China-Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics -- Alexander Korolev -- 2022 -- Amsterdam University Press -- 10 1515 9789048552733 mg -- e450daede9750610a03f9ecc459e0898 -- Anna’s Archive

China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
China–Russia Strategic Alignment
in International Politics
Alexander Korolev
Amsterdam University Press
Cover photo: Shutterstock
Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden
Typesetting: Crius Group, Hulshout
isbn
e-isbn
doi
nur
978 94 6372 524 8
978 90 4855 273 3 (pdf)
10.5117/9789463725248
754
© Alexander Korolev / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2022
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise)
without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.
Every effort has been made to obtain permission to use all copyrighted illustrations
reproduced in this book. Nonetheless, whosoever believes to have rights to this material is
advised to contact the publisher.
For my mother,
Galina N. Koroleva,
for all her sacrifices and unconditional support throughout my life
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments 11
1 Introduction
The Elusive Nature of China–Russia Relations and the Need for
Theory
Studies of China–Russia relations: in search of the “right” label
Existing definitions of alignments: conceptual ambiguity
China–Russia relations and alignments studies – towards analytical synergy
The book: structure and the logic of analysis
2 The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
Treaty alliances and informal alignments: the analytical implications
The ordinal index of strategic alignment
Explaining the trend: the three balances as incentives for alignment formation
Robustness check: economic and diplomatic cooperation
3 Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
China–Russia cooperation treaty
The early stage: conf idence building measures and regular
consultations
1 Confidence building measures
2 Regular consultations
Moderate cooperation: military-technical cooperation and regular
military exercises
3 Military-technical cooperation
4 Regular military exercises
Advanced cooperation: the growing interoperability of military
forces
Conclusion
4 Alignment Incentives: The Three Balances
Balance of power: the shift in the distribution of capabilities and
its implications
13
16
19
22
25
35
37
41
48
56
65
66
67
68
69
73
73
83
86
89
99
100
Balance of threat: convergence of China and Russia’s perception
of external threats
Convergence of interests and implications for China–Russia
alignment
Conclusion
5 Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomacy
Economic cooperation: trade, unequal interdependence, and new
initiatives
The formation of “unfavorable complementarity” in China–Russia economic relations
Attempts to reverse the trend
Diplomatic cooperation: a reflection of geopolitical interests
Conclusion
108
115
120
129
130
130
142
147
151
6 Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments 157
US–India cooperation from the strategic alignment perspective 158
Confidence building measures and US–India alignment
160
Mechanisms for regular consultations in US–India strategic
cooperation162
Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC)
164
Regular joint military exercises in US–India relations
167
Advanced cooperation and interoperability of US and Indian
military forces
171
Explaining US–India strategic cooperation: power, threats, and
interest
172
Robustness check
180
Conclusion
181
7 Conclusion
Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications
China–Russia relations: an ever-consolidating strategic alignment?
The alignment framework and the study of interstate strategic
cooperation
189
190
194
Index 199
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1 The stages, criteria, and causes of alignment formation
42
Figure 3.1 Development of China–Russia military cooperation
90
since 1991
Figure 4.1 Commonality of China’s interests with Russia and the
119
US (1991-2020)
132
Table 5.1 China–Russia trade (1992-2019)
Table 5.2 Non-energy share of China–Russia trade in 2001-2019 (%) 137
148
Table 5.3 Veto records in UN Security Council (1991-2020)
149
Table 5.4 China–Russia joint vetoes in the UNSC since 1991
Table 6.1 India’s major regular military exercises with the
170
United States and Russia
Table 6.2 Comparison of China–Russia and US–India alignments 182
Acknowledgments
This book draws together the strands of my research on China–Russia
strategic cooperation and international relations (IR) more broadly. As such,
it has been long in the making. I always wanted to write a book that would
bridge area studies and IR literature and thus bring the important case of
China–Russia relations back to IR-informed research.
In hindsight, the starting point of this book can be traced back to December 2015, when I was invited to deliver a public lecture on China–Russia
strategic cooperation at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
in Singapore. When preparing for the lecture, I discovered two things about
China–Russia relations as an object of scholarly inquiry: the overall tendency
to underestimate the breadth, depth, and consequentiality of China–Russia
strategic cooperation and the simultaneous detachment of China–Russia
studies from the mainstream IR theorizing. In my subsequent works, I tried
to address these issues. This book draws upon those works but pushes the
theoretical and empirical analysis further in an attempt to not only present
a theory-grounded analysis of contemporary China–Russia relations but
also generate frameworks and theoretical approaches that can be applied
to other cases of interstate strategic cooperation to facilitate comparative
analyses of different strategic alignments.
Throughout the process of the book gradually taking shape, I benefited
from multiple colleagues who commented on earlier drafts and parts of the
chapters. I am also grateful to those colleagues who invited me to present
my research on China–Russia relations, thus inadvertently pushing the
project forward. An inevitably incomplete list must include: Michael Raska,
Konstantin Topilskiy, Richard Bitzinger, Oriana Mastro, Brandon Yoder, Ted
Hopf, Gaye Christoffersen, Vladimir Portyakov, Liu Feng, Jeffrey Taliaferro,
Camilla Sørensen, Pu Xiaoyu, Zhang Ruizhuang, Feng Shaolei, Vasily Kashin,
Thomas Wilkins, Dorothy Horsfield, Richard Sakwa, Victor Larin, Deborah
Larsen, Margaret Pearson, Nicholas Ross Smith, and Rajesh Basrur. I am also
grateful to Amsterdam University Press editors Saskia Gieling and Maryse
Elliott, whose patience and professionalism are gratefully acknowledged.
My apologies and appreciation to anyone not listed above but who has
also contributed by a valuable comment or feedback on the earlier drafts
of different segments of the book.
The beginning of the intensive writing stage coincided with the outbreak
of the first wave of the COVID-19 global pandemic soon after which Sydney
was sent into the first lockdown. During those taxing times, the work on this
12 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
book would not be possible without support, encouragement, and advice
coming from my wife, Fengshi Wu. Thank you as well to my little daughter,
Helena, for her patience (and sometimes impatience!) as I wrote this book.
Sydney, November 2021
Alexander Korolev
1
Introduction
The Elusive Nature of China–Russia Relations and the Need
for Theory
Abstract
This chapter explores how the International Relations (IR) literature on
alignments can help understand the case of China–Russia relations and
how, in turn, the study of China–Russia relations can enrich the theoretical knowledge about alignments. The existing studies of China–Russia
relations have failed to develop a theory-grounded system of indicators
to measure China–Russia alignment. In turn, the IR literature does not
have a ready-made, indicators-based taxonomy of alignments that could
be applied to the China–Russia case. In this context, this chapter places a
particular emphasis on the importance of theory for the comprehensive
and systematic understanding of China–Russia alignment. It also presents
the book structure, methodology, and research design that redef ine
China–Russia relations in theory-informed terms of strategic alignment
and reconnect it with theoretical IR.
Keywords: China–Russia relations, international relations theory, alliance,
alignment
The rationale behind this book is two-fold. On the one hand, China–Russia
strategic cooperation has displayed significant development and become
an increasingly important factor in contemporary international politics,
with considerable implications for both US–China and US–Russia relations.
On the other hand, attempts to develop a theory-grounded framework and
corresponding measurements that would allow an accurate and systematic
assessment of the level of China–Russia strategic cooperation as well as its
progress over time have been extremely scarce in the existing literature.
China–Russia strategic cooperation has progressed considerably and consistently since the end of the Cold War. According to official documents and
Korolev, Alexander, China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press 2022
doi: 10.5117/9789463725248_ch01
14 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
statements, the relationship has progressed from “good neighborliness” in the
early 1990s to “constructive cooperation” in the late 1990s to “comprehensive
strategic partnership” in 2001, then further on to “comprehensive strategic
partnership of coordination” in 2012 and to “comprehensive strategic partnership of equality, mutual trust, mutual support, common prosperity and
long-lasting friendship” in 2016 (Korolev & Portyakov, 2019). A new upgrade
took place on June 5, 2019, when Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin declared
China–Russia relations to be “a comprehensive strategic partnership of
coordination for a new era,” which highlights consistent consolidation of
China–Russia alignment, its immunity to exogenous shocks, and willingness
on both sides to deal with the challenges of the future (Xinhua, 2019).
The relationship soared in the context of Russia’s high-profile “turn to
the East,” the deterioration of Russia–US relations after the Ukraine Crisis,
China’s “new assertiveness” in the South and East China Seas, and the recent
worsening of China–US rivalry, especially in the context of the COVID-19
global pandemic when the deteriorating relations between Washington and
Beijing became increasingly reminiscent of Cold War-style geopolitics. In
this context, calls have risen in both China and Russia to form a strategic
“alliance” to protect the interests and enhance the international geopolitical
standing of the two countries. Some of Russia’s foreign policy experts
have called for upgrading China–Russia collaboration to the level of a
full-fledged political-military alliance (Tavrovsky, 2014). In China, despite
the official “non-alignment” doctrine, some experts have also called to
upgrade the partnership with Russia to a full-scale alliance (Yan, 2012;
Dai, 2012).1 Some prominent Chinese IR experts have argued that China
will be unable to shift the US-dominated unipolar world order “unless it
forms a formal alliance with Russia” (Yan, 2012). Most remarkably, China’s
first National Security Blue Book, commissioned by the government and
written by experts from the Institute of Contemporary International
Relations, recommends that China should consider forming an “alliance
with Russia” (Global Times, 2014). In 2019, during the Valdai discussion
club conference in Sochi, Russia, President Putin was unambiguous by
announcing that China and Russia have developed a truly strategic “alliance
relationship” (Akopov, 2019). In 2020, Putin mentioned that “our [China
and Russia] relationship has reached such a level of coordination and
trust that we don’t need it [the alliance], but, theoretically speaking, it is
not unimaginable…. It is not our task at the moment, but, in principle, we
1 For a concise summary of Chinese experts’ arguments in favor of alliance with Russia, see
Lee and Lukin (2016), pp. 117-120.
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15
don’t plan to exclude such a scenario [forming an alliance with China]
either” (President of Russia, 2020).
Given China and Russia’s geopolitical parameters and military capabilities, a tighter alliance between them could significantly change the entire
power structure of the contemporary international system. It could also have
tremendous ramifications in terms of challenging the existing liberal order
in the most fundamental ways. Russia could gain more opportunities to
balance the United States and promote its vision of multipolarity in Europe.
China could receive more political backing from Russia and greater access
to Russia’s energy resources and military technologies, perhaps with the
integration of strategies for defense innovation and transition toward joint
development of arms, which would be an indispensable asset for China in its
growing tensions with the United States. Closer China–Russia cooperation
could also strategically reshape Eurasia by making it more interlinked in
both economic and strategic terms. Closer China–Russia alignment could
also further limit Russia–US and China–US cooperation on issues of crucial
strategic importance for the United States. More fundamentally, a more
closely aligned China and Russia would have a stronger license to reject
Western democracy and the Western model more broadly because both
view it as a threat to their geopolitical interests and their regimes’ survival.
Many Western analysts increasingly recognize the serious geopolitical
challenge to the United States and its strategic allies that China–Russia
consolidating alignment can pose. Thus, some leading US experts on the
issue worry that China, if supported by Russia’s military-technical prowess
and enormous resources, could challenge US national security interests as
never before (Ellings & Sutter, 2018). Other leading American strategists
have been blunt in a recent special report to Congress by stating that US’s
military superiority has “eroded to a dangerous degree,” to the extent that
the US “might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia,”
especially “if it is forced to fight on two or more fronts simultaneously”
(National Defense Strategy Commission, 2018, pp. v-vi).
Despite its significance for international politics, strategic cooperation
between China and Russia in the post-Cold War era turns out to be difficult
to define and explain. The extant studies display disturbing ambiguity
regarding where China and Russia stand in terms of alliance formation,
with assessments ranging from the two being called “allies” to “rivals.” The
reason for such an extensive range of conflicting depictions and the resultant inconclusiveness has to do with both the methodology of the existing
analyses and the detachment of China–Russia studies from IR theory. The
existing studies of China–Russia relations have mostly been unable to bear
16 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
significant theoretical fruit and contribute to conceptual generalization
in IR. Even applications of IR theories to explore and explain the case of
China–Russia strategic cooperation or attempts at theory building within
the case itself have also been scarce.2 The existing theories of alignment, in
turn, have been unable to measure the strength of alignment in a systematic
and rigorous way. For the IR field more broadly, China–Russia relations
have predominantly, but unjustifiably, remained a peripheral case, often
altogether absent from the mainstream IR theorizing.
The lack of a theory-grounded approach and the ambiguity that surrounds
the analyses of China–Russia relations are counterproductive. Without
methodical assessments of China–Russia alignment, international relations
experts might be miscalculating the overall tendency of power relations
within the international structure as well as the dynamics of China–US
and Russia–US relations. What is at stake is not just theoretical. Knowing
how closely aligned China and Russia are has significant policy implications, particularly for the United States and its allies. While China and
Russia individually may still have some distance to travel before mounting
a consequential challenge to American global influence, the aggregation
of their capabilities in a functioning alliance or even alignment, and the
ensuing geopolitical leverage, poses a serious challenge for Washington.
For example, should the US and its strategic allies focus on tackling China’s
growing capabilities or, instead, driving a wedge between Moscow and
Beijing, whose cooperation increasingly displays the features of an anti-US
strategic alliance? The two options entail differently tailored foreign policies.
Telling which one should be feasibly pursued, and thus potential costs of
miscalculation minimized, is difficult without a methodical assessment of
the alignment between China and Russia.
Studies of China–Russia relations: in search of the “right” label
There has been a striking lack of progress in understanding China–Russia
relations and the degree to which they have developed over time. This
2 This does not mean that there are no works that have employed IR theories to the case
of China–Russia relations. Some rare exceptions include Korloev (2016), who uses a two-level
approach (global and regional) to develop a structure of Sino–Russian relations where the two
align together globally but compete and hedge regionally, and Krickovic (2017), who employs
structural realism and the logic of power shifts to explain the genesis and robustness of the
relationship and its symbiotic nature. Both works, however, bypass the takes of def ining
China–Russia relationship before trying to explain it.
Introduc tion
17
is manifested in the titles of some books on the relationship. In the year
2000, the pervasive question was “Rapprochement or Rivalry?” (Garnett,
2000), twelve years later, the question had barely changed to “Rivalry or
Partnership?” (Bedeski & Swanström, 2012). Numerous underspecified and
contrasting terms have been used to describe this bilateral relationship.
Since the mid-1990s, and following the official language of Beijing and
Moscow, China–Russia relations have been referred to as various “partnerships” – simply “partnership” (Kerr, 2005), “limited partnership” (Garnett,
1998), “strategic partnership” (Wilson, 2004) or “limited defensive strategic
partnership” (Li, 2007). Other popular names have to do with a variety of
“axes” – “axis of convenience” (Lo, 2009), “axis of necessity” (Kuchins, 2014),
“axis of insecurity” (Brenton, 2013), or “axis of authoritarians” (Ellings &
Sutter, 2018). China–Russia relations have also been called “entente” (Trenin,
2015), a relationship of “parallel identities” (Rozman, 2014) and other terms.
The relationship has also been reported to be undergoing a “long sunset” (Lo,
2004) or carrying the features of “strategic parallelism without partnership
or passion” (Weitz, 2008). Other allegorical descriptions include “comrades
in arms” (Muraviev, 2014) a “romance” (Roh, 2019) or “ambivalent embrace”
(Kuchins, 2007), along with Russia being presented as a “loud dissenter” and
China its “cautious partner” (Snetkov & Lanteigne, 2015).
To add to the lexical confusion, the term “alliance” has also often been a
reference point in scholarly discussions of China–Russia relations. According to Voskressenski (2003, p. 208), China and Russia “have always been
exploring some form of alliance with each other.” Cohen (2001) characterizes
China–Russia collaboration as an “emerging alliance” requiring careful
monitoring. Nemets (2006) calls it an “ominous anti-American alliance” with
the potential to considerably reconfigure the international balance of power
and severely harm American interests. Wishnick (2001, p. 798) argues that
China–Russia relations had the strategic and political foundations for an
“incipient alliance” that, however, were countervailed by a range of divergent
interests limiting how close the two countries can be. Trenin (2015) argues
that China and Russia are entering into relations of a new kind that “will fall
short of a formal alliance but will be closer than the strategic partnership the
two countries have had since the 1990s.” What has been glaringly missing in
the “alliance” discussions, however, is the alliance framework itself, which
makes it impossible to determine in which aspects, if at all, China–Russia
relations are an alliance and whether the two countries are capable of joint
action in the case of a hypothetical conflict with other major powers.
Against the backdrop of intensifying Russia–US rivalry after the Ukraine
Crisis and China–US competition in East and Southeast Asia, more attention
18 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
started to be paid to military cooperation between the two countries (Meick,
2017; Watts et al., 2016; Korolev, 2019; Muraviev, 2014; Blank, 2020). In this
context, some observers have raised straightforward questions, such as “Is
there a China–Russia alliance?” (Goldstein, 2017) and “Are China–Russia
relations an alliance or not?” (Zheng, 2016). However, as in the case of the
broader literature mentioned above, there has been no comprehensive
framework for assessing military cooperation that would demonstrate
the level of China–Russia military cooperation and its progress over time.
With such a range of assessments from highly optimistic (or alarmist)
to highly skeptical, it remains unclear how closely China and Russia are
aligned because none of the applied terms have been defined in a manner
that is sufficient for making them subject to systematic empirical examination. For example, Lo (2009) lists factors that can undermine the depth of
China–Russia cooperation without defining and operationalizing his very
dependent variable – the “axis of convenience” itself – thus creating an
observationally equivalent argument so that any interstate relationship can
be an axis of convenience. Rozman (2014) argues that China and Russia’s
national identities are much closer to each other than usually thought, and,
hence, China–Russia cooperation is based on a deeper shared vision and
shared values, but without defining this cooperation itself.
There have been multiple descriptions and examinations of various
empirical aspects of recent China–Russia strategic cooperation (Wilson,
2016; Cox, 2016; Ambrosio, 2017; Kaczmarski, 2017; Kaczmarski, 2019; Odgaard,
2017; Wishnick, 2017; Bolt & Cross, 2018). However, attempts to develop
an analytical framework grounded in IR theories to assess and explain
the degree of alignment between the two countries have been scarce and
have lacked objective measurements.3 Reliance on ad hoc measures and
explanations that are neither systematic nor theory-grounded results in a
disconnected patchwork that has retarded the cumulative development of
knowledge in the field. This problem equally characterizes broader studies
of China–Russia relations. Thus, the explanations of the upward trend
in the bilateral relationship, suggested in the existing literature, include
causal factors as different as the behavior of the United States (Kerr, 2005;
Lo, 2009; Menon, 2009; Lukin 2015; Charap et al., 2017), the nature of China’s
and Russia’s political regimes (Menon, 2009; Rozman, 2014; Lukin, 2015;
Charap et al., 2017), national identities (Kerr, 2005; Kuchins, 2007; Rozman,
2014; Trenin, 2015; Wishnick, 2017), concerns about separatism (Kerr, 2005;
Lo, 2008; Odgaard, 2017), benefits of economic cooperation (Kerr, 2005;
3
A rare example of an attempt to conceptualize without objective measures is Wilkins (2008).
Introduc tion
19
Wilson, 2004; Swanström, 2014; Lukin, 2015; Trenin, 2015; Gabuev, 2016;
Charap et al., 2017), friendship among national leaders (Ferdinand, 2007;
Lo, 2008; Gabuev, 2016) and other factors. The problem with these studies is
that with some exceptions (Kerr, 2005; Ferdinand, 2007; Li, 2007; Odgaard,
2017; Wishnick, 2017) their explanations rely on an arbitrary selection of
causal factors that are not grounded in explicit theories. An otherwise
useful and comprehensive recent work (Bolt & Cross, 2018) has brought
in-depth regional expertise and actively engaged with Chinese and Russian sources, which is valuable in its own right, but still failed to present a
theory-grounded analytical framework and corresponding measurements
that would allow for a systematic assessment of the level and progress of
China–Russia strategic cooperation.
As demonstrated by Yoder (2020, p. 2), the lack of careful attention to
theory in studies of contemporary China–Russia relations results in myriad
ad hoc explanations and diverse predictions – a situation where scholars
talk past each other, basing their arguments on unstated assumptions and
unspecified causal mechanisms that inform which evidence is considered and how it is interpreted. In sum, our knowledge of the strength of
contemporary China–Russia strategic cooperation has been limited and
unsystematic. Rozman’s (1998, p. 396) assessment from more than 20 years
ago remains accurate today: analysts “have reached little consensus on what
the [China–Russia] partnership is, why it has developed, what it signifies,
and how firm it is likely to be.” It is even more so in the context of the Russian
and Chinese leaders’ desire to bill the China–Russia partnership as a new
phenomenon in international politics (Wilkins, 2008, p. 367).
Existing definitions of alignments: conceptual ambiguity
Referring to the IR literature does not help to resolve the confusion that surrounds China–Russia relations and reveals even more problems for defining
and measuring interstate strategic cooperation. Alignment is an inchoate
term that has not been systematically defined in the IR literature. The
literature on “alliances,” in turn, contains more than 30 different definitions
of the term (China–Russia relations meet some, but not others) and only two
attempts to develop an objective indicators-based taxonomy (Fedder, 1968;
Russett, 1971), both of which are now quite dated. 4 Tertrais (2004) mentions
4 To appreciate the variability of alliances from some form of loose cooperation over general
goals to strict commitments solidified by a formal alliance treaty, see: Weitsman (2003), Walt
20 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
the “laxity” with which experts and officials use the term. Walt (1987, p. 1)
uses “alliance” interchangeably with informal “alignment” and does not
provide indicators for either. Ward (1982, p. 14) documents that “much
written work uses the three different orientations – alliance, alignment, and
coalition – as though they were identical.” According to Wilkins (2012, p. 54),
despite multiple publications, there is little understanding of “alliances”
and other “alignments” between states, and there is no credible taxonomy.
Conceptual problems surrounding alliances and alignments in the study
of international politics are perennial ones. In his seminal work in 1960s,
Liska (1962, p. 3) wrote about the impossibility of separating alliances from
international politics in general and, hence, the difficulties of studying them
as a phenomenon. Three decades later, Snyder (1991, p. 121) echoed Liska’s
concerns arguing that while alliances and alignments are the most central
phenomena in international politics, isolating them as objects of analysis is
difficult due to their ubiquity and variety of formal and informal manifestations. This problem has retarded the generation of theories about alliances,
which contrasts with the theoretical richness of IR studies of various forms
of conflicts, such as war, crisis, or deterrence (Snyder 1991, p. 121).
The conceptual confusion regarding both the forms and the causes of
alliances remains unresolved. Salmon (2006, p. 839) demonstrates that in
the absence of a single definition of alliance, the meaning of the concept
has varied “from agreements on values, goals, ideology, mutual benefits to
agreements for fighting and, indeed, attacking third parties.” At the same
time, some argued that a broader definition of a military alliance would
include alliances that do not even imply a security guarantee (Tertrais, 2004,
p. 136). Such variety has led Wilkins (2012, p. 56) to conclude that despite the
wealth of scholarship, there has been no general theory of alliances, and that
is why it is imperative to re-examine and revise the existing frameworks
and definitions of alliances and alignments. In sum, there is no ready-made
framework in this subfield of IR that could be applied to assess and explain
the case of post-Cold War China–Russia relations, as well as other interstate
alignments.
At the same time, the term “strategic partnership” – the official name for
China–Russia relations – has been surrounded by even greater confusion.
The problem with the term is that there are so many interstate relations
that are called “partnerships” and so little conceptual work identifying the
meaning and implications of “partnerships” that the term loses any analytical
(1987), Snyder (1997), Singer and Small (1966), Ashley Leeds and Anac (2005), Morrow (2000),
Reiter (1994), Sorokin (1994), Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan (1973).
Introduc tion
21
value. As documented by Kay (2000), partnerships appear with various adjectives, and there are numerous other terms with parallel meanings, adopted
by various states. These include the most popular “strategic partnership,”
but also “strategic dialogue,” “special relationship,” “enhanced relationship,”
“constructive strategic partnership,” “comprehensive partnership,” “long-term
comprehensive partnership,” “long-term stable constructive partnership,”
and “good-neighborly mutual-trust partnership” (Kay, 2000, p. 15). These
terms may signal certain diplomatic posturings of some countries in different real-world strategic contexts, but they remain imprecise and open
to interpretation and speculation. Often, “partnerships” play the role of
not more than “simply a rhetorical device used by diplomats to help them
around the rough edges of shifting global politics” (Kay, 2000, p. 17). There
have been very scarce scholarly treatments of the term in connection to
alliances and alignments and, hence, limited understanding of the nature
and functions of partnerships (Wilkins, 2015, p. 81). On top of it all, some
scholars have also talked about alignments under the partnership framework
and, simultaneously, located partnerships under the broader concept of
alignment (Strüver, 2016). To add to the conceptual complexity and overlaps,
strategic partnerships have also been viewed as falling under the alignment concept and, simultaneously, representing a form of “soft balancing”
(Ferguson, 2012, p. 205).
In summary, the theory-grounded conceptual apparatus available to
scholars working on China–Russia relations or other interstate alignments
is ambiguous and lacks agreed-upon, objective measurements. Discussion of alliances, alignments, partnerships, and other forms of strategic
cooperation is characterized by theoretical and empirical overlaps when
both the different names and tools of analysis are used interchangeably.
Since “alignment,” military or not, is a core dependent variable that pervades
the IR field, the scarcity of attempts to measure it has serious implications
for IR research. For example, it is possible that some of the “puzzles” of
increasing or decreasing cooperation that scholars have sought to explain
do not actually exist by objective measures, while others might have gone
unrecognized.5 This poses an analytical challenge for assessing China–Russia
5 Consider, for example, the cacophony of assessments surrounding China’s reaction to the
Russia–Georgia war of 2008 and the Ukraine Crisis of 2014. Regarding the former, some argued
that China “sides with the West, not Russia” (The Associated Press, 2008), while others argued that
China was on Russia’s side (Yu, 2008). The same occurred with the Ukraine Crisis: some argued
that China “sided with Russia” (Durden, 2015) while others observed that “China splits with Russia
over Ukraine” (Stearns, 2014). Academic studies on the issue are similarly divided (see: Korolev
& Portyakov, 2018). These conflicting depictions vividly reveal the problem with answering a
22 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
relations. At the same time, it provides an opportunity for innovation both
theoretically and empirically.
China–Russia relations and alignments studies – towards
analytical synergy
This book bridges area studies and IR literature by linking China–Russia
relations to the study of alignments. It maps out the evolving China–Russia
strategic cooperation in terms amenable to international relations theorizing
and endeavors to go beyond the China–Russia case per se to start qualifying
and quantifying strategic alignment in international relations. It develops a
set of objective and deductively justifiable criteria to measure and explain
the development of “alignment” in post-Cold War China–Russia relations.6
As such, and given the limitations of both fields (the study of China–Russia
relations and the study of alignments) mentioned above, the approach
adopted in this study involves “zigzagging” between theory and empirical
analysis in that it draws on the existing theoretical knowledge, however
limited, about interstate strategic alignments to understand the case of
China–Russia alignment but also uses the empirical data from this case to
inform generalizations regarding interstate alignment formation and thus
enrich existing theoretical knowledge.
This approach requires cross-fertilization of empirical and theoretical
analyses to develop a framework that can both comprehend the empirical
realities of contemporary China–Russia alignment and, at the same time,
help grasp the generalizable dynamics of alignments that could facilitate
the formulation of hypotheses and expectations concerning alignment
formation and development. The analytical intention is that the elements
of alignment that are informed by the existing theoretical knowledge and
refined based on the analysis of China–Russia relations can also apply to
other interstate relations.
The primary theoretical inquiries this study sets out to explore are: How to
define and measure strategic alignments between states? What stages does
seemingly simple question of whether China cooperated with Russia or not. In this situation,
viable explanations are impossible because the very dependent variable cannot be defined.
6 When it comes to “objectivity,” there are limitations faced by any social scientists. In this
sense, the suggested framework represents an interpretation, a needed one, as the author
believes, but still an interpretation. It is objective in that it is based on the topical literature
and operationalizable and verifiable indicators. However, the selection of those criteria as well
as their measurement may be open to interpretation.
Introduc tion
23
an alignment go through before becoming a full-fledged alliance? Because
there are no current frameworks for assessing alignment, the empirical goal
of accurately assessing the degree and trajectory of strategic cooperation
in post-Cold War China–Russia relations (the main empirical goal) entails
first answering these questions and thus fulfilling a broader theoretical
goal of constructing a framework to assess interstate alignments.
The framework offered in this book synthesizes the theoretical literature
on alliances, alignments, strategic partnerships, and other forms of interstate
cooperation to develop an empirically operationalizable set of criteria for
what in this book is called “strategic alignment.”7 The framework moves
beyond simply extracting and listing different indicators from the literature
and adds an ordinal dimension to the indicators by introducing definitions
of “early,” “moderate,” and “advanced” stages of alignment development. To
more effectively trace the trend in China–Russia relations over time, this
framework qualitatively measures the degree of indicators within each
stage, rather than dichotomously coding the presence or absence of these
indicators. At the same time, while the particular emphasis is placed on
military cooperation as the backbone of strategic alignment in general, and
between China and Russia in particular, the book explores the economic and
diplomatic dimensions of the bilateral relations as a “robustness check” – to
assess the overall progress over time and to identify whether the increased
cooperation is limited to the military realm.8
Applying this framework to the case of post-Cold War China–Russia
relations allows making further conceptual refinements. The China–Russia
case can help understand how a great power relationship can start from
a very low level and progress to a closer alignment, what stages it goes
through and how. At the same time, the framework allows gauging the
7 Admittedly, there are no perfect terms in the study of international relations. Like many
others, “strategic alignment” is not a perfect concept. However, unlike “alliance,” it possesses
the needed breadth that can facilitate conceptual development. At the same time, it reflects the
nature of interstate relations that are not ad hoc, which is why it is “strategic,” and are driven by
military cooperation (the cornerstone of China–Russia relations), which is why it is “alignment,”
and not just “cooperation.”
8 I thank Brandon Yoder for the suggestion to look at economic and diplomatic cooperation
as a “robustness check” on China–Russia strategic cooperation. The robustness check approach
with regards to the economic and diplomatic dimensions of cooperation is dictated by the
diff iculty of assigning relative weights to these dimensions that are incommensurate with
the military dimension within an alignment. However, the primary focus on the military
dimension is warranted, insofar as it has the highest bar for cooperation and is very likely to
be accompanied by enhanced economic and diplomatic cooperation. See futher discussion of
this issue in Chapter 2.
24 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
relative significance and scale of the contemporary China–Russia strategic
alignment by placing it in a comparative context. Doing so also tests and
generalizes the suggested framework using other cases. To achieve this goal,
the same framework is applied to assess the case of US–India alignment
as also a case of a growing strategic alignment which, according to some
observers, shares similarities with China–Russia alignment. While the
suggested framework will likely (and hopefully) invite additional refinements
and revisions, including tests with larger samples, it represents a necessary
step to fill a crucial gap in the IR literature.
Empirically, the book assesses and explains the degree and trajectory
of alignment in post-Cold War China–Russia relations. The main empirical questions include: How closely aligned are China and Russia? How
technically prepared are they for united military action and a full-fledged
military alliance? How does China–Russia alignment fare, based on the
objective measurements, with other representative alignments? Is alignment
between China and Russia an ad hoc reaction to the recent deterioration
of their relations with the United States, or does it have deeper causes that
are rooted in long-term international-systemic trends? What explains the
growing closeness between the two countries and how might this trend be
modified or reversed?
The empirical goal is not to rename the relationship and add a new catchword to the already long list of labels. Doing so does not seem to be a very
meaningful analytical endeavor. Nor is the goal to pick a fight with either
“optimists” (or “alarmists”), who believe that China–Russia alignment is solid,
reliable, and has potential to grow, or at least that the existing problems
in the relationship are not insurmountable (Nguyen, 1993; Nemets, 2006;
Kaczmarski, 2015; Cox, 2016; Ambrosio, 2017; Wishnick, 2017), or “skeptics,”
who try to pile up evidence to prove the opposite (Lo, 2009; Menon, 2009;
Brenton, 2013; Wilson, 2016). This strategy, without due attention to theory,
would simply continue the infinite regress that besets the discussion of
China–Russia relations. In fact, this study has issues with both camps but
more from a methodological point of view because the works on both sides
of the argument do not sufficiently utilize IR theoretical knowledge or apply
rigorous measurements. This study does not attempt to prove that China
and Russia are going to inevitably fight together against another country
soon, or, in contrast, that the alignment is going to fall apart. It is not a
policy interpretation, and the analytical style and emphasis in this book
are different from those of area specialists.
Instead, the goal is to measure and explain the change in the China–Russia
alignment relationship over time while also providing a rough point estimate
Introduc tion
25
of the absolute degree of cooperation. From an empirical standpoint, this
study should be viewed as a long-needed reality check of the elements of “alliance” in China–Russia relations that are becoming increasingly prominent
in both the literature and the policy discourse. In other words, it provides
a theory-grounded demonstration that is as accurate as possible of where
China–Russia military cooperation stands in terms of alliance formation.
By explicitly applying an alignment framework, it enhances the clarity of
the existing discussion of the “allianceness” of China–Russia relations. It
helps to understand how ready the two countries are for a formal military
alliance should such a decision be made.
The application of the alignment framework developed in this book
establishes that on a range of criteria China–Russia military alignment is
moving closer to a full-fledged alliance. It is solid and comprehensive and,
having passed what is defined in the framework as the “moderate” stage
of alignment, continues to show a consistent incremental upward trend.
It is also highly institutionalized, with growing elements of inter-military
compatibility and interoperability. China–Russia alignment also appears
responsive to external circumstances and based on a shared perception of
the geopolitical security environment. At the same time, there are strong
structural incentives for furthering the alignment that have been consolidating since the end of the Cold War and are unlikely to disappear soon. In
other words, China–Russia relations appear ready for a tighter defense pact
should the two countries decide to commit to it. Not announcing a formal
“alliance” does not mean that such an alliance is not possible or not ready.
The authorization of a China–Russia alliance is a matter of political will, not
technical readiness, and the political will may not yet exist.9 Nevertheless,
once and if such decisions are made, there is little that might hinder the
effective functioning of a China–Russia alliance.
The book: structure and the logic of analysis
The rest of the book is organized into six chapters. Chapter 2 presents the
theoretical framework of the analysis which is called an “ordinal model of
9 See a very balanced article by Fu Ying, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. Fu (2016) sends a clear message to
the American readership that by no means is the China–Russia relationship simply a “marriage
of convenience” because it is complex, sturdy, and deeply rooted. Simultaneously, however, it is
not an “alliance.”
26 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
strategic alignment.” Chapter 2 is a theoretical chapter that guides the discussion in all the remaining chapters. The development of the framework and
the organization of the subsequent chapters are driven by the methodological
consideration that one must first define the variable of interest before one
can effectively embark on explaining it; especially given the ambivalence
that dominates the field of China–Russia studies as mentioned above. The
issue of definitions preceding explanations has been highlighted in the
social science methodology literature. It has been suggested that “sometimes
the state of knowledge in a field is such that much … description is needed
before we can take on the challenge of explanation” (King et al., 1994, p. 15).
In other words, systematic description and definition are prerequisites to
explanations, because “it is hard to develop explanations before we know
something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis of
what characteristics” (King et al., 1994, p. 34).
The suggested framework consists of two clusters. The first cluster deals
with the institutionalization of inter-military relations. It identifies seven
indicators of military cooperation and groups them into the three stages
of early, moderate, and advanced cooperation. Each indicator is ordinal;
that is, the early-stage indicators precede the moderate and advanced
indicators. While the primary emphasis is on military cooperation as the
backbone of strategic alignment in general, and between China and Russia
in particular, the framework also measures cooperation on economic and
diplomatic dimensions as a “robustness check” to explore whether the
increasing closeness in the relationship goes beyond the military realm.
The second cluster deals with explanation and delves into the incentives for
alignment formation, which are gauged by the connected conditions related
to the three balances – “balance of power” (Waltz, 1979), “balance of threat”
(Walt, 1987), and “balance of interests” (Schweller, 1998). All three drive the
alliance formation process and appear in alignment discussions in one
form or another. In the actual application of this causal cluster (Chapter 5),
these three factors are located along the stages outlined in the first cluster
to link the process of alignment development with the evolution of the key
causal forces.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are the empirical examination of China–Russia
relations based on the framework presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 “Military
Cooperation: Approaching Alliance” is the empirical examination of the first
cluster of the framework – the stadial routinization and institutionalization
of China–Russia alignment. The framework is applied to demonstrate the
developmental trajectory since the end of the Cold War and the current
state of China–Russia military alignment. The chapter delves into the
Introduc tion
27
underreported routinized inner workings of China–Russia alignment,
going beyond the prevalent focus on relatively easy-to-trace China–Russia
arms deals or military modernization programs in the two countries. The
“early” indicators include confidence building measures and mechanisms of
regular consultations. The “moderate” indicators comprise military-technical
cooperation and personnel exchange and regular joint military exercises. The
“advanced” indicators cover different levels of integrated military command,
joint troop placement, exchanges of military bases, and common defense
policy. The chapter demonstrates that post-Cold War China–Russia relations
have, from a low starting point, grown steadily more robust, and are close
to surpassing the moderate stage of alignment. Currently, China–Russia
alignment sits at the borderline between moderate and advanced alignment,
as defined in this analysis, and there exists a strong basis for more advanced
forms of bilateral strategic cooperation.
Chapter 4 “Alignment Incentives: The Three Balances” explains the
dynamics described in the previous chapters and is the empirical examination of the second cluster of the alignment framework – the incentives for
alignment formation. Both China and Russia have structural positions
within the international system that make them subject to systemic pressures. This chapter demonstrates that the causes of the consolidation of
China–Russia alignment are to be found at both the international-systemic
and domestic-politics levels. More specifically, these causes are the changes
that are happening in the three balances – the balance of power, the balance
of threat, and the balance of interests. All three are the major causes of
alliance formation. At the same time, a lot has been assumed with regards
to how these three balances operate in the context of China–Russia relations, which make empirical checks necessary. The chapter explores the
relative power dynamics within the contemporary international system and
drawing on first-hand data uncovers the perceptions of external threats and
interests in China and Russia to show both convergences and divergences.
It is demonstrated that since the end of the Cold War the three balances
have evolved in a way that incentivized a closer strategic alignment between
China and Russia and that there are reasons to expect a further deepening
of the bilateral alignment.
Chapter 5 “Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomacy” assesses indicators of economic and diplomatic cooperation as a robustness check on
the comprehensiveness of the upward trend in China–Russia alignment.
The military dimension has the highest bar for cooperation. However,
alignment does not focus solely on the military dimension of international
politics but spreads across security, diplomatic, and economic spheres.
28 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Increases in military cooperation are very likely to be accompanied by
enhanced economic and diplomatic cooperation. This happens both
because incentives for military cooperation are also likely to apply to the
economic and diplomatic realms, and because economic and diplomatic
cooperation complement and augment joint military capabilities. Theoretical
and empirical assessments of alignments often move beyond narrowly
defined security guarantees. In the assessment of the military component
of China–Russia cooperation, it is particularly important to consider the
economic and diplomatic aspects of cooperation because China–Russia
relations are often perceived as being military-dominated and lacking other
foundations. The analysis in this chapter uses quantitative indicators, such
as the volume and pattern of bilateral trade and its share in each country’s
total external trade, the volume and nature of direct investments between
the two countries, the patterns of China–Russia voting behavior in the UN
Security Council and other international institutions, with special emphasis
on the extent of convergence and divergence between China and Russia,
as well as the agendas of regional blocs in which China and Russia are
core players. The chapter shows that bilateral cooperation in each of the
non-military dimensions, while not yet as strong, has steadily increased.
Chapter 6 “Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments” provides a comparative perspective on China–Russia alignment
using the framework developed in Chapter 2. If the evidence of growing
strategic cooperation is presented in a vacuum (i.e., without offering a point
of comparison), the depth of this cooperation risks appearing greater than
it is. While trends might appear apparent, the relevance of those trends is
debatable without comparisons. To understand the extent to which China–
Russia cooperation matters at all, it is necessary to assess this cooperation in
both absolute and relative terms. This requires applying similar criteria to
other existing alignments. Simply put, what level are China and Russia really
at in their relationship? Moreover, if China–Russia strategic cooperation
has progressed, the question is – relative to what? Chapter 6 compares
the alignment between China and Russia with the US–India alignment.
