Equalization of Regional Development in Socialist Countries: An Empirical Study Author(s): I. S. Koropeckyj Source: Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Oct., 1972), pp. 68-86 Published by: University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1152905 Accessed: 08-02-2016 17:45 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1152905?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic Development and Cultural Change. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Equalizationof Regional Developmentin Socialist Countries:An EmpiricalStudy* I. S. Koropeckyj Temple University The equality of economic development among geographic regions, regardless of how defined, is an important goal in any country's economic policy. This is particularly true under socialism for the following three reasons. First, according to Socialist ideology, this system can be introduced only in a country that is economically well developed. It follows that all regions of such a country must be equally advanced; otherwise it becomes illogical for some more advanced regions to be Socialist while less developed regions are not. Second, one of the main characteristics of socialism is egalitarianism; therefore all citizens, no matter in which region they reside, should be assured equal opportunity for a higher standard of living and for social advancement. Third, the Socialists believe that in a multinational state, in which various nationalities inhabit their own ethnic territories, the economic equality of these regions is a precondition for achieving political, social, and cultural equality.1 Furthermore, Socialists claim that regional equality can be achieved only under socialism. In simplest terms, this goal of equality will be advanced when the backward regions grow at a faster rate than do the more developed regions. The growth of underdeveloped regions depends on many variables, such as construction of new enterprises, provision of social overhead, urbanization, and population migration. In order that these factors become effective, they should be introduced on a large scale and at the same time. The massive deployment of resources and simultaneous decision making, according to this line of thinking, are possible only under socialism, in which the state is the owner of material resources and in which more or less centralized planning and management of the national economy exist. In contrast, Socialists are convinced, the market forces in capitalist economies are too weak and too slow to obtain results comparable with those under socialism. * I wish to thank my son Roman for his assistance with calculations. 1 For further discussion of this problem, see my "Industrial Location Policy in the U.S.S.R. during the Postwar Period," pt. 1, in Joint Economic Committee, Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970). 68 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj The goal of regional equality, however, clashes with another very important goal of Socialist countries: the maximization of the growth rate for the entire national economy over some foreseeable future. Under socialism, full employment exists by definition; therefore, assuming that the saving rate has been determined, the growth rate can be increased if the resources are transferred from sectors with lower productivity to sectors with higher productivity-for example, from agriculture to industry. Also, the new resources-the entries in labor force and investment -should be allocated to the high-productivity sectors. Since the productivity of resources employed in the same sectors depends considerably on the location of enterprises, the maximization of growth rate will be assured when the favored sectors are developed predominantly in regions in which the productivity is higher than in the rest of the country. Such regions are most often more advanced regions. In view of the relatively low mobility of the population, those regions which are more developed and in which the faster growing sectors are concentrated will advance faster-for example, in terms of income per capita-than the remaining regions. The intent of this paper is to examine empirically the record of Socialist countries in regard to the equalization of regional development. In this group will be included only the Socialist countries of East Central Europe (including, obviously, the Soviet Union). The emphasis will be on the period since World War II. It is generally accepted that the most appropriate indicator of the level of economic development of a nation or a region is national income per capita. Were such data available for the regions of Socialist countries, it would be possible to determine the degree of interregional inequality as well as the changes which have taken place under the Socialist system in these countries and to compare them with market economies. In such a way, an explicit supplement to the pioneering article by J. G. Williamson could be made.2 There are, however, certain difficulties encountered in undertaking this task. The Socialist countries estimate the national income for individual regions, using as a rule the production method. Since they are following the Marxist approach, this estimate includes only the net value added in material production branches3 and excludes the net value added in service and government sectors.4 Thus it is appropriate to refer 2 J. G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of the Pattern," Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 13, no. 4, pt. 2 (July 1965). freight transportation, the production3 Industry, agriculture, construction, serving communication, trade and public catering, material and technical supply, procurements, and others. 4 The other important difference between Western and Marxist concepts of national income lies in showing the returns to factors of production. The latter shows explicitly only the return to labor and considers the return to other factors of production as a surplus created by labor for the society, which is then appropriated and redistributed by the state. 