all”) inefficient:
necessity of locally and culturally specific rules and multi-scale management systems
4
Ostrom - two main research problems:
(1) Analysis of rational action
 … starts from the assumption of ”bounded rationality” (Herbert
Simon): human rationality is limited in manifold ways, limits need to
be found from empirical research
 Ostrom: how to integrate 2 contrasting forms of rationality in joint
resource use,
- individual rationality or the ”pursuit of self interest” and
- collective rationality or the capability to cooperate?
- Actors need to communicate, negotiate with each other - transfor-
ming competition and conflict in cooperation (learning to cooperate)
-
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(2) Social dilemmas of resource use, e.g.:
Garrett Hardin: ”Tragedy of the commons”
(1968)
• Hardin: when natural resources are used in common property the
consequence is overuse of resources (temptation of individual users
to make an extra gain by overusing the common resource - it is not
their private property and they do not have to bear the immediate
consequences of that overuse)
• Hardins´ proposal: transform of commons to ”modern property”
(state property or private property): nature to be managed through
exclusive property rights
• Hardins´ difficulty: the unclear concept of commons (he under-
stood commons in the sense of ”open access” or ”lack of ownership
rights” – but commons is a specific form of property rights
6
Terminology: ”commons” and ”common pool
resources”
 ”Commons” as a form of property
 ”Common pool resources”/CPR: certain kinds of resour-
ces as they exist in nature (e.g., a fish stock)
 Ostrom & Becker (1995) describe CPR with two terms:
(1) ”difficulty of exclusion” (of a user from the use of a
resource – similar to public goods)
(2) ”subtractability of benefits”: the part of the resource
used by one resource user is no longer available for others
(certain public goods or resources are non-subtractable:
e.g., the sunshine/sunset, knowledge)
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Is the institutionalization of property rights the
solution to resource use problems?
 Natural resources are used by humans under different forms of
property rights – all require management/coordination of use:
(1) no property/free access (”res nullius”)
(2) collective property (local commons)
(3) state property
(4) private property
 Ostrom (and other social ecologists): no form of property
rights sufficient for regulating resource use
 Property rights need to be supplemented by further (social, cultural,
political) institutions, rules and regulations to prevent “overuse (of
resources) and collapse (of society)”
8
Critique of Hardins´ analysis
 Private or state property cannot prevent overuse of resources
and destruction of the environment (as suggested by Hardin) all forms of property can have positive or negative
consequences for the environment
 With Ostroms´ empirical studies of local resource management systems in many countries and cultures (similar as
Bonnie McCay for fisheries management):
 Hardins´ conclusion rejected: commons regimes often
succeeded to maintain resources for long time
 Preconditions for sustainable local resource management – see
Becker & Ostrom 1995: design principles for successful
cooperation
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Ostroms research - main results:
(1) List of ”design principles” - sustainable/longenduring local resource management systems
1. Clearly defined boundaries
2. Monitoring
3. Costs and benefits should be proportional and fairly distributed
between users
4. Creating rights (to organize)
5. Power of resource users for rulemaking (”collective choice
arrangements”)
6. Graduated sanctions
7. Mechanisms for conflict resolution
(8. Nested enterprises – for larger resource use systems)
(Becker & Ostrom 1995, p. 119)
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(2) Second list: variables for selection of norms,
rules, property rights that reduce externalities
1. Information about the resource system available at low costs
2. Homogeneous group of participants (similar preferences)
3. Participants have similar views of benefits and risks of specific
management options
4. Social capital (trust and reciprocity)
5. Small and stable group size of resource users
6 Participants can make their own rules that are supported by
authorities
7. Not/little ”discounting the future”
8. Adequate collective choice rules
9. Low cost monitoring and sanction arrangements
(Becker & Ostrom 1995, p. 124f)
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Summary: results of Ostrom´s research
Sustainable local resource management systems:
- Create social capital (trust) and cultural capital (strengthen traditional forms of community-based resource use)
- Improve rights, power, capacities of resource users
- Create access to markets, capital, investment for local users
- Improve risk management, limit risks (precaution)
Potential strengths: local knowledge, trustworthy participants, adapted rules, lower enforcement costs
Potential weaknesses: local elitism, some resource users do not
organise/cooperate, access to scientific information limited, conflicts
may arise, large common pool resources cannot be managed locally
General ideas for solutions of CPR-problems: resource management in decentral, networked, ”polycentric systems”; ”adaptive management” (policy as experiments); cooperation/participation of users 12
Later research of Ostrom: social-ecological systems (SES),
“multi-tier framework, complex systems
(1) The multitier-framework – a new form of (grounded )
theory?