The US–India evolving alignment is a new development in post-Cold War
international politics that is also often being viewed as an ad hoc reaction to
the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region and, hence, is a useful reference
point for assessing the relative depth of China–Russia alignment.
Admittedly, from a theoretical standpoint, systematically comparing
China–Russia alignment with only one other alignment may not be sufficient
for the robust generalization of the framework. However, it is enough to
execute a plausibility probe (George & Bennett, 2005; Levy, 2008; Eckstein,
Introduc tion
29
1991) for the framework and to see whether, where, and on which parameters
China–Russia alignment is ahead or behind this point of comparison. As
Eckstein defines it, plausibility probes are useful at the preliminary stages of
theory construction and “involve attempts to determine whether potential
validity may reasonably be considered great enough to warrant the pains and
costs of testing” (Eckstein, 1991, p. 147). This book offers such a plausibility
probe into the alignment framework it develops: it first conceptualizes the
framework of alignment, and, secondly, conducts an empirical inquiry into
it. Further testing the framework with dozens of other examples, perhaps
also from other historical periods, is the next analytical step that goes
beyond the scope of this book.
Chapter 7 “Conclusion: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications”
puts the strands of the analysis together and discusses the implications
of the main f indings for our understanding of China–Russia relations
and the overall evolution of the post-Cold War international structure. It
discusses the significance of the phenomenon of China–Russia relations
for understanding the formation and development of alliances and the
importance of theory-grounded analysis for understanding the patterns
of interstate relations.
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https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-and-russia-alliance-orno-alliance.
2
The Ordinal Model of Strategic
Alignment
Abstract
This chapter synthesizes the literature on alliances, alignments, and
strategic partnerships to develop an ordinal framework that offers a way to
systematically assess the degree and the causes of strategic alignment. The
framework’s first cluster covers the degree of institutionalization of intermilitary relations by identifying seven indicators of military cooperation
grouped into three stages of early, moderate, and advanced cooperation.
The second cluster covers alignment incentives that are gauged by the
three balances and the related theories of alignment formation – the
balance of power, the balance of threat, and the balance of interests.
While the primary emphasis is on military cooperation as the backbone
of alignment, the chapter also suggests assessments of economic and
diplomatic cooperation as a “robustness check” to explore whether the
relationship goes beyond military realm.
Keywords: alignments, military cooperation, economic cooperation,
balance of power
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the lack of a universal alignment framework
seriously complicates the empirical assessment of interstate strategic cooperation. Even the definitions of a more conventional term – “alliance” – vary
in terms of comprehensiveness and precision. According to Walt (1987, p. 1),
both “formal” and “informal” relationships of security cooperation between
sovereign states qualify as an alliance. Weitsman (2003, p. 7) provides an even
broader definition according to which alliances are agreements that simply
provide “some element of security” to the participants. Snyder (1997, p. 4)
defines alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of
military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own
membership.” The emphasis on formality (formal treaties) as an attribute of
Korolev, Alexander, China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press 2022
doi: 10.5117/9789463725248_ch02
36 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
alliances helps to narrow down the definition significantly, but it excludes
a range of important and strategically consequential informal alignments.
The alignment framework offered in this book begins with the assumption that alignment formation is a stadial process in the sense that
the development of a functioning alignment takes time, and interstate
strategic cooperation must pass an early and a moderate stage before it
moves into an advanced stage and, hence, a tighter alignment. States are
not likely to become closely aligned overnight. While they may rush into
a bonding alliance treaty in response to an external threat or shock, the
actual functionality of such an alliance, as well as the compatibility and
interoperability of the allies’ military forces, is likely to be questionable,
unless the actors involved have already had a history of comprehensive
strategic cooperation.
The idea that every strategic alignment has, in a sense, a “life cycle” and
progresses through stages is implicitly present in the relevant alignment
literature. Wilkins (2012, p. 69) posits that interstate security cooperation
evolves along a “collaboration continuum” passing through the stages of
formation, implementation, and evaluation. The idea that gradual alliance
institutionalization, routinization, and formalization improve intra-alliance
policy coordination and, hence, alliance performance and reliability
(Morrow, 1994; Smith, 1995; Fearon, 1997) also implies a stadial process in
alignment formation and consolidation. Gradual institutionalization over
time can lead the alliance to become an established cybernetic organization
(Bennet, 1997, p. 855). Institutional structures of alignments can tighten
and deepen, evolving towards closer cooperation or perhaps even a fullfledged alliance (Wilkins, 2008, p. 367). At the same time, such structures
can move in the opposite direction towards less cooperation. From this
perspective, the formalization of an alliance is simply a more advanced
stage of alignment formation, which serves to strengthen pre-existing
conditions by adding greater precision, legal obligations, and reciprocity
(Snyder, 1991, p. 124).
This stadial view of alignment formation conforms to the reality of the
case at hand. As noted by Strüver (2016, p. 13), China’s partnership relations
usually require time to develop and pass different stages. Thus, a large
number of China’s strategic alignments started as “friendly cooperative
partnerships” or “cooperative partnerships” and later evolved into “strategic
partnerships” or “comprehensive strategic partnerships” – a process accompanied by increasing degrees of formalization and specification. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, the case of China–Russia strategic cooperation
has over the past 30 years progressed through the different stages from
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
37
initial “good neighborliness” to more advanced “comprehensive strategic
partnership of coordination for a new era.”
Driven by these considerations, the first cluster of the analytical framework offered below (the institutionalization of inter-military relations) deals
with the stages of alignment formation and consolidation. It is ordinal in that
some indicators precede the others, and it consists of three sub-clusters of
indicators of early, moderate, and advanced stages of alignment. According
to this approach, some indicators that imply an improvement in relations
from low initial levels of cooperation may indicate increasing tensions if
they emerge when cooperation is already relatively high.
Following the analytical approach of “zigzagging” between theory
and empirical observations outlined in Chapter 1, the case of post-Cold
War China–Russia relations assists in defining and conceptualizing the
stages of alignment formation. While general assumptions are inspired
by the literature on alignments, the case of the China–Russia relationship
since the end of the Cold War is used as a source of abundant empirical
evidence to fertilize and specify the theory and further unpack the stages
of alignment formation. This means that some indicators or their order in
the framework are China–Russia-specific and less generalizable, which is
why the framework is further tested using other archetypal alignments
in Chapter 6. After introducing the first and the second clusters of the
framework, this chapter discusses the role of economic and diplomatic
cooperation in assessing the overall comprehensiveness of alignment. Before
addressing these tasks, however, a few words must be said about the role
of formal alliance treaties in the context of this study and specifically the
stadial perspective on alignments mentioned above.
Treaty alliances and informal alignments: the analytical
implications
Formal alliance treaties are a cornerstone issue for understanding interstate
alignments and usually the first criterion to look at when assessing strategic
cooperation. Walt (1993, p. 20) emphasizes that alliance, as a cooperative
security relationship between states, usually takes “the form of a written military commitment.” Treaties are indeed a mark of international
cooperation, which is otherwise difficult to measure (Owen, 2020, p. 810).
Alliances involve some form of written commitment that is supposed to be
known publicly (Bennet, 1997, p. 847). Some view the signing of an alliance
treaty as nothing less than a “unique dividing place” along the spectrum of
38 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
cooperation because relations between states with formal alliance treaties
are qualitatively different from those with no such treaties (Reiter, 1994,
p. 495). Formal treaties add precision and credibility to the relationship, and
they signal the involved parties’ intentions to others (Salmon, 2006, p. 819).
Considering alliances as “formal contracts” between states is an opinion
shared by many, if not the majority, in the field.10
Formal treaties have also been considered as an alliance vs. no alliance
demarcation point in official documents. For example, the US Department
of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines an alliance as
“a relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more
nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests
of the members” (Gortney, 2010, p. 13, as cited in Cook, 2013, p. 559). Notably,
the existing quantitative datasets, used in multiple studies of alliances,
are compiled based on formal alliance treaties. For example, the Alliance
Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset categorizes the content of
existing military alliance agreements (Leeds, 2018). The Correlates of War
(COW) dataset is also based on formal alliance treaties, including defense
pacts, non-aggression treaties, and ententes (Gibler, 2009).
Despite formal alliance treaties being an important indicator of alignment, and strategic cooperation more broadly, relying on them can be
misleading. States can act as allies without binding treaties, and treaties
may show nothing more than a paper alliance. Morgenthau (1976, p. 193)
registered situations when state interests “so obviously call for concerted
policies and actions that an explicit formulation of these interests, policies
and actions in the form of treaty of alliance appears to be redundant.” The
Anglo–French entente before World War I, for example, was a non-alliance
relationship which generated alignment expectations greater than those
in many formal alliances (Snyder, 1991, p. 125). Moreover, states can wage
wars as alliance members without binding alliance treaties, as happened in
the case of the “Grand Alliance” of the United States, Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union, formed during World War II to defeat Nazi Germany. Despite
lacking many of the de jure attributes of an alliance, this alignment shifted
the international power balance significantly (Wilkins, 2012, p. 60-61). High
levels of formalization can even mean that the alignment commitment is
in question and cannot be relied upon (Leeds & Anac, 2005, p. 197). Less
explicit or even vague alignment agreements, in turn, can mean more
10 For relevant works defining alliance as a form of a written agreement, see Snyder (1990),
Reiter (1993), Leeds (2003), Lai and Reiter (2000), Smith (1995), Bennett (1997), Gärtner (2001),
(Liska, 1962), Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan (1973), Singer and Small (1966), Russett (1979).
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
39
confidence of allies in each other’s loyalty in the long run and make states
feel it necessary to stand by the ally in critical situations (Snyder 1984, p. 73).
In summary, as Ward (1982, p. 7) rightly put it, alignments are “not signified by formal treaties but are delineated by a variety of behavioral actions.”
Interdependence and the commonality of strategic interests can make states
act as allies without requiring formal commitments. Some “tacit alliances”
place actual military support without expressed commitments at the core
of the relationship (Booth, 1975), and in “de facto alliances” the absence
of a formal agreement does not prevent states from acting as if such an
agreement existed (Kinter & Pfaltzgraff, 1973). Informal alignments, such as
the US–UK, US–Israel, or US–Taiwan alignments, far surpass some formal
alliances, such as the China–DPRK or US–Thailand alliances, in terms of
de facto levels of security cooperation.
In light of this, this study does not consider an alliance treaty as a useful
cut-off point when assessing alignments. In essence, it agrees with the view
that alliance is merely a sub-category, even though an important one, within
a broader concept of alignment (Chidley, 2014, p. 114). Formal alliances are
behavioral means to strengthen or add formality to alignments (Wilkins,
2012, p. 76). Snyder’s (1997, p. 123) recommendation that discussions on the
subject must not be limited to formal alliances because “what we really want
to understand is the broader phenomenon of ‘alignment,’ of which explicit
alliance is merely a subset” is particularly pertinent in this context. Thus,
while this study does assess the nature and content of the existing written
agreements between the countries of interest, the primary concern here is
the actual working of military cooperation that has come to fruition, not
the promises of formal treaties.
This approach fits well with the empirical reality of China–Russia alignment, in which the lack of a formal alliance treaty does not necessarily
indicate weak strategic cooperation and, conversely, the presence of a treaty
does not mean deep cooperation. At the same time, given the authoritarian
nature of the two political regimes, any alliance arrangements between
Moscow and Beijing may remain secret and, therefore, unknown to the
public and external observers.11 Some experts have registered an element of
“deliberate ambiguity” in China–Russia relations that can mask the actual
degree of cooperation to external observers (Wilkins, 2008, p. 371). At the
same time, announcing an alliance treaty is a public declaration that not only
sends strong signals but also entails reputational costs if alliance obligations
11 This analysis excludes characteristics that cannot be observed or indicators requiring
classified information.
40 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
are not kept.12 The governments in Moscow and Beijing not being willing to
announce an alliance does not mean that one does not exist.
Rejection of the alliance treaty as a sufficient indicator of alignment
raises another analytical issue – that of the scope of alignment and what
dimensions the alignment framework should include. Even formal alliances
are believed to represent a “heterogeneous category of cooperative security
agreements” (Leeds, 2003, p. 427). At the same time, the theoretical and
empirical assessment of alliances has moved beyond the narrowly defined
security guarantee to include multiple non-security variables (Bennett, 1997;
Lai & Reiter, 2000; Simon & Gartzke, 1996). Alignments are viewed as “far
less formal, less military oriented, and less determinative in their mutual
defense commitments” (Tow, 2007, as cited in Wilkins, 2015, p. 85). According
to Ward (1982, p. 7), “alignment is a more extensive concept than alliance
since it does not focus solely upon the military dimension of international
politics.” Alignments are presented as novel and versatile mechanisms of
strategic cooperation that spread across security, diplomatic, and economic
spheres (Wilkins, 2015). In turn, other forms of cooperation, such as strategic
partnerships, explicitly place a greater emphasis on economic cooperation,
which has become particularly important in the post-Cold War globalized
world (Chidley, 2014).
At the same time, while the rationale to unlock a more multidimensional
approach that moves beyond military-to-military contacts is well justified, it is difficult to assign relative weights to other dimensions (either
economic or diplomatic) of cooperation, even though those dimensions
might complement and augment military cooperation. A case can be made
that the military dimension has the highest bar for cooperation: states that
cooperate diplomatically and economically do not necessarily cooperate
militarily, but increases in military cooperation are more likely to be accompanied by enhanced economic and diplomatic cooperation. However,
the existing literature supports this hypothesis only partially. Mansfield
and Bronson (1997) found that trade did not necessarily make alliances
more likely, and the evidence on whether alliances enhance trade levels is
somewhat mixed (Mansfield & Bronson, 1997; Bliss & Russett, 1998; Morrow et al., 1998). As argued by Benson and Clinton (2016, p. 11), the idea of
12 An interesting case in this regard is the China–North Korea alliance. Beijing’s reluctance (or
inability) to offer sufficient security commitment to its treaty ally, especially when pressure from
the United States on North Korea peaked, caused concern regarding China’s overall deficiency
as an ally and the low reliability of Beijing’s security guarantees in general. For more on China’s
alliance relations with North Korea, see Lee, Alexandrova, Zhao (2020), Li and Kim (2020).
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
41
creating an additive index of alignment based on multiple characteristics
is problematic because there is no theoretical guidance for combining
different dimensions or interpreting the resulting scale. Specifically, it
is difficult to evaluate the relative magnitude of the differences between
dimensions of cooperation. Is an alignment which fares strongly on both
military and economic cooperation scales twice as strong as an alignment
with military cooperation only? Questions like these and the assumed
equivalences between different dimensions make a hypothetical additive
index difficult to rationalize (Benson & Clinton, 2016).
Therefore, the approach taken in this study prioritizes military cooperation as a basis of strategic alignment, which is the dominant view in the
literature (Fedder, 1968; Holsti et al., 1973; Walt, 1987; Levy & Barnett, 1991;
Walt, 1993; Wilkins, 2012; Wilkins 2015), and develops a framework that
is best suited for assessing military cooperation. At the same time, and
based on the literature mentioned above, it does not ignore cooperation
in the economic and diplomatic dimensions. However, it explores it as
a “robustness check” – not a part of the ordinal scale but as important
information to assess whether the closeness in bilateral relations is limited
to the military realm only.
The ordinal index of strategic alignment
Indicators of military cooperation constitute the bulk of our framework.
Most forms of alignment have security-related properties and are based on
recognizing common security concerns or providing for military cooperation
to various degrees. The existing literature on alignments has established that
greater institutionalization, understood as increased policy coordination,
routinization, and formalization during peacetime, affects alignments’
reliability, performance in potential military conflicts, and credibility to
deter challenges (Morrow, 1994; Smith, 1995; Fearon, 1997; Leeds & Anac,
2005). Intra-alliance contacts and integration, along with the background
of alliance formation, is a crucial criterion of alignment (Russett, 1971).
Synthesizing the literature and analyzing the post-Cold War China–Russia strategic cooperation identifies seven indicators (stages) of military
cooperation, grouped in three sub-clusters of early, moderate, and advanced
cooperation (see the left half of Figure 2.1).
The early-stage indicators precede the moderate and advanced indicators.
In turn, the presence of an advanced indicator itself, even at lower levels,
indicates a higher overall degree of military cooperation. In other words, the
Regular joint military exercises
Military-technical cooperaon/
personnel exchange
Mechanism of regular consultaons
4
3
2
Source: Created by the author
Confidence building measures
Integrated military command
5
1
Joint troop placement/military bases
Common defence policy
6
7
Figure 2.1 The stages, criteria, and causes of alignment formation
Stages of alignment formaon
advanced
moderate
early
low
high
low
high
low
high
low
high
low
high
low
high
low
high
Causal factors condions at each stage:
42 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Evoluon and consolidaon within causal cluster
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
43
degree of cooperation is determined by the highest stage that is manifested,
and higher stages subsume lower stages. For example, stages 3 and 4 on
Figure 2.1 require stage 2, and stages 5, 6 and 7 necessitate stages 2, 3, and
4. However, some early-stage indicators can be expected to fall off when
they are no longer necessary, and their continuous presence might indicate
backsliding rather than development. It is the expansion of higher-level
indicators that reflects increasing alignment. It is hypothetically possible
to see moderate, or even advanced, indicators without early ones depending
on peculiarities of a particular case. However, as argued below, there is a
sound rationale behind these indicators and their ordering, such that in
most cases we should expect to see lower stages of cooperation exhibited
at high levels before alignment enters the moderate and advanced stages.
CBMs (confidence building measures) are the first early indicator of a
cooperative trend. It is an indicator of weak alignment because by implementing CBMs, the parties are attempting to overcome initially high degrees
of mistrust or resolve highly contentious issues, e.g., border disputes, and thus
remove them from bilateral agendas.13 Trusting states such as, for example,
Canada and the United States do not actively patrol their shared borders.
They do not worry about the ensuing vulnerability, because even though
it would be easy for either country to initiate encroachment against the
other and only citizens would sound the alarm, mutual hostilities are highly
unlikely. Similarly, trusting in one another’s ongoing friendly intentions,
Denmark and Sweden make no effort to defend their common borders.
Active surveillance of the type employed by the United States and the Soviet
Union, in contrast, suggests that the two superpowers were concerned that
cheating would occur absent this oversight (Hoffman, 2002).
The importance of confidence building activities for incipient alignments
was highlighted by Deutsch (1957), who argued that gradual confidence
building could help states create a sense of a peaceful community and lay
the foundation for deeper strategic cooperation. CBMs contribute to the
reduction of uncertainty in a relationship by creating iterative episodes of
reciprocal behavior. The overall sense of reciprocity between allies, in turn,
enhances mutual trust and fosters foundations for more advanced forms
of cooperation (Snyder, 1997, p. 359).
CBMs, as an early indicator of alignment, is of direct relevance to the case
of China–Russia relations. Given the complex history of the China–Russia
13 It is believed that removing highly contentious issues of territory from the agenda of alignment members creates and facilitates a sustained peace between even the most belligerent
states. See: Gibler (1996), p. 89.
44 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
border since the 17th century, many assessments have highlighted the lack of
trust as a significant weakness of China–Russia strategic cooperation. Some
emphasize that China–Russia relations lack trust and are characterized by
competition, especially in the regions shared by both countries (Mankoff,
2014). Others argue that despite common interests on the global scene,
there is a fundamental lack of strategic trust between Beijing and Moscow
(Niquet, 2014). Still, others suggest that Russia neither trusts anyone, nor is
it trusted by anyone, particularly in Asia (Radchenko, 2014). The assessment
of alignment in China–Russia relations invites a check of whether China
and Russia invest efforts into undertaking specific measures aimed at
enhancing mutual confidence.
Early, low-level CBMs can be “emergency contacts” that are aimed at,
for example, preventing dangerous military activities or resolving border
disputes. When these problems become resolved, and the cooperation moves
forward, higher-level CBMs can include measures of demilitarization and
de-securitization of the common border, the routinization of mechanisms
for resolving disputes or regularly sharing defense-related information,
which enhances predictability between the two states and indicates higher
levels of trust.
Mechanisms of inter-military consultations follow CBMs as an indicator
of early alignment. Consultations and regular talks among allies are an
essential aspect of an alliance (Snyder, 1997, pp. 350-362). In the lead up to
WWI, Russia felt emboldened to stand up to Austria and Germany thanks to
its confidence in French support, which derived, to a significant extent, from
the experience of the military staff talks (Snyder, 1997, p. 353). The formation
of consultation mechanisms is crucial for alignment institutionalization and
performance (Leeds & Anac, 2005). The evidence of regular official contacts
between the military or civilians in the defense or other relevant ministries
of the alignment members indicates the degree of strategic cooperation
and integration (Russett, 1971, p. 267) because the formal mechanism of
interaction facilitates intra-alliance cooperation (Bennett 1997, p. 855).
Such a mechanism enhances mutual understanding and increases the
predictability of intra-alignment dynamics, which can be vital assets when
joint action is required. The transition from CBMs to regular consultations
is marked by a shift in the agenda from the existing problems between
the consulting parties to broader issues of regional and global politics. A
shift from low to high levels of cooperation occurs when the consultation
mechanisms start to display the following features. First, the parties begin
to create unique platforms – that they do not have with other foreign states
outside of the alignment membership – which provide for regular meetings
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
45
and more in-depth cooperation. The second feature has to do with the
comprehensiveness of the institutionalized infrastructure of security consultations. To be ranked “high” in our framework, consultations infrastructure
must be multi-level and happen among multiple government agencies and
organizations – from top decision makers to defense ministries or their
equivalents to regional formats at the level of provinces and cities and
further down to regular contacts between border garrisons and different
types of troops and army units. Such mechanisms ensure effective exchange
of information across the whole spectrum of defense and security-related
institutions and facilitate the smooth functioning of the alignment. Finally,
the content of communication matters. High level of cooperation requires
that consultations have an element of “thinking together” about external
challenges. Such discussions contain holistic strategic assessments of
external threats and regional security challenges and are not confined
only to technical issues related to procurements of arms or joint military
exercises. Substantive discussions of the strategic environment contribute
to the formation of a joint understanding of external threats and challenges.
The third indicator – military-technical cooperation (MTC), accompanied
by regular exchanges of military personnel – further unfolds the institutionalization of alignment and reflects the beginning of the moderate stage
of strategic cooperation. As defined by Meick (2017, p. 3), military-technical
cooperation may consist of a range of defense industry engagements, such
as sales of arms, joint research and development of new weapons, technology transfer, maintenance of weapons systems with sharing of technical
knowledge as well as various weapons licensing agreements. MTC, in the
form of military training or technology transfer, is a measure of the depth of
an alignment (Benson & Clinton, 2016, p. 8). Access to each other’s technology
is one of the reasons why alliances remain useful for their participants in
the 21st century (Tertrais, 2004, p. 141).
MTC increases interdependence and the compatibility of military hardware, which may be crucial for allies in times of war when shared supplies
of equipment and logistical and technological support may determine the
alliance’s performance (Korolev, 2019a, p. 236). Simultaneously, sharing of
technological expertise requires a considerable amount of trust. Moreover,
the proper organization of MTC requires a high level of coordination across
multiple institutions (research centers, manufacturers, and various government agencies), shared procedures and standardized training. These are
essential parameters of MTC that take time to develop. In turn, the active
exchange of military personnel and opening military educational institutions and curricula to a foreign state that accompanies MTC also requires
46 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
significant trust in the partner. MTC is a critical component of China–Russia
alignment (Blank, 2020) as well as alignments between other states that
are transitioning from a strategic partnership to a deeper strategic alliance
(Wilkins, 2015).
The progress from low to high levels of cooperation within MTC is
indicated by the transition from only providing technical training and
assistance related to purchasing arms to actual military technology transfers
and long-term projects for joint design and the production of arms and
their components. Growing interdependence is an important aspect of
this development. For personnel exchanges, advancing to higher levels
is manifested in progress from short-term visits for technical training to
joint military education programs. At the same time, from the standpoint
of alignment theory, high-level cooperation in terms of MTC requires that
an ally does not engage in MTC of the same or higher level and quality
with a third party that is a strategic rival or in direct confrontation with
the other ally. Forging defense cooperation with competing powers can be
an effective way to offset risks and uncertainties if the relationship with
either one power deteriorates. However, such behavior has to do more with
hedging than alignment.14
The fourth indicator, which closes the moderate cooperation stage, is
regular joint military exercises. Such exercises take place during peacetime
and can happen regularly throughout the whole of an alignment’s existence
(Bergsman, 2001, p. 28). Regularized military exercises are essential for
an alignment’s functioning because they contribute to a greater degree
of military compatibility and interoperability, increase coordination, and
practice joint techniques (Korolev, 2019a, p. 236). If conducted effectively
and regularly, they create credible commitments, improve the ability of the
allies to fight together, or even forge the allies into a unified fighting force,
which not only raises the chance that the alignment will win a war but
also makes allies more likely to come to one another’s aid in time of need
(Morrow, 2000, p. 71). Such exercises also open the door to a stage of more
advanced forms of military cooperation and often send important signals,
admonitions, or assurances to specific external actors.
The progress from low to high levels within this indicator occurs with
changes in the geographic range and the content of military exercises. For
example, expanding the geography of exercises from the parties’ immediate geopolitical environments to distant seas, especially in response to
new developments in international politics, would indicate a significant
14 For explication of the concept of “hedging,” see Korolev (2019b), Lai & Kuik (2020)
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
47
advancement. Similarly, changes from simple joint maneuvers to the actual
establishment of joint military command centers and the introduction of
command code sharing systems, as well as other forms of interoperability,
would reflect a high level of cooperation. As with the previous indicator
(MTC), scoring “high” on regular joint military exercises implies that an ally
does not engage at a comparable level with the other ally’s strategic rivals,
which, as mentioned above, would turn alignment behavior into hedging
behavior. For example, a hypothetical scenario of Russia having advanced
regular military exercises with both China and the United States would not
indicate a close alignment with either great power. At the same time, Russia’s
simultaneous engagement with China and, for instance, other members of
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) that are not China’s strategic
rivals does not detract from China–Russia alignment.
The advanced stage of military cooperation is assessed using three criteria
– an integrated military command, joint troop placements or military base
exchanges, and common defense policy.15 An integrated military command
provides the organizational framework for fulfilling joint military tasks
by the aligned parties. In these circumstances, each country’s military
forces, which normally remain under respective national control, become
available for joint operations and are placed under the responsibility of either
one side’s commanders or a joint command structure on an agreed basis.
Examples of integrated military command could include the introduction
of a shared system of command codes or adopting an operating language
allowing the transmission of orders and communications between the
involved militaries; episodes of merging the allies’ army units into a single
operational grouping with the purpose of practicing joint interoperability;
establishing joint command centers staffed with officers from both sides
working together. There is also variation in the degree to which military
commands can be integrated. A relatively low degree of integration would
occur episodically and without long-term commitments, as characterizes
joint military exercises. A higher level, in turn, would be characterized by
permanently operating command structures that are consistently deployed,
and thus would entail long-term commitments.
Joint deployments and base sharing are a step forward because these
measures include sensitive issues of territorial sovereignty. The establishment of military bases abroad enables a country to project power in the
15 These criteria are mentioned in various forms, but without sequence, as indicators of
advanced military cooperation. See, for example: Fedder (1968), Leeds and Anac (2005), and
Benson and Clinton (2016).
48 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
recipient country and influence political events there. Also, the existence
of bases abroad implies rights to military facilities in foreign territory. These
are highly sensitive issues, in general, and in the context of China–Russia
relations, in particular. A low degree of base sharing occurs when mutual
deployments are small and do not include air force or other sophisticated
weapons. High-level base sharing occurs when the size of the deployed contingent is large and accompanied by the significant allocation of advanced
military hardware.
Finally, the highest form of military cooperation is a common defense
policy at the executive and strategic levels. It requires the most binding
commitments between allies with the purpose of joint fulfillment of the
most demanding military missions. This also involves pooling resources for
defense equipment acquisition as well as obligations to supply combat units
for jointly planned missions within a designated period. Most importantly,
this level of cooperation requires synchronized and harmonized actions
with regards to the allied parties’ national security. This indicator may
also be manifested at higher and lower degrees, depending on the scale
and content of cooperation, but it always requires extensive investment in
joint action and indicates in-depth military cooperation. The decision to
enter this stage requires strong incentives and resolve from policymakers
and cannot occur without first achieving a high degree of cooperation on
the more moderate indicators described above.
Explaining the trend: the three balances as incentives for
alignment formation
Once the strategic alignment (the dependent variable) is defined, one can
start explaining the alignment dynamics. As mentioned above, alignments
involve costs and require a strong rationale to materialize, especially if an
alignment is to move through the stages outlined above. To explain the
alignment progress across a period of time, it is important is to understand
the evolution of the causal factors and interrelationship between them
against each stage of alignment formation (see the right half of Figure 2.1).
According to the “capability aggregation model,” dominant in alignment
studies, (Barnett & Levy, 1991, p. 371), alignments are formed by states
to aggregate their capabilities into a greater joint capability to improve
their international security positions. This perspective, together with the
prevailing view that alignments are formed by security-seeking states
against more powerful other states (Liska, 1962; Walt, 1987; Snyder, 1991;
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
49
Bennett, 1997) and to deal with immediate or potential threats (Salmon,
2006, p. 819), explicitly suggests two specific theories that explain alignment
formation. One is the balance of power theory (Waltz, 1979), according to
which states form alliances to balance against the most powerful states in
the system, and the other is the balance of threat theory (Walt, 1987), which
argues that states balance against the most threatening states rather than
simply the most powerful ones.
At the same time, alignments include not only “alignments against”
but also “alignments with,” which, as some argue, may better reflect the
realities of the modern world (Chidley, 2014, p. 142). According to Snyder
(1991, pp. 123-125), the existence of common interests among states is an
important factor that undergirds the idea of “alignments with” and forms
the expectation of support on which alignments are based. Specifically,
a state will expect support from states with which it shares interests and
will expect a lack of support, or even opposition, from states with which
its interests conflict (Snyder, 1991, p. 124). This discussion leads to the third
theory, and the related causal factor, that can explain alignment formation
– the balance of interests (Schweller, 1998).
Thus, the incentives for alignment formation used in our framework
originate from considerations of the balance of power but represent both
the systemic and domestic factors that drive alignment. As great powers,
both China and Russia occupy structural positions within the international
system that make them subject to systemic pressures. At the same time,
they have complex domestic political environments that cannot be ignored.
The first causal factor – the balance of power – is the system-level condition
determined by the power structure configuration within the international
system (Waltz, 1979). The second cause – the balance of threat – is a later
development of the balance of power theory which looks at the unit-level
perceptions of threat (Walt, 1987). The third cause – the balance of interests – is still another advancement that highlights complex unit-structure
interactions (Schweller, 1998). At the same time, for this causal cluster to
yield more explanatory power, it is essential to consider changes not only
in each of the three balances but also in the pattern of interaction between
them – changes both within and between the circles on the right side of
Figure 2.1.
The first cause – material power balance – is where the analysis begins.
Polarity provides dispositional pressures that structure the horizons of
states’ probable actions. One of the most salient features of the post-Cold War
international system has been the ultimate primacy of the United States in
the global distribution of capabilities. Waltz (2000) believed that post-Cold
50 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
War unipolarity, like any other unipolarity, was self-destructive because
under anarchy, which defines the international environment, secondary
states would inevitably start to try to undermine the hegemon’s (the US’s)
pre-eminence. Even if the hegemon manages to restrain itself, other states
are still inclined to worry about their safety in the unbalanced international
system, and, hence, will attempt to realign with other secondary states
(external balancing) as one of the possible ways to enhance their security.
States balance against hegemons, even those that seek to maintain their
pre-eminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence than
coercion, because unipolar systems inevitably lead to geopolitical backlashes.
Consequently, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment” is just a geopolitical
interlude that will give way to multipolarity. Therefore, the systemic push to
form an alliance originates from a lack of balance of power, and alignment
formation is a way to restore the balance of power condition.
However, the balance of power logic of alignment formation is less
linear than the balance of power assumption might suggest. According to
the “theories of non-balancing” (Korolev, 2018) that became popular after
the end of the Cold War, balancing behavior by secondary states is highly
unlikely because the United States is too powerful – to the extent that any
alignments between potential challengers (including China and Russia) will
fail to make any difference.16 The alleged power gap between the United
States and the rest was such that the United States represented a separate
class by large margins. No other state or group of states had enough material capabilities to challenge its absolute dominance significantly. In the
post-Cold War literature, this power gap was presented as unprecedented
and self-reinforcing, and it generated the unsurpassable power threshold
that became one of the main explanations of why other secondary states
do not form alliances to balance against the United States. According to
this assessment, even if non-liberal states, such as Russia and China, are
not satisfied with the current unipolar order, they do not have sufficient
capabilities to undertake effective balancing. From this standpoint, any
anti-US alignment is viewed as futile.
This discussion about the impact of US-led unipolarity on the behavior
of states (regardless of whether it still conforms to reality or not) highlights
a more general issue that the impact of polarity on alliance formation is
complex. In a sense, there is a Goldilocks logic underlying the balance of
power assumption: while the lack of power balance is conducive to alignment
16 For a collection of relevant essays on why balancing, including alignments, is unlikely in
the post-Cold War unipolar international environment, see: Ikenberry (2002).
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
51
formation, the concentration of too much power in one pole can also avert
alignment formation. In other words, the degree of systemic imbalance
must be “just right” to effectively trigger the formation and consolidation
of alignment. The military capacity of potential alignment must be able to
generate at least some degree of what is called a “deterrent effect” (Benson &
Clinton, 2016, p. 5), when the summative capacity of alignment can tangibly
affect an adversary’s foreign policy calculus (Morrow, 1994; Smith, 1995;
Leeds, 2003; Zagare & Kilgour, 2003; Yuen, 2009; Johnson & Leeds, 2011;
Benson, 2012; Benson et al., 2014).
Thus, the empirical assessments of the balance of power as a factor of
alignment formation require not only exploring the power distribution
within the international system and seeing whether there is a hegemon but
also answering the question of whether the potential military capacity of a
hypothetical alignment (China–Russia alignment in our case), understood
as the combined military strength of the allies, can restore a relative balance
of power, and become an effective way of balancing.
A later development of the balance of power theory – the “balance of threat
theory” – provides the conception of the second cause of alignment formation
in our framework, which relates to common threats faced by the potential
allies. According to Walt (1985), external “threats” are the main drivers of
alliance behavior. It is specifically common threats that play a particularly
important role in motivating states to enter the same alliance. The presence
of a common threat or enemy distinguishes alignments from other forms
of interstate cooperation (Salmon, 2006, p. 817). States’ shared perception
of a common threat creates a “clear agreed-upon target,” which facilitates
alliance coherence (Bennett, 1997, p. 852). Lai and Reiter also argued that
states that face a common threat are especially prone to alignment: “Not
only does each wish to minimize the possibility that it will be attacked,
but each state is more likely to be willing to fight if the other is attacked
because the enemy is common.” Consequently, “fears of entanglement in an
unwanted war and of the defection of alliance partners from the alliance
agreement are reduced” (Lai & Reiter, 2000, p. 211).
American power has often been presented as “off-shore” – separated
from others by the oceans – and therefore, not posing a direct threat to
other states’ survival (Walt, 2002). Some scholars have also emphasized the
“post-modern” nature of American power: even though hard power is still
the ultimate factor, in everyday politics the primary emphasis is on soft
power, which is much harder to contain. Joffe (2002, p. 170) asks, “How does
one contain power that flows not from coercion but seduction?” American
benevolence, helpfulness, and reliability lead other liberal states to choose
52 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
not to balance (Owen, 2002, p. 257). Thus, according to this logic, even if the
United State is the most powerful state in the contemporary international
system, if it does not threaten the major challengers (China and Russia or
others) or is not viewed as a threat by them, there are no strong reasons to
expect the emergence of an anti-hegemonic alignment.
It must be mentioned that this study does not apply Walt’s balance of
threat theory in a strict sense but, instead, places emphasis on the general
statement by Walt and other alliance scholars about the importance of
“common external threats” as a driving force of alignments (Walt, 1987;
Bennet, 1997; Lai & Reiter, 2000).17 Such an approach seems justifiable in the
context of this study. As demonstrated elsewhere, such factors as offensive
capability and offensive intensions, identified by Walt as threat-forming
factors, are not based on objective criteria and remain speculative, as do
the chances of assessing them accurately (Rosato, 2015; Van Evera, 1998). As
to geographic proximity, in Walt’s theory it should work against alignment.
However, it may work in reverse: bordering great powers well recognize the
potentially devastating costs of the use of or threats to use force against
each other. Because border conflicts between adjacent great powers are
extremely costly, these powers may choose to invest significant efforts
to keep the border peaceful and eventually improve the relationship. It
appears that it is this dynamic that is at play between China and Russia. A
certain geopolitical sense of a big neighbor makes both sides understand that
conflicts are extremely costly for both and, therefore, it is better to coexist
peacefully.18 Some assumptions of Walt’s theory might work in some cases
but not in others and hence require further testing and verification using
larger samples of cases. This, however, does not undermine the importance
of external threats perception as a factor of alignment formation.
Empirically, therefore, one must check whether potential allies have
a shared view of major external threats or consider the same state as the
most threatening adversary and how these perceptions evolved. Also,
17 Walt’s original balance of threat theory discerns four factors that contribute to the formation
of threat: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions (Walt, 1987,
p. 23). At the same time, he highlights that “one cannot say a priori which sources of threat will
be most important in any given case, only that all of them are likely to play a role” (Walt, 1985,
p. 3). In other words, threats cannot be simply assumed based on these four conditions but need
to be established empirically.
18 As demonstrated in Chapter 6, a similar dynamic applies to China–India relations, when
India is reluctant to explicitly support the US’s hard balancing against China because New
Delhi, being China’s geographic neighbor, is concerned about irreversibly antagonising China
or being viewed by Beijing as a part of the anti-China camp.
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
53
potential allies must define an external threat in similar terms or, in other
words, locate it within the same category of threats. For example, if one
ally perceives an external threat (the third state) as a threat to global order,
whereas the other ally views it as a threat to its border security, there will
be a categorical mismatch of threats, even though both types of threat are
associated with the same state. Thus, the convergence of external threat
perceptions implies that the threat must be associated with the same state
but also be in the same category of threats. An indication of a perceived
precipitating threat would be a change in the language of joint statements
or interactions more broadly from expressing a shared understanding on
broad issues of international politics to the consolidation of that language
around the issue of explicit common external threats associated with a
specific geopolitical rival.
A further revision of the balance of power and balance of threat theories
is Randall Schweller’s “balance of interests” theory (1998), which explains
the third cause of alignment formation – common interests. Schweller
(1994, p. 88) argues that whether (and with whom) states establish alliances
depends on states’ understanding of their mutual interests, rather than on
perceptions of threats or power asymmetries, specifically that “the most
important determinant of alignment is the compatibility of political goals.”
“Status quo states” align with each other because they share the interests
of maintaining the existing world order and containing revisionist states.
“Revisionist states,” in turn, align with each other because they see more
benefits in changing the system (Schweller, 1993). The rise of a revisionist
great power may also trigger bandwagoning on the part of smaller revisionist
states.
Echoing Schweller’s emphasis on the compatibility of political goals, other
scholars specializing in alignment studies also mention “normative partnerships,” based on a common set of behavioral norms, values, and standards
(Smith, 2006, p. 112); credible commitments and similarity of interests, when
states’ interests are not required to be identical but must be complementary
or at least parallel (Morrow, 1991, p. 931); or an “underlying community of
interests” (Salmon, 2006, p. 820) – all as essential characteristics of strategic
alignment. Sustainable alignments are based on shared values or ideology
and are organized around a general purpose, known as a system principle,
such as, for example, the championship of a multi-polar world (Wilkins,
2008). Liska (1962, p. 12) argues that while alliances must be subject to a
shared external threat, they are also predicated on a sense of community.
Alignments have also been seen as a manifestation of the involved actors’
willingness to pursue joint interests and mutual goals in common and, in the
54 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
case of China, have been shown to be more likely to occur “when countries
have comparable positions on the liberal world order” (Strüver, 2016, pp. 6-8).