69 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange to this concept as the net material product (NMP).5 The use of NMP imparts a downward bias on interregional differences in terms of national income because tertiary industries are usually much better developed in rich, urbanized regions than in underdeveloped regions. This makes rather difficult the comparison of Socialist with Western countries, which, of course, include the service and government sectors in national income estimates for their regions. But the real obstacle is the fact that only a few of the Socialist countries estimate the NMP by regions." The best in this regard is Yugoslavia, which has provided this information since 1953 in sufficient detail for its eight subdivisions. In addition, Yugoslavia calculates the NMP for its basic political units, the communes. The USSR has calculated since 1956, but published only since 1958, the NMP for its fifteen union republics. The absolute data are, however, available only for the entire country and for a few of the most important republics; for all of them, only the annual growth rates are published. The NMP has recently been published for the two constituent republics of Czechoslovakia for the period up to 1960, but not for its eleven microregions. Finally, a recent study provides the percentage distribution of the NMP by seventeen administrative units in Poland for 1961, 1965, and 1967. In view of these difficulties,this paper has a more limited objective: to investigate interregionalinequality in terms of industrialization in Socialist countries. The degree of industrialization can be best presented with the help of net industrial output per capita.' Unfortunately, the net industrial output data are available only for eight subdivisions of Yugoslavia since 1953and two constituent republicsof Czechoslovakia since 1960. The gross output of industry-which suffersfrom such well-known deficiencies as the influence of the changes in vertical integration and in contributions from other sectors-are published for regions in East Germany, Poland, and can be fairly reliably estimated for the USSR. Hungary publishes only the index of gross industrial output since 1965 and Czechoslovakia (for its eleven subdivisions) since 1967. Bulgaria and Romania do not publish any information on the industrialoutput by their regions. However, 5 As developed in Socialist countries, the national income for the entire country and for individual regions can be estimated according to the production, distribution, and final use methods. The national estimates based on these three methods must be by definition the same. For an individual region, however, these three estimates will deviate from the national income (still Marxist definition) actually created in this region and among themselves because of existing price structure, the method of distribution among all regions of total surplus value initially collected by the state, the budgetary relations between the state and regions, and by the difference between income earned and spent in individual regions. For the discussion of these problems in regard to the USSR, see S. Sitarian, Natsional'nyi dokhod soiuznykh respublik (Moscow, 1961); 0. O. Nesterenko et al., eds., Natsional'nyi dokhod Ukrains'koi RSR v period rozhornutoho budivnytstva komunizmu (Kiev, 1963). 6 See Appendix. manufacturing, 7 In Socialist countries the statistics on industry comprise mining, electric power generation, and fishing. 70 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj all these countries publish industrial employment data by regions for various postwar years. When related to the population, these data can be used as indicators of the degree of industrialization by regions. Obviously, the employment data are not the perfect substitute for the output data; the indexes of employment will differ from output indexes if the regions differ not only in regard to the net output but also in regard to the change of industrial structure and the changes of resource productivity. The regional data on industrial employment might, of course, be of interest per se, or they might serve as a good substitute for determination of the industrialization levels by regions. But in the case of Socialist countries, these data can be used as a good indicator of regional economic development in general. The economic development in these countries (following the example of the USSR) has meant first of all the rapid development of industry, primarily of its heavy branches,8 a development which could have been achieved basically through the transfer of labor marginally employed in agricultureto industry.9This close direct relationship between the NMP per capita and the gross industrial output per capita and between the NMP per capita and the industrial employment per 10,000 population by regions is uniformly confirmed by the high coefficients of correlation of cross-section data for three countries for which the necessary data are available (table 1). The coefficient of correlation for the growth rates of these variables, as can be seen in this table, TABLE 1 COEFFICIENTSOF CORRELATIONBETWEENNET MATERIAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA AND INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT PER CAPITA AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENTPER 10,000 POPULATION BY REGIONS IN SELECTEDCOUNTRIES AND FOR SELECTEDYEARS Country and Years Poland: 1960 ............... 1968 ............... Rates of growth ..... USSR: 1958 ............... 1968 ............... Rates of growth ..... Yugoslavia: 1953 ............... 1967 ............... Rates of growth . . . . . Industrial Industrial Output Employment .948 .939 .539 .916 .875 .219 .898 .959 .950 .891 .951 .757 .935 .976 .703 .970 .988 .645 SOURCE.-See Appendix. NOTE.-The NMP data for Poland are for the years 1961 and 1967. 8 John P. Hardt, "East European Economic Development: Two Decades of Interrelationships and Interactions with the Soviet Union," in Joint Economic Committee, Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1970), p. 10. 9 Andrew Elias, "Magnitude and Distribution of the Labor Force in Eastern Europe," in Joint Economic Committee, pp. 156 ff. 71 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange varies, however. It remains high for the USSR, but is lower for Yugoslavia and still lower for Poland. The divergence between growth rates of industrial output and the NMP per capita by regions in Yugoslavia and Poland can be partially explained by the fact that, among all Socialist countries, agriculture grew at the fastest rate in these two countries.10 As a result, the growth of NMP was relativelyless dependent on the growth of industrial output than it was in other Socialist countries. Nevertheless, it seems that in view of the foregoing, the assumption can be made that the regional data on industrial employment are representative of the regional level of industrializationand of economic development in general. The subsequent analysis of interregional inequality and the changes in this inequality will rest on these data. As a measure of regional