.
Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)
Resource
System
(RS)
Governance
System
(GS)
Interactions (I) → Outcomes (O)
Resource Units
(RU)
Direct causal link
Users
(U)
Feedback
Related Ecosystems (ECO)
(2) Social-ecological systems …
- … are coupled social and ecological systems: social systems
cannot function without ecosystems as their resource base, and
ecosystems include social systems of humans
- The coupling of SES can change: it can become more lose or close,
functional or dysfunctional/”maladaptive” - but according to social
ecology there can never be a complete separation of social and
ecological systems
- SES-analysis: searching better (sustainable) forms of integration of
social and ecological systems
- Here ends Ostroms´research: without sufficient analysis of
complex global systems – for these systems information
from other social-ecological research required:
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The ”physical economy”: statistics of global resource
use (Marina Fischer-Kowalski et al.)
Presently unresolved resource use problems are enormous:
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005 –
Direct drivers growing in intensity
Most direct drivers of
degradation in ecosystem
services remain constant
or are growing in intensity
in most ecosystems
Conclusion (1) Strengths and weaknesses of Ostroms
research
Strengths:
Ideas for improving resource governance/”good government”:
 Local systems are nested in larger systems, local processes are
embedded in large-scale processes
 Widening the perspectives in policy analysis: complexity, transsectoral strategies, integrated resource management
 Multi-scale management/linking of different levels of policy processes
(local, regional, national, international, global)
 Participation of new actors in policy processes/decision-making
(non-governmental actors, local actors, citizen – “civil society
action”)
 Creating new legitimation and consensus in political decisions
and collective action
17
…
Weaknesses:
Ostrom develops no strong theory, difficult to understand with
her framework complex systems
 Simple diagnosis of a “scaling-up problem”: larger numbers of
resource users, larger resource systems increase difficulties of
organizing, rule finding and rule enforcement
 Insufficient analysis of the globalizing economy and society
and their ”systemic nature” (e.g., phenomena of unequal exchange,
power asymmetries, institutional mechanisms directing the
distribution/redistributon of resources) and of
 the nature of ecological distribution conflicts (Martinez-Alier)
 Difficult to understand the structures and functions of societies as
systems of historically specific kind, the historical specificity of
the modern world system
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Conclusion (2) “New perspectives for community and
society in 21st century”
 1. Why should the discussion about ecology of humans start
with the notion of community? – Solutions need to be found at
local/community levels; the complexity of global systems (ecological
earth system, economic world system) managed through coordination of local systems
 2. What are the social-ecological ideas for a community-
based organization of the economy? – “Polycentric systems”,
“nested systems”, “embedded processes”, “circular economy”
 3. How are views of nature, knowledge about resource use
and relations between men connecting with each other? –
Historically seen not always well connected: dysfunctional connections in modern society - “Dominant Western Worldview” or “Human
Exce(m)ptionalism paradigm” (Catton & Dunlap)
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End of the presentation
Thank you for your interest!
References
 Acheson, James M.: Institutional Failure in Resource Management (Annual
Review of Anthropology, 2006, 35, pp.117–34)
 Becker, C. Dustin; Ostrom, Elinor: Human Ecology and Resource
Sustainability: The Importance of Institutional Diversity (Annual Review of
Ecology and Systematics, 1995, 26, pp. 113-133)
 Liu, Jianguo, et al.: Coupled Human and Natural Systems (Ambio, 2007, 36,
8, pp. 639-649)
 Ostrom, Elinor, An agenda for the study of institutions (Public Choice, 1986,
48, 3, pp. 3-25)
 Ostrom, Elinor: A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of
Collective Action (American Political Science Review, 1998, 92, 1, pp. 1-22)
 Ostrom, Elinor: Coping with Tragedies of Commons (Annual Review of
Political Science, 1999, 2, pp. 493-535)
 Ostrom, Elinor: Sustainable Social-Ecological Systems: An Impossibility”
(Paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, “Science and Technology for Sustainable
Well-Being,” 15–19 February in San Francisco, 28pp)
Slides in Russian
 The following slides summarize main points of the
presentation in Russian
Элинор Остром – кто она?