An empirical assessment of this condition would require demonstrating
how hypothetical allies (China and Russia in our case) see the international
status quo and whether they want to revise it; in which ways, if at all, their
interests are complementary or parallel; and how deeply they share commitments to challenging or maintaining the contemporary world order.
This requires not only looking into bilateral documents and speeches of the
top policymakers but also reality-checking established assumptions that
China benefits from the international status quo, whereas Russia does not.
As in the case with threats, interests, in the form revisionism and status
quo orientation, can have different permutations in different contexts and,
therefore, cannot be assumed and need to be established empirically. For
instance, one would assume since both China and Russia increased their
power after the end of the Cold War – after the existing US-led order was
fully established and its benefits allocated – they should display revisionist
inclinations. But do they? Even if they do, does the revisionism supported by
Beijing have much in common with that propagated by Moscow? How have
the two revisionisms changed since the end of the Cold War? Do they show
convergence in terms of increasing rejection of the international status quo?
These are empirical questions that need to be answered before the impact
of the balance of interest on alignment behavior can be established. Besides
the language of joint statements and interactions, the actual participation
in international institutions that represent an alternative order is a useful
indicator.
Besides exploring the changes within each of the three causal factors
mentioned above, it is essential to consider the interaction between them
in generating an interstate alignment. Balance of threat (Walt) and balance
of interests (Schweller) are not unrelated to the balance of power (Waltz).
In other words, the balance of power is an essential component of both the
balance of threat and the balance of interest theory. As acknowledged by
Walt (1985, pp. 9-10), “the greater a state’s total resources … the greater a
potential threat it can pose to others…. The overall power that states can
wield is thus an important component of the threat they can pose to others.”
It is more accurate, therefore, to talk about the most “threatening power”
rather than merely “threat” or “power” (Walt, 1985, pp. 8-9). A strong state
can either be threatening or not, but it is difficult for a weak state to pose an
existential threat to greater powers. There is an apparent synergy between
the balance of threat and the balance of power arguments.
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
55
In a similar vein, Schweller (1993) highlights that his concept of state
interest (whether status quo or revisionism-oriented interests) occupies
a position equally prominent to that of the distribution of capabilities.
The balance of interest theory implies “equal focus on both the power and
interests of states … and contains complex unit-structure interactions,”
according to which “predictions are co-determined by the power and
interests of the units and the structures within which they are embedded”
(Schweller, 1993, pp. 76-77).
The need to consider the interconnectedness between power, threats,
and interests is also hinted at by Snyder (1991, p. 124) who talks about the
dispositional pressures of polarity and strength inequality between states
either reinforcing or undermining the expectations of support coming
from commonality or conflict of interests. It is the combination of the
“conflict and commonality factor” (i.e., whether the interests are common
or conflicting) and the “strength inequality factor” (i.e., the polarity of the
international system and power gaps between major states involved in
the alignment dynamics) that produces a pattern of interstate alignment
(Snyder, 1991, p. 124). Threats, in turn, can motivate states to increase their
military capabilities (internal balancing) or realign with others (external
balancing). Either action impacts the balance of power itself.
At the same time, the synergy between the three factors of alignment
formation does not a priori suggest that they always coincide and that for
great powers there is no difference between them (e.g., the most powerful
is the most threatening and that interests fully depend on threats). This
scenario is possible, but not guaranteed a priori. It is possible that only
one or two factors incentivize alignment, while other(s) pull in a different
direction. In this case, alignment incentives may weaken or disappear.
A case in point is the post-Cold War US–India relationship, explored in
Chapter 6, in which misalignment between the incentives emanating from
the considerations of power, threats, and interests weakens the causal push
for closer defense cooperation.
This link between “power,” on the one hand, and “threat” and “interest,”
on the other makes for a framework in which balance of power configurations can be viewed as a necessary condition for China–Russia alignment,
whereas balance of threat and balance of interests have to do with sufficient
conditions. The analysis, therefore, begins with the assessment of the evolution of the material capabilities distribution (the balance of power) since
the end of the Cold War as the very first step in assessing the structural
conditions within which China–Russia alignment evolves. Then, it moves
56 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
to the assessment of mutual threats – as the more immediate incentive
for alignment. Finally, it proceeds to the exploration of mutual interests.
An important question is whether there is a convergence or divergence
between the three balances in terms of pushing China and Russia together
or pulling them apart. As shown in Figure 2.1, the three balances, while each
undergoing change, gradually become interconnected and converge into
a single causal bundle, in which the three balances reinforce each other,
thus reinforcing incentives for alignment formation and consolidation.19
Robustness check: economic and diplomatic cooperation
As a robustness check on the comprehensiveness of the upward trend
in China–Russia strategic alignment, this study considers non-military
aspects of bilateral cooperation, in particular the economic and diplomatic
dimensions that factor in the alignment’s functioning. It has been argued
that alignment does not necessarily focus solely upon the military aspect
of international politics but spreads across the security, diplomatic, and
economic spheres (Ward, 1982, p. 7; Wilkins, 2015, p. 81). It has also been
contended that many existing alliances do not fall neatly into the category of
dealing with life or death (Salmon, 2006, p. 821) and that the actual motives
for alliance formation are subject to the impact of various non-security
variables (Simon & Gartzke, 1996, p. 618). Some also justify consideration of
the non-security aspects of alignments on the basis of the alleged transition
of 21st-century international politics from narrowly defined security concerns
to maximizing economic advantages for domestic interests (Qobo, 2010,
p. 17). In the assessment of the military component of China–Russia alignment, it is particularly important to consider the economic and diplomatic
aspects of cooperation because China–Russia relations are often presented
as military-dominated and lacking other foundations (Shtraks, 2015).
The role of economic cooperation, particularly trade, in alignment development has received a fair amount of attention in the literature (Bliss
& Russett, 1998; Morrow, 1991; Morrow et. al., 1998; Gowa, 1994; Mansfield
& Bronson, 1997). Echoing Montesquieu’s famous dictum that “the spirit
of commerce unites nations,” some scholars have used economic logic to
explain states’ security concerns and alignment patterns (Lai & Reiter, 2000,
p. 209-210). Thus, the gains from trade are likely to bolster the aggregate
19 For a more explicit elaboration of ways and conditions in which those three mechanisms
interact with each other and become interconnected, see Chapter 4.
The Ordinal Model of Strategic Alignment
57
political-military power of the alliance and enhance the allies’ security
(Mansfield & Bronson, 1997, p. 94). Conversely, the lack of trade can undermine the foundations of an alliance. Economic interdependence, in turn, can
make alliances more likely, because economically interdependent states may
view threats to their economic partners as threats to their own interests.
Hence, governments become more willing to accept the costs of alliance
with valuable economic partners, to deter attacks on them, and defend them
in case of war (Lai & Reiter, 2000, p. 209). For example, the solidity of the
European Union (EU) as a security alliance has been explained by the EU’s
strong economic integration, among other factors (Tertrais, 2004, p. 147).
The first thing to look at when examining the economic dimension of
alignment is trade dynamics. However, there are other indicators of deeper
economic cooperation and interdependence. Røseth (2017) differentiates
between “pragmatic” and “strategic” cooperation by the degree of mutual
vulnerability that the parties are willing to accept. Thus, the transition from
pragmatic to strategic cooperation occurs when the emphasis of cooperation
shifts from ad hoc, episodic geopolitical cooperation to large-scale economic
motives, long-term energy commitments, and, most importantly, acceptance
of vulnerability vis-à-vis the other (Røseth, 2017, pp. 23-25). Adopting a
strategic approach indicates a state’s substantive geopolitical and economic
reorientation toward its alignment partners which are now allowed to
have a significant role in its economic wellbeing. The critical principle of
strategic cooperation is a “willingness to trust another party and thereby
accept vulnerability to obtain a common goal” (Røseth, 2017, p. 29).
When assessing the degree of China–Russia economic cooperation as a
component of alignment, the present study examines bilateral trade dynamics. Trade, however, may not be an indicator of robust cooperation in this case
because China is the largest single trade partner for more than one hundred
countries. By examining absolute trade volume alone, therefore, it is difficult
to determine the countries for which China is a strategic partner or only a
trade partner. An indication of stronger cooperation would be an increasing
number and share of energy projects and related investments that commit
both sides to creating and using immovable elements of costly infrastructure,
which requires fulfilling a range of mutual obligations. These long-term
commitments create vulnerabilities and shared risks between the parties
and are not taken lightly by the governments. Also, energy is considered a
strategic industrial sector by the Chinese and Russian governments.
At the same time, it is essential to explore the actual model of economic
cooperation between China and Russia and the geopolitical implications
that it generates. Beneath the façade of growing trade volume and energy
58 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
projects, there might be a relationship complicated by the existing pattern of
division of labor that exists between the two countries. For example, if Russia
is increasingly unhappy about its economic role in its interactions with
China, this might have significant long-term implications for China–Russia
alignment. In a similar vein, if China is less interested in building a mutually
beneficial economic cooperation with Russia, it will have implications
for the bilateral strategic alignment. In other words, it is essential to look
beyond trade statistics and explore the existing economic models of China
and Russia and their roles in determining their fundamental developmental
interests. Such interests can have either positive or negative spillover effects
on the relationship in other spheres.
Strategic alignment also entails diplomatic cooperation that displays a
degree of mutual support and coordination in international institutions.
Alignments should provide members with “mutual expectations of support”
that can contain elements of both “hard” and “soft” balancing (Wilkins, 2012,
p. 65, 73). Based on shared interests, alignments include the “expectations
of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states
in future interactions” (Snyder, 1997, p. 6). Aligned parties also display some
degree of policy coordination and a “willingness to commonly pursue joint
interests and mutual goals” (Strüver, 2016, p. 8).
To assess the degree of diplomatic cooperation, this study explores the
pattern of China–Russia joint voting behavior in the UN Security Council
(UNSC), the UN General Assembly (UNGA), IMF, G20, WTO, and other
regional organizations. It also explores China–Russia joint membership in
institutions and the agendas of regional blocs in which China and Russia
are core players. Diplomatic cooperation can also be reflected in official
statements and declarations, as well as state leaders’ public speeches about
the strategic concerns of the other party.
In summary, the suggested framework, while developed to assess alignment in China–Russia relations, is general enough to travel across other
cases of interstate cooperation to facilitate comparisons between different
strategic alignments – the task undertaken in Chapter 6.
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3
Military Cooperation: Approaching
Alliance
Abstract
This chapter is the empirical examination of the first cluster of the alignment framework developed in Chapter 2 – the stadial institutionalization
of China–Russia alignment. It demonstrates the development trajectory
since the end of the Cold War and delves into the underreported routinized
inner workings of China–Russia alignment, going beyond the prevalent
focus in the related studies on China–Russia arms deals. By tracing the
evolution of China–Russia alignment from the “early,” through the “moderate,” and to the “advanced” indicators of alignment, it demonstrates that
post-Cold War China–Russia relations have, from a low starting point,
grown steadily stronger. Currently, China–Russia alignment sits at the
borderline between moderate and advanced alignment, while moving
gradually into the advanced category. The upward trend is consistent,
and there exists a basis for more advanced forms of bilateral strategic
cooperation.
Keywords: China–Russia military cooperation, strategic alignment,
military alliance
As mentioned in the previous chapters, there has been a good deal of ambiguity in the assessments of post-Cold-War China–Russia cooperation.
While most of the official “names” of the relationship indicate an upward
trend, how close are the two countries based on the ordinal framework
and indicators of alignment developed in Chapter 2? Figure 3.1 displays
the trajectory of post-Cold War China–Russia military cooperation. While
there are chronological overlaps between the indicators, the transition into
higher-level cooperation at each stage happens after the previous stage of
cooperation has become high.
Korolev, Alexander, China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press 2022
doi: 10.5117/9789463725248_ch03
66 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
China–Russia cooperation treaty
As elaborated in Chapter 2, a formal treaty cannot be an exhaustive indicator of interstate alignment. It is even more so in the case of China–Russia
relations. For example, Fomin et al. (2019) has systematically studied the
correlation between Russia’s formal alliance obligations and the patterns of
its actual military and political cooperation and discovered no significant
association between the level of formal alliance commitments and the actual
military cooperation. Instead, the formal obligations that Russia enters into
with other countries have been shown to do more with diplomatic gesturing
and support within international institutions (Fomin et al., 2019). At the same
time, the formal treaties cannot be dismissed altogether as they do carry some
information and can be a first step in understanding strategic cooperation.20
Since the end of the Cold War, China and Russia have generated more than
200 bilateral treaties. The most foundational one is the bilateral “Treaty of
Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation” (the so-called “Big Treaty”),
signed by Jiang Zemin and Vladimir Putin on July 16, 2001, in Moscow.21
In contrast to the “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance,” signed in 1950, the 2001 Big Treaty avoids defining external
threats explicitly. It does not include the casus foederis clause (i.e., mutual
defense in the event of military aggression against an alliance member
nation). Therefore, it falls short of a defense pact and should on no account
be mistaken for an alliance treaty (Wilkins, 2008, p. 369).
However, Articles 2, 7, 8, 9, and 16 of the Big Treaty turn it into a clear
consultation and non-aggression pact that contains provisions that can be
interpreted as elements of an implicit defense pact. According to Article 2,
for example, China and Russia in their mutual interactions commit not
to: use force or the threat of force; adopt economic or other pressure; be
the first to use nuclear weapons; or aim strategic nuclear missiles at each
other (Korolev, 2019, p. 237). Article 8, in turn, contains provisions for the
event of war, according to which both parties commit not to participate in
any alliance or bloc that damages the sovereignty, security, and territorial
integrity of the other party. They also commit not to permit a third country
to use their territory to damage or establish an organization or group that
20 For an extended theory-grounded discussion of what formal treaties are an indication of
and why they cannot be relied upon in assessing the actual content interstate alignments, see
Chapter 2 above.
21 For the full English text of the treaty, see (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China, 2001). The treaty is still in force and is up for an automatic renewal after its f irst
expiration in 2021.
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
67
damages the national sovereignty, security, or territorial integrity of the
other party. Both China and Russia commit to prohibiting such activities.
More controversial is Article 9 that states that in a situation when one
of the parties deems that peace is threatened or its security interests are
involved, or it is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate
such threats (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
2001). Given that “the threat of aggression” and the means of “eliminating such
threats” are open to interpretations, Article 9 can be viewed as containing
certain features of an implicit defense pact, in a sense that if either party is
attacked or becomes involved in a conflict, the other party is expected to help.
At the same time, the absence of a military assistance provision is compensated for by Article 7, according to which the two parties commit to
coordinate their military efforts and policies “so as to consolidate each other’s
security and strengthen regional and international stability” (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2001). Article 16, in turn,
contains provisions for increased military cooperation, such as the sharing
of “military know-how.” As such the China–Russia Big Treaty can be viewed
as an alliance treaty subtype that, while failing to qualify as an explicit
defense pact, fully qualifies as a non-aggression pact and a consultation pact.
With Articles 7, 9, and 16, it can be viewed as exceeding these categories.
The early stage: confidence building measures and regular
consultations
The first indicator of early strategic alignment in our framework is confidencebuilding measures (CBMs). In China–Russia relations, most of such measures
were concentrated in the 1990s and were related to the multiple rounds of
bilateral border negotiations. The earliest, low-level CBMs were joint attempts
to normalize relations through a series of measures aimed at settling the
disputed parts of the China–Soviet border and demobilizing military forces
along the entire 4,300 km-long joint border. Given the complex history of the
China–Russia border since the 17th century and the border conflicts of the
1960s, these were highly contentious and sensitive issues, and their resolution
was necessary before there could be any progress in the relationship. It was
from these border-related negotiations as well as the initial border demilitarization and de-securitization measures that the CBMs gradually developed
and then subsequently transformed into a comprehensive mechanism of
regular consultations on a wide range of strategic issues.
68 1
China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Confidence building measures
On December 18, 1992, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin signed “The Memorandum of Understanding on the Guiding Principle for the Mutual Reductions
of Armed Forces and the Strengthening of Trust in the Border Region,” which
claimed to create a “common border of trust” (President of Russia, 1992).
Negotiations to reduce military forces in the border area and strengthen
inter-military trust continued for the next two years and culminated in
Russia’s Chief of General Staff, Mikhail Kolesnikov, visiting Beijing in
April 1994. In July 1994, the two countries signed “The Agreement on the
Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities,” which aimed to further desecuritize the border and create procedures for dealing with “accidental
border crossings,” which occurred along the long border. This agreement also
established a mechanism of regular information exchanges regarding the
movements and activities of the two countries’ border army units (Government of Russia, 1994). Two months later, Jiang Zemin visited Russia, and
the two countries signed two additional important documents: the “Joint
Statement on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons against East Other and Not
Targeting Strategic Nuclear Weapons at Each Other” and the “Agreement
on the Western Part of China–Russia Border,” which settled the western
segment of the border (Zhongguo Falv Fagui Zixun Wang, 2010). Around
this time, bilateral relations were upgraded from “good neighborliness” to
“constructive cooperation.”
These early measures were paralleled by China–Russia CBMs involving
Central Asian states, which was an essential aspect of the initial trust
building between the two countries. Russia has always considered Central
Asia to be part of its sphere of interest and is highly sensitive towards other
great powers trespassing into that area. In the context of China’s growing
capabilities, misunderstandings, or lack of transparency between Moscow
and Beijing in the region contains a danger of creating suspicion and tensions
that could set the relationship back. This had been recognized in both
countries. On April 26, 1996, the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (the Shanghai Five) gathered in Shanghai to sign
an agreement establishing a number of CBMs within a 100 km-wide zone
on both sides of the 8,000-km border that China shares with the other four
countries. These included limits on the number and scope of border-area field
exercises and movements, measures to prevent hazardous military activities,
and expanding contacts between the countries’ military forces and border
troops. A year later, in April 1997, the leaders of the five countries signed
the “Treaty on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in Border Areas,” which
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
69
required the withdrawal of most troops stationed within the 200 km-wide
zone along the border that China shares with the four countries (Kile, 1999).
On November 10, 1997, at a summit in Beijing, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang
Zemin signed a new border agreement, which settled the demarcation of
the longest eastern sector of the China–Russia border, with the two islands
that were in the border rivers left to future negotiations. The agreement
was a diplomatic breakthrough because it signified a settlement of almost
the entire China–Russia border. This was also a turning point after which
bilateral CBMs of a higher level were introduced. These CBMs aimed at
deeper demilitarization of the border and more comprehensive information
sharing. Thus, in August 1998, the two countries signed the “China–Russia
Protocol on Border Defense Information Exchange,” which enhanced the
procedures for mutual notifications about military activities close to the
border. This was followed, in December 1999, by agreements for the complete
removal of Chinese and Russian operational army units to 100 km away
from the border, which created a vast demilitarized area (Wu, 2002). The
formal and final resolution of the border issues occurred on October 14,
2004, through the signing of the “Agreement on the Eastern Segment of
the China–Russia Border,” which resolved the issue of the two disputed
islands – the Bolshoi Ussuriisky Island and Bolshoi Island – and closed the
book on territorial disputes in China–Russia relations.22
While the CBMs mentioned above do not indicate that a high level of
trust had been achieved in China–Russia relations, they demonstrate that
the two countries openly recognized the problems the lack of trust can
create for the relationship and decided to consistently work on it, which
significantly helped to improve the overall spirit of bilateral contacts at the
early stage of cooperation.
2
Regular consultations
With the border issues resolved, the number and frequency of bilateral
CBMs in China–Russia relations dropped considerably. Simultaneously the
CBMs started to become more sophisticated in terms of form and content
22 At the time of writing, there are no off icial border disputes between China and Russia.
However, the so-called theories of “unequal treaties” and “unfavorable territorial demarcations”
between China and Russia prior to 1917 remain deeply entrenched in Chinese, and to an extent in
Russian, societies, providing fertile soil for nationalism, irredentism, and historical revanchism,
especially in connection to the “China dream” rhetoric, which is aimed at the restoration of the
historical glory of the Chinese nation. For more on how China and Russia try to alleviate these
negative historical memories, see Korolev & Portyakov (2019).
70 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
and gained a broader, non-contentious agenda, thus gradually evolving into
regular consultations.23 These contacts developed into a comprehensive,
routinized mechanism of regular consultation at all levels. The mechanism
further developed into a multi-level institutionalized infrastructure of
contacts and regular information exchanges among almost all major government agencies and organizations – from the top decision makers and
their administrative units to the Defense Ministries and their subdivisions
as well as regional military districts and border garrisons and military
educational institutions. Arguably, there is only one state other than Russia
with which China has military interactions that are of comparable depth
and comprehension: Pakistan.24
Of particular interest is the fact that even during Russia’s explicitly
pro-West orientation under Yeltsin and early in Putin’s presidency,25 when
the intensity of contacts between the two countries’ top decision makers
appeared to decline, China and Russia never stopped bilateral consultations
at different levels (see Figure 3.1). Moreover, the mechanism of inter-military
consultations never ceased to expand as new consultations formats were
added to it. Some of them were established through signing a formal treaty
or agreement, whereas others emerged as an outcome of the routinization
and institutionalization of regular practices.
Formally, China–Russia military consultations began in 1992, when the
then-Chinese Defense Minister, Qin Jiwei, visited Moscow and established
official relations between the militaries of the two countries. On October 11,
1993, during Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev’s visit to Beijing, the
two countries signed the “Military Cooperation Agreement between the
Ministries of Defense of China and Russia,” which laid the formal foundation
for bilateral inter-military cooperation.26
The first mechanisms of regular consultation included the Regular Meetings Between Defense Ministers of Russia and China, established in 1993,
and the Annual Strategic Consultations among Chiefs of the General Staff,
established in 1997. Both mechanisms take the form of annual meetings in
23 Arguably, the last CBM occurred in 2009 with the Agreement on Mutual Notification about
Launches of Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles, which established a new level of
information sharing. See China News (2009).
24 Author’s interview with an expert on China–Russia military cooperation from the Institute
of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, October 3, 2016.
25 On how Russian ruling elites in the 1990s and early 2000s were trying to hinge Russia to
the Western neoliberal project by advocating closer cooperation with the developed West, see
Hopf (2013).
26 For full Russian text of the agreement, see: Official Portal of Legal Information (1993).
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
71
Moscow and Beijing on a rotating basis with agendas ranging from general
issues of strategic orientation and military strategy in the two countries
to military-technical cooperation. These mechanisms generate an active
flow of information between top military officials and facilitate a common understanding of foreign policy orientations. However, given their
relatively broad agenda and the presence of similar consultation practices
in China’s and Russia’s interactions with other countries, as well as their at
times procedural and symbolic nature, they do not reflect actual high-level
cooperation.
A shift to the high level of cooperation in terms of military consultations
began in the early 2000s (after the CBMs resolved contentious border issues
as outlined above) creating more specialized mechanisms that China and
Russia do not have with many foreign states. An essential step in this direction was the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
in 2001, which significantly expanded and institutionalized the interface of
China–Russia military consultations. It introduced multiple new platforms
for regular interactions between Defense Ministers and other military
officials of different levels and generated is be called the Mechanism of
Inter-Military Consultations within the Functioning Structure of the SCO.
These mechanisms include the SCO’s Annual Summits, held annually in one
of the member states’ capital cities, the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structures
(RATS), established as a permanent body within the SCO, the Meetings of
Heads of Ministries and Departments, which provide an extra platform
for consultations between the two countries’ Defense Ministers, and the
traditional bilateral military consultations “on the sidelines” of the SCO
similar to the already routinized special “Putin-Xi forums” that regularly
occur during multilateral meetings to demonstrate the special relationship
between the two leaders (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation,
2015a).
A new advancement in the area of bilateral consultations occurred in
October 2004, when a new mechanism focusing on China’s and Russia’s
immediate national interests – Russia–China Consultations on National
Security Issues – was established (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, 2004). This mechanism operates at the level of Heads of the
Security Council (on the Russian side) and State Council representatives
(on the Chinese side). It became a consultative format that China only
has with Russia. According to China’s State Council representative, Tang
Jiaxuan, the new mechanism is “the first precedent in which China creates
an interstate mechanism of consultations on its national security issues
with a foreign state” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
72 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
2005a). This indicates the “convergence of Russia’s and China’s positions on
major global and regional security issues” and “the transition of bilateral
security cooperation into a new quality” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation, 2005b). Both countries intend to use the new
communication channel to jointly react to new challenges and protect
their national security interests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, 2005b). On December 8, 2009, at the fourth annual consultation in this format, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai
Patrushev, and Chinese State Council member Dai Bingguo announced
that this bilateral security dialogue should occur no less than four times
a year (Sputnik News, 2009).
The breadth and depth of China–Russia security consultations continued
to increase, in response to the contingencies of the international environment in the Asia Pacific, such as the aggravation of tensions in China–US
relations, the South China Sea territorial dispute, and the North Korean
nuclear problem, among others. A case in point is the China–Russia Northeast
Asia Security Dialogue – a new platform for regional security consultations,
which was launched in April 2015 and aimed to “create effective security
mechanisms in Northeast Asia” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2015). This security dialogue has become the most tightly
scheduled format, with the frequency of meetings varying based on the
urgency of regional issues, even happening bimonthly immediately after
the US decision to deploy the THAAD missile shield in South Korea.
Given the growing significance of cyberspace in international relations,
China and Russia have developed consultation mechanisms in this area as
well. In June 2016, Putin and Xi, after reconfirming their bilateral commitment to cooperate in “information space,” established that the Minister of
Cyberspace Administration of China and the Aide to the President of Russia
on Information Technologies Application would meet regularly to consult
on the issues of common concerns and ensure inter-agency coordination
(Bolt & Cross, 2018, p. 245).
The spillover effect of the high-level consultations was the development
of various regional military consultation formats between different types
of troops and army units, which deal with the issues of border protection,
topogeodesic, metrological, and combat support, combat training, and
others. Examples include Blagoveshchensk-Heihe Border Garrisons Consultations and Meetings mechanism, or the consultations between Russia’s
Central Military District and Beijing Military District, which comprises
commanders of battalions and companies from the Volga Region, Ural, and
Siberia (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2015b).
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
73
Since the early 1990s, China and Russia have been launching new or
enhancing existing consultation mechanisms every three to four years.
Currently, all the mechanisms combined generate a frequency of 20 to 30
high-level security-related consultations every year. This number excludes
the entire body of regional cooperation formats that occur between provinces
and cities, educational exchanges, and military exercises. Thus, high-level
inter-military contact between China and Russia occurs almost every two
weeks. Most of these meetings end with a joint statement or declaration that
reflects the two countries’ shared view on issues of international politics.
All these mechanisms have been consistently operating since the date of
their establishment.
Moderate cooperation: military-technical cooperation and
regular military exercises
The moderate stage of cooperation has been marked by the development of
Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC), accompanied by military personnel
exchanges, and the introduction of regular military exercises after various
consultation mechanisms became institutionalized in the mid-late 2000s.
While episodic military-technical exchanges between China and Russia
began to occur in the 1990s, MTC fully flourished in the mid-2000s and early
2010s, after bilateral consultations were already institutionalized. Around
this time, regular joint military exercises began to be launched, developing
the interoperability of the two countries’ military forces.
3
Military-technical cooperation
In the early 1990s, Russia was experiencing severe economic hardship.
China–Russia military-technical exchanges during those years contained
some barely legal practices, which constituted a large and hard-to-gauge
“grey area” in the two countries’ bilateral transactions and contributed to the
emergence of specific frameworks for China to obtain military hardware and
technological expertise from Russia. In the 1990s Russia’s military-industrial
complex rapidly degraded due to lack of funding and engineers’ incomes
dropped below subsistence level. According to some sources, multiple
Russian scientists and weapons designers went to China disguised as tourist
groups, when in fact they were selling military technologies for generous
payments compared to their salaries at home institutions. (Felgengauer,
1997). There are also records of some tragically comic episodes, such as, for
74 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
example, bartering a Russian civilian jet airliner Tupolev Tu-154 for two
freight cars of Chinese cucumbers (Larin, 2005, p. 75).
Practices like these helped China to leapfrog over many early stages
of military-technological modernization. They alleviated the impact of
the western arms embargo, imposed by the United States and European
countries against China in response to the Chinese government’s brutal
suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Russia was the only
available source of advanced military technologies, desperately needed for
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization. However,
those were years of chaotic exchanges between China and Russia, and
their actual impact on MTC remains underreported and not fully known.
An attempt to regulate the China–Russia MTC started in 1992, with the
signing of the “Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement” and establishing
the “Russia–China Mixed Intergovernmental Commission on MilitaryTechnical Cooperation” (MICMTC), which became a platform for formalized
discussion of arms sales from Russia to China and contributed to the overall
normalization and regulation of the bilateral MTC. On May 30, 1992, China
procured its first two modern Russian Su-27 fighters, the capabilities of
which far surpassed any fighters operated by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
at that time (Mei, 2018). By 1996, as a result of the work of MICMTC, China
and Russia agreed on the Su-27 project – hitherto, the largest project for
defense technology transfers from Russia to China, according to which
China’s Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC) procured a license to assemble
200 Russian supermaneuverable Su-27 jet fighters. The Su-27 project opened
the era of Sukhoi fighters in Chinese military aviation and provided crucial
channels for China to obtain technological expertise from Russia. As some
observers have noted, the first China-made Su-27 fighters had to be shipped
back to Russia for reassembly due to substandard work. Furthermore, to
provide training, quality control, and management, and to facilitate the
successful absorption of the production technology by the Chinese side,
more than a hundred Russian engineers were assigned to the Su-27 project
and travelled to China (Cheung, 2009, p. 141). The acquired technology has
subsequently been exploited for the development of the Chinese Shenyang
J-11B fighter – China’s own upgraded version of Su-27, which entered production in 2007.
In 1997, China purchased a license to produce Krasnopol-M explosive
projectiles (Cheung, 2009, p. 141). Between 1990-1997 there were also multiple
purchases of Russian military hardware for both PLAAF and PLA Navy
(PLAN). Many of these transactions were facilitated by the Chinese Admiral
Liu Huaqing, considered by many to be the father of the modern PLAN, who
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
75
visited Russia multiple times during that period (Wu, 2017). Those were
signs of progress in China–Russia relations with significant impact on the
development trajectory of China’s military forces. The impact of projects
such as Su-27 on the shape of China’s air power cannot be underestimated.
However, these were somewhat sporadic episodes of MTC.
Vladimir Putin’s accession to power in 2000 and the consequent centralization of power in Russia marked the beginning of a complete overhaul
of Russia’s arms export structure. The Russian Federation Committee for
Military-Technical Cooperation with the Foreign States was established and
empowered with broad control and supervisory functions.27 This measure
allowed for increasing the volume of arms exports while improving quality
controls. Also, it set the stage for more advanced forms of MTC. As a result,
by the mid-2000s, technology transfers and joint ventures amounted to 30%
of the overall transfers of Russian military equipment to China (Cheung,
2009, p. 141). In 2006, Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov emphasized
that in the sphere of MTC, China is Russia’s “privileged partner” and MTC
constitutes the backbone of the China–Russia strategic partnership, which
elevates the entire bilateral relationship (Lin, 2006).
Despite this positive dynamic, China–Russia MTC experienced temporary
stagnation in the mid-2000s, with arms trade volume between the two
countries dropping significantly. Even the MICMTC meetings, taking place
regularly since 1992, were suspended in 2006 and 2007 due to alleged “lack
of topics for discussion” (Kashin & Gabuev, 2017, p. 14). Russia’s relative
domestic recovery and, hence, reinvigorating massive purchases by the
Russian Defense Ministry had made exports to China less necessary. Additionally, there were two China-related causes of the slowdown. First, the
Chinese authorities believed that China had become more self-sufficient
and capable of producing its own arms and, therefore, decided to reduce
large-scale arms imports. Second, Russia’s concerns about China’s unlicensed
reverse-engineering of weapons and potential competition with the cheaper
China-made weapons on the markets of Latin America, North Africa, and
other regions increased considerably (Kashin & Gabuev, 2017, pp. 15-17).
Together, these factors generated an impression that Russia’s arms export
to China would drop to insignificant levels (Kashin, 2018, p. 222).
However, this trend was short-lived. On the one hand, the Chinese turned
out to be over-optimistic in their assessment of the country’s defense industrial capacity to meet the PLA’s growing demands for high-tech items,
27 For more on Putin’s early policies in the area of defense exports, see Kozyulin (2001), Makienko
(2001).
76 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
particularly aircraft engines. China’s domestic industry failed to develop
and produce the needed weapons systems in time (Kashin, 2018, p. 222). At
the same time, the signing on December 11, 2008, during the 13th meeting
of China–Russia MICMTC in Beijing, of the “Agreement of Intellectual
Property in Military-Technical Cooperation” significantly alleviated Russia’s
concerns about the reverse-engineering issue. Another factor behind Russia’s
diminishing concerns about theft of technology by the Chinese was the
strengthening of Russia’s counterintelligence system and an almost complete
exclusion of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members, such
as Ukraine and Belarus, from the design and production cycle of the most
advanced Russian weaponry. As a result, China’s ability to gain illicit access
to Russian know-how reduced dramatically (Kashin, 2018, p. 226). These
changes resulted in the resumption of an upward trend in the China–Russia
arms trade by 2010 and facilitated exports of more advanced arms and
technologies to China.
Among the many new deals of the early 2010s, there were a few notable ones that fall into four major categories. The first one has to do with
aerospace engines – an area where China remains dependent on Russia
(Raska & Bitzinger, 2020). In 2012, China received large deliveries of Russian
aircraft engines, such as AL-31FN, D-30KP-2, RD-33, and RD-93 (Kashin,
2018, 223). AL-31FN and RD-33 are used on the Chinese J-10 and FC-1 fighters, respectively (Raska & Bitzinger, 2020, p. 96). In the same year, China
placed new orders for 140 AL-31F engines and 184 D-30KP2 turbofan engines,
needed for China’s new H-6K bomber and Y-20 transport aircraft as well as
for retrofitting the PLAAF’s existing Il-76 transport aircraft (Kashin, 2008,
p. 223). As a result, aircraft engines constituted 30% of China’s total arms
imports in 2012-2016 with Russia being the largest supplier accounting for
57% of Chinese imports (Fleurant et al., 2017, p. 9).
The second segment is related to export to China and maintenance of Russia’s S-400 “Triumf” (Triumph) anti-aircraft weapon systems. China became
the first foreign purchaser of the previous generation of these systems – the
S-300. This was also the case with the S-400 deals. After lengthy negotiations, the deal to deliver four battalions of S-400 systems to China, worth
more than US$1.9 billion, was signed in 2014 (Kashin, 2008, p. 224). S-400
is widely regarded as one of the most advanced air-defense systems in the
world “on par with the best the West has to offer” (Ritzen, 2018). Therefore,
this transaction has seriously alarmed some Western defense analysis, who
argue that China’s operation of S-400 means that in a possible crisis related
to Taiwan, US and Taiwan planners must plan to yield air superiority to the
Chinese or “accept high levels of risk to US aviation assets” (Heath, 2016).
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
77
The third major project was the purchase of Russian Su-35 supermaneuverable fighter jets by China. The negotiations started in 2012, and in
November 2015 a contract was signed for 24 Su-35 fighters at a price of US$2.5
billion. Soon after the first batch of four Su-35 was delivered to China in
December 2016, the jets patrolled the South China Sea in February 2018 and
near Taiwan in May of the same year (Goldstein & Kozyrev, 2020, p. 29). Su-35
fighters are held in high esteem among Chinese experts, not least because
they can be rapidly put into service by PLAAF thanks to decades-long
experience with Russian fighter jets (Huang & Fan, 2019).
The fourth project has to do with China importing Mi-171 medium-lift
helicopters for the PLA. China has purchased more than 200 such helicopters and in 2012 had more than 300 in operation. In 2011, China signed an
agreement with Russia to legally manufacture the Mi-171 in China and,
according to some predictions, may eventually have over a thousand Mi-171s
(StrategyPage, 2012). Some experts argue that these helicopters have not
only proved indispensable for dealing with humanitarian disasters, such
as the earthquake in Sichuan, but have also formed the backbone of PLA
ground forces’ air mobility (Goldstein & Kozyrev, 2020, p. 28).
After a short-lived decline in bilateral military transactions, China–Russia
arms deals were fully back on track by 2010-2012, with China retaining its
role as one of Russia’s biggest arms buyers. Moreover, in the context of the
Ukraine Crisis of 2014 and after, a more profound qualitative change started
to unfold in the bilateral interactions – Russia started to consider China
as not only a market but also a provider of critical items for Russian arms,
increasingly making bilateral interactions a reciprocal “two-way street.”
Examples include Russia starting procurement of naval diesel engines
produced by Henan Diesel Engine Industrial Company instead of those
produced by German MTU (Motoren- und Turbinen-Union) for its coast
guard patrol ships and Buyan-class missile corvettes (VPK News, 2016). In
2014, the two countries started to explore the possibility of Russia procuring
and acquiring production technology of space-grade radiation-resistant
electronic components from the state-owned China Aerospace Science and
Industry Corporation in exchange for Russian RD-180 liquid-fueled space
carrier rocket engines and production technology (Lenta.Ru, 2016). The
Russian defense industry searching for suppliers in China became a new
development in the bilateral relationship (Kashin, 2008, p. 227).
The major shift that indicates a transition to high-level MTC in China–
Russia relations took place roughly in the mid-2010s when the pattern of
MTC started moving away from merely providing a structure for arms and
technology transfers to a more interdependent relationship that includes
78 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
long-term joint projects related to joint development and production of
arms and their components. The new trend has been marked by a gradual
decrease in Russia’s significance as a net weapons provider accompanied
by an increase in the number of long-term cooperation projects. Moreover,
the relationship is increasingly characterized by joint R&D cooperation
that serves the military needs of both countries. Technological partnership
based on subcontracting work on various essential elements of the overall
design and joint programs for defense innovation transform the nature
of the originally transactional China–Russia MTC and create long-term
mutual dependencies.28
While Russia designing or contributing to the design of Chinese weapons
systems existed earlier, the new trend has been characterized by Russia
beginning to develop critical elements of different platforms, such as suspension system elements for tracked vehicles, elements of aerial vehicle
airframes, and specialized software, rather than entire platforms (Kashin,
2008, p. 225). This development interlocks arms production in both countries
and increases interdependence. At the same time, as noted by Kashin (2008,
pp. 224-225), even though such contracts, as well as contracts for military
R&D, are difficult to track and they remain unidentified in the Russian
media, their increased role in general China–Russia cooperation is a fact that
has been registered by Rosoboronexport (Russia’s sole state intermediary
agency for military exports and imports).
The list of China–Russia joint long-term MTC projects is long and growing, even though different projects progress with different speeds, with
some failing to fully enter the implementation stage. At the same time,
information on many joint undertakings in this area is not publicized by
either Russian or Chinese government and media, unless there is a strong
intention on the government part to make the information public for political
reasons. The most extensive China–Russia MTC programs are currently
related to aircraft engines and anti-aircraft weapons. For example, the
Chernyshev Moscow Machine-Building Enterprise and the China National
Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation are undertaking a joint
program to modernize the Russian Klimov RD-33 turbofan engine for a
lightweight fighter jet that has become the primary engine for the Chinese
CAC/PAC JF-17 Thunder lightweight multirole combat aircraft. An indication
28 Joint development and production of arms by China and Russia deserves a separate study as
it can be viewed as a factor creating levels of long-term interdependence higher than in today’s
allegedly most advanced alliances (e.g., US–Japan alliance) the members of which do not build
critical weapons systems together.
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
79
of Russia’s readiness to increase bilateral cooperation in this area was the
discussion of cooperation on joint production of a new fighter jet turbofan
engine based on engine technology used in the Russian 117S engine, which
powers the newest Su-35 fighters (Aviation Explorer, 2014).
Another project indicative of the growing role of Russian companies as
subcontractors in Chinese defense industry R&D and production projects
is the joint construction and co-production of a large military helicopter,
which was agreed by Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in May 2015, when Xi was
attending the May 9 Victory Parade in Moscow. Beijing has already imported
a few Russian Mi-6 super heavy helicopters, but the two sides decided to
expand cooperation and invest in the joint development of a new helicopter.