inequality, the weighted coefficient of variation will be used following the example of Williamson."1The coefficient shows by what percentage on the average all regions deviate in terms of the variable under consideration from the average value of this variable for the entire country. The higher (lower) the value of this coefficient, the larger (smaller) the degree of regional inequality. It is possible that this coefficient might decrease over time while the relative difference between the highest and lowest values might increase, and vice versa. Its disadvantage is that, being based on the squared differences between the value of the variable for each individual region and the national value, the coefficient might be pulled upward when a few extreme deviations are present. Table 2 presents such coefficientsfor the countries under investigation. They were calculated for all of them for industrial employment per 10,000 population; for the NMP per capita; and for industrial output per capita, whenever the necessarydata were available. In order to observe the changes over time, the coefficients are given for the earliest and for the most recent years for which the data could be found. The calculations refer to the highest administrative subdivisions whose names are listed in the Appendix. The subdivisions for all countries, except the USSR and Yugoslavia, have the nature of microregions, that is, they have been created in order to facilitate the country's administration. Since the statistical service has been organized on their basis, these regions became de facto economic regions also, in view of the fact that the planning and management of the 10 Gregor Lazarcik, "Growth of Output, Expenses, and Gross and Net Product in East European Agriculture," in Joint Economic Committee, p. 481. 11 Williamson, p. 11. The coefficient of variation was calculated according to the following formula: '/ •(Yi -- Y)I(fln) where fi = population of the ith region, n = national population, yi = net material product (industrial output) per capita or industrial employment per 10,000 population of the ith region, and Ti= net material product (industrial output) per capita or industrial employment per 10,000 population for the entire country. 72 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj national economy is decentralized-or is supposed to be decentralizedto their level. The eight subdivisions of Yugoslavia are based on ethnic and historical principles and hence they differ considerably among themselves in size of area, population, and economic potential. Czechoslovakia, in addition to being subdivided into eleven microregions, is most often analyzed in the literature in terms of ethnic subdivision into Czech and Slovak republics. In the case of the USSR, two subdivisions are used in table 2; one refers to the union republics which, being organized according to the ethnic principle, differ widely among themselves in all respects. In the second subdivision, the largest two republics are subdivided into economic regions-the Russian SFSR into ten and the Ukraine into three-and these thirteen regions with the remaining thirteen republics combined, represent a less diverse distribution. But still the latter is a distribution of macroregions, in contrast to the distributions of microregions for all TABLE 2 COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION FOR NET MATERIAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA, OUTPUT PER CAPITA, AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT PER 10,000 SOCIALIST COUNTRIES Country and Number of Subdivisions INDUSTRIAL POPULATION IN FOR SELECTED YEARS Industrial Industrial Output Employment Years NMP 1957 1968 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. .523 .313 1961 1968 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. .322 .278 1955 1968 N.A. N.A. .308 .224 .364 .312 Bulgaria: 27 ................. 27.................. Czechoslovakia: 11 .................. 11 .................. East Germany: 15 .................. 15 .................. Hungary: 20 .................. 20 .................. Poland: 17 .................. 17 .................. 1963 1968 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. .712 .500 1950 1960 .931 .504 .805 .512 17 .................. 1968 N.A. .190 (1961) .179 (1967) .377 .403 Romania: 16 .................. 16 .................. USSR: 1959 1968 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. .475 .386 15 .................. 15 .................. 15 .................. 1950 1958 1968 N.A. .146 .203 .277 .221 .257 26 .................. 26 .................. 1958 1968 N.A. N.A. .402 .361 .306 .276 .274 N.A. .357 (1965) Yugoslavia: 8 ................... 8 ................... 1953 1967 .302 .376 .623 .463 .423 .355 SOURCES.-SeeAppendix. NOTES.-SeeAppendix. N.A. = not available. 73 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange other analyzed countries, except, of course, Yugoslavia. A further disaggregation of the USSR in terms of population is possible to the lower administrative level-autonomous republics, territories, provinces, and national districts. However, the data that can give any indication of the economic development of these subdivisions are limited to the percentage of urbanites in the total population; and the level of urbanization is considered, particularly in the USSR, an important indicator of industrialization and economic development in general.12 Calculated on this basis, the cofficient of variation showed a decrease from .400 to .321 between 1959 and 1970;13 this is consistent, as will be shown below, with the behavior of three variables for most of the countries under analysis. As can be seen from the table, the coefficient of variation for industrial employment declined in all cases. As a result, this coefficient in recent years was around the .300s for most countries, being higher only for Hungary and Poland. The coefficient for industrial output per capita, wherever available, was in magnitude and behavior similar to that for industrial employment. The coefficient for the NMP per capita in all three cases was lower than the coefficient for the other two variables, and in the cases of the USSR and Yugoslavia it increased between the benchmark years. While the reasons for regional differences in economic development and the theory and practice of eliminating them (under socialism in general and in the specific countries in particular) are outside the scope of this article, only the systematic relationship between regional inequality and its most obvious factors will be empirically investigated here. One such