Политолог (1933-2012), Workshop в политической теории и политическом анализе в Университете Индиана, США (”Bloomington
Школа”), Нобелевский лауреат по экономике 2009
Междисциплинарные исследования в области использования природных ресурсов, проблем и конфликтов в этом процессе (в критической традиции институциональной экономики)
Решение проблем типа «трагедия общего» (= переиспользование
ресурсов, которые используются сообща), решение через развитие или усиление режимов управления локальными пользователями ресурсов, в т.ч. ресурсов общего доступа/ ”common pool
resources” (например, рыбные ресурсы, дикие животные, воды)
Дискуссия о развитии и конструировании
проблем окружающей среды
 более конкретные описания – т.е. на историческом, социальном,
культурном, экологическом уровнях: для структуризации исследований
окружающей среды и использования природных ресурсов:
 Трагедия ресурсов общего пользования /”tragedy of the commons” (G.
Hardin)
 «Трагедия огораживания (общинных земель)» /”tragedy of enclosures”
(J. Martinez-Alier)
 Дилемма заключенных/”prisoners dilemma”
 Кооперация/отсутствие кооперации (cooperation/non-cooperation) –
проблемы «халявщиков»/”freerider”
 Дилемма информация/оценка (information/valuation-dilemmas) –
например, через использование ресурсов
Использование человеком ресурсов:
формы и проблемы
 Главным фактором, определяющим использование природных
ресурсов и их распределение между людьми, являются различные
формы права собственности:
- Отсутствие собственности на ресурсы или свободный доступ к
ресурсам / no property rights, free access
- Коллективная (общинная) собственность /collective property (locally)
- Государственная собственность / state property
- Частная собственность / private property
 Классификацию прав собственности можно расширить, включив в
нее такие виды прав в отношении природных ресурсов, как доступ
к ресурсам, их добыча и переработка, торговля ресурсами. Остром
сформулировала системную классификацию для всех видов
апроприации
…
 Вопрос о дефиците/границах многих институтов порождает
конфликтную полемику и противоречивые предложения о путях
решения проблем окружающей среды. Возникает дилемма:
- решение проблем окружающей среды через рынок и право частной
собственности
- решение проблем окружающей среды через регулятивные институты,
коллективную собственность, кооперацию пользователей
 Для большей части проблем, связанных с использованием природных
ресурсов большим количеством пользователей: эмпирические исследования до сих пор не подтвердили, что рынок и частная собственность могут способствовать их удовлетворительному решению
 Остром и многие другие исследователи окружающей среды выдвигают
аргументы в пользу поиска иных решений. По их мнению, следует, как
минимум, дополнить экономические институты институтами политическими и социокультурными институтами, чтобы регулировать
использование ресурсов
Becker и Ostrom (1995)
 не дают общего предложения для решения проблем использова



ния ресурсов. Они отвечают на более специфический вопрос:
При каких условиях локальное управление ресурсами со стороны
локальных пользователей может оказаться успешным решением
дилеммы использования ресурсов?
Ответ представлен в той же манере, в которой Остром сформулировала свою стратегию исследования:
искать не общее или стандартизированное решение для всех
случаев, а специфические условия, в которых локальное управление может решить проблемы такого рода
(это включает следующий вопрос: для каких видов проблем
локальное управление может стать решением?)
Definitions & explanations
 (Only for discussion)
Social ecology - various approaches
1. An environmnentalist tradition – ecoanarchism, USA: Murray
Bookchin (1921-2006) and the ”Institute for Social Ecology”
Bookchin: ”we are likely to find structures of domination within
societies that lack economic classes and the bureaucratic nationstate. … physical domination and power are not the only
means of social control. Hierarchy `is also a state of
consciousness´ as well as a social condition. People can be
oppressed by their consciousness, their understandings and beliefs, as much as by external forces. Thus Bookchin speaks of
people who `internalize´ social structures of hierarchy” and learn
to accept guilt and sacrifice (Desjardins, p. 235)
2. Scientific traditions in social ecology
India: Rhadakamal Mukerjee; Ramachandra Guha (in ”Social Ecology”,
1994, p. 5) – 5 components interacting: culture, polity, social
structure, economy, ecological infrastructure (= soil, water, forests
etc.)