According to the Chairman of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China,
Lin Zuoming, who visited the “Russian Helicopters” company to meet with
its General Director, Alexander Miheev, in 2015, the two parties agreed to
accelerate the process and specified the tasks each side would undertake
(People’s Daily, 2015). As of 2019, the project appears to be progressing as
planned, even though it is still far from delivering a prototype (Goldstein &
Kozyrev, 2020, p. 28). At the 2019 International Aviation and Space Saloon
(MAKS-2019), which took place on August 27-September 1 at Zhukovsky
airport close to Moscow, China and Russia signed an agreement, according
to which, the jointly developed Advanced Heavy Lift (AHL) helicopter would
take to the skies by 2032 (Defense World.net, 2019).
Other projects showing, with varying success, growing interdependence
in the MTC realm include the launching of the assembly of GAZ “Tigr” (Tiger)
multipurpose, all-terrain infantry mobility vehicle in China (TASS, 2015); the
space program which includes plans to build a joint base on the moon; the
production of Russian rocket engines in China; and joint projects in satellite
navigation, remote earth sensing, producing electronic components and
space equipment, human spaceflight, and others (Krecyl, 2014). Another
project worth mentioning as an indication of a gradual move towards creating an industrial alliance is the two countries’ agreement for jointly designing
and producing a wide-body passenger aircraft, signed during Putin’s visit
to China in 2016. Besides, according to officials from Rosoboronexport,
work is underway to power the J-31 Chinese fifth-generation aircraft, which
is considered an export program for competing with the US on regional
markets, by Russian RD-93 engines (Krecyl, 2014).
It is important to emphasize Russia’s changing attitude toward a more
comprehensive and interdependent MTC with China, specifically the seemingly disappearing caution about relying on China in this area. When meeting with the Chinese Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission,
80 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Xu Qiliang, the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Shoygu, stated that in
the context of the strategic environment in the Asia Pacif ic, Northern
Africa, and the entire world becoming increasingly difficult, “China–Russia
MTC is gaining a special character and a special meaning. The level of
our relations demonstrates that we do not have unsolvable problems. Our
work will be aimed at the realization of our MTC projects” (Krecyl, 2014). In
turn, Sergei Kornev from Rosoboronexport stated that the forefront of the
China–Russia MTC is increasingly represented by the joint production of
weapons in Chinese territory (Krecyl, 2014). According to the chief editor
of the Moscow Defense Brief and Russia’s leading expert on China–Russia
military cooperation, Vasili Kashin, “if previously Russia was constrained by
political factors in its MTC with China, now those factors have disappeared.
We are now too interlinked with the Chinese.” Moreover, China currently
has much to offer, for example, electronic components, including those for
the space program, composite materials, drone technologies, and engines
for warships.
Russia’s tendency to consider China as not only a market but also an
indispensable MTC partner consolidated after the Ukraine Crisis. Some
experts believe that given the current dynamics, even if Russia–Western
political relations stabilize at some point, Russia has already passed the
point of no return in its MTC with China (Krecyl, 2014). Moreover, according
to Russian officials, the Kremlin trusts China and is going to consistently
work to enhance bilateral MTC, disregarding Western provocations in the
form of reconstructing “China’s threat for Russia” (People’s Daily, 2015). The
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in his speech about the development
of Russia’s comprehensive partnership with China on November 22, 2014,
noted that: “We can now even talk about the emerging technological alliance
between the two countries. Russia’s tandem with Beijing is a crucial factor for
ensuring international stability and at least some balance in international
affairs, as well as ensuring the rule of international law” (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2014). A sign of the growing attention that
political leadership in the two countries pays to the bilateral MTC was that
in December 2017, General Zhang Youxia, the Deputy Chairman of China’s
Central Military Commission responsible for science and technology issues,
when attending a yearly meeting of the MICMTC in Moscow, was received
personally by President Putin (Kashin, 2008, pp. 229-230).
While the shift of attitudes in the top echelons of the Russian government
may not by itself indicate a high level of bilateral trust, it shows that Russia
is reconsidering its previous defense-equipment-for-cash model of MTC with
China, which makes future enhancements in China–Russia MTC easier.
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
81
Maintaining a high level of cooperation between the two countries’
defense industries and militaries requires a significant pool of trained
professionals with profound knowledge of the other side’s capabilities.
Therefore, the development of military personnel exchanges paralleled
the development of MTC and evolved from short-term visits for technical
training to longer-term military education programs. Some Chinese analysts
argue that for understanding China–Russia military cooperation one must
understand that many of China’s most promising military officers have
been or are being educated in Russian military academies (Yang, 2019, p. 11).
Russia was the first foreign destination for PLA officers’ military education. The official statistics on the number of personnel involved in military
educational exchanges are classified, mostly at China’s request.29 However,
the existing open sources suggest that bilateral military personnel exchanges
have been increasing. Moreover, interviews show that China does not have
similar types of military personnel exchanges with any other major power.
Although short-term exchanges and visits by PLA off icers to different
countries, including the US, are not rare, long-term educational programs,
in which officers are methodically trained to later join the PLA’s command
staff exist in China’s relations with Russia only. It is not likely that military
cadres that have extensive exposure to Western education will smoothly
move to top-ranked command positions because China does not trust the
US and its Western allies in military relations.30
In 1996, the Central Military Commission of China ratified a series of
documents targeted at facilitating military educational programs specifically
with Russia. These included the Notice on Sending Military Students to
Russia and Other Countries (Guanyu Xiang Eluosi Deng Guo Paiqian Junshi
Liuxuesheng de Tongzhi), the Methods of Management of China’s Overseas
Students in Russia (Fu Eluosi Junshi Liuxuesheng Guanli Gongzuo Zanxing
Banfa), and the Practical Suggestions Regarding Military Overseas Students
Returning from High-Level Commanding Training in Russia (Guanyu Fu
Eluosi Gaoji Zhihui Peixunban Junshi Liuxuesheng Huiguo Hou de Shiyong
Yijian). In September 1996, China negotiated an agreement with Russia
on sending Chinese students to Russian military educational institutions
for comprehensive education and training and sent the first batch of 42
high- and medium-rank officers and engineers (Jiefang junbao, 2008). Beyond
general education and training for military commanders, an essential aspect
29 Author’s interview with an expert on China–Russia military cooperation, Moscow,
October 2016.
30 This assessment emerged during several interviews with both Russian and Chinese experts.
82 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
of such exchanges consisted of training Chinese officers to use new advanced
weapons systems, purchased from Russia, such as S-300 anti-aircraft missile
systems, SU-family aircraft, and Kilo-class submarines.
In July 2000, the two sides signed a Basic Bilateral Agreement on Military
and Defense Cooperation for the Period from 2000 to 2015, which further
expanded the inter-military exchanges (Li, 2009). According to the agreement, China sent 450 air force, rocket force, and navy officers to Russia for
advanced education. Russia, in turn, sent advisors to assist PLA officers in
learning how to properly exploit Russian military hardware (Yu, 2004, p. 722).
There are a few military educational institutions that are the primary
destinations for Chinese PLA officers. Top-ranking officers typically go
to the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which provides general programs in strategic and tactical aspects of
warfare and, according to some estimates, accepts up to 20 high-ranking
PLA officers every year.31 Other important institutions are the Combined
Arms Academy of the Armed Forces, the Gagarin Air Force Academy, and
the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation. They provide
two- to three-year programs, and each accepts 40-60 PLA officers every
semester (mostly mid-career-level officers and General Staff officers who
are between 35 and 45 years of age).32 Although the Chinese officers typically
attend classes separately from their Russian peers, the actual content of the
curriculum is similar to what is taught to Russian officers.
Education in Russia has helped many PLA officers make significant
career leaps. For example, Lu Chuangang, a Senior Colonel, studied at the
Russian General Staff Academy and became the Head of the PLA’s Command
Group for the 2008 “Peaceful Mission” China–Russia joint military exercises.
Xu Linping, who was promoted to Major General in 2007 and served as a
Commander of the 38th Army Group of the Beijing Military Area of the
PLA during 2011-2014, also studied in Russia. In January 2014, he became
the Vice-Commander of the PLA’s Lanzhou Military Region. Chen Zhaohai
became the Director of the Military Training and Arms Department of the
PLA General Staff Headquarters. It is worth noting that Cao Gangchuan,
who was China’s Defense Minister between 2003 and 2008 and became the
primary facilitator of China’s purchase of Russian arms, studied in Russia
for six years.
Although the tangible impact of China–Russia military educational
exchanges is difficult to measure, the fact that large numbers of PLA officers
31 Interview with an expert on China–Russia military cooperation, Moscow, October 2016.
32 Interview with an expert on China–Russia military cooperation, Singapore, October 2016.
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
83
study in Russian military institutions and are trained to use Russiandesigned military hardware should not be underestimated. Together with
narrowly specialized knowledge, the PLA’s officers absorb the knowledge of
Russian military traditions and strategies, which is likely to affect China’s
military build-up and army organization and make the two countries’ overall
thinking about modern threats and warfare more compatible.
4
Regular military exercises
Transitioning to the next sub-stage in the moderate stage of strategic cooperation between China and Russia occurred by introducing joint military
exercises, which contribute considerably to the enhancement of mutual
trust, transparency and cooperation in the military field. The intention to
start such exercises was first officially expressed in 2003 by Russia’s Chief
of General Staff, Yury Baluevsky, who announced to the Chinese military
leadership that consolidation of strategic cooperation with China is one
of Russia’s foreign policy priorities and that regular military drills would
push the partnership to a new level and provide a mechanism for mutual
learning. The Chinese welcomed the suggestion, and on December 13, 2004,
the two countries announced a decision to conduct the first large-scale
joint military exercise, named “Peace Mission.”
The first exercise – “Peace Mission 2005” – occurred on August 19-25,
2005, in China’s Shandong Peninsula and Russia’s Vladivostok, and engaged
10,000 soldiers and officers (8,000 Chinese and 2,000 Russians). The official
reason for the new exercises was counter-terrorism. However, the large
scale of the exercise and the use of heavy firepower, including long-range
bombers, as well as practicing air and naval blockades, amphibious assaults,
and occupying region demonstrate that the actual goals must have been
broader. Some believe that the actual goals included intimidation of Taiwan
or preparation for a post-Kim Jong-il regime collapse scenario. For Russia,
the drill also became a showcase for its military hardware, after which
significant arms deals were signed between China and Russia (Korolev, 2019).
“Peace Mission”-type large-scale joint military exercises became regular
and have been held every year since 2005. Some were held within the SCO
format, and most included strategies and tactics for resisting the danger of
“color revolutions” and curbing political turmoil in Central Asia. As a rule,
Western observers and journalists were denied access to these exercises.
After “Peace Mission-2009,” which occurred in China, there were the first
Chinese calls to abandon the “non-alignment strategy.” It was argued that
such a strategy is a strategic illusion that deprived the PLA of the valuable
84 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
experience of aligned warfare (Huangqiu Shibao, 2009). “Peace Mission-2010,”
in turn, was the longest exercise and lasted 17 days, from September 9-25,
2010, and included approximately 5,000 servicemen, more than 300 military
vehicles and in excess of 50 aircraft and helicopters (Korolev, 2019). During
the subsequent yearly “Peace Missions” China and Russia further practiced
military cooperation and solidified the mechanism of joint military exercises. After more than 15 years of such exercises, the two countries’ militaries
have made significant progress in improving interoperability.
In 2012, another type of regular large-scale China–Russia military
exercises – “Joint Sea” – was introduced. While “Peace Mission” involves
predominantly ground and air exercises, “Joint Sea” aims to achieve better
coordination between the two countries’ navies.
The first “Joint Sea” occurred on April 22-27, 2012 in the Yellow Sea and
included practicing convoying, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine warfare,
anti-piracy and rescue activities, and naval logistics. The “Joint Sea” naval
exercises have taken place every year since in different locations. “Joint
Sea-2015” was a geopolitical game-changer, as it became the largest naval
exercise undertaken by the PLA Navy with a foreign navy and, occurring
in the post-Ukraine context, the second stage of it was located in the
Mediterranean, which is considered the heart of NATO. Before heading
out with Russian ships to the Mediterranean, Chinese military vessels
entered the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. This military visit was
also the first in the history of China–Russia relations and was symbolically
connected to Xi Jinping’s attendance at the Victory Parade in Moscow on
May 9, 2015. During the drills, the two navies demonstrated a high level
of coordination in foreign waters (Bondareva, 2015). In turn, “Joint Sea2016,” which occurred on September 12-19, 2016, included surface ships,
submarines, fixed-winged aircraft, helicopters, and amphibious vehicles
and became the first major exercise of its type that included China and
a second country in the disputed South China Sea after the Hague-based
tribunal overruled China’s claims on the waters under its nine-dash line
claim. The drills also featured sophisticated joint maneuvers, such as strike
warfare, amphibious warfare, and anti-submarine warfare (Panda, 2016).
“Joint Sea-2017” happened in the Baltic and featured one of China’s newest
Type 052D destroyers (Goldstein & Kozyrev, 2020, p. 31). “Joint Sea-2019”
drills, in turn, were significant because they took place close to the Cape
of Good Hope “at the confluence of the Atlantic and Indian oceans, along
major global shipping route” (Muhin, 2019).
Combined, the “Peace Mission” and “Joint Sea” exercises guarantee that,
every year, China and Russia have one to two large-scale regular joint
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
85
military exercises, which include thousands of servicemen and hundreds
of military vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, and naval ships. Some observers
in Russia note that vast geographic range of China–Russia military drills,
which spans from in and off the coast of eastern China to Central Russia
and to Central Asia, and the leap in geography toward the Mediterranean
Sea and the Atlantic and Indian oceans shows that the two countries are
sending a message to the world about their close military partnership and
demonstrating strategic unity (Trenin, 2015).
In May 2016, China and Russia launched a new joint regular military
exercise, “Aerospace Security 2016,” which took place at the Central Research
Institute of the Russian Armed Forces and became the first Russia–China
computer-simulated missile defense drill. “Aerospace Security – 2017” was
located in Beijing in December 2017. According to China’s Defense Ministry,
these drills will bolster cooperation between the two countries’ armies and
secure a strategic balance of forces in the Pacific Rim. The main task of the
exercises is “to work out joint planning of combat operations when organizing
air missile defenses, operation and mutual fire support” (TASS, 2017). The third
“Aerospace Security” drills took place in Russia in 2019. While both countries
emphasize that the drills are not directed against third countries, they occur
in the context of China–Russia joint opposition against the US global defense
system and seek to strengthen bilateral military interoperability.
Around the same time, China and Russia began to conduct another type
of regular joint exercise – regular exercises for internal security troops,
which include Russia’s National Guards and Federal Security Service and
China’s People’s Armed Police. The frequency of these exercises varies from
year to year, but often they are held more than once a year. The inclusion
of these activities increases the number of Chinese–Russian regular joint
military drills to five to six per year.
After 2015, there was a new trend of holding various joint military activities
in addition to regular exercises mentioned above or as a substitution for some
annual exercises that did not take place.33 For example, in 2015, the annual
“Joint Sea” was deemed insufficient, and the two countries conducted an
additional drill in the Sea of Japan near Vladivostok two months later in
August 2015, to which China dispatched its new PLAAF KJ-200 early warning/
battle management aircraft (Goldstein, 2016). In September 2018, China
participated in “Vostok-2018” – Russia’s largest military drills since the end
of the Cold War. Bringing in almost a thousand Chinese artillery pieces and
33 The Joint Sea exercises did not take place in 2018 and 2020 but were made up for by other
bilateral and multilateral exercises.
86 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
armored vehicles, 3,200 Chinese soldiers and 30 helicopters, the drills took
place in Russia’s central and eastern regions and were carried out under joint
Russian–Chinese command (Volkov, 2018). In July 2019, China and Russia
started their first joint air patrol of the East China sea and joint strategic
aviation exercise in the region. The event made headlines as South Korean
interceptors had to fire warning shots at Russian aircraft. According to some
Russia-based analysts, the air mission was conducted to further consolidate
China–Russia military cooperation (Korostikov, 2019). While the frequency
of these activities, outside of the scheduled “Peace Mission,” “Joint Sea,” and
“Airspace Security” exercises, can vary from year to year, adding them to the
mix significantly increases the number of joint military maneuvers each year.
On August 9-13, 2021, amidst COVID-19 pandemic and international travel
restrictions, China and Russia held an exercise Sibu/Cooperation-2021 that
became the first exercise when China hosted Russian troops on its territory.
The exercise involved more than 10,000 ground troops and air forces and
took place in China’s north-central Ningxia region, which borders Xinjiang,
where China is accused of detaining more than one million Uighurs in
internment camps. This exercise also marks the first time Russian soldiers
were using Chinese weapons, which is a step forward in terms of operability
(O’Connor, 2021).
The growing number of China–Russia joint military drills in different
parts of the world and increasing coordination between the two militaries
lay the foundation for potential joint military action in multiple theaters of
operation simultaneously, which could significantly undermine the US’s
capacity to maintain a decisive strategic advantage globally. China and
Russia through the mechanism of military drills can effectively draw the
attention and capabilities of the US and its allies to a specific region, thus
reducing their ability to react to either China’s actions in the Pacific or
Russia’s actions in the Western part of Eurasia. According to some analysis,
the expanding geography of China–Russia military drills and the growing
complexity of operations suggest that such a scenario is being considered
(Kashin, 2008, 231).
Advanced cooperation: the growing interoperability of military
forces
The problem with assessing advanced levels of military cooperation is the lack of
data. One way to address this situation is to examine the details of joint military
activities more carefully. Although there is no current evidence of military base
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
87
exchanges (indicator 6), the increasing comprehensiveness and regularity of
China–Russia military exercises reveal growing military interoperability and
integrated military command (indicator 5). Moreover, some early evidence of
an emerging common defense policy become visible (indicator 7).
Experts agree that the degree of compatibility and interoperability
between Chinese and Russian forces has been growing as multiple exercises
have involved the creation of joint command centers, tactical groups under
a single command, or air groups implementing attacks jointly (Trenin, 2015;
Kashin, 2018). Thus, during the above-mentioned “Peace Mission-2005,” a
new system of command codes was introduced to allow for the transmission
of orders and communication between Russian and Chinese pilots. “Peace
Mission-2009” was also characterized by the improved coordination of
military forces with elements of a joint defense simulation. More elements
of interoperability and integrated command were observed during “Peace
Mission-2010,” in which two Russian Mig-29s and three Chinese H-6 jet
bombers were merged into one squadron and performed joint tasks to
practice joint command codes and interoperability (China Military Online,
2010). It is also worth emphasizing that all China–Russia joint tasks during
the drills operate in the Russian language. Chinese PLA soldiers and officers
learn the Russian command system to facilitate interoperability.34
During “Joint Sea-2014,” the exercises included the joint defense of warships
in anchorage, convoying and rescuing captured naval ships, elements of
anti-aircraft warfare, and several rescue operations. All operations were coordinated from a joint command center. “Joint Sea-2015” marked a step forward
because it included the joint command of warships in the foreign waters of the
Mediterranean Sea. For that purpose, a joint command center was established
in the Divnomorskoye Coordination Center of the Russian Black Sea port
of Novorossiysk (Parffit, 2015). According to the Chinese Defense Ministry,
one of the aims of the exercise was “to increase our navies’ ability to jointly
address maritime security threats” (Reuters, 2015). During the post-Hague
tribunal “Joint Sea-2016,” which occurred in the South China Sea, the Chinese
and Russian navies engaged in a range of activities, including search and
rescue drills, anti-submarine warfare, and, remarkably, “joint island-seizing
missions,” which appear to be a new addition to the “Joint Sea”-type drills
that indicates growing interoperability and integrated military command.
Remarkable in this regard is Zapad/Interaction-2021 China–Russia joint
exercise. According to Senior Colonel Li Shuyin, a researcher of the Academy
34 Author’s interview with an expert on China–Russia military relations, Singapore, October 11,
2016.
88 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
of Military Sciences of the Chinese PLA and expert on Russian military
studies, one of the prominent features of the exercise was that Chinese
and Russian troops did not plan independently and then act in respective
groups under the same combat scheme, mostly demonstrating the relative
independent operations of both parties in the same battlefield environment.
Instead, this joint exercise has fully realized mixed grouping, joint planning
and training, with joint operations accounting for an even larger part, thus
further enhancing bilateral interoperability (China Military Online, 2021).
What deserves special attention when discussing the advanced cooperation
and interoperability between China and Russia is the ongoing integration
of the two countries’ satellite navigation systems – China’s Beidou and Russia’s GLONASS. The two systems are expected to use the same signal, and
China and Russia will cooperate in developing various applications for the
system. According to Andrei Ionin, Chief analyst of the GLONASS Union, the
GLONASS-Beidou cooperation, in creating a satellite communication system,
can compete with the US’s Iridium network (Ionin, 2015). Other experts believe
that the introduction of the common signal by GLONASS and BeiDou is a step
of political significance and can be interpreted as the creation of a “navigation
alliance” between China and Russia (Cheberko, 2015). Another indication of
the growing high-tech cooperation between China and Russia is cooperation
in cyberspace. According to a 2019 report on the high-tech partnership, the
Chinese Huawei Technologies Group is actively facilitating China–Russia
cyber integration by opening data centers in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan,
Novosibirsk, and Nizhny Novgorod (Bendett & Kania, 2019, pp. 9-10).
The apotheosis of strategic-level cooperation and integration of command
systems was the announcement by President Putin in October 2019 that
Russia was actively helping China to create a missile attack early warning
radar system. The announcement was made on October 3, during the 16th
annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi. Putin stated that “I
don’t think I will reveal a big secret here. It will become known anyway,” but
he also highlighted that “this is a very serious thing that will fundamentally
enhance the defense capability of China because currently only Russia
and the United States have such a system” (Nechaev, 2019). Subsequently,
China and Russia were reported to have signed contracts worth US$60
million to develop software for the new system (Interfax, 2019b). Sergei
Boev, the general designer of the missile attack warning systems and the
General Director of the “Vimpel” Russian Interstate Corporation involved
in the project, later stated that cooperation with China in this area was
“ongoing,” but also that “we cannot provide more details since it has to
do with confidential agreements” (Interfax, 2019a). According to some
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
89
recent assessments, the new China–Russia missile early warning system is
nearing completion. It will be based on the Russian “Tundra” satellites and
“Voronezh” modular ground-based radar stations set up in Chinese territory.
The system will provide advance warning on potential incoming missiles’
trajectory, speed, time-to-target and other critical information needed for
an effective interception (Defense World.net, 2020).
The new level of cooperation in this area is an outcome of the aforementioned “Aerospace Security” joint regular military exercises that have been
taking place every year since 2016. At the same time, Russia sharing missile
early warning capability with China is considered by experts unprecedented
for China–Russia relations from both the historical and military-technical
standpoints (Nechaev, 2019). Strategic arms, and specifically missile early
warning systems, are the most critical and sensitive aspect of any country’s
defense capability. China and Russia extending their cooperation into this area
is a significant leap in terms of bilateral trust. Possession of the early warning
system will enhance China’s defense capabilities immensely, because China
will have a powerful tool to protect itself from becoming a victim of a disarming
first blow from the US. Moreover, it opens avenues for the integration of China’s
and Russia’s early warning systems, when warning stations in Russia and China
are merged into a single complex to increase the speed with which the two
countries can be warned of and intercept a potential strike from the United
States. According to a retired Deputy Commander of Russia’s Air Defense
Command, Alexander Luzan, Russia will benefit too because the creation of a
unified information space and data exchange with Chinese radars will mean
that “the security of our country [Russia] from the East will be better ensured”
(Nechaev, 2019). Some Russian Asia specialists expressed concerns, however,
arguing that Russia bears serious risk trusting China so much (Rosbalt News
Agency, 2019). At the same time, some Moscow-based defense analysts argue
that integration of the two countries’ early warning systems facilitates further
convergence of Russia’s and China’s defense strategies, which could result in
the formation of a common defense policy (Nechaev, 2019). If this happens,
China–Russia military integration and interdependence is predicted to match
the level of the advanced alliance relationships the United States has developed
with countries such as France and the United Kingdom (Kashin, 2019).
Conclusion
The above analysis demonstrates that China–Russia military cooperation
is not impulsive or ad hoc, but rather strategic and displays immunity to
90 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Figure 3.1
Development of China–Russia military cooperation since 1991
High
Common
defence
low
Bases
Integrated
mil.
Mil. exercs
CBM
Low
high
low
MTC
Consult.
high
low
low
low
low
high
high
high
early stage
moderate stage
advanced stage
Source: Created by the author
external perturbations. Since 1991, China and Russia have constructed comprehensive mechanism of inter-military cooperation that has steadily been
expanding and continues to expand, starting to move into the initial stages
of advanced alignment, as defined in the present framework (Figure 3.1). Each
horizontal bar in Figure 3.1 represents a criterion examined above. Various
frequent consultations provide a mechanism for both countries to deal with
bilateral and international issues in a timely manner. MTC and exchange
of military personnel raised the level of inter-military compatibility. Since
2005, as a result of regular joint military exercises, China and Russia have
achieved a certain degree of episodic interoperability of their military
forces. These developments increase mutual predictability in China–Russia
relations. Moreover, with collaborative design and production of arms as
well as elements of integrated military command and common defense
policy, even though still episodic, but progressing (as is the case with the
early warning system), the current scale of China–Russia cooperation goes
beyond what some existing bilateral alliances represent. The current state
of military interoperability shows that bilateral military interactions are
highly functional and that there is a strong basis for further enhancements.
Not announcing “alliance” does not mean alliance is not possible or not
ready. Rather, delaying the off icial announcement, or not making such
announcement at all, may be benef icial to both China and Russia. The
Military Cooperation: Approaching Alliance
91
authorization of an alliance comes down to political will, not technical
readiness. Moreover, for China–Russia military cooperation to become
an important factor in great power politics, a formal alliance is not
necessary. The actual functionality of China–Russia alignment achieves
an impact on international security matters that satisf ies both Beijing
and Moscow.
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haijun de junshi jishu hezuo (xia) [Shaking hands in the blue ocean: Technology cooperation between Russia’s Severnoye Design Bureau and the Chinese
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Ma? [Joint military exercises: Will China and Russia form a military alliance?].
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Yang, Y. (2019, December 5). Ejun yuanxiao: youxiu junguang de yaolan [Russian
military academies: the ‘cradle’ of excellent military officers]. Jiefang junbao
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China–Russia military relations in the new century]. In J. Luan (Ed.), ZhongE Guanxi de lishi yu xianshi [History and Reality of China–Russia Relations]
(pp. 718-725). Henan Daxue Chubanshe [Henan University Press].
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October 10). Zhonghu Renmin Gongheguo Zhuxi he Eluosi Lianbang Zongtong
Lianhe Shengming [The Joint Statement of the Presidents of People’s Republic
of China and the Russian Federation]. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/3b_1.
pdf?_=1316627913
4
Alignment Incentives: The Three
Balances
Abstract
This chapter is the empirical examination of the second cluster of the alignment framework developed in Chapter 2 – the incentives for alignment
formation as expressed by the balances of power, threat, and interests. It
explores the changes within each “balance” as well as in the relationship
between them to explain China–Russia alignment. The chapter examines
the relative power dynamics within the contemporary international
system and the perceptions of external threats and interests in China
and Russia. It shows convergences between China and Russia in terms
of how they view the evolving international order and demonstrates the
gradually growing interconnectedness between the three balances in the
context of China–Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. There
are reasons to expect a further strengthening of the bilateral alignment.
Keywords: Russia–China alignment, balance of power, balance of threat,
balance of interests
According to the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, applying
the “three balances” approach to explain the dynamics of China–Russia
alignment requires exploring three factors for alignment formation: 1) the
relative material capabilities of the great powers and the impact of a potential
alliance on the balance of power within the international system; 2) the
compatibility of the potential allies’ views of external threats; 3) the potential
allies’ interests in revising the international status quo. To better explain the
alignment trajectory over a period of time, it is also essential to understand the
interrelationship between the three balances across the stages of alignment
formation, identified in Chapter 3. Since the three balances are not unrelated
to each other, this raises the question of whether there is a convergence or
divergence between them in terms of incentivizing China–Russia alignment.
Korolev, Alexander, China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press 2022
doi: 10.5117/9789463725248_ch04
100 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Balance of power: the shift in the distribution of capabilities and
its implications
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the empirical assessment of the balance of
power as a factor of alignment formation requires exploring two factors.
The first is the systemic power distribution itself, and the second is whether
a potential China–Russia alliance can mount a challenge to the dominant
superpower significant enough to for effective balancing.
According to the balance of power theory, the structure of the international system is reflected in the distribution of material capabilities among
major powers (poles of power) defined in relative terms (Waltz, 1979). The
measures of material capabilities, most widely used in the analyses of the
balance of power, are the gross national product (GNP) and levels of annual
military spending (Ripsman et al., 2016, p. 34-46). These measures are crude,
but they provide a useful first point of reference to the structural incentives
under which great powers operate.
These measures reveal that the US’s dramatic power dominance, which
since the collapse of the Soviet Union has generated an unsurpassable power
threshold preventing any anti-US balancing attempts, has deteriorated. By
the late 2000s, the period of US “hyperpower,” when other powers or alignments between them could not balance the US effectively, had ended. The
international system, in a sense, moved “back to normal,” with the US being
a “regular unipole” – still possessing obvious material supremacy vis-à-vis
others but losing the the unprecedented unassailability of its dominance
that used to make any potential anti-US alliances futile. In other words,
the structure of the international system has moved to what can be called
“regular unipolarity” – an environment that is most conducive to balancing
actions, such as alliance formation, by other major powers.
The relative power of both China and post-Soviet Russia vis-à-vis the
US has increased substantially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In
1991, the US’s total GNP of $6.158 trillion was more than 16 times that of
China ($383.373 billion) and almost 12 times that of Russia ($517.963 billion).
However, this unprecedented power imbalance was not long-lived. By 2013,
China’s GNP reached more than half of that of the US ($9.57 trillion vs. $16.785
trillion). By 2015, China’s GNP was 60% of that of the US ($11.062 trillion vs.
$18.219 trillion), and by 2019 it became almost 70% ($14.343 trillion vs. $21.374
trillion). Despite often being perceived as a declining power, Russia has
shown an 11-fold increase in GNP from a meager $196 billion post-Soviet low
in 1999 to $2.292 trillion in 2013. At the same time, the US has demonstrated
a 2.7-fold increase of total GNP since 1991 (World Bank, 2019). With all the
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
101
caveats,35 the change of material power structure in the international system
is significant. The current power structure resembles the one that existed
during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union’s GNP reached its peak of 60%
of the US total in 1975 (Office of Soviet Analysis, 1984), and when great power
balancing was the defining feature of international politics.
Changes in annual military spending further demonstrate the power
transition, as understood by the balance of power theory. Since 2010, the
US has been cutting its military budget. In 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015, it was
$711.3, $684.8, $640.2, and $596 billion, respectively. The downward trend was
reversed in 2018 and 2019, which were years of growing military spending,
but overall, between 2010 and 2019, the US’s military budget shrank by 15%.
In contrast, spending by China and Russia grew by 85% and 30% respectively
(Tian et al., 2020, p. 2). Actual military budgets fluctuate, and a lot depends
on the period covered as well as countries’ local currency exchange rates.
For example, during the decade before the Ukraine Crisis (between 2003
and 2014), the US’s military spending grew by 12%. In contrast, those of
China and Russia grew by 170% and 108%, respectively (Perlo-Freeman &
Solmirano, 2014, p. 2). In 2019, US had the world’s largest military budget of
$732 billion, followed by China with its $261 billion, and Russia appearing
as the fourth-largest spender with a defense budget of $65.1 billion (Tian
et al., 2020, p. 2).
Some have argued that that Russia is weaker than China and, hence,
cannot well-manage closer strategic cooperation with Beijing (Nye, 2015).
However, as the most recent assessments of China–Russia power balance
demonstrate: “Russia’s population is smaller, but richer per capita, than
China’s; its nuclear arsenal is larger; its military technology is superior; and
its weighty influence in energy markets – control and ownership of vast
energy resources, and energy transportation networks – all help to bring
some balance to the relationship” (Stoner, 2020, p. 110).
At the same time, experts have questioned the reliability of market
exchange rates in calculating military spending. Such data (as above) grossly
understates the real volume of spending in countries with relatively small
per-capita incomes, such as Russia and China. Kofman and Connolly (2019)
ask a pertinent question: how can Russia, with its defense spending allegedly
on par with France or the United Kington, maintain over a million military
personnel and carry out procurements of cutting-edge military hardware
35 One of the major caveats is that the actual GNP of China and Russia is not fully known. In
the Russian case, significant fluctuation of national currency exchange rate makes the task of
measuring GNP challenging.
102 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
that dwarf that of most European powers combined? Calculations based on
market exchange rates ignore the fluctuations of local currency exchange
rates, such as, for instance, the sharp depreciation of Russian ruble in 20142015. While in dollar value the Russian military expenditure in those years
was reported as declining, it increased significantly in ruble terms.
Moreover, Russia produces most of its weaponry itself. It does not import
costly arms from overseas, which means that a ruble spent at home buys
significantly more than a dollar spent abroad (Kofman & Connolly, 2019).
Therefore, using purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted estimates of
military budgets is suggested as a more methodologically sound approach
because it allows measuring non-traded goods and services that dominate
military expenditure in countries like Russia (Connolly, 2019). Thus, the
PPP-adjusted estimates of China’s and Russia’s military budgets in 2019
reached $500 billion and $166 billion, respectively (Wezeman, 2020). These
are believed to be conservative figures that exclude hidden or obfuscated
military expenditures that exist in both countries. The PPP-adjusted estimates reveal that the gap between the US, on the one hand, and China and
Russia, on the other hand, has been closing rapidly over the past 15 years
(Kofman & Connolly, 2019).
Resolving the measurement issues, if it is possible at all, is beyond the
scope of this study.36 However, the above analysis demonstrates that the
distribution of power among China, Russia, and the US has been undergoing
significant changes. While the US is still the most powerful, the power
threshold it generates is becoming less insurmountable, and hence the
costs of balancing against it more permissive. This change opens structural
opportunities for effective balancing in the form of strategic alignment,
provided that China’s and Russia’s strategic interests and perceptions of
external threats coincide. At the same time, the remaining preponderance
of US power over either China or Russia alone suppresses any incentives for
Beijing and Moscow to balance against each other. How long this peculiar
distribution of power lasts will be determined by a range of factors, and what
will happen to China–Russia relations when (and if) China truly surpasses
the US in terms of material power capabilities remains unknown. However,
this uncertainty does not cancel the current conditions of the balance of
power and the incentive structure created by it.
As argued by Monteiro (2014, pp. 179-204), while a systemic hegemon
represents the greatest overarching threat to the survival of other states,
36 For a systematic critique of the capacity of the existing indicators to gauge the transition
of power between China and the US, see Brooks and Wohlforth (2016).
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
103
such a threat is particularly overwhelming for states that are on the cusp of
becoming great powers. The narrowing of the gap in material capabilities
with the US has significant behavioral implications for both China and
Russia. It moves the boundaries of possible action and emboldens Beijing
and Moscow to undertake more assertive foreign policies, which, in turn,
increases systemic pressure on both countries. This process provokes chains
of reactions that make competing poles see each other as increasingly
threatening. Thus, for challengers of the US-dominated international status
quo, such as China and Russia, the growth of systemic pressure and the
ensuing threats paradoxically blends with the growth of their own power
and the overall improvement of their structural positions.
For example, China’s transformation into a global economic power dictated the broadening of its core national interest and de facto taking many
parameters and factors of its economy beyond the narrow framework of its
national borders. China became a global economic power. In this context,
the Chinese government started to develop a deep-sea navy (including the
construction of an aircraft carrier) to protect cargo transportation routes
most essential for China. China’s foreign policy became more assertive.
China started to be the perceived as more nationalistic and more aggressive
towards its multiple neighbors in Asia, the European Union, and the United
States, which required a balancing response.37 Similar dynamics apply to
Russia. As a result of massive rearmament programs, Russia has become
more resurgent and aspires to restore its spheres of influence, which in turn
triggers containment responses from the US.
The ongoing power transition and the subsequent changes in the behavior
of China, Russia, and the United States result in the emergence of what
Buzan and Wæver (2003) called geopolitically charged regional security
complexes (RSC). Such complexes are highly contentious, great-powerdominated regional settings in which “the members are so interrelated in
terms of their security that actions by any one member, and significant
security-related developments inside any member, have a major impact
on others” (Lake, 2009, p. 35). Such RSCs have emerged in both US–China
and US–Russia relations.
The US–China RSC has formed in Southeast Asia to a significant extent
as a result of China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) and
the US’s response in the form of “rebalancing to Asia,” aimed at reinstating
the US’s strategic leadership in the region. China’s growing naval activities
37 For an explicit identification of a rising China as a threat and a call for balancing against
China by prominent American China experts, see Shambaugh (2011), Christensen (2011).
104 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
in the SCS have posed a challenge to the freedom of the US’s maritime and
air navigation. The subsequent chain of events has put the two powers on
a collision course, intensifying the balancing dynamics between them and
contributing to their perception of each other as a threat.
China’s approach to consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the
SCS with ASEAN member states prioritized the “elimination of interference,”
which is a camouflaged warning not to involve the US (Zhao & Qi, 2016,
p. 490). In March 2009, China challenged the regional maritime primacy
of the US by harassing the USS Impeccable during its surveillance mission
in the SCS and requiring that such activities cannot be carried out without
permission. This incident triggered a formal protest from the US (Tyson,
2009). Subsequently, the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that freedom of navigation, access to Asia’s maritime commons,
and respect for international law in the SCS is in the US’s “national interests”
(US Department of State, 2010). This statement has turned the issue of
sovereignty over maritime features into a matter of US–China rivalry.
In January 2012, Washington adopted strategic guidelines that identified
China as a potential anti-access threat and announced a new approach to
organizing its military power. The new Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC) required increasing the deployment of US naval capabilities to
Asia-Pacific (US Department of Defense, 2012). The bilateral tension further
intensified when, on August 12, 2014, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) J-11 fighter intercepted, coming dangerously close, a US Navy
P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft (Dutton and Erickson, 2015).
Another step towards confrontation happened on October 27, 2015, when
the destroyer USS Lassen undertook a high-profile voyage in the SCS. The
goal of the mission was to assert the freedom of navigation and the UNCLOS
principle that man-made islands built on low-tide rocks are not entitled to
the 12-mile territory zone in surrounding waters (Panda, 2016). At this point,
some experts started speculating about the danger of direct military clashes
between China and the US (Auslin, 2015; Steward & Brunnstrom, 2015).
The list of events contributing to the deterioration of US–China relations
in the context of power transition can be continued to include US–China
trade and tariff wars, multiple incidents of entry-visa denials on both sides,
embargoes on goods, bans on Chinese 5G mobile network technology. This
downward trend only accelerated in the context of the COVID-19 global
pandemic, which has significantly exacerbated the already confrontational
dynamics, with China simultaneously attempting to strengthen its international leadership role (Smith, 2020). As US–China rivalry intensifies,
discussions about a prospective China–Russia alliance to deal with the
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
105
“threat from the West” becomes more urgent. It is even more so after the US
National Security Strategy, published in December 2017, called China and
Russia US’s major adversaries (President of the United States, 2017, p. 25).
Similar dynamics – from the accumulation of capabilities to increasingly
assertive behavior and then to balancing and confrontation – can also be
observed in the US–Russia RSC in Eastern Europe. Particularly illustrative
are the Russia–Georgia war of 2008 and the Ukraine Crisis of 2014, which
are central to the intensifying geopolitical tensions between Russia and the
West (predominantly the US) and epitomize Russia’s attempts to reclaim
its influence in what it considers areas of primary strategic interest.
Russia’s military conflict with Georgia was ultimately aimed at thwarting the US’s geopolitical projects in the Caucasus and preventing Georgia
joining NATO (Korolev, 2018). The Russia–Georgia war, which happened
from August 7-12, 2008, was the first time since the end of the Cold War
that Russia used military force outside its state borders. When the war
began, there were reportedly 130 American military specialists attached
to the Georgian army. As the war progressed, the US transported 2,000
Georgian soldiers from Iraq to Georgia and provided Georgia with $200
million in military aid (Sizov, 2009). The then US President George W. Bush
assessed Russia’s behavior in Georgia as “unacceptable in the 21st century”
(Alexander & Pleming, 2008). A few days after the war, the Russian Black Sea
fleet engaged in naval maneuvering with the NATO fleet in the Black Sea,
which further increased the temperature of US–Russia tensions. Some of
Russia’s leading foreign policy experts with links to the Kremlin commented
that Russia fought and won a war against Georgia that was backed by the
US and NATO and, thus, gave “a firm rebuff to the aggressors” (Karaganov,
2011). Such assessments – that Russia was dealing in Georgia with a more
significant external threat posed by the US – became dominant in various
Russian language publications (Sizov, 2009).