factor is the level of economic development. It has been theoretically shown and empirically proven on the basis of cross-section and time series data that the relationship between the level of economic development of a country and the interregional inequality within it resembles an inverted "U."'14 In other words, interregional inequality is smaller in both mature and backward countries than in countries at an intermediate level of economic development. The increasing inequality of developing countries can be attributed to the migration of labor, primarily of skilled labor, to capital flow from the relatively less developed to the growing regions, to existing external economies in the latter, and to government policies. On the other hand, the reasons for the decrease in this inequality in more mature countries include mainly greaterpurchases of raw materials 12 Cf. Ia. G. Feigin, ed., Zakonomernosti i faktory razvitia ekonomicheskikh raionovS.S.S.R. (Moscow, 1965), pp. 162 ff. 13 See Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Narodnoe khoziaistvo S.S.S.R. v 1959 g. (Moscow, 1960), pp. 27-33; Pravda,April 19, 1970. The data are from the two postwar censuses and refer to 162 and 163 subdivisions, respectively. 14 Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Under-Developed Regions (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1957),chaps. 3-5; Albert O. Hirschman,TheStrategyof Economic Development(New Haven, Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1958),chap. 10; Williamson, n. 2 above. 74 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj and agricultural products by advanced regions from underdeveloped regions; increases in productivity in underdeveloped regions as a result of migration; and, most important, growth-promotinggovernment policies. The data in table 3 should prove helpful in answering this question. Column 1 shows the relative GNP per capita by countries in descending order, Czechoslovakia being the highest.15 These estimates are for the year 1955, but the ranking has remained unchanged in more recent years, though the range of variation decreased somewhat.16 According to these data, the countries can be divided into three groups. The most developed group includes Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Calculation of one source places their incomes approximately at the level of some West European countries.17Thus, by inference, these countries can be included TABLE 3 OF VARIATIONOF INDEX OF GROSSNATIONALPRODUCTPER CAPITA, COEFFICIENT FOR MOST RECENT YEAR, AND RATE OF CHANGE IN INDUSTRIALEMPLOYMENT YEARS BENCHMARK BETWEEN COEFFICIENT Country Czechoslovakia............ East Germany ............ USSR .................... Hungary ................. Poland ................... Romania ................. Bulgaria ................. Yugoslavia ............... Index of GNP (CSSR = 100) (1) 100 100 Coefficientof Variation (2) .278 .312 Rate of Change in Coefficient (3) - 2.12 -1.20 76 72 65 .274 (.357) .500 .403 -0.61 -7.33 -3.92 47 44 38 .386 .313 .355 -2.33 -4.78 - 1.26 SOURCES.-Col. 1, Pryor and Staller, p. 2, table 1; cols. 2 and 3, table 2. NOTE.-For the USSR the coefficients are presented for the distributions by union republics and, in parentheses, by union republics and economic regions combined. 15 Frederic L. Pryor and George J. Staller, "The Dollar Values of the Gross National Products in Eastern Europe 1955," Economics of Planning 6, no. 1 (1966): 2. Although in 1955 Czechoslovakia and East Germany had equal GNP per capita, in the succeeding years the position of the latter deteriorated relative to the former. 16 There are also available estimates of GNP per capita for these countries by Everett E. Hagen and Oli Hawrylyshyn, "Analysis of World Income and Growth, 1955-1965," Economic Development and Cultural Change 18, pt. 2 (October 1969): 41, tables 8A and 8B, for 1960 and 1965. The estimates for six countries, without the USSR and Yugoslavia, are given by Maurice Ernst, "Postwar Economic Growth in EasternEurope (A Comparisonwith WesternEurope),"in Joint Economic Commit- tee, New Directions in the Soviet Economy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 877, table 1, for 1964; and Thad P. Alton, "Economic Structure and Growth in Eastern Europe," in Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe, p. 49, table 4, for 1967. The ranking of these countries in all these years is the same as in 1955, with only one exception: In 1960, 1964, and 1965 Bulgaria and Romania reversed their positions. were at about the same level as 17 In 1960 Czechoslovakia and East Germany such well-developed countries of Western Europe as Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. The position of Czechoslovakia and East Germany deteriorated in regard to the enumerated countries in 1965, and in that year their GNP per capita was approximately in the same range as that of the Netherlands, Austria, or Italy (see Hagen and Hawrylyshyn, pp. 34, 36, 41). 75 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange in group 2 of Kuznets's well-known classification of countries by level of economic development.18 In group 3, Kuznets lists only the USSR, but Hungary and Poland can be included in this group as well, because their GNPs per capita, as shown in table 3, do not differ much from that for the USSR. Finally, the least developed countries are Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, and consequently they belong to Kuznets's group 5. Column 2 of this table shows the coefficient of variation for industrial employment for the most recent year. According to the previously outlined hypothesis, one should expect the coefficient to be lower in the top and the bottom groups and higher in the intermediate group. The table shows that this is, in general, indeed true. One exception is the USSR. This country rightly belongs to the intermediate group in terms of economic development, but its coefficient for the distribution of union republics is lowest among all analyzed countries. The deviation of the USSR from the hypothesis advanced here is much less pronounced when the coefficient for the distribution of union republics and economic regions (.357) is used. The hypothesis of inverted "U" will be made more credible in the table if the USSR is included in the top group. But even without this shift, the hypothesis looks valid in view of the fact that the number of observations is only eight, and one should not expect to get the normal distribution in any respect in such a case. In his article, Williamson has shown the relationship, also on the basis of time-series