USA: Social psychology (Urie Bronfenbrenner, 1917-2005):
psychologist, child development – spatial relations between
man/environment
USA and Europe: E. Ostrom et al: analysis of social-ecological
systems
Europe: New social ecology – global resource use problems
• ”Institute for Social-Ecological Research”,
ISOE, Frankfurt/M, Germany (E. Becker et al.)
• Social ecology, University of Vienna and Klagenfurt,
• Austria (M. Fischer-Kowalski et al.)
Rationality
 See working group “Adaptive Behavior and Cognition”, Max Planck
Institut für Bildungsforschung, Berlin (Gigerenzer et al):
 Rationality is a multi-semantic, varying and changing concept, used
in many disciplines, with many “models of sound judgment,
inference and decision making. These models evolve over time, just
as the idea of rationality has a history, a present and a future.”
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001, p. 1)
 “Bounded rationality” was in an early version defined by John
Locke: humans should be aware of the capacities of their understanding and knowledge “and the horizon found which sets the
bounds between the enlightened and the dark parts of things,
between what is and what is not comprehensible by us” (J. Locke,
1998 (1619), p. 16f)
The ”prisoners´ dilemma” – no optimal solution
 The ”prisoners dilemma” is a formalized model from game theory of
a problem that can be applied to resource use problems – to answer
the questions: Under which conditions can resource users cooperate? (When) can they trust each other?
 W. Poundstone, (1992, Prisoner's Dilemma, Doubleday, New York)
describes the PD as follows: Two members of a criminal gang are
imprisoned, they have no means of speaking to or exchanging
messages with the other. The police don't have enough evidence to
convict the pair on the principal charge. They plan to sentence both
to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police
offer each prisoner a bargain: if he testifies against his partner, he
will go free while the partner will get three years in prison on the
main charge. If both prisoners testify against each other, both will be
sentenced to two years in jail.
Structural variables (for non-repeated and repeated
interaction)
1. the number of participants involved;
2. whether benefits are subtractive or fully shared (i.e., public goods vs
common-pool resources);
3. the heterogeneity of participants;
4. face-to-face communication;
5. the shape of the production function.
Then, we will focus on situations where repetition of the situation makes possible the impact of additional structural variables including:
6. information about past actions;
7. how individuals are linked;
8. whether individuals can enter or exit voluntarily.
(Ostrom 2007, p. 4)
(How) can the institutionalization of property rights
help to solve resource use problems?
 J. Acheson (2006, p. 121): “economists see private property as ha-
ving many advantages, they have long advocated solving resourcemanagement problems by effecting private-property rights or by simulating such rights with mechanisms such as licensing or quotas”,
but in practice the possibilities of privatization are limited:
 “If privatization is going to solve resource-management problems,
property rights have to be complete and well defined, efficient
markets for those resources have to exist, and enforcement of
property rights must be possible at low cost. In the real world, some
important resources, such as migratory species of fish, cannot be
privatized. Moreover, market inefficiency and market failure are
common …. There is no market for some resources such as air.”
Achesons´ proposal (2006, p. 129)
 “Management will be effective only if resources are matched
with governance structures and management techniques. A
governance structure using a technique on one resource might
succeed, whereas the same governance organization using the same
technique might fail miserably when applied to another resource. For
example, tradable environmental allowances have worked well in
controlling air pollution …, but such programs (e.g., ITQs) have
generally not done well in managing fisheries because they have
motivated fishermen to high grade (discard all fish except the most
desi-rable) …, have led to a concentration in control by a small elite
…., and in many cases have not conserved the fish stocks”
 Rather than searching one solution in form of communitybased, state-based or market-based resource management:
combinations of all these
Social capital …
“… is the shared knowledge, understandings, norms,
rules, and expectations about patterns of interactions
that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity
…. In the establishment of any coordinated activity,
participants accomplish far more per unit of time devoted to a
joint activity if they draw on capital resources to reduce the
level of current inputs needed to produce a joint outcome.