The Ukraine Crisis of 2014 further intensified Russia’s confrontation with
the West, and specifically with the United States. It broke out in the context
of the construction of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – Russia’s
attempt to unify the Post-Soviet space under its leadership. The United States
and its Western allies did not embrace Russia’s Eurasian agenda, calling it
an attempt to re-establish the USSR (Hauslohner, 2014). The then-Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton stated shortly before the breakout of the Ukraine
Crisis that “it’s [the EAEU] not going to be called that [Soviet Union]. It’s
going to be called a customs union, it will be called the Eurasian Union and
all of that, but let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is,
and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it”
106 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
(Klapper, 2012). As in the case with the Russia–Georgia war, the Ukraine
Crisis reflected a more profound geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West, which was only exacerbated by the crisis (Smith, 2020).
The crisis was followed by Western sanctions against Russia and Russian
countersanctions in response. Some studies have argued that Russia has
been engaged in hard internal balancing against the US (Steff & Khoo, 2014;
Korolev, 2018).
It would be an oversimplification to argue that consistently there were no
differences in Washington’s attitudes towards China and Russia, especially
before 2010. Russia experienced pressure from the US to a larger extent than
China, the relations of which with the US looked like a partnership that
combined elements of both competition and cooperation (Mastanduno,
2019). At the same time, there were periods of closer relations between
Russia and the US – during Vladimir Putin’s early years as a president and
later through Medvedev’s presidency when Putin effectively remained in
charge – and China and the US – e.g., with the introduction of the Group of
Two (G-2) concept in 2005 to denote an allegedly special relationship between
Washington and Beijing. However, these twists and turns appeared to be
fluctuations within the trend rather than changes of the trend. As some
analysts note, US–China partnership eroded to the point of collapse after
2010, and by 2017 US policymakers recognized that China, like Russia, had
moved towards anti-US revisionism (Mastanduno, 2019, p. 503). Thus, by
2017-2018, both China and Russia found themselves in rather confrontational
relationship with the United States.
While gradually losing its military-technical advantage,38 the US explicitly
identifies both China and Russia as major competitors that drive its defense
decisions and military resource allocation. As demonstrated by Cheung (2018,
p. 6), China is designated by the US as its main strategic rival and is given
the primary place in US defense strategy. Washington increasingly takes
steps to engage Beijing in a direct military-technological competition that
is projected to be long-term and result in an arms race (Cheung & Mahnken,
2018, pp. 239-245). In response, the Chinese strategists increasingly make
the US the primary focus of China’s defense policy (Chase & Mastro, 2018,
p. 114). Since the mid-2000s, China’s national security policymakers and
experts have increasingly viewed the US as a direct military competitor
and a potential adversary that does not want to see big powers like China
38 For a detailed analysis of how the US is gradually losing the initiative in military competition
and is starting to become reactive to China’s and Russia’s moves rather than setting the scope
and pace of that competition, see Cheung & Mahnken (2018).
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
107
and Russia become stronger (Cheung & Mahnken, 2018, p. 243). A 2011 study
by analysts from the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences recommended
that China must build strategic balancing capabilities in nuclear, space, and
air deterrence, “even if this leads to an intense arms race” (Wang F, 2011).
The same dynamics apply to US–Russia relations. Washington calls
Russia a “revitalized malign actor” (US Department of Defense, 2019, p. 11)
and imposes comprehensive sanctions against Russia. Moscow responds
by engaging in anti-US balancing using all available means, particularly by
aligning with China (Korolev, 2018). According to Alexei Pushkov (the head
of the foreign affairs committee in Russia’s lower house): “the United States
runs the risk of making a huge foreign policy blunder by simultaneously
antagonizing two major powers…. For the United States, Russia is an enemy,
and China is a potential enemy. But the confrontational course with both
major powers is a strategic mistake” (RIA Novosti, 2014).
That simultaneous confrontational relations with both China and Russia
systematically encourage China–Russia alignment and do not bode well for
US long-term strategic interests has also been emphasized by some prominent IR scholars in the United States. Thus, John Mearsheimer castigated
US foreign policy by calling it a “strategic foolishness of the first order”
for driving Russia into the arms of China and neglecting the potential
geopolitical consequences of this for the United States (Nikkei Asia, 2015).
Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, in the early 2010s, China–Russia
military cooperation has progressed into the advanced stage, which was
marked by the growing interoperability of China’s and Russia’s military
forces. Cooperation between China and Russia in the most critical and
sensitive areas occurs as the two countries jointly oppose the US and both
US–China and US–Russia relations deteriorate. In the context of the evolving
power balance, this deterioration generates an external compulsion that
removes any political barriers that used to constrain China and Russia from
forming a de-facto alliance relationship.
The above analysis demonstrates how the redistribution of material capabilities between China, Russia, and the US have gradually created conditions
conducive to anti-US balancing by China and Russia. Such balancing has
materialized in more assertive policies, which further precipitated the balancing dynamics. Facing China and Russia as long-term strategic adversaries
simultaneously, Washington attempts to maintain its still existing power
advantage by containing both challengers. China and Russia, strong but still
weaker than the US, respond by enhanced military cooperation to deal with
the US challenge more effectively. This triggers further acts of containment
from the US, which further incentivize China–Russia alignment.
108 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Balance of threat: convergence of China and Russia’s perception
of external threats
The shared perception of external threats has been mentioned in the literature on China–Russia relations as a factor that drives the two countries
closer. Cohen (2001) argues that the “emerging alliance of China and Russia depends on how deeply the two Eurasian powers feel that the United
States threatens their interests.” Lee and Lukin (2016, p. 239) emphasize
that China–Russia cooperation is cemented by the shared perception of the
United States as the main threat to the two countries’ geopolitical interests,
civilizational identities, and domestic political regimes. Trenin (2015) also
argues that the existence of a common foe – the United States – has the
potential to transform the China–Russia partnership into an alliance.
As elaborated in Chapter 2, the empirical analysis of the balance of threat
requires checking whether potential allies have a shared view of major
external threats and how these perceptions evolved. Analyzing China–Russia
bilateral documents, joint statements and declarations, as well as other
primary and secondary sources, allows for achieving this goal. Exploring the
evolution of external threat perceptions in China and Russia also enables
understanding how the changes in the balance of power and the consequent
foreign policies analyzed above have had a bearing on the formation of
threat perceptions and vice versa.
China and Russia each considered the US as an external threat. As relations of both countries with the US experienced long-term deterioration,
the relatively distant threat posed by the US to China and Russia grew in
proportion and gradually developed into an immediate threat to both China
and Russia. Moscow and Beijing have recognized that sharing resources
can provide the most effective way to tackle the technologically superior
United States. The “US factor” has become a driving force of China–Russia
military cooperation. China and Russia share views on US-related external
security threats across a wide range of issues, including the US National
Missile Defense (NMD) agenda in Eastern Europe, Washington’s attempts
to strengthen its political and military influence in the Asia Pacific, the
eastward expansion of NATO, the “color revolutions,” issues of territorial
integrity, and other issues of global and regional politics.
The two countries’ shared concerns about the US NMD, for instance, can
be traced back to the bilateral declarations and joint statements of the 1990s.
The most representative ones include “Joint Statement on Russia–China
Relations at the Turn of the 21st Century,” dated November 23, 1998, the
“Russia–China Information Communique about Consultations on the ABM
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
109
Treaty-related issues,” signed on April 14, 1999, and “the “Russia–China
Joint Statement” of December 10, 1999 (President of Russia, 2000a). By the
mid-late 2000s, those concerns had grown into stronger resistance. They
dominated the China–Russia bilateral agenda during the annual “ShanghaiFive” (today’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) Summit meeting in
Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on July 5-6, 2000. The summit took place shortly
after the US Congress had passed legislation on the deployment of a defense
system against limited ballistic missile attack. During the Summit, President
Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, organized their
own “mini-summit” to discuss the role of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
treaty and potential threats associated with the US NMD.
China–Russia concerns regarding the US NMD came to the fore again
during Putin’s state visit to Beijing on July 17-18, 2000. The two sides signed
nine documents, two of which – “The Beijing Declaration” (President of Russia,
2000b) and the “Joint Statement on ABM Treaty” (President of Russia, 2000a)
– formally consolidated a common stance on the NMD and the US-dominated
unipolar world order more broadly. China and Russia shared deep concerns
about the US planning to build NMD and bypassing the ABM agreement.
They stated that the “true goal of such a policy is to seek unilateral military
and security dominance that will pose the gravest, adverse consequences
to the security of Russia, China, other states, to the global stability and the
United States itself” (President of Russia, 2000a). China and Russia also urged
Washington to adhere to the ABM Treaty, warning that altering it “would
trigger a new arms race and lead to an about-face in the positive trends that
appeared in the world politics after the end of the Cold War” (President of
Russia, 2000a). They also announced that Washington presenting the alleged
“missile threat” to the US from “some countries” as a rationale for the new
NMD was “totally unjustified” (President of Russia, 2000b).
In early 2000s, still being relatively weak militarily and feeling threatened
by the US plans to deploy a missile defense system against “rogues states”
in Poland and the Czech Republic, Putin attempted a pro-US overture by
suggesting that the US could use a Russian-controlled radar in Azerbaijan
instead of US anti-missile hardware in central Europe. However, this counterproposal, which was nothing less than integrating US and Russia defense
systems, was unsuccessful as both the Eastern European states and the US
itself rejected it, even though Bush had called it interesting and innovative
(Zakaria & Bohan, 2007). This rejection exacerbated Russia’s perception of the
US as an existential threat, resulting in further deterioration of US–Russia
relations and Putin vowing to target Europe if Washington pressed ahead
with its shield plan.
110 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
In this context, on May 23, 2008, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao restated their shared view on
international issues in general, and the US NMD, in particular. The newly
signed “Joint Russia-China Declaration on Major International Issues” stated
that “the creation of global missile defense systems and their deployment in
different regions of the world … does not help to maintain strategic balance
and stability, and hampers international efforts in arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation” (President of Russia, 2008).
As demonstrated in the previous section, these were the years of intensifying regional confrontation involving the US on the one hand, and China and
Russia on the other. This process gradually resulted in the convergence of
China and Russia’s views of external threats with respect to the United States.
China perceived the US’s “pivot to Asia,” announced in 2011, and the
subsequent revitalization of Washington’s policies in Asia as a severe security
threat. Beijing viewed it as an attempt to create containment lines against
China in the Pacific using Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and
other US allies, and as a preventive measure against the possibility of Asian
countries gathering around China.39 The US was perceived to be playing up
the security concerns of countries in the region to contain China. Articles
in People’s Daily (the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party)
pictured the US’s policies as threatening China’s core national interests and
bolstering the US’s Asian allies “to assemble a coalition to counterbalance
China’s growing power” (Wang T, 2011). Articles published under the name
Zhong Sheng (“the voice of the Central”) are believed to be written by the
Chief of the editorial staff at People’s Daily, and experts view them as soft
announcements of new official policies. Some of such articles stated that the
US’s “Air-Sea Battle concept would push the US into a dangerous position of
provocative war planning against China” and “the US strategy of pivoting to
Asia-Pacific has the obvious feature of confrontation” with China (Zhong
Sheng, 2012, as cited in Swaine, 2012, p. 23).
The perception among Chinese defense and national security policy planners that the US has become a direct military adversary of China increased
after Washington launched the Third Offset Strategy (TOS). 40 The TOS
39 For a detailed analysis of Beijing’s perception of Obama’s “pivot” see Swaine (2012). For a
criticism of the US’s alliances in Asia by Chinese officials and media, see Ruwitch (2014) and
Wang, H. (2015).
40 The Third Offset Strategy is a reform of US strategic and defense technology institutions
to enhance focus on innovation to counteract strategic technological advantages made by top
adversaries. It aims at sustaining the US’s military advantage in the long-term and ensuring
the capacity to both deter a war and to win one, if necessary.
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
111
signaled that the United States had started engaging China in direct defense
technological competition (Cheung, 2018, p. 6). The significant political,
economic, technological, and geostrategic capabilities that the US has to
employ to ensure that its TOS is successful contributes to the perception
of the US as a threat to China’s growing ambitions and interests. In a study
of US–China strategic distrust, Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal (two
influential academics and foreign policy advisers) discovered that “some
high-ranking Chinese officials have openly stated that the United States
is China’s greatest national security threat. This perception is especially
widely shared in China’s defense and security establishment and in the
Communist Party’s ideological organizations” (Lieberthal & Wang, 2012,
p. 13). The COVID-19 global pandemic and the subsequent deterioration of
US–China relations have further added fuel to the fire of an already heated
bilateral relationship (Bisley, 2020).
When it comes to Russia, the United States and the rounds of NATO
eastward expansion supported by it, have traditionally been viewed by
Moscow as major security threats. The intensification of tensions between
Russia and the United States that began in the late 2000s has exacerbated
this perception. After the Russia–Georgia war of 2008, Moscow started
to seriously consider the possibility of military conflict with the West.
The Ukraine Crisis of 2014 has further consolidated this shift in Russia’s
thinking about the future of warfare. According to official documents, it is
not international terrorism or other non-traditional security challenges that
threaten Russia the most. Instead, it is “major foreign powers” (the United
States) and their military-technical advantages that pose an existential
military threat (President of Russia, 2014c). The “National Security Strategy
of the Russian Federation until 2020” states that the main threats to Russian
security are associated with the attempts of “leading foreign countries” to
achieve “predominant superiority in the military sphere, primarily in terms
of strategic nuclear forces” (President of Russia, 2009). Russian security
planning has long assumed that the US has been aggressively pursuing
technological initiatives to achieve military dominance (Kashin, 2018, p. 217).
The deterioration of Russia–US relations has triggered the convergence
of Russia’s perception of external threats with that of China. Russia started
viewing Washington’s predominantly China-centered policies through the
lens of its own balancing against the United States. The TOS, mentioned
above, is a case in point. As demonstrated by Kashin (2018, pp. 212-214),
Russian writings on TOS have presented it as aimed at maintaining the US’s
military advantage over strategic adversaries, such as China and Russia.
However, they also acknowledge that it was a response primarily to China’s
112 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
growing anti-access/area-denial capabilities in the Asia-Pacific and only
secondarily to the growth of Russia’s military capabilities. This view of TOS
as a primarily “anti-China” initiative could be found not only in scholarly
publications but also in the media outlets of the Russian Ministry of Defence
(Kashin, 2018, p. 215). 41
However, the changes in US–Russia relations as a result of the Ukraine
Crisis and the subsequent anti-Russia sanctions have shifted this interpretation and incentivized a reconsideration of military cooperation with
China to place greater emphasis on joint efforts as the most effective way to
balance against the United States. On November 18, 2014, the Chinese Defense
Minister, General Chang Wanquan, and his Russian counterpart, Army
General Sergei Shoigy, issued a joint statement unequivocally identifying the
United States as the primary external threat to both countries. They stated
that China and Russia are “concerned with the US’s attempts to strengthen
its political and military influence in the Asia Pacific,” and that China–Russia
military cooperation becomes essential in this context. The two ministers also
pledged to jointly resist the threat of “color revolutions” which are viewed as
“experiments of the American spin doctors” that “threaten China’s and Russia’s
national interests” (Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2014).
The systemic pressure coming from the United States and the simultaneous
deterioration of US–China and US–Russia relations has made China’s and
Russia’s assessment of external threats also coincide in the SCS region – a
region of seemingly low significance to Russia. As can be judged from multiple
publications in leading Russian international studies journals, such as Aziya
i Afrika Segodnia [Asia and Africa Today], Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’ [International Affairs], Problemu Dal’nego Vostoka [Far Eastern Affairs], Rossiya
v Global’noi Politike [Russia in Global Affairs], and specialized web portals,
Russian experts and political elites interpret the US’s “rebalancing to Asia”
as an attempt to contain China.42 China, in turn, is viewed as promoting an
“alternative model of development,” which Russia supports because this model
prioritizes the “reformation of the present international order” (Mihnevich,
2012). Fyodor Lukyanov, Russia’s leading political scientist and editor-inchief of Russia in Global Affairs, also argues that Washington exploits the
security concerns of such countries as Australia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Japan, Vietnam, and India to contain China (The Voice of Russia,
2012). Viktor Trifonov (2012), a former diplomat and now an international
41 See, for example, Udaltsov (2015).
42 For a comprehensive review of Russia’s views of the US’s rebalancing to Asia strategy, see
Portyakov (2015, pp. 255-266).
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
113
relations researcher, also argues that the US’s activity in the Asia Pacific,
and specifically in the SCS, is aimed at dragging China into a confrontation.
The dominant view in Russia of the US’s policy in the SCS region strikes a
chord with China’s assessment of the issue (Korolev, 2019a). Some of Russia’s
military experts argue that China’s growing assertiveness in the SCS is
beneficial for Russia’s broader security interests. Thus, the construction of
military infrastructure in the SCS by China can provide Russia with extra
protection against US Aegis systems, navy ships, and SM-3 Tomahawk
missiles in the Asia-Pacific region (Litovkin, 2016). Other experts have
proposed forming a permanent Russia–China joint naval operation group
supported by Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers to contain the US–Japan
coalition naval forces in the area (Mardasov, 2016). Others believe that by
supporting China, Russia will be able to accelerate the return of the balance
of power in Asia, which is beneficial to strategic stability (Novikov, 2015).
Further analysis of the meeting protocols of China–Russia regular security consultations, such as regular meetings between defense ministers,
strategic consultations between Chiefs of the General Staff, Russia–China
consultations on national security issues, and China–Russia Northeast
Asia security dialogues,43 reveals increasing concerns about the “US factor”
and the importance of a China–Russia joint reaction to it. The critique and
condemnation of US policies in Asia and elsewhere as “increasingly threatening” and the designation of the international environment as “increasingly
complicated and unfriendly” as well as the proclamation of the intentions
of China and Russia to join efforts in resisting the growing US threat have
become an embedded norm of China–Russia security dialogue. The US’s
alleged intentions to contain China and Russia via various means, including
the NMD program, THAAD in South Korea, “pivot to Asia,” economic sanctions, or NATO eastward expansion; the danger of the “West-ignited color
revolutions” in Central Asia and the US’s broader onslaught on “legitimate
political power” (and the potential threat to the political regimes in Moscow
and Beijing); emphasis on a mutual consensus and understanding of each
other’s views on the geopolitical security environment; and outlining of
China–Russia future collective security arrangements in Asia – all have
become a routinized content that travels from top to bottom of multiple
China–Russia multiple security consultations. 44
43 For a detailed review of these regular consultation mechanisms see Chapter 3 above.
44 For a concise summary of a selection of various China–Russia joint statements that identify
the United States as a threat for both countries and an explicit call for coordinated actions against
the US’s attempts to increase its influence in Asia-Pacific and beyond, see Korolev (2019b), p. 239.
114 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
In its interactions with the United States (or with any other country),
China never calls Russia a threat. Russia too never frames China as a threat in
its formal contacts with other countries. On the contrary, Russian authorities
and military experts have consistently refuted the “China threat” theory.
In 2010, President Putin stated that:
“Foreign experts keep telling us about the threat from China. We are
not worried at all…. There is no threat on the side of China …. We have
coexisted with China for a thousand years. We had difficult moments,
and at times better relations, but we know each other very well and we
have got used to respecting each other …. China does not have to populate
the Far East and Eastern Siberia to get what it needs: natural resources ….
We have just finished the construction of an oil pipeline. We are ready
to build two gas pipelines. We will be supplying coal to them …. China
does not want to worsen relations with us” (Reuters, 2010).
In his 2012 article “Russia and the Changing World,” Putin focused on the
increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region in international affairs
and emphasized that “with its stand in the international arena, China
does not provide any reason to talk about its desire to dominate. Indeed,
China’s voice does resonate more confidently in the world, and we greet
this since China shares our views on the evolving multipolar world order”
(Putin, 2012).
There also seems to be a consensus in the Kremlin that in the foreseeable future, China will not pose a threat to Russia. According to General
Leonid Reshetnikov, who heads the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies,
a think-tank under the Russian president:
“We are closely following the situation in China. Of course, this is a big
country, where different factions exist, including expansionist ones.
China’s main rival is the United States, not Russia. Therefore, China
needs a well-protected and quiet rear area. For the next 30-40 years,
Russia is unlikely to face any threat from China. Beijing is doing its best
to avoid whatever might cause Russia’s irritation and negative reaction.
A serious conflict between Russia and China is possible only if grave
mistakes are made by us or by the Chinese, or else if the American
agents do a good job in China. The Western countries are keen to set
Russia and China against each other. They keep forcing on us this
China threat notion. Yet we will never buy that” (cited from Lee &
Lukin, 2016, p. 106).
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
115
Simultaneously, the Russians’ perception of China has improved significantly. According to a public opinion survey “Foreign Enemies and Friends
of Russia,” conducted at the end of 2014, more than 60% of the Russian
population considered China–Russia relations as friendly (Levada-Center,
2014). Other major public opinion research centers have also registered a
positive perception of China in Russia since the mid-2000s (FOM, 2014).
Comparable public opinion surveys in China demonstrate similar dynamics.
More than 70% of the Chinese consider China–Russia relations to be either
“very good” or “good” (Pan & Wu, 2008). This data reveals that Russia seems
to have significantly resolved the “China threat” complex that existed in
Russian society and among political elites in 1990s and early 2000s. The
demilitarized common border and the absence of any visible border security
arrangements either in Blagoveshchensk or Khabarovsk (the two Russian
cities bordering on China), also testifies to that.
This improvement in China–Russia mutual perceptions does not mean that
no one in Russia views China as a threat. China surpasses Russia in various
significant metrics, and it is to be expected that Russian political elites and
ordinary people have reasons to worry about a rapidly rising China. From
this standpoint, closer cooperation with Europe or the United States as a
preventive counterbalance against China is not unreasonable. One can also
think that the cultural affinity between Russia and the West that is arguably
stronger than that existing between Russia and China. However, as Lee and
Lukin (2016, p. 104) rightly contend, this argument is problematic simply
because Moscow sees the US-led West as a bigger, and more immediate, threat
than China. A similar point was earlier made by the Deputy Director of the
Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir
Portyakov, who argued that “at present, any unprejudiced person is much
better aware than before that today and tomorrow Russia faces a much bigger,
more dangerous and more real threat from the West than a hypothetical
threat from a rising China in the day after tomorrow” (Portyakov, 2014). These
perceptions, strengthened by the simultaneous deterioration of US–China
and US–Russia relations, and exacerbated by the COVID-19 global pandemic,
incentivises closer military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.
Convergence of interests and implications for China–Russia
alignment
An empirical assessment of common interests requires exploring how China
and Russia see the international status quo with regards to the most powerful
116 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
state in the international system (the US) and whether they want to revise
it. As argued by Trenin (2013, p. 6), China–Russia strategic cooperation is
solid “for it is based on fundamental national interests regarding the world
order as both the Russian and Chinese governments would prefer to see it.”
The question is whether China and Russia display revisionist inclinations
and how those evolved along with the changes in the balance of power and
balance of threat conditions analyzed above.
The content of China–Russia post-Cold War declarations and statements
reveals that both countries are not interested in maintaining the unipolar
status quo in which the United States occupies a dominant position. In
multiple joint declarations and statements, China and Russia emphasized
the necessity for cooperation to promote the principle of multipolarity.45 The
anti-unipolarity mood grew substantially in the late 1990s and evolved from
calling multipolarity a desirable world order to manifesting determination
to promote such an order. On April 23, 1997, Yeltsin and Jiang signed “Russian–Chinese Joint Declaration on Multipolar World and the Formation
of a New International Order.” The document expressed determination to
“promote the multi-polarisation of the world and the establishment of a new
world order.” It stated that “no country should seek hegemony, exercise power
politics, and monopolize international affairs” (Diplomaticheskii Vestnik,
1997). In the joint statement made on November 10, 1997, China and Russia
restated that for ensuring world peace and development, all countries should
follow the trend toward multipolarity (Sovmestnoe Rossiisko-Kotaiskoe
Zayavlenie, 1997).
Against the backdrop of the wars in the Balkans, the US withdrawal
from the ABM treaty and plans to deploy a new NMD, an increasing American military presence in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, and the US
operation in Iraq, the revisionist anti-unipolarity mood in both China
and Russia increased. On February 12, 2007, President Putin delivered his
famous Munich speech, which reflected the geopolitical ambitions of the
new post-Soviet Russia and explicitly rejected the concept of a unipolar
world, dominated by the United States. According to Putin:
“The unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s
world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in
45 See China–Russia joint declarations dated September 3, 1994; April 25, 1996; April 23,
1997; November 10, 1997; and November 23, 1998. The documents are available through the
Diplomaticheskii Vestnik [The Diplomatic Herald] journal, published by the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
117
today’s – and precisely in today’s – world, then the military, political, and
economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is
that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no
moral foundations for modern civilization” (President of Russia, 2007).
The following year, on May 23, 2008, China and Russia issued the “Joint
Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation
on Major International Issues” (also called the “Medvedev-Hu” statement).
In the document, they explicitly supported BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa) and presented it as a needed counterbalance to the
US-led unipolar world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic
of China, 2008).
In the subsequent years, Russian and Chinese leaders on multiple occasions have emphasized their shared preference for a more multipolar world
in which the voices of the “non-West” hold more sway. President Putin was
reported to have repeatedly stressed that Russia’s economic future lies with
China, which is on track to surpass the United States as the leading global
economic power (Korolev, 2016, p. 385). Russia’s insistence on multipolarity
is glaringly present through Putin’s increasingly strongly worded statements
at various international summits and conferences. On October 24, 2014, in
his speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club in the city of Sochi,
Putin stated that a unipolar world is not sustainable, because:
“a unilateral diktat [of the US and its allies] and imposing one’s own
models produces the opposite results. Instead of settling conflicts, it
leads to their escalation; instead of sovereign and stable states, we see the
growing spread of chaos; and instead of democracy, there is support for a
very dubious public ranging from open neo-fascists to Islamic radicals”
(President of Russia, 2014b).
Similar rhetoric, containing increasingly direct accusations aimed at the
West, and specifically the US, and rejecting the US-led global order can
be traced in multiple public speeches by the Russian leader, such as “The
Crimean Speech of Vladimir Putin” (President of Russia, 2014a), “The UN General Assembly Speech of 2015” (President of Russia, 2015). China reciprocates
in a less confrontational tone but supporting the commonality of interests
with Russia. In his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International
Relations about the importance of China–Russia strategic cooperation, Xi
Jinping criticized foreign interference in states’ domestic affairs and stated
that “Strong China–Russia relations not only answer to our interests but
118 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
also serve as an important, reliable guarantee of an international strategic
balance and peace” (Soldatkin, 2013). Overall, both Moscow and Beijing
increasingly emphasize that their positions on major international issues
are “similar or identical”; that their bilateral relations have “no problems”
or lack “problems that cannot be solved”; or, at least, “there is no conflict of
core interests” (Portyakov, 2015, p. 143).
Chinese leaders and diplomats are more circumspect in their rhetoric
compared to their Russian counterparts. Therefore, it is useful to examine
Chinese experts’ assessments of where China’s interests stand vis-à-vis
Russia and the United States. In this regard, the “China’s Relations with
Great Powers” dataset, created at the Institute of International Relations of
Tsinghua University in Beijing, is particularly illuminating. 46 The dataset
contains monthly expert-coded assessments of China’s relations with major
powers since 1950. The assessments are aggregated into a scale from -9 to +9.
The lowest three values (-9 to -7) indicate high, medium, and low levels of
“confrontation,” which is defined as a relationship between “enemies.” The
next three (from -6 to -4) are for the same three degrees of “tensions.” The
range from -3 to -1 stands for high, medium, and low levels of “disagreements”
– situations when conflicting interests dominate over common interests.
Relations falling between +1 and +3 are “regular” with the commonality of
interests slightly surpassing competition; +4 through +6 stand for “good
relations” in which common interests significantly exceed disagreements,
even though the latter can be considerable. The top of the scale, from +7
to +9, indicates “friends” with shared strategic interests and near-identical
positions on major international issues. 47 This scale allows for assessing
long-term trends of commonality of China’s interests with other powers
as viewed by China’s top international relations experts.
Figure 4.1 reveals the convergence between China’s and Russia’s interests
with the simultaneous divergence of China’s and the US’s interests. The
deterioration of China–US relations was most dramatic after 2016, and
since mid-2018 China–US relations have been ranked significantly below
the traditionally tense China–Japan relations, reaching the mark of -7.6.
Tsinghua scholars give China–Russia relations in 2020 a value of +8.3, which
46 Tsinghua University is one of China’s leading universities. It is ranked as the 15th best
university in the world according to the QS World University Rankings, and is considered the
best university in Asia by the Times Higher Education Asia University Rankings.
47 For more details on coding procedures, refer to Zhongguo yu daguo guanxi shujuku shiyong
fangfa [Manual for the dataset on China’s relations with great powers], available at the Tsinghua’s
Institute of International Relations web-portal http://www.imir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/
iis/7522/index.html.
119
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
Figure 4.1
Commonality of China’s interests with Russia and the US (1991-2020)
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
China-U.S. relaons
China-Japan relaons
China-Russia relaons
Source: Calculated by the author based on the Tsinghua University dataset “China’s Relations with
Great Powers,” available at http://www.imir.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/iis/7522/index.html
means “highly friendly.” This is the highest assessment China has had of its
relations with great powers, and it indicates a commonality of interests and
consensus on a wide range of international issues. While these assessments
can be questioned from various methodological standpoints, they offer a
valuable Chinese perspective on China’s relations with major powers.
China–Russia cooperation within multilateral formats, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS, also indicates an intention
to revise the international status quo. For example, the establishment of the
BRICS Development Bank (New Development Bank) on July 15, 2014, and the
creation of the reserve currency pool (the Contingent Reserve Arrangement)
represent attempts to challenge the dominance of the US dollar in global
trade, as well as dollar-back institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
There is a conviction in China and Russia that under multipolarity both
countries would have more freedom of action and opportunities to protect and
expand their national interests. At the same time, along with the deterioration
of US–China and US–Russia relations, the China–Russia relationship has
become increasingly permeated by the intention to flesh out the “non-Western”
identity in international relations, which deepens the ideational and normative
rift between China and Russia on the one hand, and the United States on the
other. In this regard, some scholars have noted that China–Russia revisionism
has fundamental causes related to “cultivating a community of like-minded,
120 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
non-Western countries” that could have greater leverage over shaping the future
of the international order (Haenle & Trenin, 2015). Even though there is no Cold
War-style ideological confrontation with the US, the current fault lines might
be even more profound. Now China and Russia fundamentally reject the idea
of American global leadership and the “universal values” of the West, which, as
some Russian experts have argued, are increasingly associated with a new wave
of colonialism under the slogan of “democracy” (Lukin, 2015). China, in turn,
identifies itself as a leader of the developing “South” and attempts to cultivate
its traditional morality, rooted in Confucianism (Lukin, 2015, p. 90; An, 2014).
According to Rozman (2014, p. 1), there are “striking parallels in the ways in
which presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin envision the resurgence of
their countries domestically and internationally.” The firm conviction shared
by the two countries is that the West poses the main obstacle to grand projects
of “Sinocentrism” and “Russocentrism” (Rozman, 2014, p. 1). In this context, the
US-dominated world order is viewed by China and Russia as a civilizational
threat. Such non-acceptance of American leadership and rejection of Western
ideology result in the tighter consolidation of the “non-West” where China and
Russia see themselves as the core players.
Conclusion
When projected on current China–Russia relations, the balance of power,
balance of threat, and balance of interest are shown to be incentivizing
a stronger alignment between China and Russia. Current China–Russia
relations display a growing balancing momentum against US-led unipolarity,
which is strengthening their alignment.
In the medium term, the trend toward closer strategic alignment between
Russia and China is likely to be stable, and a clash of interests between
Beijing and Moscow is unlikely. More pressure from the US is likely to
accelerate China–Russia alignment. It will incentivize both China and Russia
not only to enhance military cooperation but also work on fundamentally
improving their bilateral relations, ironing out any remaining contentious
issues. At the same time, depending on how their relations with the US and
Europe evolve, China and Russia could gradually reduce their anti-West
rhetoric and reverse the alliance trajectory within their bilateral cooperation.
However, given the state of China’s and Russia’s relations with the US as well
as how far Beijing and Moscow have gone in their strategic cooperation, it is
most likely for China and Russia to become more interdependent and their
cooperation more comprehensive in the years to come.
Alignment Incentives: The Three Bal ances
121
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5
Robustness Check: Economy and
Diplomacy
Abstract
The military-security dimension of alignment has the highest bar for
cooperation. However, empirical assessments of alignments often move
beyond it to include the economic and diplomatic spheres. This chapter
assesses economic and diplomatic cooperation as a robustness check on
the comprehensiveness of China–Russia cooperation’s upward trend.
In its discussion of economic cooperation, it attempts to unpack the
geopolitical pressures generated by the economic cooperation model and
assess its impact on China–Russia alignment. With regards to diplomatic
cooperation, the emphasis is on the patterns of China’s and Russia’s voting
behavior in the United Nations Security Council and their activities within
other regional international institutions. The chapter shows that bilateral
cooperation in non-military dimensions is not yet as strong. However, it
has steadily improved.
Keywords: China–Russia alignment, economic cooperation, diplomatic
cooperation
The analysis below explores China–Russia economic and diplomatic cooperation. When assessing economic cooperation, it uses quantitative indicators,
such as the volume of bilateral trade and its share in each country’s total
external trade. It also looks at the composition of China–Russia trade and
how it has changed since the end of the Cold War. Particular emphasis is
placed on the model of economic cooperation, the roles China’s and Russia’s
economies play in it, and the geopolitical implications it generates from
the standpoint of strategic alignment. The below analysis also assesses
the degree of diplomatic cooperation by exploring China–Russia voting
behavior in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the agendas
of China–Russia cooperation in regional formats.
Korolev, Alexander, China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press 2022
doi: 10.5117/9789463725248_ch05
130 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Economic cooperation: trade, unequal interdependence, and new
initiatives
Since the beginning of the Policy of Reforms and Opening in 1978, China
has been much more successful economically than post-Soviet Russia. The
difference between China’s and Russia’s economic transition experiences
manifests itself most remarkably in the growing gap between the size of
the countries’ economies as expressed by GDP. In 2013 the ratio of China’s to
Russia’s total GDP was 4.3:1, calculated in current dollars based on the market
exchange rate, and 4.5:1, based on purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted
estimates. By 2016, these ratios became 8.7:1 and 5.6:1, respectively. Meanwhile, Russia’s to China’s per capita GDP ratio in 2013 was 2.2:1. However,
in 2016 it became 1.1:1, which means that China’s per capita GDP is almost
on par with Russia’s – a rather devastating outcome for Russia, given the
two countries’ demographic parameters. 48
The formation of “unfavorable complementarity” in China–Russia
economic relations
China–Russia relations have often been viewed as “warm in politics, but
cold in economics” or “hot at the top and cold at the bottom” due to the
allegedly unrealized potential for economic cooperation and small total
volume of trade (Shtraks, 2015). Some scholars highlight that “the lack of
substance” in trade and economic ties constitutes a severe limitation in the
China–Russia partnership (Lo, 2009, p. 177). While these assessments may
not fully conform to reality, they invite extra examination of economic
cooperation as a factor in China–Russia strategic alignment.
The gap between the total volume of China’s and Russia’s economies by
itself is not an insurmountable barrier for economic cooperation. China–Russia trade has grown substantially since the end of the Cold War. Throughout
the 1990s, its total volume was a meager $5-7 billion and by 2000 reached
only $8 billion. However, by 2011 it had grown tenfold and reached $80
billion. In 2014, before the Russian ruble devaluation in the aftermath of
the Ukraine Crisis, China–Russia bilateral trade reached $95.28 billion.
China became Russia’s largest single-country trade partner (see Table 5.1).
In 2015, China–Russia trade dropped to slightly more than $68 billion, due
to the Russian currency depreciation but bounced back quickly. In 2018,
48 Calculated based on World Economic Outlook Database, see (International Monetary Fund,
2017).
131
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
Table 5.1
China–Russia trade (1992-2019)
Years
Total China–Russia Trade
(billion USD)
China’s share in Russia’s
external trade (%)
Russia’s share in China’s
external trade (%)
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
5.86
7.68
5.08
5.46
6.85
6.12
5.48
5.72
8.00
10.67
11.93
15.76
21.23
29.10
33.40
48.17
56.83
38.80
55.45
79.25
88.16
89.21
95.28
68.06
69.53
84.72
106.89
109.74
4.81
5.67
3.59
3.39
4.34
3.74
3.71
4.28
4.52
5.06
6.04
6.05
5.77
5.97
6.53
7.31
7.61
8.42
9.52
10.17
10.4
10.54
11
11.9
14.76
15.43
15.65
16.54
3.54
3.92
2.15
1.94
2.36
1.88
1.69
1.59
1.68
2.09
1.92
1.85
1.84
2.05
1.89
2.21
2.22
1.76
1.86
2.18
2.28
2.15
2.21
1.72
1.89
2.05
2.31
2.40
Source: Calculated based on China’s and Russia’s customs statistics and United Nations Comtrade
database https://comtrade.un.org/. The calculations may vary slightly depending on the source,
but the dynamics of trade within the presented period remains unchanged regardless of the data
source.
it surpassed the epochal $100 billion, set up as a strategic goal by both
countries. The growth has continued since then (United Nations, 2020a).
Despite the significant growth, China–Russia trade in 2019 was only
slightly more than one-fifth of China–US trade ($109.74 vs. $541.82 billion),
despite the drastic decline of China–US trade in 2018, and 2.5 times smaller
than Russia–EU trade in the same year ($277.1 billion). China–Russia trade
glaringly lags behind China–US and Russia–EU trade in terms of volume. At
132 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
the same time, a closer look at the data reveals a trend that is indicative of
some critical proportional changes over the last few years, especially after
the Ukraine Crisis in 2014.
As shown in Table 5.1, Russia’s share in China’s total external trade has
been incomparably smaller than that of China’s in Russia’s external trade.
While Russia accounted for only around 2% of China’s total external trade,
China’s share in Russia’s external trade has been steadily increasing from
only 5% in 2001 to 16.54% in 2019. While Russia’s share has been growing
consistently since 2015, from 1.72% to 2.4%, which is a significant change,
given the initially low share, it is too early to say whether it is a consistent
trend. Thus, in terms of trade, Russia depends on China much more than
China depends on Russia. On the other hand, what Russia exports to China
are strategic goods, such as crucially important high-tech military hardware
and energy resources the strategic significance of which may not be fully
grasped by the above figures.
The Ukraine Crisis, plummeting oil prices, mutual sanctions between
Russia and Europe, and the dramatic devaluation of the ruble in 20142015 caused a 30% decrease in Russia’s total external trade. At the same
time, Russia’s trade with the EU as a whole (Russia’s largest trade partner)
decreased by 45% from $417 billion in 2013 to $230 billion in 2015, which
is more significant than the overall decline of Russia’s external trade. In
turn, China–Russia trade dropped only by 24% over the same period, which
is less than the overall decline. As a result, right after the Ukraine Crisis
Russia’s trade with China has grown vis-à-vis its trade with the EU. This
trend becomes more pronounced if looked at from a longer-term perspective
covering the post-Ukraine Crisis years. Thus, in 2019 the total volume of
Russia–EU trade had dropped by 34% compared to pre-crisis 2013. In turn,
China–Russia trade volume has grown by more than 23% in US dollar terms
despite all the odds, including the ruble devaluation. Against the backdrop
of pressure from the West to isolate Russia, China responded by offering
Russia multiple new opportunities of economic cooperation (The Straits
Times, 2015; Ostroukh, 2015). By all evidence, China has contributed to filling
the void that emerged in Russia’s foreign trade due to Western sanctions
and Russia’s retaliatory embargo.