data, between the level of economic development and interregional inequality. In other words, there is a tendency for mature countries to decrease this inequality, while countries in the initial stage of economic growth tend to increase it. Is this also true for Socialist countries? Table 2 shows that all of them decreasedtheir interregionalinequality in terms of industrial employment between the initial and terminal years, irrespective of their levels of economic development. Yet the coefficient of variation decreased quite differentlyfor individual countries. A measure of this decrease, the average annual rate of decrease, is given in column 3 of table 3. If the tendency established by Williamson for free-market economies were true also for Socialist countries, the rate of decrease should be directly proportional to the relative level of economic development. However, such a relationship is not observed at all.19 On the other hand, one can observe in column 3 a tendency which can also be represented by an inverted "U": The rate of decrease in the interregional inequality was lower in the top and bottom groups, with the exception of Bulgaria in the latter, and higher in the intermediate group, again with the exception of the USSR. One plausible explanation for the 18 Simon Kuznets, "QuantitativeAspects of the Economic Growth of Nations: Level and Variability of Rates of Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change5 (October 1956): 17, table 4. 19 r is equal to .123. 76 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj low decrease of coefficient among relatively more developed countries could be the fact that the inequality among their regions is already low and the possibility for further leveling out is limited. In the case of the relatively underdeveloped nations, the low rate of decrease in coefficient could possibly indicate the planners' preference for the maximization of growth rate for the entire country at the cost of equalization of interregional inequality, and these two objectives, of course, are often contradictory.20 Thus the possibility and preference to achieve the decrease in interregional inequality seems to be present in the countries of the intermediate group. In addition to the level of economic development and, obviously, to the explicit commitment on the part of the state to regional equalization, a hypothesis can be advanced that some other factors under socialism may have had systematic influence on the attainment of this goal. Three such factors can be quantitatively investigated: 1. Industrialization means bringing into the production process some previously unemployed or underemployed resources, human as well as natural, that are spread throughout the country. Often these resources cannot be easily moved, or moved at all. Therefore, the greater the growth rate of industry, the more industrialization spreads spatially and causes interregional differences to decrease. 2. Soviet-type industrialization places special attention on the growth of heavy industry. Since heavy-industry branches, which include mining and primary processing of raw materials, among others, are obviously more location bound than consumer industries, such an industrialization approach consequently should show relatively faster growth of those regions in which conditions for these branches are present. It might be expected, therefore, that the higher the growth of heavy industry, the lower the decrease in interregional inequality. 3. The productivity of resources and the growth of this productivity usually vary among individual regions of a country. In order to maximize the growth for the entire country, the resources should be allocated to the regions in which the resource productivity grows fastest, with the obvious consequence of increased interregional inequality, at least in the intermediate future. Thus, the inverse relationship between the growth of resource productivity and the decrease in regional inequality can exist. However, no systematic relationship among these three factors, considered as independent variables, and the decrease in coefficient of variation for industrial employment, as a dependent variable, can be 20 This can be seen on the example of investmentpolicy in Romania. According to John Michael Montias, "The investmentprogramin Rumaniaalso gives expression to the systematicpolicy of building plants on the basis of the latest world technology, no matter how capital-intensiveit happens to be. This policy conflicts with the aim of providing as many peasants as possible with job opportunities in the cities, an aim that apparentlyfits on a lower rung of the planners' priority scale" (Economic Development in Communist Rumania [Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967], p. 232). The implication of such a policy to interregionalinequality is obvious. 77 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange empirically proved for the countries under consideration. In the first two cases the coefficient of correlation is statistically insignificant, while in the third case it is too low to be convincing.21 There remains one more problem to be considered, namely, whether there is any relationship between the decrease in economic differences among regions and the fact that these regions are inhabited by different nationalities. The problem is important, because, as was stated earlier, Marxists believe that the attainment of political and cultural equality among concerned nationalities is contingent on the attainment of economic equality. Perhaps more important, in multinational countries there is a strong pressure by nationalities living in underdeveloped regions for growth-promoting assistance from the federal government. Economically disadvantaged nationalities believe that the federal government, under socialism, is in an excellent position to provide such assistance because of public ownership of means of production and because of the central planning. The attitude of the advanced regions in this respect is ambivalent. On the one hand, they would like to get rid of the burden of subsidizing via the federal budget a minimum standard of living, mainly in the form of collective services, in the underdeveloped regions; but, on the other hand, they are reluctant to supply the substantial investment funds needed for the big push in underdeveloped regions. Without this help from the advanced regions, a sustained growth in the underdeveloped regions, with eventual ability to support themselves, is unthinkable. Still, in sum, one would expect the tendency toward regional equalization to be