They are more productive with whatever physical and
human capital they draw on, if they agree on the way
that they will coordinate activities and credibly commit
themselves to a sequence of future actions.” (Ostrom
1999, p. 176)
Coupled human and natural systems (CHANS) or SES
 “… a new paradigm that emphasizes hierarchical couplings of
natural and human systems across organizational, spatial, and
temporal scales. The approach is not simply larger-scale
analysis, as with previous global modeling efforts (e.g., World
Dynamics …, Limits to Growth …). Rather it stresses the
nesting of local systems in regional and global
systems, the cumulative effects of local processes on
global processes, the differential coupling of human
and natural systems at each scale, the embedding of
smaller-scale processes in larger scale processes, and
the influences of larger-scale processes on smallerscale processes.” (Liu et al., 2007, p. 645)
Ostrom 2007: with the concept of SES in search of a
science of complex systems
 Abstract: “Given rapid changes in large-scale human and biophy-
sical processes - carbon emissions, population increase and migrations, overharvesting and pollution leading to loss of species
– scien-tists are worried that many of the social-ecological systems existing today may collapse by the end of the 21st century. Is this an exaggerated worry? …. More important than simply worrying, however, is the development of a strong diagnostic method for analyzing the diversity of processes and the multiplicity of potential social
and bio-physical solutions that are needed to cope effectively with these
varied processes. …. Our need today is building a strong interdisciplinary science of complex, multilevel systems that will enable
over time a matching of potential solutions to a careful diagnosis of specific problems embedded in a social-ecological context.”
”Rebound effect” (or ”Jevons paradox”)
 Non-intended consequences of improved technical and economic
efficiency of production in modern market economies (dematerialized production, cheaper products):
 more of the products/resources are used, annihilating efforts of
resource saving by some people
(Sorell, S. & Dimitropoulos, J._ The rebound effect: Micro-economic
definitions, limitations and extensions. Ecological Economics 2008,
65, 3, 636-649)
Forms and consequences of natural resource use are more
complex than they appear in individual awareness and
behaviour - not only natural laws, also social structures
regulate individual behaviour
The concepts ‘‘resilience’’, ‘‘robustness’’, and
‘‘vulnerability’’
“… can only be understood in relation to one another …. All
three are properties of a combined SES. Robustness is the most
recent of these terms …. Its intrinsic meanings are still under
(sometimes heated) discussion …. In the present context, it seems
to refer to the structural and other properties of a system that allow
it to withstand the influence of disturbances without changing
structure or dynamics (Anderies et al., 2004). Current levels of
robustness may be based on past adaptations. If these were
highly specific, the system may need to adapt upon
encountering new types of disturbances …. As defined by
Holling (1973), by contrast, resilience refers to ‘‘the capacity of a
system to absorb and utilize or even benefit from perturbations and
changes that attain it, and so to persist without a qualitative change
in the system’s structure.’’ (Young et al., 2006, p. 305)
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Rockström et al., ”planetary boundaries”
 “We have identified nine planetary boundaries and, drawing upon current
scientific understanding, we propose quantifications for seven of them.
These seven are climate change (CO2 concentration in the atmosphere
<350 ppm and/or a maximum change of +1 W m-2 in radiative forcing);
ocean acidification (mean surface seawater saturation state with respect
to aragonite ³ 80% of pre-industrial levels); stratospheric ozone (<5%
reduction in O3 concentration from pre-industrial level of 290 Dobson Units);
biogeochemical nitrogen (N) cycle (limit industrial and agricultural
fixation of N2 to 35 Tg N yr-1) and phosphorus (P) cycle (annual P inflow
to oceans not to exceed 10 times the natural background weathering of P);
global freshwater use (<4000 km3 yr-1 of consumptive use of runoff
resources); land system change (<15% of the ice-free land surface under
cropland); and the rate at which biological diversity is lost (annual rate
of <10 extinctions per million species). The two additional planetary
boundaries for which we have not yet been able to determine a boundary
level are chemical pollution and atmospheric aerosol loading. We
estimate that humanity has already transgressed three planetary
boundaries: for climate change, rate of biodiversity loss, and changes to the
global nitrogen cycle.”
Exponential growth phenomena at global levels
Steffen et al. 2004