As explained in the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, an
indication of deeper economic cooperation is the emergence of projects
that involve long-term commitments and obligations from both sides as
well as mutual vulnerabilities, as in the case of, for instance, constructing
immovable and costly energy infrastructure. Unlike regular trade exchanges,
such projects generate greater interdependence and are not taken lightly
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
133
by the governments. China–Russia cooperation in the energy sector falls
within this category of economic cooperation.
As in the case of military-technical cooperation analyzed in Chapter 3,
China–Russia cooperation in the energy sector in the 1990s and early 2000s
was sporadic, small scale, and often undisclosed. In those years, economic
exchanges rarely went beyond transactional buying and selling, and the two
countries were not significant to each other’s energy sectors. Recovering
from the Soviet collapse and highly dependent on the export of mineral
resources, early post-Soviet Russia attempted to increase its oil and gas
export to Asian countries. However, it remained reluctant to increase its
energy cooperation with China significantly.
The situation began to change by the end of President Vladimir Putin’s
second term, and later in the context of Russia’s “reorientation to Asia”
strategy (Korolev, 2016). Russia had become a significant oil and gas supplier
for China, while the Chinese market had become one of the primary destinations for Russia’s energy exports. Moreover, the new joint energy-related
projects went beyond the traditional trade transactions. They involved
establishing long-term energy cooperation that included large-scale, onland energy infrastructure cutting across the China–Russia border. This
development connected China and Russia closer, making any perturbations
in the relationships costly for both sides.
The first such project was the construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific
Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline – a 1,056 km-long pipeline from Skovorodino
(Russia) to Daqing (China), jointly constructed by the Transneft (Russia’s
state-controlled pipeline transport monopoly) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The construction of the pipeline was completed
in 2010. On January 1, 2011, oil shipments started (Soldatkin & Fletcher, 2011).
The ESPO pipeline has had a significant impact on oil export from Russia
to China, which more than doubled between 2010 and 2015, and exceeded
800,000 barrels per day in 2016. 49 Due to the large capacity of the ESPO
pipeline, in 2014 Russia became China’s third largest supplier, accounting
for 11% of China’s total oil imports. In 2015 and 2016, Russia continued to
take market share from other oil exporters and overtook Saudi Arabia as
the largest crude oil supplier to China. In 2018 and 2019, Russia remained
the largest crude oil supplier to China, averaging 1.6 million barrels per
day, which amounts to 15% of China’s total crude oil imports (US Energy
Information Administration, 2020).
49 For the sake of comparison, in 2000 Russia’s oil export to China was only 88,000 barrels per
day.
134 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Another significant shift in China–Russia energy cooperation occurred
in 2013 when Beijing received access to Russia’s gas fields. Moscow has
always been cautious about granting China access to its natural resources.
However, at the G-20 summit in St. Petersburg on September 5, 2013, the
CNPC and NOVATEK (Russia’s largest independent natural gas producer)
concluded, in the presence of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, an agreement
to the purchase of a 20% equity share in the large Yamal LNG project by
CNPC. The project includes the construction of a large LNG plant with a
capacity of 16.5 million tons per annum, based on the feedstock resources
of the South-Tambeyskoe field near Sabetta in the Yamal peninsula, and
the construction of transport infrastructure which includes a seaport for
large-capacity LNG carriers and an airport (Novatek News, 2013).
Not everything went smoothly. For instance, China getting access to
Russia’s gas fields could be juxtaposed with the failed acquisition of shares
in the biggest oil field in Russia, the Vankor field. However, as emphasized in
the analytical framework developed in this book, any assessment depends
on the point of reference. If one is to take what might hypothetically have
happened should there be no hurdles in China–Russia energy relations (the
expectations of a full-fledged energy alliance) as a reference point, it is easy
to spot Russia’s or China’s reluctance to unleash the cooperation fully. Yet if
one is to compare with what existed in reality between the two countries,
the above-mentioned developments are a significant step forward.
The signing of the $270 billion oil and $400 billion gas megadeals in 2013
and 2014, respectively, are other important milestones in China–Russia
energy cooperation. Analysts emphasize the geo-economic importance of
opening the Chinese market to Russian hydrocarbon resources (Trenin,
2015). Some analysts argue that given the international circumstances,
the China–Russia gas agreements are the primary successes of bilateral
economic cooperation in 2014 (Portyakov, 2015a). Thus, the gas deal provided
for the annual supply by the Russian state-controlled gas company, Gazprom,
of 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas for 35 years via the “Sila Sibiri” (the
Power of Siberia) gas pipeline the construction of which was also part of
the signed deal.
These developments are in stark contrast to Russia’s cautiousness towards
cooperation with China in the energy sector in the 1990s and early 2000s.
The Ukraine Crisis of 2014 and the changing conditions of the balances of
power, threat, and interests as the primary causes of alignment formation
(see Chapter 4) have transformed Russia’s approach to energy cooperation with China in a similar way to how they have affected China–Russia
cooperation in the military realm. In February 2015, the Russian Deputy
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
135
Prime Minister responsible for overseeing Russia’s gas and oil industries,
Arkady Dvorkovich, stated that there were no more psychological barriers
or political obstacles in the sphere of energy cooperation between China
and Russia. He mentioned that China was Russia’s primary partner in Asia,
and Russia would consider allowing China to have more controlling stakes
in strategically important energy projects (RBK, 2015). A year earlier, the
Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that the critical bilateral
decisions and agreements “pave the way to an energy alliance between
Russia and China” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
2014). Assessments by the International Energy Agency (IEA), issued in 2015,
also forecasted a significant increase in Russia’s pipeline gas supply to China
to the level of 80 bcm by 2040 that would constitute 30% of Russia’s total
gas exports (International Energy Agency, 2015). China and Russia have
become more interdependent in the energy sector, and Russia has displayed
a willingness to accept a greater degree of economic vulnerability to China.
In this context, “complementarity” had become a catchword for
China–Russia economic cooperation, especially from the Chinese side’s
perspective. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, during his meeting with Russian
President Putin in 2014, after the agreement on the delivery of Russian
gas to China via the Power of Siberia pipeline was signed, emphasized
the “enormous complementarity” of the two countries’ economies (InoTV,
2014). The “complementarity” argument was also echoed by high-level
advisors associated with China’s Ministry of Commerce (Tsoi, 2016). Xi
Jinping himself emphasized the complementarity of China’s and Russia’s
economies during his meetings with Vladimir Putin (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). The affirmation that Russia’s and China’s economies’ complementarity provides opportunities for
expanding bilateral cooperation is also regularly repeated by some Russian
experts (Radio Liberty, 2016; RUSSIAN.NEWS.CN, 2017).
At first sight, the difference between China’s and Russia’s economic
models and the ensuing complementarity of the two economies should
incentivize closer China–Russia cooperation. According to the logic of
comparative advantages, Russia’s role as a major provider and China’s role as
a major consumer of energy resources should stimulate mutually beneficial
economic cooperation conducive to closer alignment.50 For Russia, revenues
from the export of natural resources constitute the lion’s share of its national
budget. In turn, China is a resource-thirsty country whose diplomacy, to a
50 For the theoretical elaboration on how economic cooperation can enhance alliance formation,
see Chapter 2.
136 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
considerable extent, is driven by the need to secure energy resources, which
has a bearing on partner selection.51 Some studies have also demonstrated
that the supply of natural resources is an essential driver of China’s alignment
choices. Thus, “China is more likely to enter into partnership relations with
countries that have large producers of petroleum and/or strategic industrial
minerals within their territory” (Strüver, 2016, p. 19). From this standpoint,
China–Russia energy cooperation should contribute to closer alignment.
However, such interpretation obscures the complexity of the situation.
A closer look at the model of China–Russia economic cooperation and the
division of labor it fosters reveals that the oft-praised “complementarity,”
allegedly conducive to closer cooperation, actually creates geopolitical
pressures that spawn pitfalls for closer cooperation. The two countries
find themselves on different sides of the market which, given the history of
Russia and China–Russia relations, creates deep division in terms of their
respective developmental interests and has adverse spillover effects on
other areas of the relationship. In the current economic cooperation model,
Russia has secured a role that it cannot fully embrace. This situation creates
discomfort on the Russian side and a constant resistance against the status
quo in the bilateral economic cooperation, even though this resistance is
often silenced due to geopolitical circumstances. At the same time, there
is a recognition that changing the status quo and improving the quality of
bilateral economic cooperation poses significant challenges that are mostly
Russia’s responsibility, even though not without support from China.
The crux of the issue is that the rapid growth of China–Russia trade’s
total volume has been accompanied by the emergence of a bilateral trade
structure that is too unbalanced (Table 5.2). These changes reflect a gradual
degradation and primitivization of Russia’s economic model since the Soviet
collapse. The patterns of economic growth of China and Russia over the last
three decades have differed dramatically. Russia has almost entirely lost
its manufacturing industries and has firmly slipped into the category of a
petrostate. In turn, China has become the world’s factory on a gargantuan
scale, producing more than 20% of global manufacturing output. It is worth
noting that a similar trade structure characterizes Russia’s trade with Europe.
How Russia fares in trade relations with China is not because of Beijing’s
sinister intentions to exploit Russia’s resources and turn it into an energy
appendage. Instead, it is an outcome of failed economic reforms in Russia
51 On how “energy diplomacy” has been an important driving force behind China’s relations
with different countries and regions, see Zhu (2016), Currier and Dorraj (2011), and Heath (2012),
among others.
137
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
and Moscow’s incapacity to produce competitive manufactured goods. If
Russia is becoming an energy appendage, it became such in relations with
Europe much earlier than with China.
Table 5.2
Non-energy share of China–Russia trade in 2001-2019 (%)
Year
Share of machinery and
equipment in China’s total
export to Russia
Share of machinery and
equipment in Russia’s
total export to China
Share of mineral resources
in Russia’s total export to
China
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
9.33
10
17.6
17.2
20.1
28.9
30.6
36.8
33.5
38.4
40.9
42.4
45.16
46.13
36.07
38.78
41.89
43.39
43.38
28.7
20.1
12.9
4.8
2.0
1.2
1.3
1.7
2.0
1.44
0.7
0.6
0.36
1.14
2.05
2.74
6.56
2.93
4.28
10.2
11.63
19.81
29.59
33.65
41.90
43.64
52.33
49.4
54.58
65.6
69.61
70.67
74.80
66.71
63.30
65.30
73.59
69.90
Source: Calculated based on China’s and Russia’s custom statistics and UN Comtrade database
https://comtrade.un.org/. The calculation results may differ slightly depending on the source, but
the dynamics of trade within the presented period remains unchanged regardless of the data
source.
As shown in Table 5.2, the share of machinery and equipment progressively
grew in China’s exports to Russia – from 9.33% in 2001 to 20% in 2005 and
38.4% in 2010 – but drastically dropped in Russia’s exports to China – from
28.7% in 2001 to 2% in 2005, and 1.44% in 2010. Simultaneously, the share
of oil and oil products in Russia’s exports to China grew from 10.2% in 2001
to more than 50% by 2008. In 2013, the share of machines and equipment
in China’s exports to Russia reached 45.16%. Similar Russian exports to
China fell to a meager 0.36%, while the share of oil and oil products reached
70.67% (Table 5.2). Thus, in less than two decades, the share of machines
and equipment in Russia’s exports to China plummeted from almost 30% to
138 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
less than 1%, whereas oil and oil products soared to more than 70%. These
changes reveal significant transformations in each of the two countries’
economic structure and the consolidation of respective specializations in
the global division of labor.
At the same time, China’s role as “the world’s factory” is gaining a new
dimension as machinery and equipment produced by China approach the
level of those produced in developed countries in terms of both quality
and technical characteristics. This industrial success has allowed China to
become one of the major exporters of various types of machinery. According
to some expert assessments, China has significantly surpassed Russia on
various indexes of innovation and information technology development
(Portyakov, 2014). The deterioration of Russia’s economic standing vis-àvis China could diminish Russia’s significance for China as an economic
partner. Nor can Russia effectively play its signature “energy diplomacy” with
China in the way it does with Europe. Unlike Europe, for which Russia is a
major energy resource provider, China does not strongly depend on Russian
resources. Even with all its energy exports to China, Russia occupies only
slightly more than 2% of China’s total external trade.
In sum, the evolution of China–Russia trade since the collapse of the USSR
has been dramatic. In the 1990s, Russia’s imports from China predominantly
comprised light industrial products and common consumer goods, such
as textiles, clothes, shoes, consumer electronics and home appliances. In
turn, China’s demand was concentrated on Russian arms, iron, timber, a
broad spectrum of machinery and equipment, and chemical fertilizers.
In the 2000s, there were drastic changes in the bilateral trade structure
with important implications for strategic cooperation. At least four such
implications can be discerned.
The first implication has to do with the clear division of roles of a major
exporter and a major purchaser of energy resources between Russia and
China. Such a provider-consumer divide often places Russia and China on
the opposite sides of the negotiating table in economic transactions and
national economic interests more broadly. Naturally, the purchaser wants to
buy cheaper, whereas the provider wants to sell more expensive. This situation has made both China and Russia reluctant to compromise in bilateral
economic transactions. A telling example in this regard is the notoriously
protracted price disagreements in China–Russia energy transactions. It took
the two countries almost ten years before they agreed, in 2014, on the price of
the Russian gas that was to be delivered from Siberia to China’s North-eastern
regions. The agreement was reached only after Europe and the US started to
impose economic sanctions on Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
139
(Luhn & Macalister, 2014). A similar situation was observed in negotiations
over the price for electric energy supplies from Russia to China. For Russia,
whose budget and economic well-being depend on revenue from the export
of energy resources, the price of such resources is an existential concern.
The protracted price disagreements and constant bargaining generate
dissatisfaction with the partner that can affect cooperation in other areas,
as was the case with military-technical cooperation when Russia failed to
implement an agreement to deliver a large number of military transport
aircraft to China (Portyakov, 2015b, p. 87).
When it comes to economic cooperation in the global market and energyrelated international institutions and regulations, China is more likely to
appear on the same side of the negotiating table as Japan, South Korea, the
US and other energy importing countries. A testimony to this is the meeting
of leading global energy importers, such as China, India, Japan, South Korea,
and the United States, which took place in Beijing in 2006 with the intention
of establishing cooperative mechanisms, aimed at reducing dependence on
energy imports and importers (People’s Daily, 2006). Such episodes indicate
that China, as an importer, and Russia, as an exporter, of energy resources
in many respects are driven by different economic interests, which can
potentially undermine the strategic unity within China–Russia alignment.
The second implication of the existing pattern of China–Russia economic
cooperation is psychological and has to do with mutual perceptions. China
increasingly perceives Russia as a net energy exporter. This perception and
the torturous process of adjusting to this role within Russia creates a very
complicated psychological mix and ignites various deep-seated anti-China
phobias in Russian society. Except for the military-industrial complex,
Russia is less and less perceived as a source of innovation and new, modern
technologies and more and more as a source of energy resources and a market
for finished manufactured products. Russian society does not seem to be
ready for that. For Russia, which only twenty years ago was ahead of China
on many economic development indicators, this is a harrowing outcome
that thins out the otherwise strong foundations of China–Russia strategic
cooperation. A well-known Russian expert on China from Vladivostok in
Russia’s Far East, Viktor Larin, has aptly grasped the essence of the problem
and the Russian sentiments associated with it in the title of one of his
books on the issue – In the Shadow of the Awakened Dragon (Larin, 2006).
Many in Russia experience emotional discomfort, resentment, and even
humiliation about Russia’s standing in bilateral economic cooperation with
China, which harms China–Russia ties. The Russian general public becomes
cautious and sometimes displays negative attitudes toward China. Even
140 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
though these emotions do not develop into open aggression, they generate
an implicit public demand for protecting Russia’s national markets and
producers from Chinese economic expansion and preventing Russia from
turning into China’s resource appendage.
Indeed, the growing inflow of finished commodities from China threatens
Russia’s ailing manufacturing industries. A telling example was the rapidly
increasing volume of the sale of steel pipes imported from China to Russia,
which grew 2.5-fold in 2007 and 4-fold in 2008. After resentment expressed
by Russian pipe producers, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade had to
officially announce the beginning of an anti-dumping investigation against
China at the end of 2008. Such incidents undermine the overall climate of
China–Russia economic and strategic relations.
The third implication that emanates from the model of China–Russia
economic cooperation is the reluctance on China’s side to invest in industrial manufacturing and technology-intensive production in Russia. The
consolidating view of Russia as a source of mineral resources and an export
market drives this reluctance. Another problem is the unfavorable business
climate in Russia, which is only exacerbated by the energy export-dominated
economy controlled by large state corporations, and the lack of attention
to the role of small and medium-sized businesses. China’s low interest in
investing in production capacities in Russia fully manifested itself in the
2009 Joint Program of Cooperation between North-East China and Russia’s
Far East and Siberia, adopted by the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev
and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao. According to this document, the
lion’s share of joint projects suggested by the Chinese for realization in
Russian territory addressed mineral resources extraction only. In contrast,
processing and production facilities that feed on those resources were to
be erected in Chinese territory (Kostenko et al., 2009).
The fourth implication has to do with regional geopolitical ramifications
in Russia’s Far East and in Central Asia. Russia undoubtedly needs cooperation with China to accelerate the development of its Far East and Siberia.
However, the existing bilateral economic cooperation model with clearly
delineated roles cannot generate high growth rates in those territories or
improve the well-being of the population there. Nor can it enhance the
region’s macroeconomic stability or increase the competitiveness of locally
produced goods on the Chinese market. The closure of multiple factories
in Russia’s Far East after the USSR collapsed has increased unemployment
and triggered an outflow of population from an already sparsely populated
region. This trend, in turn, reduces the region’s agricultural and industrial
self-sufficiency. Thus, China’s and Russia’s existing economic models and
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
141
their “mutual complementarity” creates an economic cooperation pattern
that is suboptimal for achieving fruitful and comprehensive economic
cooperation. In the long term, it could have significant negative implications
for the development of Russia’s far eastern territories.
Not surprisingly, these developments have fed public fears in Russia
regarding China. These fears peaked before the systemic deterioration of
Russia’s relations with the US and Europe, after which the main threat is
perceived to be coming from the West, not East.52 Quite revealing in this
regard are Russians’ views of China in the early 2000s, when according to
FOM (Russia’s Public Opinion Foundation), more than 40% of the Russian
population viewed China’s rapid rise as a threat to Russia’s interests; by 2014
this figure had dropped to 18% (FOM, 2014). Russian epistemic communities
and policy-making elites have also highlighted the potentially negative
consequences of the existing pattern of China–Russia economic relations
for Russia. According to Sergei Karaganov (an academic and presidential
advisor to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin), if the current economic
trends persist, there would be a danger of Russia’s eastern territories and
subsequently all of Russia becoming not only an economic but also a political
appendage of China. Such analyses inevitably fed the sentiment in favor of
containing China (Karaganov, 2011).
In this regard, quite indicative was a report prepared by the Russian
Foreign and Defence Policy Council (a non-governmental public association)
in 2001, focusing on Russia’s strategy in Asia. The report presented a prognosis
that Chinese economic and demographic expansion is inevitable, and that
Moscow should take measures in advance to prevent Siberia and the Far East
from becoming a zone of ethnic and socio-political confrontation (Russian
Foreign and Defense Policy Council, 2001). After visiting Russia’s Far East in
2008, the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also complained about
the regrettable economic situation in the region and sent a warning that
without active measures there was a danger of “losing everything” (Vesti.
Ru, 2008).
In a similar vein, the alleged China–Russia competition in Central Asia
boils down to the divergence of interests along the provider-consumer divide
under the conditions of weak economic integration, rather than China’s
pursuit of political and strategic dominance in the region. Driven by the
52 On the evolution of perceptions of external threats as a driving force behind China–Russia
strategic alignment, see Chapter 4. As will be demonstrated below, the systemic push emanating
from the changes within and between the “three balances” analyzed in Chapter 4 have also had
an impact on China–Russia economic cooperation.
142 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
quest for natural resources, China is interested in obtaining access to the
rich energy reserves of the Central Asian states at an affordable price. Therefore, Beijing pro-actively invests in oil and gas extraction in Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, as a large producer of all
manner of manufactured products, China wants its goods to have access to
the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, these interests
contradict those of Russia, which, as an exporter of resources and a country
with weak manufacturing industries, is interested in maintaining control
over the region’s energy sectors and, simultaneously, restricting the inflow
of cheap goods into the EAEU economic space.
These divergencies of economic motivations impede joint China–Russia
projects and policies and negatively affect the bilateral relationship. Telling
examples in this regard are the protraction of negotiations regarding the
integration of the EAEU and China’s Belt and Road Initiative project and
Russia’s reluctance to conclude a free trade agreement between China and
the EAEU. At the same time, such a free trade agreement was signed with
Vietnam. This situation irritates China and provides a breeding ground for
mutual mistrust.
Attempts to reverse the trend
The existing model of China–Russia economic cooperation has always been
a concern, at least for the Russian side. There has been a recognition that
a more diversified economic cooperation with China could significantly
contribute to the modernization of the Russian economy. At the same
time, considering Russia its important strategic partner, China has been
moderately willing to respond positively to Moscow’s attempts to change
the status quo. However, such attempts became distinguishable only after
the Russia–Georgia war in 2008, and they materialized more fully in the
aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis in 2014-2015. The Crisis had changed the
policy options available to Russia. With respect to China, those were years
of aggravation of tensions in the South China Sea. During these events,
both China’s and Russia’s relations with the system leader (the United
States) deteriorated. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the worsening of both
Russia–US and China–US relations was associated with the internationalsystemic changes in the three balances – the balances of power, threat, and
interests – that drive strategic alignment.
Changing the existing model of China–Russia economic cooperation
is diff icult because it requires certain sacrif ices from both Russia and
China. What is needed is nothing less than Russia’s reindustrialization by
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
143
developing and diversifying its manufacturing industry and forming an
investment-and-innovation-based model of China–Russia cooperation.
These changes would require departing from the primitive “fast cash”
transactional approach and transitioning to a model that would go beyond
energy and primary materials exports and include longer-term joint projects
in high-tech, engineering, manufacturing, agriculture, and finance. Resisting the simple logic of short-term profits and, instead, investing political
and material capital into something that will not entirely accrue benefits
until some point in the distant future is not comfortable. It can occur only
gradually and requires serious and consistent efforts by both China and
Russia. In the case of China–Russia relations, creating a multifaceted and
mutually beneficial bilateral economic cooperation that would take into
consideration each other’s interests requires, in a sense, going against the
market logic of supply and demand. This is a difficult task, especially for
cash-strapped Russia.
Nevertheless, as China–Russia strategic alignment progresses, such
transformation attempts are being made, with varying degree of success.
In 2008, China demonstrated its willingness to accommodate Russia’s
economic interests by agreeing to resume the construction by Atomstroyexport (Russia’s nuclear power equipment and service exporter) of the
third and fourth units of the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant – China’s largest
nuclear plant, located in Jiangsu province on the coast of the Yellow Sea. On
November 23, 2010, Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation also signed a contract
with Atomstroyexport according to which Russia would supply 1060 MWe
VVER-1000 reactors53 for Units 3 and 4 worth $3.3. billion. Construction of
unit 3 was temporarily delayed by the 2011 nuclear accident in Japan but
finally began in December 2012 (World Nuclear News, 2012). Additionally,
Russia’s strategy of “reorientation to Asia,” which emphasizes cooperation
with the Asia-Pacific region and China’s Belt and Road initiative have created
joint infrastructure development opportunities. An example of this is the
Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway in Russia, which involves significant
Chinese investment.
It is also worth noting the emergence of multiple non-energy related
contracts between China and Russia in 2014. The most notable ones include
the collaborative design and production of a long-range wide-body civilian
aircraft; the foreign-exchange swap of 150 billion RMB between the Chinese
and Russian central banks; the China–Russia Silk Road Innovation Park in
53 VVER stands for the Russia-designed “Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reaktor [Water-Water
Energetic Reactor]” – a pressurized water reactor with a very high power output.
144 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
the city of Xian (China); cooperation on manufacturing jet engines using
Russian technologies; new joint R&Ds in the development of satellite navigation systems; as well as other projects in agriculture, space exploration,
education, and medical care (RT, 2014). In this context, in his speech on the
development of China–Russia comprehensive partnership on November 22,
2014, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that “We can now …
talk about the emerging technological alliance between the two countries”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2014).
Quite remarkable in this regard is the composition of the large package
of China–Russia agreements signed during Xi Jinping’s symbolic visit to
Moscow in 2015 to attend the May 9 Victory Parade. Only 24% of those
agreements were related to natural resources. The area of finance, banking, and investment stands out, occupying 38% of all agreements. R&D
and high-tech account for 21%; transport and infrastructure – 10%; the
remaining 7% are related to media and information security (Smirnova,
2015). While these figures are based on the number of agreements signed and
do not reveal each group of agreements’ actual value, they demonstrate an
attempt to go beyond the energy sphere and transform the energy-dominated
pattern of economic cooperation. During the same visit, Putin and Xi also
signed an agreement on the joint construction and production of a large
military helicopter and a joint statement declaring an intention to merge the
development of the Russia-led EAEU and China’s Belt and Road initiative to
reduce the likelihood of potential confrontation in Central Asia. President
Putin stated in this regard that “the integration of the Eurasian Economic
Union and Silk Road projects means reaching a new level of partnership
and implies a common economic space on the continent” (RT, 2015a). A
year earlier, in another joint statement, the Russian leadership positively
commented on “the readiness of the Chinese side to take Russia’s interests
into consideration when elaborating and realizing the conception of SREB
(Silk Road Economic Belt)” (President of Russia, 2014).
The most notable non-energy China–Russia projects have been making
progress. For example, the Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway has received
$6 billion of Chinese investment (Centre for Research of Developing Markets,
2016a, p. 4) and, at the time of writing, was expected to be put into operation
in 2026. In November 2016, at the 11th China International Aviation and
Aerospace Exhibition in the Chinese city of Zhuhai, the f irst mock-up
of the above-mentioned jointly designed wide-body civilian aircraft was
presented by the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) and
Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) (Ptichkin & Cherniyak, 2016).
At the same exhibition, China agreed to purchase several Russian Beriev
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
145
Be-200 multipurpose amphibious aircraft, which was an international
breakthrough for the Russian producers. This transaction deserves special
attention because, by that time, China’s Aviation Industry Corporation
(AVIC) had completed the design and construction of its own large amphibious flying boat the TA-600, which was also displayed in Zhuhai (Ptichkin &
Cherniyak, 2016). Despite having a competitive model entering the market
themselves, the Chinese side agreed to purchase the Be-200, which signaled
their willingness to consider Russa’s commercial interests. At the same time,
China and Russia also launched various projects in satellite navigation,
remote earth sensing, electronic components and space equipment, and
human spaceflight, many of which are areas of comparative strengths
for Russia (Centre for Research of Developing Markets, 2016b). The full
realization of these projects will take time. However, they will contribute to
forming a more balanced pattern of economic cooperation between China
and Russia and greater long-term interdependence.
Equally important is the expanding access for various Russian nonresource-related Companies to the Chinese markets. In May 2015, Russian
smartphone manufacturer YotaPhone launched the new YotapHone-2
model in China. Now the Chinese market generates more than half of the
total revenue of the company. The Alibaba Group Holding Limited (China’s
largest e-commerce company) jointly with the Russian Export company
(Russia’s first cross-border international trading corporation) has launched
an online platform for promoting Russian goods on the Chinese market.
Simultaneously, the Chinese corporation Haier has invested $55 million in
opening modern refrigerator production facilities in Naberezhnye Chelny
(Russia). It became the first joint China–Russia factory with a high degree
of localization which is not related to the energy sector (Business Online,
2016). Additionally, the LeEco Corporation (a Chinese technology company
and one of the largest online video companies in China) signed an agreement
with the Russian Export Centre and the Institute of Internet Development
to promote Russian media content in China. While these projects are still
only initial steps, they contribute to the transformation of the “unfavorable
complementarity” pattern in China–Russia trade relations.
It is also evident that China and Russia are gradually simplifying trade
regulations in the non-energy sector. In 2016, China started to ease restrictions on the import of meat and offal from Russia. China also increased
imports of Russian chocolate tenfold, becoming the largest importer of
chocolate and confectionery from Russia. Simultaneously, Russian exporters of grain, corn, rice, soy, and rapeseed successfully passed the access
procedures and entered the Chinese market, where their market share has
146 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
since grown. Notably, China is willing to simplify trade regulations with
regards to Russia further.
Bilateral cooperation in agriculture has also been growing in other ways.
China and Russia have established a Business Council on Agricultural
Cooperation and Investments. The two countries are also creating a new,
and first in Russia, Chinese animal and husbandry cluster in Primorsky
Krai in Russia’s Far East. Chinese agricultural corporations also contributed
to the revival of two milk factories in the region. The Chinese Tiangong
Group LTD started cooperating with agricultural companies in the Altai
Region (Russia) on importing food to China. Simultaneously, China and
Russia are involved in the construction of a China–Russia grain logistics
center in Mikhaylovksy District in Russia’s Far East (Centre for Research of
Developing Markets, 2016b). If they succeed, such projects will contribute
to the diversification of China–Russia trade and help Russia benefit from
China’s economic growth. One should also mention the completion of two
new bridges across the Amur River along the China–Russia border, which
significantly facilitate direct economic exchange between the two countries
(Portyakov, 2020, p. 67).
The above list of China–Russia non-energy-related projects is inevitably
incomplete as cooperation in this sphere is expanding rapidly. However, it can
be concluded with a high degree of confidence that significant attempts are
being made by both China and Russia to diversify the structure of bilateral
economic relations. Going beyond the narrow limits of hydrocarbons trade
can enhance mutual benefits and mitigate the energy provider-vs.-consumer
hurdle. As documented in Table 5.2 above, the structure of China–Russia
bilateral trade at the national level has demonstrated slight changes in the
positive direction (see Table 5.2 after the year of 2013). The year 2013 appears
as a relative transition point after which Russia’s non-energy exports to China
started to pick up slowly, even though the growth has not been stable. In 2015,
for the first time in over a decade, the share of machinery and equipment
in Russia’s exports to China exceeded 2%. In 2016 it approached 3%, and
in 2017 it reached the record 6.56%, which is a significant improvement,
given the low starting point. While hardly a stable trend yet, these changes
indicate some degree of success and give Moscow and Beijing a reason for
cautious optimism.
Even though the progress has been modest, these changes alleviate
Russia’s concerns about becoming an energy appendage of China that
negatively affect China–Russia strategic alignment. Noting the progress,
Russian President Putin emphasized in his press conference on September 5,
2016 at the G20 Summit in Hanzhou that “the structure of our bilateral trade
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
147
is improving due to the growing export of Russian machinery and other
advanced products to the Chinese market, and also due to the growing
number of joint high-tech projects.” This structural shift, according to
Putin, is “a positive change in our bilateral relations,” which is “much more
important than the absolute figures of trade turnover” (TASS, 2016).
A significant qualitative change in China–Russia trade and economic
cooperation structure will require consistent attempts on both sides for
years or even decades. There is currently no reason to expect miracles,
and the structure of Russian export to China in the next five to ten years is
unlikely to change dramatically. Export of oil and other resources is most
likely to continue to occupy the predominant position (about two-thirds of
total exports). Simultaneously, the share of manufactured goods in Russia’s
imports from China is likely to increase, also as a part of growing Chinese
investment in Russia. Given how firmly Russia has consolidated its role as
an energy exporter, even full commitment from China is unlikely to change
the bilateral trade pattern soon.
Nevertheless, the growing mutual recognition of the problem and
the introduction of relevant policies and initiatives opens the door for
cooperation and a closer strategic partnership. The intention to move
further along the way of building a more balanced and mutually beneficial
pattern of economic cooperation has been testified by signing more than
twenty documents on China–Russia economic cooperation in various
spheres during Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia on June 5-6, 2019 (Portyakov,
2020, p. 67). An external factor that incentivizes closer cooperation in
the sphere of high tech is the ban introduced on the use of American
technologies by the Chinese Huawei corporation (one of the world’s
largest producers of smartphones), imposed by Washington. It appears
that the external pressure generated by the changes within and between
the “three balances” (see Chapter 4) drives both the military-defense
cooperation and, with some delay, economic cooperation between China
and Russia.
Diplomatic cooperation: a reflection of geopolitical interests
Economic cooperation between China and Russia, explored above, lags
significantly behind their military-strategic cooperation. However, China–
Russia diplomatic cooperation is close to it, responding to the changes
along the three balances explored in Chapter 4. Both countries have used
existing international institutions quite effectively to jointly resist the US
148 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
or its allies’ attempts to use force to remove recalcitrant regimes or exert
economic pressure on states deemed by the US and its allies as guilty of
human rights violations.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a useful indicator of diplomatic cooperation
is the voting behavior in influential international institutions, such as the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Voting patterns are effective
indicators of alignment in international politics (Kim & Russett, 1996;
Ferdinand, 2014). Meanwhile, a stronger indicator of alignment is not merely
similarity of votes, such as voting of “yes,” “no,” or “abstained” together
with other members of UNSC or other international platforms, but the
joint use of the veto power – when a project supported by the majority is
blocked by the minority. The power of a negative vote or veto, available to
the permanent members only, prevents the adoption of a resolution or a
proposal, even if it has received the required votes. It is a stronger political
statement that often entails high reputational and political costs, triggers
disagreements or even confrontation, and sometimes criticism of the entire
Security Council or international community more broadly. It is the element
of going against the majority of influential players that makes joint vetoes
a stronger indication of an alignment.
Since 1991, only three countries – China, Russia, and the United States
– have used the veto power in the UNSC, and only two – China and Russia
– used joint veto (Table 5.3). While in the early 1990s there were no joint
China–Russia vetoes, after 2007, more than half of all Russia’s vetoes and
all of China’s vetoes in the UNSC were joint China–Russia vetoes.
Table 5.3 Veto records in UN Security Council (1991-2020)
Total
United States
Russia
China
China–Russia
46
17
(13 before 2007)
14
(3 before and
11 after 2007)
2
(both before 2007)
13
(all after 2007)
Note: 2007 is the year of the first China–Russia joint veto in the UNSC.
The first time China and Russia jointly vetoed a UN resolution – the resolution over Myanmar – was 2007. Since then, the incidence of China–Russia
joint vetoes in the UNSC has increased in number and frequency, reflecting
a higher level of diplomatic cooperation (see Table 5.4). In 2008, another veto
was imposed to protect Mugabe’s Zimbabwe from censure. The intensity of
149
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
China–Russia cooperation within the UNSC increased in the early 2010s with
the series of China–Russia joint vetoes on US-backed resolutions on Syria.
Thus, China and Russia jointly vetoed four such resolutions: on October 4,
2011; February 4, 2012; July 19, 2012; and May 22, 2014 (United Nation, 2020b).
These vetoes effectively thwarted the US-led efforts, together with France,
the UK, Germany, and Portugal, to topple the Assad regime.
The US and its allies castigated China and Russia for the joint vetoes and
accused Beijing and Moscow of buying time for President Assad to smash
the opposition (The Guardian, 2012). The then US ambassador to the UN,
Susan Rice, stated that the United States was “outraged” and “disgusted”
by the China–Russia joint vetoes (Voltairenet.org, 2011). In turn, Hillary
Clinton indicated that China and Russia would “pay the price” for supporting
Assad (RT, 2012). UN envoys also stated with regards to the China–Russia
joint vetoes that the US and its allies’ efforts to impose sanctions on Syria
were met with “fierce resistance” from Russia and China (Charbonneau,
2011). However, at a 2014 meeting in Beijing, Russian and Chinese leaders
congratulated each other for preventing a western intervention, which,
from their perspective, would have made matters much worse, and would
have undermined any moves toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict
(Cox, 2016, p. 325).
As demonstrated in Table 5.4, the highest intensity of China–Russia
cooperation starts in the second half of the 2010s, with seven joint vetoes
happening between 2016 and 2020, which demonstrates the formation of
a China–Russia power axis within the UN. Six of those joint vetoes were
against UN resolutions on the situation in the Middle East, and one had to
do with the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
Table 5.4
China–Russia joint vetoes in the UNSC since 1991
US
US
RF
RF US
US
CH
RF US CR US
US
CH
US US US RF
US CR CR RF
CR CR
CR RF CR RF RF CR CR
US US US US
US
US CR
RF RF RF RF RF CR CR
RF
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
CR
Note: Compiled by the author based on data from United Nations (2020b). Each abbreviation
indicates a veto on different resolutions. RF stands for vetoes by the Russian Federation, US – by
the United States, CH – by China, CR – China–Russia joint vetoes.
150 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
In addition to the UNSC, voting behavior in the Human Rights Council
displays an even stronger alignment pattern. From 2006 to 2012,54 out of
the total of 120 voting occasions, China was never on the same side with
the US. However, there was a 99% rate of agreement between China and
Russia (Wu, 2017).
An important aspect of China–Russia diplomatic cooperation is the still
nascent attempt to form an alternative system of international governance
with particular emphasis on the regional level. In this context, some scholars
speak about the emergence of a new, non-Western, regionalism, led by China
and Russia and attempting to compete with, if not challenge, the West-led
formats of regional integration and institution-building (Kaczmarski, 2017).
Thus, China and Russia have enhanced cooperation within multilateral
formats, such as the SCO and BRICS. For example, the 2015 consultations
between the SCO members stressed that economic sanctions without
authorization by the UNSC were unacceptable (The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, 2015). Russia has suggested a BRICS energy association to
ensure the energy security of BRICS member states (RT, 2010). On June 29,
2015, Russia officially joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) as a co-founder and the third largest stakeholder after China
and India. Asian nations have 75% of the bank’s shares. Russia joined as
a regional – “Asian” – signatory with 6.66% founding share and gained
5.53% percent of voting share that gives it a role more significant than
that of any other “Western” signatory in not only investment decisions but
also in the formation of the board of directors (Huang & Chen, 2015). The
Russian authorities have been reported to believe that AIIB “will contribute
to Eurasian integration” and that Russia considers itself to be “a country
belonging to the target region of the bank’s operations” (RT, 2015b).
In the context of deteriorating Russia–West relations, these initiatives are
viewed by some experts as marking the end of the epoch of post-communist
Russia’s integration with the West and the emergence of new Eurasian
geopolitics in which Putin’s vision of a “greater Europe” from Lisbon to
Vladivostok is being replaced by a “greater Asia” from Shanghai to St.
Petersburg (Trenin, 2015).
Particularly important are China and Russia’s efforts to synchronize their
regional projects within the geopolitical space of Greater Eurasia. It appears
that even in the areas of competing interests, such as in Central Asia, Beijing
and Moscow have found a way to cooperate. The 2015 agreement to connect
54 After six years on the UN Human Rights Council, China had to leave it in compliance with
a rule that was set by the Council for each member state.
Robustness Check: Economy and Diplomac y
151
the development of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and
Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road initiative testifies to that spirit of cooperation
(Korolev, 2016). In his presidential address to the Russian Federal Assembly
in 2019, Putin re-emphasized that economic coordination in Eurasia and
the creation of common markets “include implementing the decision to
coordinate the activities of the EAEU with China’s Belt and Road initiative,”
which will pave “the way to a greater Eurasian partnership” (President of
Russia, 2019). The eventual practicalities of merging the EAEU and China’s
Belt and Road initiative remain to be seen. However, as can be judged by
recent exchanges between Putin and Xi, in the COVID-19 affected year of
2020, the two countries “have smoothly promoted coordination between
the Belt and Road Initiative and the Eurasian Economic Union” (ConsulateGeneral of the People’s Republic of China in Sydney, 2020).
Conclusion
The above analysis demonstrates that China–Russia economic cooperation,
while showing signs of improvement, lags behind military cooperation.
Russia, important for China in a geopolitical sense, as reflected in diplomatic
cooperation, occupies a very modest position in China’s economic interests.
Even though Russia’s economic significance for China is gradually growing,
this is happening due to the growing energy exports to China. After the
construction of the “power of Siberia” gas pipeline, China’s energy dependence on Russia has increased. However, in other, non-energy spheres of
economic relations, Russia’s role in China’s economic growth and wellbeing
is barely significant. From the purely economic standpoint and beyond the
energy sector, it is possible to suggest that Russia is not a priority partner
for China.