stronger in multinational states than in an ethnically homogenous country. In most countries under consideration there are national minorities, but in only three of them-the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakiado the various nationalities live compactly on their ethnic lands, with, moreover, administrative subdivisions based on ethnic and historical considerations.22 Figures in tables 2 and 3 show a rather mixed trend in 21 r is equal for: (1) growth rate of industry to .208; (2) growth rate of heavyindustry branches to .098; and (3) growth of labor productivity to .535. The data for all countries except the USSR for the period between 1950 and 1968: (1) from Laszlo Czirjak, "Industrial Structure, Growth, and Productivity in Eastern Europe," in Economic Developments in Countries of Eastern Europe, p. 437, table 3; and for the USSR between 1950 and 1965 from James H. Noren, "Soviet Industry Trends in Output, Inputs, and Productivity," in New Directions in the Soviet Economy, p. 281; (2) between 1948 and 1967 from Czirjak, p. 447, table 9, and for the USSR 1950-65 calculated from Noren, p. 280, table 1; (3) 1950-67 from Czirjak, p. 438, table 6, and for the USSR between 1950 and 1965 from Noren, p. 282, table 2. 22 Also, in Romania the Hungarians represent an important minority, primarily in Transylvania. According to the census of March 15, 1966, they accounted for 8.4 percent of the total population (Scinteia, September 18, 1966). Until 1966 a substantial part of the territories inhabited by Hungarians was organized into the Hungarian Autonomous Region. The reform of that year changed the division of the country from sixteen to forty regions, and the Hungarian Autonomous Region has been divided into Covas and Harghita regions. In addition, the Hungarians constitute significant minorities in the following regions: Bihor (32.9) percent, see 78 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj respect to the regional equalization in these countries. On the one hand, in terms of industrial employment there was a slight decrease in the coefficient in all three of them between the benchmark years. It is not surprising, because of the low level of their coefficients, that it is difficult to expect any strong decreasing tendency. The decline in the coefficient is also observed in terms of industrial output per capita for the USSR and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the interregional inequality in terms of the NMP per capita rose for these two countries. In view of the inherent importance of this problem, it is worthwhile to take a look at these three countries separately. The number of nationalities living on their ethnic territoriesis perhaps larger in the USSR than in any other country of the world. Statistical data that can give a picture (although one far from adequate) of relative economic development of individual nationalities are available chiefly for fifteen union republics. Since this breakdown is too aggregative, it conceals many important divergencies among nationalities which are constituent parts of union republics. This is primarily true of the largest among them-the Russian SFSR. As table 2 shows, there was a slight decrease in the coefficients of variation for industrial output and industrial employment for the union republics in 1958 as compared with 1950. This trend was reversed afterward, when the coefficient for industrial output had been rising and that for industrial employment had remained almost without change through the 1960s (table 4). The NMP per capita indicates TABLE 4 OF VARIATION FORNET MATERIAL PRODUCTPERCAPITA, COEFFICIENTS PER INDUSTRIALOUTPUTPER CAPITA,AND INDUSTRIALEMPLOYMENT 10,000 POPULATIONFOR UNION REPUBLICSOF THE USSR BETWEEN 1958 AND 1968 1958 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Year NMP Industrial Output ........... ............ ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... .146 .156 N.A. N.A. .181 .194 .189 .172 .187 .203 .221 .233 .231 .255 .248 .229 .244 .248 .250 .257 Industrial Employment .276 .290 .277 .282 .271 .282 .277 .276 .277 .274 SOURCEs.-NMP and industrial output, see Appendix; employment, TsSU, Trud v SSSR (Moscow, 1968), pp. 43-71; population, various issues of TsSU, Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. NOTE.-N.A. = not available. Revista de Statisticd, 1968, no. 8, p. 72); Bragov; Maramureq; and Satu-Mare. In terms of industrial employment per 10,000 population, the industrial development of these regions is by and large at the nationwide level. (I wish to thank Dr. George Pall for this information, and to express appreciation to him and his colleagues of the Resealch Project on National Income in East Central Europe, Columbia University, for aid with statistics of some of the countries under consideration.) 79 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange growing disparity among republics for this latter period also.23 This reversal is remarkable because it took place during the period of decentralization of planning and management of Soviet industry which lasted from 1957 to 1965. In any case, these fluctuating developments throughout the postwar period certainly do not prove the continuous determination of Soviet planners to equalize the levels of economic development among fifteen national republics, although this objective and its alleged successes are constantly publicized by Soviet propaganda. This is not to deny that in absolute terms the progress of some underdeveloped republics was significant; however, it was not strong enough to improve their position relative to that of more advanced republics in per capita terms. The faster population growth in the former was partly the reason for this phenomenon.24 On the other hand, there is a definite trend observable toward the reducing of interregional inequality within the largest Soviet republic, the Russian SFSR, which accounts for more than one-half of the country's population and almost two-thirds of the national income and total industrial output. The coefficient of variation of industrial output per capita declined for ten regions of this republic from .523 in 1940 to .354 in 1958 and .234 in 1968.25 This strong decline, and also the decline in the divergence among three regions of the Ukraine, were responsible for the reduction of this coefficient when it is calculated for these thirteen regions and the remaining thirteen republics combined (table 2). I have argued elsewhere that the principal reason for the lack of equalization trend among union republics and for the existing trend toward equalization among the regions of the RSFSR is the preoccupation of Soviet leaders with defense considerations in locating industry.26 This objective is of such paramount importance in the USSR that both the economic objective-the maximization of national income for the entire country-and the ideological-political objective-the equalization of development level among republics-are subordinated to it. It was mainly the defense consideration that was responsible for the shift in the 1930s of the gravity center of Soviet industry from the western industrial centers 23 According to one calculation, this coefficient increased 37.2 percent between 1958 and 1965 (see V. Zlatin and V. Rutgaizer, "Comparison of the Levels of Economic Development of Union Republics and Large Regions," Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly-ekonomicheskie nauki, no. 8 [1968], translated in Problems of Eco- nomics 12 [June 1969]: 12, table 1). 