The problem of economic cooperation in the context of China–Russia
relations goes deeper than an uncomplicated insufficiency of such cooperation or less-than-desirable trade volume. China’s and Russia’s different
economic models – namely China being a major importer and Russia a
major exporter of energy resources – create unfavorable (mostly for Russia)
complementarity, which complicates the bilateral relationship and can be
viewed as a hurdle for a tighter alliance formation.
At the same time, the growing systemic pressure as a result of deteriorating relations with the system leader (the US) and the ensuant changes within
the three balances as the causes of alliance formation incentivizes China
and Russia to begin implementing policies to transform, if not remove, the
152 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
existing economic problems. While the hurdles remain, the two countries
have been working hard, especially since 2014, to minimize their impact by
trying to change the pattern of economic cooperation. Only some modest
results have been achieved by the end of the second decade of the 21st century.
However, it appears that as the pressure emanating from the intensifying
confrontation with the US increases, Moscow and Beijing search for ways to
overcome the existing economic divergences and disagreements to jointly
address the external pressure.
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6
Comparative Mapping: US–India and
China–Russia Alignments
Abstract
To better understand the extent of China–Russia alignment, it is useful
to assess it in relative terms. This chapter applies the alignment criteria
developed and tested in the previous chapters to US–India alignment. US–
India alignment is a new development in the post-Cold War international
politics formed in the context of rising China and believed to share certain
features with China–Russia post-Cold War alignment. This makes it a useful
reference point for assessing the relative depth of China–Russia strategic
cooperation. The goal of the comparison is twofold. First, it aims to see how
China–Russia alignment fares vis-à-vis US–India alignment and where it is
ahead or behind. The second goal is to execute a plausibility probe for the
developed framework by applying it to a new case of strategic cooperation.
Keywords: strategic alignment, China–Russia relations, US–India relations
The previous chapters have demonstrated that China–Russia strategic
cooperation has progressed considerably and consistently since the end
of the Cold War. However, if the evidence of growing strategic cooperation is presented without comparison, the depth of such cooperation risks
appearing greater (or smaller) than it actually is. While the upward trend
in China–Russia strategic cooperation is evident, assessing the level of
that cooperation and the amount of its progress requires comparison. As
shown below, the US–India alignment shares certain features with the
China–Russia alignment. At the same time, both alignments have been
the subjects of expert debates regarding their depth and sustainability, and
there has been no systematic, theory-grounded assessment of US–India
alignment explicitly applying an alignment framework.
The analytical framework offered in Chapter 2 provides the metrics for
comparative mapping of different interstate relations along the stages of
Korolev, Alexander, China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press 2022
doi: 10.5117/9789463725248_ch06
158 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
alignment formation, which facilitates understanding of those relations.
At the same time, systematic application of that framework to the case of
US–India alignment, besides its empirical value, is also significant from
the standpoint of a plausibility probe (George & Bennett, 2005; Levy, 2008;
Eckstein, 1991). Given the nature of the task, this chapter will explore the
parameters of US–India alignment in a more abridged form, with the
overarching goal of assessing the level of cooperation compared to the
China–Russia case.
US–India cooperation from the strategic alignment perspective
The US and India, like China and Russia, are not identified as formal allies.
Therefore, it is not surprising that none of their four bilateral “foundational
agreements” (often referred to as “enabling agreements”) delineating specific
aspects of defense cooperation – the General Security of Military Information
Agreement (GSOMIA), signed in 2002; the Logistics Exchange Memorandum
of Agreement (LEMOA) of 2016; the Communications Compatibility and
Security Agreement (COMCASA), signed in 2018; and the Basic Exchange
and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geopolitical Intelligence, signed
in October 2020 – contain any clearly defined obligations to defend each
other (White, 2021, p. 6). Nor such obligations exist in any of the auxiliary
annexes to these documents or any other bilateral documents.55 As argued
throughout this book, however, formal alliance treaties are a weak indicator
of the level of actual alignment because states can act as allies without
binding treaties and, conversely, an alliance on paper does not necessarily
mean an alliance in reality.56
Overall, US–India relations have transformed fundamentally from the
rather tense bilateral relationship of the late Cold War into a strategic
partnership with extensive defense ties, joint military exercises, joint
training and education programs, and other aspects of a growing strategic
alignment. Progress has been particularly significant since the early 2000s
55 The additional documents include The New Framework for India–US Defense Relations,
signed in 2005 and updated in 2015; a Maritime Information Sharing Technical Arrangement
(MISTA), signed in October 2020 to advance maritime domain awareness; and Industrial Security
Annex to the GSOMIA, signed in 2019. For more on the history and the nature of US–India
bilateral strategic cooperation documents in the context of broader US–India relations, see
White (2021); Pant and Joshi (2017); Rajagopalan (2020).
56 For a more in-depth discussion of the role of formal alliance treaties in alignment formation
and development see Chapter 2.
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
159
and, according to some assessments, has exceeded what India ever achieved
with the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Tellis, 2015, p. 6).
As with the relationship between China and Russia, post-Cold War
US–India relations have also been subject to conflicting assessments. Furthermore, like the studies of China–Russia relations, the existing writings
on US–India cooperation have provided a wealth of empirical material on
its various aspects but have so far failed to test the historical record against
a theory-grounded alignment framework.57
US–India relations have been described as a “global partnership with
the potential to shape the future security architecture of the Indo-Pacific”
(Ladwig III & Mukherjee, 2019b, p. 52). The relations have been viewed as
based on a “broad convergence of geostrategic and geoeconomic interests”
(Puthan Purayil, 2021, p. 3). The United States has been identified as India’s
“single-most important external partner” (Mohan, 2008, p. 56). Indian
officials have called the US and India “natural allies” (Parthasarathy, 2000).
Top US officials, including Kurt Campbell (Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), Leon Panetta (Defense Secretary), Rex
Tillerson (Secretary of State), as well as Presidents Barack Obama and Donald
Trump on various occasion have emphasized the significance of US–India
cooperation for international peace and security (Ladwig III & Mukherjee,
2019b, p. 54). In 2014, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President
Obama jointly penned a Washington Post article presenting the US–India
partnership as capable of defining the 21st century (Modi & Obama, 2014).
Soon after, the US administration announced India as its first “major defense
partner,” authorizing bilateral military-technological cooperation at the level
of the US’s most advanced alliances (Paul & Underwood, 2019; White, 2021).
However, the progress in US–India strategic cooperation has not been
consistent and smooth, witnessing ups and downs and even significant
setbacks. For example, the signing of the LEMOA – one of the foundational
defense agreements – took more than a decade since it was first proposed
in 2004, primarily due to New Delhi’s reluctance to enter a closer defense
partnership with the US (Pant & Joshi, 2017, p. 133). The relationship also
stalled on many other issues, and many experts started questioning the
initial enthusiasm that surrounded it (Boggs & Burns, 2015; Goel, 2014; Lavoy
& White, 2015; Perkovich, 2020; Smith, 2014), suggesting that inflated expectations do not conform to the realities of US–India cooperation (Lalwani &
Byrne, 2019). Some assessments even suggested that in terms of foreign policy
57 An attempt to examine post-Cold War US–India alignment by applying a consistent set of
analytical questions, but dissociated from any explicit theory, can be found in Mistry (2016).
160 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
preferences, India is no closer to the US than is Russia or China (Shad, 2018).
According to Cara Abercrombie (former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for South and Southeast Asia), the US–India partnership “lacks the
maturity critical to enabling the cooperation envisioned” (Abercrombie, 2019,
p. 20). This divergence of assessments invites systematic analysis applying
a theory-grounded alignment framework.
Confidence building measures and US–India alignment
During the Cold War, the US and India belonged to opposing geostrategic
camps, and their relations during those years have been deemed as “little
more than floundering” (Puthan Purayil, 2021, p. 3) and “largely fraught”
(Xavier, 2019, p. 23). As some experts argues, the very idea of the US working
closely with India would have been far-fetched only a decade ago (Ladwig
III & Mukherjee, 2019b, p. 53). In his June 2016 address to the US Congress,
Modi also hinted at the baggage of historical distrust by mentioning the need
to overcome the “hesitation of history” (Pant & Joshi, 2017, p. 133). Indeed,
when India conducted nuclear tests and declared itself a nuclear weapons
state in 1998, Washington sanctioned India, which severely undermined
the bilateral trust (Tellis, 2015; Xavier, 2019). Given this historical record,
confidence-building measures (CBMs) were necessary before the relationship
could progress towards closer strategic cooperation.
Unlike China and Russia, the US and India do not share disputed borders,
so CBMs between them were different. There were no “emergency contacts”
aimed at preventing dangerous military activities along the border, as was
the case at the outset of China–Russia post-Cold War cooperation. US–India
CBMs had to deal with other thorny issues undermining the bilateral trust.
One such issue was India’s nuclear weapons program and the US’s policy
of containing it. India was under US sanctions for more than 30 years after
it tested its first nuclear weapon in 1974. Nor was Washington willing to
accept a new nuclear state after India’s tests in May 1998. The nuclear
issue dragged the bilateral relationship down, significantly hampering
cooperation (Pant & Joshi, 2017; Puthan Purayil, 2021; Tellis, 2015; Xavier,
2019).
Washington accommodated India as a de facto nuclear state in 2005
through the US–India nuclear accord. On July 18, 2005, President George
W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in a joint statement, agreed
to enter into a civil nuclear agreement. Singh thanked Bush for ending
the “nuclear apartheid,” imposed on India for more than 30 years, making New Delhi unable to trade in nuclear materials (Firstpost, 2017). This
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
161
agreement marked the first recognition of India as a nuclear power and
became a landmark that US policymakers hoped would “help transform
the partnership between the world’s oldest and world’s largest democracy”
towards closer cooperation (Rise, 2006). It signaled that the US was serious
about building strong relations with India and would now treat India as
a valued geopolitical partner rather than a target of its non-proliferation
policies (Tellis, 2015, p. 6).
The 2005 nuclear accord laid the groundwork for the 2008 US–India Civil
Nuclear Agreement, which further enhanced bilateral trust and facilitated
strategic cooperation. The United States agreed to work toward full civil
nuclear cooperation with India and, according to some assessments, did
nothing less than overturn existing global norms and rules by obtaining
exemptions to many Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) rules for India to support
the agreement (Nasralla & Murphy, 2016; Rajagopalan, 2020). Signing the
agreement also required amending US domestic laws, especially the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954. The 2008 nuclear agreement was a high point in US–India
relations that indicated the US’s recognition of India as a “responsible nuclear
state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order” (Pant, 2007,
p. 455). These measures helped to convince New Delhi of the US’s commitment to the partnership and laid the foundations for the steady growth of
bilateral ties.
Other issues and related measures contributing to confidence building had to do with the Iran factor in US–India relations with Washington
displaying accommodation towards each other’s interests. In response to
Iran’s nuclear program, the US imposed tight sanctions on Tehran. Other
countries that imported oil from or had investment projects in Iran were
also subject to sanctions. However, Washington made exceptions for India,
acknowledging New Delhi’s “legitimate business interests” in its Chabahar
port project in Iran – a measure supported by both the Obama and Trump
administrations (Kutty, 2019, p. 110). In June 2018, US officials announced that
they understood the interests that come into play for India in the Chabahar
port complex, which provided a new transportation corridor for landlocked
Afghanistan and promised millions of dollars in trade (Nichols, 2018). In
November 2018, Washington exempted the port project from sanctions,
which further confirmed its intention to accommodate India’s interests
(Landay, 2018). These measures do not fully resolve the Iran issue but,
together with Washington’s willingness to defer some regional security
issues in South Asia to New Delhi and engage India in international formats,
such as G7, they contribute to the confidence building needed for strategic
cooperation (Puthan Purayil, 2021; Xavier, 2019).
162 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Mechanisms for regular consultations in US–India strategic
cooperation
As mentioned in Chapter 2 and demonstrated in Chapter 3, regular consultations are necessary for the smooth functioning of strategic cooperation
and are an indispensable aspect of alignment. The US and India have
made significant progress by expanding their consultation structure from
sporadic contacts to more regular formats. The most important consultation
mechanism, which took place for the first time on September 6, 2018, is the
annual US–India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue involving the US secretaries of
state and defense and the Indian ministers for external affairs and defense.
The 2+2 Dialogue replaced the US–India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue,
which had existed since 2015, to shift the discussion of regional security
cooperation to a higher strategic plane and to insulate defense and security
issues from contentious disagreements on trade (Roche, 2017; White, 2021,
p. 7). Another important mechanism is the US–India Maritime Security
Dialogue, inaugurated in April 2016. It operates at the Assistant Secretary/
Joint Secretary level and aims to intensify consultations on maritime security
in the Asia-Pacific region (Pant & Joshi, 2017).
Another primary consultative mechanism is the Defense Policy Group
(DPG). It operates at the level of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (from
the US side) and Defense Secretary (from India’s side) to guide US–India
strategic defense cooperation. Established in the mid-1990s, it consists of five
sub-groups that advance different aspects of US–India defense cooperation
and report directly to DPG. These include the Defense Procurement and
Production Group (DPPG), co-chaired by the Director of the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (US) and the Director General for Acquisition (India)
and focusing on defense acquisition and other trade issues between the
two governments; the Senior Technology Security Group (STSG), led by the
Defense Technology Security Agency Director (US) and Additional Secretary for Defense Production (India) and dealing with export licensing and
technology security processes; the Joint Technical Group (JTG), co-chaired by
the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research (US) and
Director General of Production Coordination and Services Integration (India)
to provide a forum for discussion and coordination of defense research
and production issues. The remaining two groups within the DPG are the
Military Cooperation Group (MCG), which guides cooperation between the
two countries’ armed forces, and the Executive Steering Group (ESG), which
works in conjunction with the MCG and focuses on developing military
service-related cooperation. One should also mention the Defense Technology
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
163
and Trade Initiative (DTTI), which focuses on technology co-development
and co-production and is co-chaired by the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, on the US side, and the Secretary for Defence
Production, on India’s side (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 127; US Department of
Defense, 2015).
In terms of the number of high-level defense and security dialogues,
US–India alignment appears to be on par with China–Russia alignment.58
However, according to the metrics developed in Chapter 2, US–India alignment scores lower than China–Russia alignment.59 First, the US–India
consultation infrastructure is less comprehensive. Communication happens
regularly at the highest levels but not between bureaucracies at the local
level, creating communication gaps. In order to be considered comprehensive, bilateral consultations require a more comprehensive range of
actors beyond the Ministry of External Affairs, such as defense services,
functional ministries, and military staff (Xavier, 2019, p. 43; Ladwig III &
Mukherjee, 2019b, p. 56). Routinized engagement at all levels – from the
strategic to the tactical – is required to develop the habits of practical
cooperation and build the “connective tissue” that characterizes a mature
strategic partnership (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 136). As shown in Chapter 3,
the architecture of China–Russia consultations is comprised of a multi-level
infrastructure of contacts and regular information exchanges among almost
all government agencies and organizations – from top decision makers and
their administrative units to defense ministries and their subdivisions to
multiple regional consultation formats that occur between provinces and
cities and further down to regular contacts between border garrisons and
different types of troops and army units.
The second, related deficiency of US–India security consultations has
to do with India’s state capacity, precisely the staffing issues that create a
significant institutional mismatch between the two countries and hinder
effective cooperation. Relative to its size, India has a very small foreign
service comparable, in terms of staff numbers, to that of New Zealand and
Singapore (Markey, 2009). The Indian Ministry of External Affairs and
Ministry of Defence are not adequately staffed to support the full spectrum
of strategic cooperation with the US (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 141). For example,
the Indian Ministry of Defence has only one Joint Secretary (the equivalent
58 For China–Russia defense consultation mechanisms, see Chapter 3.
59 For the recognition of deficiencies of US–India bilateral security consultations and their
impact on strategic cooperation, see Abercrombie (2019, p. 122), Xavier (2019, p. 20, p. 43), Kutty
(2019, p. 96).
164 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
of a US Assistant Secretary) in charge of international engagement with the
entire world. Nor does it have counterparts to the US offices that focus on
political-military affairs and regional development (Ladwig III & Mukherjee, 2019b, p. 70-71). The shortage of staff limits the number of diplomatic
functions that India can undertake at any one time and constrains New
Delhi’s ability to participate in new diplomatic initiatives. It also requires
selectiveness and constant prioritization of competing demands. In this
context, it is revealing that India has ten uniformed officers in its Moscow
embassy’s defense representative office, against only three in Washington,
and multiple civilian representatives who assist with managing joint production projects with Russia (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 143).
The final aspect that places the US–India consultations mechanism
behind the China–Russia one is the communication content. US–India
consultations are dominated by technical issues related to procurement
and military exercises but lack the holistic strategic assessments of external
threats and security challenges necessary for forming a shared understanding of the global and regional environments (White, 2021, p. 9). The thematic
agenda of US–India communications does not facilitate “thinking together”
about external challenges, which undermines effective coordination and
does not help to reduce China’s ability to exploit the existing communication gaps (Xavier, 2019, p. 50). As demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, many
China–Russia consultations are designed to share strategic views on pressing
issues of international politics and prepare for possible joint reactions to
global and regional challenges.
The three interrelated issues presented above weaken the consultation
component of US–India alignment. While the two countries have made
significant progress and their mechanism of consultations cannot be ranked
as “low,” it cannot be ranked “high” either and is below the level achieved
by China and Russia.60
Military-Technical Cooperation (MTC)
MTC as a part of post-Cold War US–India relations had not seen significant
development until the early 2010s. A milestone in this regard was the establishment in 2012 of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI),
aimed at accelerating defense co-production and co-development efforts and
streamlining related bureaucratic processes (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 131). DTTI
60 This invites further finetuning of the framework by introducing a more detailed breakdown
at each stage of alignment formation.
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
165
was to identify specific pathfinder technology projects for collaboration. It
became the primary bilateral consultations forum, and by 2015 four initial
co-production pathfinder projects were identified: co-development and
co-production of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), roll on and roll off kits
for the C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft,61 a mobile electric hybrid
power source for expeditionary operations and deployments in isolated
locations, and a next-generation uniform integrated protection ensemble
for personnel operating in biological and chemical warfare environments
(Tellis, 2015, p. 8). In 2016, these four projects were expanded to include
seven working groups dealing with more sophisticated programs, such as
aircraft carrier and jet engine technology cooperation and cooperation in
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies (Abercrombie,
2019, p. 132). India expected that these initiatives would facilitate technology
transfer from the United States (Pant & Joshi, 2017, p. 140).
In 2016, in parallel with these initiatives, the US government designated
India as its “major defense partner,” a status unique to India, to facilitate
bilateral goods and technologies exchanges and demonstrate the US’s intentions to treat India as its close ally. In 2018, the US Department of Commerce
granted India the Strategic Trade Authorization Tier 1 status to further simplify
export controls (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 132). Simultaneously, India became an
important purchaser of American weapons, such as F-16s fighter jets, Apache
and Chinook helicopters, C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft, light howitzer
artillery, P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft, jet engines and aircraft carrier
technologies, and naval drones (Paul & Underwood, 2019, p. 359; Reuters,
2017). These initiatives increased the volume of arms transfers. They were also
intended to indicate the two countries’ willingness to move from simple buyerseller arrangements to more co-development and co-production. Bilateral
defense cooperation was further enhanced through educational exchanges,
with Indian officers regularly attending US Staff Colleges and officers from
both countries engaging in reciprocal training and knowledge sharing.
However, despite all the progress, the transformative impact of the DTTI
and the subsequent initiatives on bilateral defense cooperation has been
limited and failed to generate technological interdependence, which places
US–India MTC well below China–Russia MTC. Throughout the 2000s, India
appeared uninterested in and even at times hostile towards the idea of
deepening MTC with the United States. (Pant & Joshi, 2017, p. 136). Defense
co-production, though trending upward, is the area in which India’s policies
61 Roll on and off kits can be cargo modules or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
systems built into a trailer-like container that can be rolled on and off an aircraft.
166 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
converged with the US’s preferences only to a low extent or did not converge
at all (Mistry, 2016, p. 24). This was evidenced by the Indian government
rejecting multiple co-production options offered by the US, as was the case
in 2012, when under DTTI, Washington offered India co-production of the
Sikorsky Seahawk naval helicopter, the Javelin anti-tank missile, a 127 mm
naval gun, and a delivery system for scatterable mines. New Delhi decided
not to accept these offers and rejected the Javelin in favor of an Israeli
anti-tank missile (Mistry, 2016, p. 26).
According to Abercrombie (2019, p. 132), DTTI has failed to accomplish
its objective of the joint production and development of arms. While the US
tried to use DTTI to build an institutional partnership with India and US
firms wanted to capture the Indian market for coproduced weapons, India
continued to subject DTTI projects to its standard defense procurement
processes that required competition between multiple potential suppliers.
Moreover, it was challenging to identify projects needed by both countries
and simultaneously making business sense for the private-sector partners
on the US side. As highlighted by White (2021, p. 13), the progress with
co-development and co-production through DTTI has been halting, with
some agreed-upon projects being “embarrassingly modest” while others
have proved “too challenging.” The issue has been exacerbated by India’s
limited research and development capacity, which makes the involvement
of prominent US original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) unviable.
India’s tangible and intangible contributions to joint projects were never
sophisticated or inexpensive enough to justify cooperation, especially
where the most cutting-edge programs are concerned (Tellis, 2015, p. 7-8).
As a result, DTTI has primarily served to bypass the obstacles in the Indian
procurement system rather than stimulating joint defense production, and
the research, and development of weapons.
At the same time, India collaborates extensively with another great
power – Russia – which is in direct geopolitical confrontation with the
United States. Even though Russia–Indian MTC is not as advanced as Russia–China MTC, Russia has been India’s longstanding (since 1960s) partner in
developing advanced weapon technologies in a way that surpasses US–India
MTC. Examples include India’s collaboration with Russia’s Rubin Central
Design Bureau for Marine Engineering on the development of India’s first
nuclear ballistic missile submarine INS Arihant and the co-production by
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited of the Russian Mig-21, Mig-23/27, Mig-29,
and Su-30 fighter jets. India also remains reliant on Russia for spare parts
and upgrades for a disproportionate segment of its armory. According to
some assessments, even if all four DTTI projects between the US and India
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
167
succeeded on all accounts, it would still be questionable whether DTTI could
ever progress to the level of India–Russia MTC (Tellis, 2015, p. 9). Indian
purchases of Russian systems like the S-400 long-range surface to air missile
system and leases of Russian nuclear submarines only contribute to the
“rough stasis” in US–India MTC after years-long efforts at joint production
(Lalwani & Byrne, 2019, p. 47). Russia also easily remains India’s largest
arms supplier, with the value of defense purchase agreements signed only
in 2018 reaching US$15 billion, which is near the US$16 billion of US defense
sales to India over a decade (Shukla, 2019). In 2020, the US remained “still
a distant second to Russia” in arms supplies to India (Rajagopalan, 2020,
p. 84). Washington has been warning India about possible sanctions under
its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) due
to India’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400. These developments raise concerns
regarding the feasibility of US–India strategic alignment.
As in the case of regular bilateral consultations, US–India MTC has made
significant progress, and bilateral cooperation in this area might increase.
However, due to the factors reviewed above, US–India MTC cannot be
ranked “high” according to our framework.
Regular joint military exercises in US–India relations
Since the early 2000s, US–India joint military exercises have grown in size
and sophistication. The Indian military today conducts more exercises with
the US than with any other country (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 128; Rajagopalan,
2020, p. 85). There are bilateral exercises for each of the three services – army
(Yudh Abhyas exercises), navy (Malabar and RIMPAC exercises), and air
forces (Exercise Red Flag). The frequency of exercises within each service
can vary, with navy exercises happening twice a year, army exercises – once
annually, and air force exercises – once in several years. India and the US also
conduct bilateral exercises involving special operation forces (Vajra Prahar
and Tarkash exercises) and small-scale naval exercises, such as Habu Nag,
Spitting Cobra, and Salvex, focusing on amphibious operations, explosive
ordnance destruction, and diving and salvage, respectively (Mistry, 2016,
p. 25), even though not all of these minor exercises occur annually.
The most advanced and frequent are navy exercises. The annual Malabar
exercise, originally launched as a mere passing exercise62 in 1992, has become
62 A passing exercise is an exercise between two navies to ensure that they are able to communicate and cooperate in times of humanitarian relief or war. Common drills include flashing
light drills, semaphore drills, and flaghoist drills.
168 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
the largest naval exercise involving US and India. It has grown from involving
just one or two warships from each side in the early 2000s into large-scale
navy drills involving multiple warships in the mid-2000s and even aircraft
carriers in 2017 (Khera, 2017, p. 18). In 2015, Japan joined the Malabar exercises
as a permanent participant (Raghuvanshi, 2015). US–India maritime security
cooperation has received a further boost due to China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. In 2015, President Obama and Prime Minister
Modi released the US–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and
Indian Ocean Region, in which they announced their intention to enhance
maritime security cooperation (The White House, 2015). Starting from 2018,
India’s military attaché in Bahrain also serves as a liaison officer at the US
Fifth Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain – an arrangement that is believed to
significantly enhance US–India cooperation in the Indian Ocean region
(Abercrombie, 2019, p. 133).
At the same time, there are issues with US–India joint military exercises
that place this parameter of US–India cooperation below China–Russia
cooperation. First, the US and India exercise less frequently than China
and Russia. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, China–Russia regular joint
military exercises of various formats and configurations consistently take
place five to six times a year. US–India exercises take place less regularly
and with a frequency that fluctuates between one and four exercises every
year. Thus, even though India exercises with the US more than with any
other country, the frequency of the exercises is insuff icient to achieve
interoperability (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 130).63 Moreover, the analysis of
the frequency and content of India’s and the US’s military exercises with
foreign countries reveals that New Delhi and Washington are not the priority strategic partners for each other but, instead, ones among many. This
situation is predominantly due to India’s reluctance to rapidly advance its
military cooperation with the US, as evidenced by significant delays with
signing the LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA enabling agreements.
Second, in terms of geographic range and sophistication, US–India
exercises also lag behind China–Russia exercises. US–India exercises have
mostly taken place in either India or the US, or their and other participants’
immediate geopolitical environments. China–Russia military exercises,
in contrast, have consistently moved into distant regions during tense
63 For the sake of comparison, US Navy annual engagements with the Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force can be as many as 28. Even Singapore, which is not formally aligned with the
US and whose active forces number only 5% of India’s, conducts more (up to eight) military
exercises with the US than India annually (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 130).
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
169
international situations, as in the cases of the Joint Sea-2015 in the Mediterranean shortly after the breakout of the Ukraine Crisis, the Joint Sea-2016 in
the disputed South China Sea after the Hague tribunal overruling China’s
territorial claims, Joint Sea-2017 in the Baltic, and Joint Sea-2019 close to
the Cape of Good Hope (see Chapter 3). The number of troops involved in
US–India exercises, while having grown significantly, is measured in tens
in the smaller exercises and mere hundreds in the larger ones (Mistry, 2016,
p. 25), which is significantly less than the thousands typically involved in
China–Russia military exercises.
Air force exercises are considered the highest level in the hierarchy of
international military exercises due to their impact and high demand on
interoperability of forces (Khera, 2017, p. 28). However, US–India combined
air force exercises have been infrequent and irregular. US–India air force
exercises, compared to other services, have lagged in recent years, largely
due to problems of aircraft compatibility (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 129; White,
2021, p. 11). There have been calls in the expert community that the US should
seek greater air force participation in Malabar and encourage bilateral
air force simulations, wargaming, and exchanges on issues that include
both doctrinal and technical dimensions, such as airborne warning, and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in denied environments
(Burgess, 2019).
The third aspect that hiders interoperability between the two militaries
is New Delhi’s strong preference for multilateralism, at times involving
countries at odds with the United States. However, it is bilateral exercises
that result in greater interaction between the participants (Khera, 2017, p. 30).
Lalwani and Byrne (2019, p. 46) have called India’s tendency to prioritize
breadth of partners over depth of cooperation “strategic promiscuity.” Even
the most important and comprehensive US–India exercise – the Malabar
exercise – has moved towards multilateralism, with Japan and Australia
joining as permanent participants in 2015 and 2020, respectively. Thus,
US–India military exercises do not significantly stand out vis-à-vis India’s
exercises with other countries. India holds regular military exercises with
23 countries, and it exercises with Singapore almost as often as it does with
the US. India’s exercises with the US engage all three services (Army, Navy,
Air Force), but so do its exercises with Indonesia, the U.K., Singapore, and
Russia (Khera, 2017, pp. 25-29).64 Despite this diverse portfolio of partners,
some Indian experts and former military officers have called for revisiting
64 Exercises with France and Sri Lanka have engaged two services and the remaining 16
countries have been engaged by a single service only (Khera, 2017, p. 29).
170 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
India’s engagement policy towards reducing the frequency of military
exercises with certain countries “in order to engage a greater number of
countries,” because the “gains from engaging different countries would far
outweigh repeated engagement with the same partners” (Khera, 2017, p. 35).
In contrast, the US side believes that increasing the number of partners
instead of increasing the frequency of exercises with key capable partners
helps India familiarize itself with numerous militaries but does not yield
operational benefits (Abercrombie, 2019).
Finally, India’s extensive engagement with Russia undermines US–India
cooperation. As shown in Table 6.1, US–India exercises are slightly ahead
of India–Russia exercises in terms of frequency for the period from 2012 to
2020.65 However, the gap is not significant, and in some years, India and
Russia exercised more frequently than the US and India. Moreover, the
data reveals that India has more tri-service and air force exercises with
Russia than it does with the United States. While this may change, it adds
an important sobering footnote to the observed upward trend in US–India
military cooperation.
Table 6.1 India’s major regular military exercises with the United States and
Russia
year
2012
2013
United States
Qty
2
1
Description
–Malabar in Pacific Ocean (IN,
USN)
–Yudh Abhyas in India (IA, USA)
–Malabar in the Bay of Bengal
(IN, USN)
Russia
Qty
Description
2
– INDRA-V in Russia (tri-service)
– INDRA-VI in the Arabian Sea
(tri-service)
1
– INDRA-V in India (tri-service)
– Avia Indra-I in Russia (IAF,
Russian Air Force)
–Malabar in the Sea of Japan
2014
– Avia Indra-II in India (IAF,
(IN, USN, JMSDF)
3
– RIMPAC in the US (IN, USN, and
navies of 20 countries)
–Yudh Abhyas in India (IA, USA)
4
Russian Air Force)
– INDRA-VII in Russia
(tri-service)
– INDRA-VIII in the Sea of Japan
(IN, Russian Navy)
65 The list of exercises presented in the table is not exhaustive and offers a rough estimate.
It includes major regular exercises only. There are other irregular and/or infrequent exercises,
such as Cope India and Red Flag (between India and the US) or small-scale episodic exercises
on the sidelines of major exercises (as happens in both India–US and India–Russia interactions).
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
year
United States
Qty
Description
171
Russia
Qty
Description
1
– INDRA-VIII in India (tri-service)
–Malabar in the Bay of Bengal
2015
2
(IN, USN, JMSDF)
–Yudh Abhyas in the US (IA,
USA)
–Malabar in the Pacific Ocean
(IN, USN, JMSDF)
2016
4
– Red Flag-16 in the US (IAF,
USAF)
– RIMPAC in the US (IN, USN, and
navies of 25 countries)
–Yudh Abhyas in India (IA, USA)
– INDRA-VIII in Russia (IA,
2
Russian Army)
– INDRA-IX in the Bay of Bengal
(IAN, Russian Navy)
–Malabar in the Bay of Bengal
2017
2
(IN, USN, JMSDF)
–Yudh Abhyas in the US (IA,
1
– INDRA-IX in Russia (tri-service)
2
– INDRA-X in India (tri-service)
– Avia Indra- III in Russia (IAF,
USA)
2018
2
–Malabar in the Bay of Bengal
(IN, USN, JMSDF)
–Yudh Abhyas in India (IA, USA)
Russian Air Force)
–Malabar in Japan, off the coast
2019
3
2020
1
Total
20
of Sasebo (IN, USN, JMSDF)
–Tiger Triumph in India
(tri-service)
–Yudh Abhyas in the US (IA,
USA)
–Malabar in the Bay of Bengal
and the Arabian Sea (IN, USN,
JMSDF, RAN)
–Tsentr-2019 in Russia (IA, Rus2
–
1
sian Army, and the armies of
China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Pakistan and
Uzbekistan)
INDRA-XI in India (tri-service)
– INDRA-XI in the Andaman Sea
(IN, Russian Navy)
16
Note: Compiled by the author based on various publicly available sources. Abbreviations used:
IN – Indian Navy; IA – Indian Army; IAF – Indian Air Force; USA – United States Army; USAF – United
States Air Force; USN – United States Navy; JSDMF – Japanese Self-Defense Maritime Force; RAN –
Royal Australian Navy.
Advanced cooperation and interoperability of US and Indian military
forces
The characteristics of advanced alignment, as defined by our framework’s
three indicators of integrated military command, military base exchanges,
and common defense policy, are largely absent from US–India strategic
cooperation, with the only exception of nascent and episodic elements
of integrated military command. Any possibility of basing access seems,
as Lalwani and Byrne (2019, p. 47) put it, “unfathomable” in US–India
172 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
relations. Like China or Russia, India is highly sensitive about the issue
of its sovereignty. Moreover, in the Indian case, this issue is even more
problematic given India’s colonial history. For this reason, any attempts
by a foreign state to permanently deploy its troops on Indian soil are likely
to be circumscribed by New Delhi, even if doing so is dictated by the need
to tackle a severe external threat. While China–Russia alignment does
not include base exchanges either, it appears ahead in terms of integrated
military command and the emerging elements of common defense policy.
There is little evidence of moving towards a common defense policy
in US–India relations. The US–India maritime cooperation framework,
originally announced in 2006 as a way to deal with non-traditional security
threats, such as disaster response, counterpiracy, and transnational crime
(Government of India, 2006), never picked up steam due to the lack of a
political imperative for cooperation (Abercrombie, 2019, pp. 132-133). The lack
of progress towards joint planning and coordination on regional security
issues is related to the characteristics of US–India regular consultations
(indicator no. 2 explored above), which focus predominantly on technical
issues of procurements or exercise-specific discussions but lack substantive
assessment of common regional and global threats. In this light, some
experts argue that US and Indian policies are expected to continue to
operate independently and “in parallel” instead of becoming a joint effort
(Ladwig III & Mukherjee, 2019b, p. 55).
In terms of integrated military command, despite multiple joint activities
under the rubric of freedom of navigation and the freedom of the seas,
there has been little evidence of direct coordination between the Indian
and US militaries (Ladwig III & Mukherjee, 2019b, p. 66). An exception was
the 2019 Tiger Triumph joint military exercise in which the Indian Navy’s
Eastern Fleet commander served as the overall force commander, with a US
Marine Corps officer attached with him as a liaison officer (Gurung, 2019).
However, examples like this are not regular, and the two countries’ armed
forces are still far from being interoperable (Abercrombie, 2019; Lalwani &
Byrne, 2019). This makes the potential participation of US and Indian forces
in combined operations rather challenging.
Explaining US–India strategic cooperation: power, threats, and
interest
As demonstrated above, the functioning of US–India strategic cooperation
has fallen below the level of “natural allies” originally expected. According
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
173
to our framework, the causes of alignment formation and performance are
in the condition of the balances of power, threat, and interests and the interrelationship between them. The alignment incentives in US–India relations
are weaker than in China–Russia relations, primarily due to discrepancies
between the three balances. This correlation between the incentives and
the outcomes in the context of US–India relations further confirms the
robustness of the framework.
Starting with the material power balance, US–India alignment is expected because the rapid rise of China to the position of a great power with
global geopolitical ambitions has generated a systemic pressure that should
incentivize US–India alignment. The expectation of US–India alignment
are even stronger given the complicated nature of China’s relationship with
both countries. India is much weaker than China militarily, economically,
and technologically. Recognizing the significant power imbalance, India’s
military commanders have made their position unambiguous by stating
that India is “no match” for China’s military capabilities (Singh, 2009) and
that it is “not ready” for a war with China (Unnithan, 2011). Since New Delhi
cannot rely on internal balancing to cope with China’s rise, it has to reach
out to the US to mount an effective external balancing against China (Pant
& Joshi, 2017, p. 145; Puthan Purayil, 2021, p. 2; Ladwig III & Mukherjee,
2019b, p. 67). The US is still most likely capable of countering China by itself,
but it would be much easier to deal with China in cooperation with India
(Rajagopalan, 2017, p. 39). As a former US Undersecretary of State, Nicholas
Burns, highlighted in the mid-2000s, the US’s growing engagement with
India had “a tremendous strategic upside” because of its “real promise for the
global balance of power” (Burns, 2007, p. 131). Therefore, as in China–Russia
alignment, the structural factor of the balance of power pushes India and the
US together. The existing structure of the international system can explain
the ongoing rapprochement and suggests further alignment between New
Delhi and Washington (Mistry, 2016, p. 8).
However, US–India alignment is affected by the divergences between
the condition of the balance of power and those related to threats and
interests. The discrepancy between the three causal factors, largely absent
in China–Russia relations, dampens alignment incentives in the US–India
case and explains why New Delhi appears reluctant to step into a tighter
anti-China alignment with Washington.
On the surface, the US and India’s perceptions of the major external
threat coincide. There is a consensus in the literature that China is the
primary driver of US–India alignment. Balancing China has been seen as
a major reason behind US–India cooperation since the early 2000s (Mistry,
174 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
2016, p. 8). China’s rapid rise, assertiveness, and geopolitical clout appear to
have forced the two countries into unusually close security collaboration
(Ladwig III & Mukherjee, 2019a, pp. 12-14). China is also a common threat for
US and India and the “most prominent structural variable” in the upward
trajectory of US–India relations (Pant & Joshi, 2017, p. 144). Even though
policymakers are reluctant to admit it publicly, India’s relationship with
the US is “clearly a response to the rise of China” (Basrur, 2017, p. 17). Driven
by their converging concerns over China’s rise, both Indian and American
leaders started, at the turn of the 21st century, to come up with increasingly
severe threat assessments about China and invest in long-term bilateral
security cooperation (Xavier, 2019, pp. 20-28; Rajagopalan, 2020, p. 84; Puthan
Purayil, 2021, p. 4).
Some high-level political statements have borne out these assessments.
In 2014, in a joint statement, Modi and Obama for the first time expressed
concerns about “rising tensions over maritime territorial disputes” and
threats to freedom of navigation (The White House, 2014). The 2015 US–India
Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region
further emphasized the importance of safeguarding maritime security,
freedom of navigation, and overflight in the South China Sea (The White
House, 2015). In 2017, the then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson highlighted
that “China, while rising alongside India, has done so less responsibly, at
times undermining the international rules-based order, even as countries
like India operate within a framework that protects other nations’ sovereignty” (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017). According to
former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, India must align with the
US (alongside Japan, Australia, Indonesia, and Vietnam) to countervail
China, which has become the main adversary (Saran, 2017, p. 148). From
this vantage point, China appears as a common threat contributing to the
consolidation of US–India strategic alignment.
However, a closer analysis reveals that beneath the façade of shared
concerns about the rise of China and calls for deeper cooperation, the
specific “China threats” faced by the two countries are categorically different.
Washington is concerned about China’s economic and military growth,
technological advancements, and increasing global ambitions that challenge
the existing US-dominated global order.66 It is concerned about China
becoming the closest peer competitor to the US in multiple respects and
the ensuing systemic challenge to the global status quo. Specific China-led
schemes and initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), power
66 For more on how China constitutes a threat to the US, see Chapter 4.
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
175
projection in the South and East China Seas and the Indo-Pacific more
broadly, and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
(in which India is second only to China itself as the largest shareholder) all
concern Washington as they challenge the global hegemonic role of the
United States.