24 The CentralAsian republics,Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia,Tadjikistan, and Turkmenia, which are among the least developed in the USSR, showed an increase in the total population of more than 40 percent between the censuses of 1959 and 1970, while the average for the country was 16 percent (see Pravda,April 19, 1970, p. 1). 25 Sources the same as for the USSR in table 2. 26 See my Location Problems in Soviet Industry before World War II: The Case of the Ukraine(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), chap. 5; and my contribution in Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union, pt. 3. 80 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj near Moscow, Leningrad, and Donbas to the Asiatic parts of the RSFSR: the Eastern Urals and Western Siberia. This shift obviously continued during the war, when the European parts of the country were occupied or were too close to the front lines. Finally, this trend has been intensified since the middle of the 1950s, in view of the threat from China. Primarily in view of this geopolitical consideration, the economic buildup of Eastern Siberia and the Far Eastern regions of the RSFSR and the resulting decrease in interregional differences of this republic can be understood.27 The acuteness of the nationality problem in Yugoslavia needs no elaboration here.28The differences of economic development among such developed republics as Slovenia or Croatia, on the one hand, and the officially designated underdeveloped republics of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and the autonomous republic of KosovoMetohija, on the other hand, are truly great. On the satisfactory elimination of these interregional economic inequalities perhaps depends the survival of Yugoslavia as a state. However, the achievement of this goal has been counterbalanced by the simple economic fact of life, namely, that resources are usually more productive and, moreover, that their productivity grows faster in developed than in underdeveloped regions. And resources flow in the direction of the developed regions, even if that is contrary to the political requirements. As a result, there has been very little, if any, progress toward the solution of inequality problems in Yugoslavia.29 The situation is aggravated by the fact that population growth is higher in underdeveloped than developed regions.30 In order to achieve the goal of regional equality, the Yugoslav leadership had to devise the appropriate policies and to adjust them to changing conditions. Specifically, the period of the 1950s was characterized by the decentralization of economic decision making to the level of the lowest administrative unit-the commune. Still, the federal government retained responsibility for the targets of nationwide importance; in order to meet them, allocation of investable funds to more developed regions was required. Furthermore, external threat made it necessary to expand the munition industries which were also concentrated in these regions. As 27 Outside the RSFSR the special attention to the development of Kazakhstan was probably also in response to the Chinese challenge. 28 See Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1968), chap. 6; F. E. Ian Hamilton, Yugoslavia:Patterns of EconomicActivity (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1968), chap. 16. 29 For example, the NMP per capita in highly developed Slovenia was 3.8 times larger than that for Kosovo-Metohija in 1953, but 5.2 times larger in 1967. The respectiveratios for industrial output per capita were 9.4 and 6.5. 30 Cf. K. Mihailovic, "On the Yugoslav Experience in Backward Areas," in Backward Areas in Advanced Countries, ed. E. A. G. Robinson (London: Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 265. Thus the population grew at 1.82 percent in four underdeveloped regions between 1953 and 1967, the NMP 7.41, and the industrial output 12.06 percent. The respective rates for the remainderof the country were: 0.78, 7.75, and 10.59 (see sources to table 2 in Appendix). 81 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange TABLE 5 COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION FOR NET MATERIAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA, INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT PER CAPITA, AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENTPER 10,000 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 POPULATION FOR SUBDIVISIONS OF YUGOSLAVIA BETWEEN 1953 AND 1967 Year NMP Industrial Output Industrial Employment ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... .302 .358 .343 .371 .334 .375 .333 .362 .378 .383 .381 .356 .365 .357 .376 .623 .603 .600 .568 .542 .506 .459 .510 .530 .510 .492 .468 .443 .440 .463 .423 .454 .425 .437 .376 .382 .370 .339 .351 .372 .371 .373 .350 .341 .355 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... SOURCES.