India’s threat assessments are driven by categorically different considerations. India is less concerned with China’s alleged global ambitions and its
systemic challenge to the West. Instead, for New Delhi, the most significant
security threats from China are all related to geopolitically proximate
challenges “close to home,” which dictates a different pattern of behavior
towards China. The issues that top India’s agenda, but concern the US
only tangentially, include the enduring land border tension with China,
Beijing’s support of Pakistan by arms transfers and assistance with its
missile program, and China’s building of all-weather ports in Pakistan and
Sri Lanka (Pant & Joshi, 2017, p. 144; Ladwig III & Mukherjee, 2019a, p. 13; Paul
& Underwood, 2019, p. 352; Puthan Purayl, 2021, p. 5). The modernization
of the Indian armed forces is directed towards the disputed border – to
deal with the proximate geopolitical threat posed by China (Ladwig III &
Mukherjee, 2019a, p. 13). Allocation of resources for the Navy, in turn, not
only remains the lowest among the three services but has declined from 19%
of the total military budget in 2010-2011 to just 15.5% in 2018-2019, which is
indicative of a threat perception which is quite different from that of the
United States (Rajagopalan 2020, p. 89). As highlighted by Lalwani and
Byrne (2019, p. 53), India favoring the identification of the China threat as
primarily terrestrial instead of maritime or related to global order makes
India’s strategic motivations different from those of the US, which are
principally based on expectations of maritime security coordination and
cooperation on global balancing against China.
As far as China’s BRI is concerned, India worries less about how it might
change China’s regional and global influence and more about the fact that
an important part of BRI – the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) –
cuts through parts of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which India considers
its territory. Because of China’s presence in India’s immediate neighborhood,
the issue of the disputed border, together with India’s relatively limited
military capabilities, require New Delhi to be more sensitive to Beijing’s
potential reactions to what it might perceive as challenging its core interests
(Xavier, 2019, p. 26; Singh, 2019, p. 93).
Such a categorical discrepancy in threat perceptions does not exist between China and Russia. In the US–India case, this discrepancy explains the
limited nature of bilateral strategic cooperation and New Delhi’s reluctance
176 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
to cooperate militarily in high gear, not to mention moving into an antiChina alignment with the United States. Once the core goals of defense
cooperation moved closer towards balancing against China, India has been
noted to start backpedaling and proved to be an “underwhelming partner,”
which has led experts to question its alignment with the United States
(Lalwani & Byrne, 2019, p. 45).
While a common view of external threats currently exists between
the US and India only to a limited extent, the situation might change. On
June 16, 2020, Indian off icials announced that 20 Indian army personnel had died in a military standoff with China, the first time since 1975
that border tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)67 resulted
in bloodshed. Some observers have called the incident a “turning point,”
after which China–India relations can no longer be business as usual
(Guha, 2020). The incident has raised India’s security concerns about
China considerably. Soon after the incident, New Delhi decided to ban
Chinese apps with perceived security issues, reconsider certain Chinese
investments in India from the perspective of national security, and deploy
its Navy’s frontline warships in the South China Sea. These developments
may remove the existing hurdles in US–India security cooperation and
are believed by some to illustrate the formation of a more consolidated
balancing behavior towards China (Puthan Purayil, 2021, p. 2). If this
conflictual dynamic continues, India may recalibrate its threat perception
regarding China and, as a result, depart from its adherence to a rather
careful political stance towards China.
When it comes to the balance of interests, the gap between India and
the US widens, further weakening alignment incentives. As in the case of
perceptions of threats, the general strategic interests of India and the U.S
seem to coincide. India’s Act East Policy on surface dovetails well with the
US’s strategy of rebalancing to Asia as both aspire to enhance stability in
the Asia-Pacific (Mistry 2016, p. 10). The two countries claim to pursue a
collaborative approach to regional and global security (Pant & Joshi, 2017,
p. 141). A joint communique, issued after Modi’s visit to Washington in
June 2017, calls the US and India “responsible stewards in the Indo-Pacific
region” whose partnership is “central to peace and stability in the region”
(Government of India, 2017). Both sides pledged to “work together and in
concert with other partners toward advancing a free, open, and inclusive
Indo-Pacific region, based on recognition of ASEAN centrality and respect
67 The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is a notional demarcation line separating Indian-controlled
territory from Chinese-controlled territory in the Sino-Indian border dispute.
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
177
for sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rule of law, good governance, free
and fair trade, and freedom of navigation and overflight” (Government of
India, 2018a). Some believe such diplomatic language indicates the US and
India’s shared interests and concerns (Ladwig III & Mukherjee, 2019b, p. 63).
Pledges to work together on the realization of common interests have been
present, with little variation, in nearly every bilateral joint statement since
2001 (Abercrombie, 2019, p. 125).
However, beneath the surface of seemingly similar objectives are significant divergences of interests that hinder closer alignment. These divergences
have to do with different understandings of the strategic geography and
normative foundations of the “free and open Indo-Pacific,”68 different visions
of the US-led international order and the values it propagates, differences in
approaches to relations with China and international institutions dominated
by it, and continuing divergences on the issues of regional security involving
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.
The US’s view of the Indo-Pacif ic approximates the US Indo-Pacif ic
Command area of operations, which stretches from the west coast of the
US in the Pacific Ocean to the west coast of India in the Indian Ocean
(Singh, 2019, p. 79). This approach places greater emphasis on Southeast
Asia and particularly India. In contrast, India views “Indo” in broader
terms which include the whole of the Indian Ocean from South Africa to
Australia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean
islands to India’s west, and it views Indo-Pacific as extending, in Modi’s
own words, “from shores of Africa to that of the Americas” (Government
of India, 2018b; Kutty 2019, p. 98). At the same time, while identifying as a
democracy, India has not fully embraced the extension of the concept from
simply “Indo-Pacific” to “free and open Indo-Pacific,” which has stronger
normative, value-loaded connotations and anti-China flavor. Thus, New
Delhi has refused to participate in joint US–India “freedom of navigation”
patrols in the South China Sea (Rajagopalan, 2020, p. 79; Singh, 2019, p. 85;
Xavier, 2019, p. 28). These differences reflect a divergence of interests, which
poses obstacles for coordinating military and diplomatic strategies and
undermines the US–India joint balancing effort against China (Lalwani &
Byrne, 2019; Singh, 2019, p. 78).
Nor is India on the same page with the US regarding the vision of a
US-led international order and its value system. For example, having
a strong anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiment, New Delhi has
68 For an extended discussion of the contested views about the Indo-Pacific region, see Pande
and Nagao (2018), Gyngell (2018), Beeson and Wilson (2018).
178 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
been acting against the interests of the US by steadfastly supporting
Mauritius in its claims over the contested territory of Diego Garcia,
on which Washington has military bases. Thus, India supported a UN
process and the subsequent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling
that seriously jeopardized US basing in Diego Garcia, which is critical to
Washington’s power projection in the region (Baruah & Joshi, 2021, p. 19).
India also remained silent on Russia’s annexation of Crimea and voted
together with China and Russia in the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons against an investigation into chemical weapons
attacks by Russia in England against a former spy (Lalwani & Byrne,
2019, p. 49).
There are also significant differences between the US and India in understanding the role of democratic values in foreign policy and international
relations. As demonstrated by Xavier (2019, pp. 44-48), these differences
create tensions between the two countries, as happened during the refugee
crisis in Myanmar in the mid-2000s. Indian officials continued to engage
with the regime in Myanmar and refused to join US efforts to exert pressure
on it through what they considered as “counter-productive,” “intrusive,”
“country-specif ic,” and “condemnatory” UN resolutions backed by the
United States (Bhasin, 2007 as cited in Xavier, 2019, p. 45). This behavior
by India, arguably driven by the intention of preventing Myanmar from
falling into Chinese hands, marked a significant split between New Delhi
and Washington (Xavier, 2019, pp. 45-46).
India’s and the US’s approaches to China and international institutions
where it plays a significant role also diverge. India has always sought dialogue
with China despite frequent diplomatic and military confrontations. It
has consistently sought to avert the deterioration of relations with Beijing,
emphasizing that the common interests of the two countries far outweigh
the existing differences and accommodating China’s concerns by not subscribing to any anti-China alliance building (Rajagopalan, 2020, pp. 89-90;
Mistry, 2016, p. 14). The reality of the Asia-Pacific region and India’s status
as a developing country with limited capabilities require that New Delhi
cultivates functional relations with China and avoids actions that risk
jeopardizing the bilateral trade and inflow of investment from China (Joshi,
2015, p. 60). Quite indicative in this regard is Modi’s rather nuanced and
balanced keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018 in which he
expressed a “firm belief” that “Asia and the world will have a better future
when India and China work together in trust and confidence, sensitive to
each other’s interests” (Government of India 2018b). India also took common
positions with China on such international issues as climate change and
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
179
freer international trade when the US started practicing protectionism
under Trump (Rajagopalan 2020, p. 90).
India actively participates in a number of multilateral forums and
organizations that China favors, such as the RIC (Russia–India–China)
forum, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the AIIB, and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).69 Only a week after Obama’s
visit to India in 2015, which was poised to mark a qualitative change in the
US–India relationship and the beginning of India’s stronger tilting towards
the US, India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj went to Beijing
to join her counterparts from China (Wang Yi) and Russia (Sergei Lavrov)
for the 13th Russia–India–China trilateral foreign minister’s meeting. The
Joint Communiqué issued after the meeting emphasized that the three
countries “need to further strengthen coordination on global issues and
practical cooperation” (Tiezzi, 2015). Moreover, it praised Russia’s role in
fostering conversation between the Syrian Government and “opposition
groups” while also supporting “the efforts of the Syrian government to
combat terrorism,” making no mention of the Syrian government’s alleged
use of chemical weapons against civilians. The communiqué also termed
the Ukraine Crisis an “inter-Ukraine conflict” and called for a peaceful
resolution through political negotiation (Joshi, 2015, p. 6; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015).
In a similar vein, the 10th BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration of
June 27, 2018, highlighted the member states’ commitment to “multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations in international affairs”
(South African Government, 2018). According to Stuenkel (2017), given the
growing degree of institutionalization of BRICS, the Declaration indicates the
signatories’ intention to counteract US’s destructive impact (under Trump)
on global rules and norms. India’s active participation in the consolidating
institutions dominated by US’s structural rivals (China and Russia) indicates
that a closer US–India relationship does not necessarily imply balancing
against China.
The interests of India and the US continue to diverge even further on
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. India cultivates high-level diplomatic
and economic interactions with Iran to balance Pakistan and connect to
Western Afghanistan via the Chabahar port (Lalwani & Byrne, 2019, p. 46).
Washington’s engagement with Pakistan and the persisting sanctions on
Tehran are viewed in India as barriers to its economic and geostrategic
69 The SCO includes Russia, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, and China. India sought
admission and officially joined SCO as a full member in June 2017.
180 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
interests, creating strain in US–India relations (Puthan Purayil, 2021, p. 10).
The US has made attempts to accommodate India’s interests by granting New
Delhi some relief from its anti-Iran sanctions to allow India to cooperate
with Iran in certain areas (such as India’s investments in the Chabahar port).
However, the persistent divergence of national interests and priorities on
Iran’s role in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific more broadly continues to
dampen the progress in US–India strategic cooperation. Indian strategic
interests in developing relations with Iran are in striking contrast to the US’s
strategic goals of containing Iran (Mistry, 2016; Kutty, 2019; Puthan Purayl,
2021; Singh, 2019). Overall, the issues with divergent interests explored
above are not unrelated to each other. Together they have stymied closer
US–India strategic alignment, and any one of them could complicate the
bilateral cooperation in the future.
Robustness check
Similar to China–Russia alignment, US–India cooperation suffers from the
challenge of insufficient economic ties and a weak economic foundation.
Even though US–India trade is significant, second only to India–China
trade in 2020, the economic link is believed to be the weakest in the bilateral
relationship (Pant & Joshi, 2017, p. 141). As in China–Russia alignment,
US–India relations are disproportionately dependent on defense and
security ties, which requires attention, specifically from the US administration, which has a stronger capacity to shape the relationship (White,
2021, p. 20). Some experts argue that for US–India alignment, economic
and trade hurdles are a more significant challenge than the issue of Iran
(Kutty, 2019, p. 114). The existing economic problems are structural and
cannot be quickly resolved. They include longstanding disagreements over
the issues of market access and intellectual property rights. These issues
are exacerbated by the fact that the two economies are at significantly
different stages of development: while the US is a free-market economy,
India’s economy has a long way to go before it reaches that stage (Puthan
Purayil, 2021, p. 10).
US–India diplomatic cooperation, as illustrated by voting patterns in
the United Nations (UN), also reveals a low level of congruence between
the two countries’ interests. According to the US Department of State,
between 2009 and 2014, of all the votes on about 80 issues during annual
UN General Assembly sessions, India voted with the US on only 25-35%
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
181
of issues. In contrast, the US’s Asian and European allies voted with the
US on more than 70% of matters. The percentage of voting on the same
side as the US is even lower (less than 20%) on issues related to human
rights, nuclear arms control, and Israel–Palestine issues (Mistry, 2016,
p. 46). When it comes to issues of humanitarian intervention and the
responsibility to protect, India’s approach appears to converge more
with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa (India’s BRICS partners)
and with the nonaligned countries than with the United States (Sidhu,
Mehta, and Jones, 2013 as cited in Mistry, 2016, p. 46). This constitutes
a signif icant difference from the nearly identical voting of China and
Russia at the UN.
Conclusion
Many experts notice that US–India strategic cooperation has not lived
up to its initial high expectations. Therefore, policymakers, especially on
the US side, should be more realistic about what can be achieved between
the two countries in terms of building a strong policy alignment (Mistry,
2016; Ladwig III & Mukherjee, 2019b; Abercrombie, 2019; Lalwani & Byrne,
2019; Puthan Purayil, 2021). There are a number of unanswered questions
in US–India relations regarding whether the US will persist in strategic
cooperation with India and stand by India even if the alignment doesn’t
deepen, whether India would be willing to compromise on its policy of
keeping the door open to other partners to consolidate its cooperation
with the US, and whether the two countries would be able to habituate and
routinize their ongoing bilateral security cooperation to be able to move to
more advanced alignment.
By applying the alignment framework developed in Chapter 2, this chapter
has specified the weaknesses in US–India strategic cooperation and mapped
them against the case of China–Russia relations. As demonstrated above,
despite signif icant progress over the last decade, US–India alignment
remains behind China–Russia alignment on most indicators included in
our framework. Table 6.2 summarizes the comparison on all the indicators
and causal factors and specifies where exactly and how US–India alignment has lagged behind. It demonstrates that while on some parameters
US–India alignment might look on par with China–Russia alignment, there
are qualitative differences that place it behind. US–India alignment has
not made significant strides into the advanced level of alignment, whereas
182 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
China and Russia have started moving in this direction, especially after
implementing plans to develop an integrated missile attack early warning
system.70
China’s rise and its assertive policies have generated a sense of momentum
in the US–India relationship. However, the structural push to form a tighter
alignment weakens as one moves from the factor power to threats and
interests. The discrepancy between the factors of alignment formation
makes the US–India case different from the China–Russia case. The weaker
structural incentive is reflected in the reluctance of India to unequivocally
align with the US, especially when it comes to dealing with an increasingly
assertive China. Simultaneously, it is essential to highlight that US–India
strategic cooperation is not set in stone but evolving based on the above
analysis. The combination of the degree of alignment between the three
causal factors might (and is likely to) change depending on China’s rise
and its behavior towards India and the United States. These changes will
determine whether India and the US move towards a closer alignment or
further away from it.
Table 6.2 Comparison of China–Russia and US–India alignments
Advanced alignment
Alignments →
Criteria (stages) ↓
China–Russia alignment
US–India alignment
Common
defense policy
Low: emerging cooperation in
the sensitive area of strategic
arms. Integration of the two
countries’ early warning systems
facilitates further convergence
of Russia’s and China’s defense
strategies.
absent
Military bases
exchange
absent
absent
Entering high level: frequent
establishment of joint command
centers and air groups for
exercises in distant regions;
integration of satellite navigation systems; development of
integrated early warning missile
defense system.
Low: episodic practices of
integrated military command
in joint exercises within or
close to allies’ territory; limited
involvement of air force to form
joint air groups; lack of habits of
exercising joint command.
Integrated
military
command
70 See Chapter 3 for more details.
Comparative Mapping: US–India and China–Russia Alignments
Alignments →
Criteria (stages) ↓
Moderate alignment
Regular joint
military
exercises
Military
technical
cooperation
Early alignment
Mechanism
of regular
consultations
Confidence
building
measures
(CBMs)
China–Russia alignment
183
US–India alignment
High: consistently regular and
frequent large-scale exercises
in regions geopolitically distant
from the territory of both
allies; sophisticated content of
exercises actively involving air
force; limited engagement with
countries that are rivals to either
ally.
Developing: less frequent
and less regular exercises,
especially when involving the
most advanced service (the
air force); predominantly held
either in allies’ own territory or
close to it; extensive engagements of one ally (India) with
a strategic rival (Russia) of the
other (US).
High: transition from providing Developing: lack of technotechnical training and assistance logical interdependence;
related to procurements to
procurements-focused
actual military technology
cooperation; little progress with
transfers and long-term projects co-development and cofor joint design and production production of arms; extensive
of arms and their components;
and higher-level cooperation by
growing technological
one ally (India) with countries
interdependence.
(especially Russia) that are
strategic rivals to the other ally
(US).
High: comprehensive multiDeveloping:71 consultations
level infrastructure of regular
infrastructure is skewed towards
contacts with unique consulta- top decision makers. The consultion platforms existing only
tation content is dominated by
between China and Russia. The technical issues of procurement
consultations agenda includes
or exercise-specific discussions
both technical matters and
and lacks strategic assessments
holistic assessments of external of external threats.
threats.
High and completed: CBMs had High and ongoing: CBMs had
contributed to the resolution
contributed to initial trustof the border dispute and
building at early stages and
trust-building at the early stage helped remedy the post-Cold
of alignment, and some of them War “hesitation of history”
later evolved into mechanisms
legacy. Yet several unresolved
of regular consultation.
thorny issues, such as Iran,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, still
require effective CBMs.
71 As mentioned above, the simple high-low metrics offered in Chapter 2 might requires
further breakdown into intermediate levels of cooperation at each stage. The US–India case
has demonstrated that while the bilateral strategic cooperation fails to qualify as high, it is not
low either. “Developing” appears a proper term.
184 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Formation factors
Alignments →
Criteria (stages) ↓
China–Russia alignment
US–India alignment
Conducive to alignment
formation: shared interest to
reduce US global dominance;
active participation in
international institutions
promoting an alternative order;
no participation by either ally in
international institutions with
agendas explicitly unfriendly to
the other.
Conducive to alignment
formation: aligned perceptions
of threat; the US is the most
significant common threat of
systemic nature for both China
and Russia.
Misaligned: diverging approaches to the US-led global
order, regional security issues,
relations with China. Active
participation by one ally (India)
Compatibility
in international institutions
of interests
(BRICS, SCO, IAAB) promoting
an alternative order and with
agendas unfriendly towards the
other ally (US).
Ambivalent: China is a common
high-level threat, but perceptions of specific China-related
Perceptions
threats differ categorically: the
of external
US’s concern is China’s global
threats
ambitions; India’s concerns
are their border dispute and
neighborhood geopolitics.
Conducive to alignment forma- Conducive to alignment
tion: the US maintains its power formation: cooperation between
Systemic power preponderance, but the costs of India and the US can reduce
balancing become permissive if individual costs of balancing
configuration
China and Russia align with each against rapidly rising China’s
other.
power.
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7
Conclusion
Empirical Findings and Theoretical Implications
Abstract
This concluding chapter takes stock of the empirical and theoretical
findings presented in the previous chapters. Empirically, it summarizes
the key features and the trajectory of post-Cold War China–Russia strategic
cooperation and predicts its future development in the context of the evolving international environment. Theoretically, the chapter discusses the
importance and future development of the theoretical model of alignment
formation offered in this book. It highlights the significance of theorygrounded knowledge and discusses how the framework can be applied to
other cases of interstate strategic cooperation, including formal alliances
and informal alignments, both bilateral and multilateral, to understand
their nuances, functional features, and development prospects. It also
revisits the phenomenon of China–Russia relations and its significance
for understanding the formation and development of interstate alliances.
Keywords: China–Russia relations, alliance, alignment
As stated at the beginning of the introductory chapter, this study is driven
by two analytical goals – one empirical and one theoretical. The empirical
goal is to assess, as accurately as possible, and explain the upward trend
in post-Cold War China–Russia relations. In order to achieve this goal,
the study also compares the case of China–Russia alignment with that
of US–India alignment to highlight its strengths and weaknesses and
assess how it fares vis-à-vis a comparable case. The theoretical goal is
to develop a theory-grounded alignment framework and corresponding
measurements that draw on the case of China–Russia alignment but are
also general enough to travel across different cases, allowing comparative assessments. The below discussion summarizes research outcomes
regarding both goals.
Korolev, Alexander, China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press 2022
doi: 10.5117/9789463725248_ch07
190 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
China–Russia relations: an ever-consolidating strategic alignment?
The central empirical finding that challenges the existing assessments
is that the high level of China–Russia strategic cooperation is not an ad
hoc phenomenon. It is not a knee-jerk reaction to the deterioration of
US–Russia relations in the aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis or growing
US–China tensions in Southeast Asia and beyond. Instead, it is the outcome
of a consistent consolidation of China–Russia cooperation since the end of
the Cold War. There have been ups and downs in the relationship, such as
the temporary stagnation in China–Russia military-technical cooperation
in the mid-2000s and the occasional suspension of regular Russia–China
Mixed Intergovernmental Commission meetings on Military-Technical
Cooperation. These and other events might contribute to the impression that
China–Russia cooperation is a bumpy ride and fluctuates in its closeness due
to various reasons. However, these ups and downs have happened against
the backdrop of an overall continuous upward trend. Zooming out the focus
of analysis to increase the timeframe reveals a consistent, stadial progress
in bilateral cooperation that is, when viewed in its entirety, immune to
short-term perturbations and fluctuations.
At the same time, the signing by China and Russia of a formal alliance
treaty is not impending, not because the conditions for one do not exist but
because this move is unnecessary from the standpoint of a functioning and
consequential alignment. The absence of a formal alliance treaty should
not be viewed as a weakness of strategic cooperation. Alliance treaties by
themselves tell very little about the actual alignment because the lack of
clear defense obligations and the vagueness of the language are common
features of modern alliance treaties. The analysis of even the most advanced
alliances on the subject of the casus foederis clause (conditions under which
obligations to defend an ally are activated) further proves this point.
For example, the United States and Japan are treaty allies and have
consistently been identified as such. However, their 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security, the bedrock of the alliance that covers each party’s
rights and responsibilities, does not contain any strict defense obligations.
Its language is vague and does not specify how and when either party is
obliged to enter a war against a potential aggressor. Article 4 only requires
the parties to “hold consultations” when Japan’s security or international
peace and security in the Far East is threatened. The most important passage,
Article 5, only states that in case of an armed attack against either party in
the territories under the administration of Japan, each of the two countries
would “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
Conclusion
191
provisions and processes” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). As some
experts note, with the literal wording of the articles silent on both the deployment of forces and collective defense, the obligation to assist each other in
case of armed attack or direct threat is open to interpretation (Finnegan,
2009). One such interpretation is that the obligation is not mutual: Japan
is not obligated to defend the US if the latter is attacked (Chanlett-Avery
et al., 2019, p. 50). In this context, the meaning of Washington’s regular
reaffirmations that Article 5 of the alliance treaty covers the Senkaku
Islands, claimed by China, is less than straightforward.
As noted by Kashin (2019), the same ambiguity applies to the most
advanced and powerful alliance – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The pivotal Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as
the Washington Treaty and considered a tight alliance treaty) does state
that “an armed attack against one or more of them [NATO member states]
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”
However, it does not spell out the mechanism of how the collective defense
right is activated and only states that the alliance parties “will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use
of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic
area” (Kashin, 2019).
From this standpoint, there is not much difference between the US–Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the North Atlantic Treaty,
on the one hand, and the China–Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness
and Friendly Cooperation signed in 2001, on the other. As shown in Chapter 3, Article 9 of the China–Russia treaty also requires the two parties
to cooperate to jointly eliminate an external threat or aggression. Taken
out of the context of actual strategic cooperation, the obligations outlined
in the China–Russia treaty do not look qualitatively different from those
outlined in the other two advanced alliance treaties. This is not to argue
that China–Russia alignment is on par with either NATO or the US–Japan
alliance but simply that it is actual military cooperation rather than treaty
norms that make for an alliance.
Viewed from this perspective, China–Russia alignment appears as constantly consolidating and deepening. The best way to define the condition
of China–Russia strategic cooperation is as one that is “on the verge of an
alliance” (Korolev, 2019). This condition means something more than the
mere fact that it is not yet a formal alliance in the conventional sense. It
also means that China–Russia cooperation is free from the limitations of
a formal alliance as an upper bar for the relationship. In the China–Russia
192 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
case, being “on the verge of an alliance” is a dynamic process of constant
modernization of the relationship without a clear identif ication of its
endpoint. Such cooperation can fall short of what is epitomized in “formal
alliance,” but it can also go beyond that level in certain aspects. The growing interdependence of arms production processes in the two countries,
explored in Chapter 3, deserves special attention in this regard because it
creates long-term interdependence at levels higher than in most informal
alignments and even some advanced alliances.
The consolidation of China–Russia strategic alignment is likely to
continue because it is driven by systemic factors rather than short-term
changes within the two countries. Explanations of China–Russia alignment
emphasizing the political leadership factor, such as good chemistry or mutual
understanding between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, or other unit-level
(domestic) factors related to Russia’s non-Western (i.e., not sufficiently
European) culture do not work. Russia was explicitly pro-Europe, and proWest more broadly, in its identity and orientation in the 1990s under Boris
Yeltsin. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, this did not significantly
impact the overall upward trend in China–Russia relations. Even President
Putin in the early 2000s was looking to the West, airing ideas unfathomable
in the current geopolitical context, such as Russia joining NATO and even
building a joint missile defense system with the United States.72 Yet again,
China–Russia strategic cooperation progressed consistently despite these
fluctuations in foreign policy.
The gradual consolidation of China–Russia strategic alignment is the
outcome of long-term structural transformations within the international
system as reflected in the balances of power, threat, and interests. As shown
in Chapter 4, the shrinkage of the power gap between China and the US, but
with the US remaining the most powerful country within the system, has
created a strong system-level dispositional pressure on China and Russia
to align with each other. At the same time, the converging perceptions
of external threats and interests between Beijing and Moscow since the
end of the Cold War have transformed this dispositional pressure into
actual policies of alignment. These are long term trends and are likely to
continue. It is possible to imagine a dramatic shift in the US’s foreign policy
or a hypothetical Soviet-style implosion that would paralyze the US’s (or
China’s) state capacity. However, at the time of writing, such dramatic
scenarios appear unlikely.
72 For more on pro-Western orientation of Putin in the early years of his presidency, see Hopf
(2013).
Conclusion
193
China–Russia cooperation is not without its problems. The most significant
hurdles to closer cooperation, explored in Chapter 5, are in the economic realm.
They are caused by the different models of economic development in China and
Russia and the resultant roles China’s and Russia’s economies play in the global
division of labor. The existing economic cooperation model with clearly delineated roles of a major exporter and a major purchaser of energy resources that
exists between China and Russia fails to generate a high growth rate in Russia
and has negative geopolitical implications from the standpoint of strengthening
alignment. However, as also shown in Chapter 5, both Beijing and Moscow
appear to have recognized the challenge as evidenced by deliberate attempts
to transform the pattern of economic cooperation. Starting from the 2010s, as
a result of decisions at the top level, multiple non-energy-related projects have
been initiated to diversify China–Russia economic cooperation. The growing
mutual recognition of the problem and the introduction of relevant measures
have helped to alleviate the economic problem and show, more broadly, that
domestic-level circumstances are amenable to policies aimed at creating more
favorable conditions for cooperation. The gradual removal of domestic-level
hurdles enhances the alignment’s resilience and longevity.
These attempts at fostering smoother cooperation are helped by how
Beijing behaves itself in its interactions with Russia. Unlike the Soviet
Union in the years of the China–Soviet alliance (1950-1979), China in its
interactions with post-Soviet Russia does not behave as an unequivocally
dominant “big brother.” The Soviet Union’s material help to China cannot be
underestimated. However, the Soviet–China alliance was unequal not only
in material terms but also in the explicit assignment to China the role of a
subordinate partner. Today’s China seems to be more careful not to make
the impression of a dominant partner, either economically or geopolitically.
Beijing consistently emphasizes the equal nature of China–Russia cooperation and keeps Moscow informed of its activities in Central Asia and other
parts of Russia’s immediate geopolitical environment.
The trajectory of China–Russia alignment is a continuous process of
strategic cooperation driven by long-term system-level transformations.
Understanding this is crucial for the assessment of the overall tendency of
power relations within the international system and has significant policy
implications, particularly for the US and its allies. Developing an increasingly
contentious relationship with both China and Russia is bound to fail and
will only push Moscow and Beijing closer towards each other. Nor will minor
adjustments of relations with either China or Russia, such as the temporary
“reset” of US–Russia relations after the Russia–Georgia war of 2008, help
Washington reverse the consolidation of China–Russia alignment.
194 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
Given the nature of China–Russia alignment, the only possible effective
response to it for the West, and Washington specifically, must be at the
systemic level. Simply reacting to China’s increasing capabilities or tackling
Russia’s growing assertiveness is not going to help. What is required is a new
version of the great triangle diplomacy accompanied by substantial changes
in Washington’s behavior, particularly towards Russia as the weakest side
of the US–China–Russia triangle. For example, the US could better utilize
the fact that it has no significant geopolitical disagreements with Russia
in the Indo-Pacific, in contrast to Europe. Moreover, India is a friend and
an important strategic partner of both Washington and Moscow – a factor
which, together with the common interest to benefit from Asian economic
growth, opens new avenues for US–Russia cooperation. The attempts of the
Trump administration to invite both Russia and India to join the 46th G7
summit in Camp David, although rejected and blocked by some US allies,
was a move in the right direction. Through substantive cooperation with
Russia in the Indo-Pacific, the US is likely to be able to slow down, if not
reverse, the consolidation of China–Russia alignment.
The alignment framework and the study of interstate strategic
cooperation
The analysis of the China–Russia case helps illustrate how a great power
relationship can start from a very low level and progress to a closer alignment and the stages it goes through and how. In cross-fertilization with the
existing theoretical knowledge about alliances, alignments, and strategic
partnerships, this analysis enables the development of an innovative ordinal
model of strategic alignment, offered in Chapter 2. The model helps to
answer such questions as to how to define and measure strategic alignments
between states and what stages alignment goes through before it becomes
an advanced strategic alignment. At the same time, the model is flexible
and can be used to assess strategic cooperation that goes deeper than what
is observed in conventional alliances.73
To better reflect the trajectory and degree of an alignment, the model
reflects a stadial process because the development of a functioning alignment takes time. Interstate strategic cooperation must pass an early and a
moderate stage before it moves into an advanced stage. To reflect this idea
73 For the point that what China and Russia have achieved in terms of strategic cooperation
might be even better than an alliance, see Blank (2020).
Conclusion
195
of the “life cycle” of an alignment, the developed model is ordinal, with some
indicators preceding the others. It consists of three sub-clusters – three
stages of alignment formation – measured by seven indicators. Early strategic
cooperation is covered by two indicators: confidence-building measure and
mechanisms of regular consultation. Moderate cooperation is measured by
two indicators: military-technical cooperation and joint military exercises.
The third, advanced stage of alignment comprises three indicators: integrated
military command, bases exchange, and common defense policy.74
The model is also designed to illustrate the actual working of an alignment, something that has come to fruition rather than the promises of
formal treaties, which are weak indicators of alignments because the link
between treaties and behavior is tenuous. By focusing on cooperation
that has materialized, the analysis follows the alignment literature which
states that a formal alliance treaty “merely adds formality and precision”
to alignment (Wilkins, 2012, p. 56), and that it is the actual behaviors that
are of major interest (Snyder, 1997, p. 123). Thus, by offering a set of criteria
gauging the early, moderate, and advanced stages of alignment development,
the model allows rigorous comparative assessment of various instances of
actual strategic cooperation in international relations – something that has
been missing in the literature so far.
As such, the model goes beyond the case of China–Russia alignment. It has
proved useful for understanding the relative depth and scale of the contemporary US–India alignment. In turn, the analysis of the US–India case has
helped to generalize the model, establish its validity, and identify directions
for its further refinement. Thus, in Chapter 6, the US–India alignment was
shown to display a clear upward trend, like the China–Russia alignment. At
the same time, the application of the model shows that US–India alignment
lags significantly behind China–Russia alignment on most indicators of
strategic cooperation. While, from the standpoint of the balance of power,
the rapid rise of China incentivizes US–India alignment, the perceptions of
the external threats associated with China in New Delhi are different from
those in Washington. India does not fully share the US’s concerns about the
new global order, allegedly promoted by China. When it comes to interests,
the US’s and India’s positions diverge further, with Washington trying to
contain China and India needing China for its economic development. The
model further helps identify and specify the areas where US–India alignment
is most significantly behind its China–Russia counterpart. Insufficient
infrastructure of bilateral consultations focusing on the technical issues
74 See Chapter 2 for the detailed examination of each indicator at each stage.
196 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
of arms procurements, the lack of technological interdependence and little
progress with co-development of arms, and less regular military exercises,
especially when involving air force and activities in distant geopolitical
regions, are the areas where US–India cooperation needs strengthening to be
on par with China–Russia alignment. The model also shows that US–India
alignment has failed to make significant strides into the advanced level of
alignment – another area where the two alignments differ.
At the same time, this comparative exercise suggests avenues for further
improvement of the model. It reveals that the breakdown of each stage of
alignment formation into a “low” and “high” level of cooperation, while
helpful in terms of outlining the overall trajectory, might need refinement
to identify the level of strategic cooperation with greater precision. Thus,
while the analysis of US–India alignment demonstrates that the level of
strategic cooperation it displays is below the level achieved by China and
Russia and, hence, cannot be ranked “high,” it cannot be ranked “low”
either. It is somewhere in between, and in Chapter 6 is termed “developing,”
indicating an upward trend and significant progress but lack of maturity
and comprehensiveness. Applying the model to more cases will help to
further hone it by introducing a more detailed breakdown into stages of
alignment or, perhaps, changing the order of some stages if more cases
reveal a different trajectory of alignment formation.
The model structures and systematizes information about the parameters
of strategic cooperation in a theory-grounded way and can be applied to
cases of both bilateral and multilateral strategic cooperation. Basrur and
Kutty (2021) have adopted the earlier version of the model to analyze cases
of bilateral (India–Japan), trilateral (India–Japan–US) and quadrilateral
(India–Japan–US–Australia) strategic cooperation. The next candidates for
the analysis could be other cases of strategic cooperation that are of pivotal
importance to international politics, either at the systemic level or regionally,
such as China–Pakistan and China–Cambodia alignments, Russia–India
and Russia–Vietnam comprehensive strategic partnerships, Japan–Australia
strategic cooperation and other cases across different regions that are of
consequence to how international politics will evolve in the 21st century.
The framework can also shed light on the depth and breadth of strategic
cooperation within multilateral formats, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and
other cases of multilateral strategic cooperation. Systematizing a sufficient
pool of data on the actual performance of these and other cases using the
suggested model could generate new empirical data that could help shed
new light on our understanding of the institutionalization, performance, and
Conclusion
197
reliability of alignments and alliances, which has so far been predominantly
based on the analysis of formal alliance treaties.75
References
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and the Republic of Korea. Washington, DC: Center for U.S. Korea Policy, Asia
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Leeds, B. A. (2018). The Alliance Treaty Obligation and Provisions Project (ATOP)
(Version 4.01.) [Data set]. http://www.atopdata.org/
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Snyder, G. H. (1997). Alliance politics. Cornell University Press.
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Review of International Studies, 38 (1), 53-76.
75 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the existing quantitative datasets on which multiple empirical
studies of alliances are based had been compiled based on formal alliance treaties. Both the Alliance
Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds, 2018) and The Correlates of War (COW)
dataset (Gibler, 2009) are based on formal alliance treaties, including defense pacts, non-aggression
treaties, and ententes and do not pay attention to the actual performance of those alliances.
Index
alignment
and formal alliance treaty 37-41, 158,
158n56, 190, 195, 197, 197n75, 19n4
incentives for the formation of 42, 48-55,
99-120
stadial approach to 26, 36, 37, 42, 90
the concept of 19-22, 23, 23n7, 42
the ordinal index of 41-48, 42
alliance
and China-Russia relations 14-16, 17-18,
24, 25
the concept of 19-21, 35-36, 37-40
alliance treaty
as an indicator of alignment 37-40
in China-Russia relations 66-67
area studies 22
and China-Russia relations 16-19
balance of interests
as a factor of alignment formation 26, 27,
49, 53-55
in China-Russia relations 115-120
balance of power
as a factor of alignment formation 26, 27,
49-51, 54-55
to Goldilocks logic of 50-51
in China-Russia relations 100-107
balance of threat
as a factor of alignment formation 26, 27,
49, 51-53, 54
in China-Russia relations 108-115
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 142, 143, 144, 151,
174, 175
Bush, George W. 105, 109, 160
Central Asia 68, 84, 85, 113, 141, 142, 144, 150,
179, 193
China-Russia border 44, 67, 68, 69, 133, 146
China-Russia trade 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 137,
138, 145, 146, 147
diversification of 142-147, 193
China threat
the theory of 114
in China-Russia relations 114-115
in US-India relations 174, 175
Clinton, Hillary 104, 105, 149
colour revolutions 83, 108, 112
confidence-building measures
as an indicator of alignment 42, 43-44
in China-Russia relations 67-69
in US-India relations 160-161
diplomatic cooperation
as a robustness check 23, 27, 28, 40, 56, 58
in China-Russia relations 147-151
in US-India relations 180-181
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) 105, 142,
144, 151
early warning radar system 88-89, 90, 182
economic cooperation
as a robustness check 56-58
in China-Russia relations 129, 130, 132, 133,
134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144,
145, 147, 151, 193
in US-India relations 180
Georgia 21, 105-106, 111, 142, 193
Hu Jintao 110, 111
interoperability
and alignment formation 36, 46, 47, 86
in China-Russia relations 25, 73, 84, 85,
87-88, 90, 107
in US-India relations 168, 169, 171
Lavrov, Sergei 80, 135, 144, 179
Medvedev, Dmitri 106, 110, 117, 140, 141
military spending 100-101
military-technical cooperation
as an indicator of alignment 42, 45-46, 73,
195
in China-Russia relations 73-83, 133, 139, 190
in US-India relations 164-167
Modi, Narendra 159, 160, 168, 174, 176, 177, 178
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
84, 105, 108, 111, 113, 191, 192
Obama, Barack 110, 159, 161, 168, 174, 179
Pakistan 70, 171, 175, 177, 179, 183
Putin, Vladimir 14, 66, 70, 71, 72, 75, 79, 88, 106,
109, 114, 116, 117, 120, 133, 134, 135, 141, 144,
146, 147, 150, 151, 192
regional security complex (RSC) 103, 105
regular consultations
as an indicator of alignment 27, 42, 44-45,
in China-Russia relations 67, 69-73, 90, 113
in US-India relations 162-164, 167, 172, 183,
195
regular military exercises
as an indicator of alignment 27, 42, 46-47,
73, 195
in China-Russia relations 73, 83-86, 87, 89,
90, 182, 183
in US-India relations 158, 164, 167-171, 182,
183, 196
200 China–Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics
South China Sea 72, 77, 84, 87, 103, 142, 168, 169,
174, 176, 177
strategic partnership
in the China-Russia relations discourse 14,
17, 20, 75
in conceptualization of alignment 21, 23,
35, 36, 46
theory
and the studies of China-Russia relations
13, 15-16, 18-19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 29, 37
of alignment formation 19-21, 42-48, 48-58
Third Offset Strategy 110-111, 111-112
Trump, Donald 159, 161, 179, 194
Ukraine Crisis 14, 17, 21n5, 77, 80, 84, 101, 105,
106, 111, 112, 130, 132, 134, 138, 142, 169, 179, 190
unequal interdependence 130, 131-132
unfavorable complementarity 130-132, 135, 137
strategic implications of 138-142
attempts to reverse 142-147
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 28,
58, 129, 148, 149, 150
United States
as a driver of China-Russia strategic
alignment 99-120
the relative decline of 15, 100-103, 106
and China 103-105, 106-107, 110-111
and Russia 105-106, 107, 111-113
US-India alignment 24, 28, 157-158, 159n57, 160,
163, 164, 173, 180, 181, 182-183, 189, 195, 196
Xi Jinping 14, 71, 72, 79, 84, 117, 120, 134, 135, 144,
147, 151, 192
Yeltsin, Boris 68, 69, 70, 116, 141, 192