-See Appendix and various issues of Statistioki Godiinjak Jugoslaviji. table 5 shows, this resulted in an increase in the differencesamong republics during this period of time. To avoid continuous budgetary grants-in-aid to backward regions in order to maintain the minimum social services to the population, between 1957 and 1961 the federal government undertook a massive investment program in the backward regions.31 The consequent growth of these regions at a faster rate than the national average caused regional divergences to decrease somewhat. This can be observed in the behavior of coefficients of the three variables in table 5. Having reached their peak in the early 1960s, they have been declining since. However, this progress could be endangered by the 1965 reforms that give greater economic power to the republics.32 This might create another obstacle to the flow of resources from the more developed to the less developed regions because the borders among them might become more rigid. Yet the authorities believe that further progress in equalization will be assured with the help of the Fund for Crediting the Economic Development of Economically Lesser Developed Republics and Regions, created in 1965. That organization was made responsible for providing not only the investment funds but also the technical know-how and the skilled personnel to these regions.33 Since the creation of Czechoslovakia after World War I, Slovakia, which accounts for more than one-third of the country's total area and nearly one-third of its total population, has been considered an underdeveloped region. Very little was done to reduce the economic inequality Shoup, p. 234. Paul Shoup, "The Evolution of a System," Problems of Communism 18, nos. 4-5 (1969): 76. " Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, p. 239. 31 32 82 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj between Slovakia and other regions during the interwar period. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that considerable progress in this direction has been achieved since World War II. Thanks to large investments, financed to a considerable extent by more developed regions,34and to the transfer of labor from agriculture to other economic sectors, the Slovakian NMP and, first of all, the industrial output, grew at a faster rate than did that for the entire country. For example, the gross output of industry grew between 1948 and 1968 in Slovakia at 12.3 percent annually, whereas the nationwide rate was equal to 9.2 percent, and the respective rates for industrial employment were 4.7 and 2.3 percent.35 In terms of NMP per capita, available since 1960, Slovakia improved its position from 80.2 percent of the nationwide level in that year to 83.5 percent in 1968. The improvement in terms of net industrial output per capita was even greater during the same period of time, from 66.5 to 77.2 percent.36The advance of Slovakia would have been even greater if it were not for the sectoral and geographical dissipation of investment which resulted often in failure to benefit from the economic advantage of large-scale production.37 Other reasons mentioned for insufficientgrowth of Slovakia are the weak theoretical basis for regional planning and deficiencies in the implementation of plans.38 This discussion has been concerned with the investigation of the statistical relationship in Socialist countries between the level, and its changes, of interregional inequality and the various factors that may influence it. The relationship established for the market economies (that the degree of inequality is the highest in the countries at the intermediatelevel of economic development) seems to be applicable also to Socialist countries, at least in terms of industrial employment per 10,000 population. However, in view of the fact that the inequality decreased between benchmark years in all countries under consideration, the hypothesis that this inequality tends to decrease for most advanced countries and to increase for the least developed countries cannot be confirmed. One can observe of a Backward Area in Czechoslovakia," 34 Pavel Turcan, "The Development in Robinson, p. 244. Statisticeska rodenka CSSR, 1969 (Prague, 35 Federalni Statisticesky13•fad, 1970), pp. 22-23, 26-27, 58-59, 60-61. 36 Ibid., pp. 151, 160. 37 Turcan, pp. 249 ff. It is interesting to note that the Czechoslovak approach toward the problem of capital-intensity of investment was exactly opposite to that of Romania (see n. 20 above). According to Turcan, "investments [in Slovakia] were directed towards branches that had the highest requirements in manpower, whilst the technical level of the new installations was often only a secondary consideration" (p. 250). This obviously explains why the growth rate of employment in industry was considerably higher than that of output. It is certainly also responsible for the decrease in the coefficient of variation for industrial employment among eleven Czechoslovak microregions (table 2). 38 J. Ferianc, "Problems of Regional Planning in Czechoslovakia and of Research into Regional Models," in Economic Development for Eastern Europe, ed. M. C. Kaser (London: Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 104-6. 83 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange instead that the relatively developed and relatively underdeveloped countries show the lower decline in the interregional inequality than the intermediate countries. Two other hypotheses must be rejected: (1) that there is a direct correlation between the growth rate of industrial output and the rate of decrease in interregional inequality; (2) that there is an inverse correlation between the growth rate of heavy industry output and the rate of decrease in interregional inequality. On the other hand, the possibility that there is an inverse correlation between the growth rate of labor productivity and the rate of decrease of interregional inequality cannot be completely ruled out. In regard to the relationship between the ethnic heterogeneity of a country and the economic inequality of its regions, it is impossible, of course, to make any generalizations on the basis of only three countries which, in addition, have had completely different experiences. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that this factor seems not to have been overly influential on the regional equalization. Internal and external exigencies (among them very likely the political strength of federal authorities and the degree of decentralization in economic decision making) may appear to be of decisive importance. Yet from all this discussion one fact stands out clearly: The inequality among microregions decreased in terms of industrial employment in all eight countries, if the USSR is also included on the slim evidence of urbanization. This decrease, although at various rates, took place despite significant differences among these countries in terms of the level of economic development. There is probably no doubt that this has something to do with the Socialist system of their economies. Such factors as the centralization or the degree of decentralization in decision making, the full employment of all resources, the general emphasis on rapid economic growth, and the structural changes certainly can be influential on the reduction of interregional inequality. Further research is therefore obviously needed to generalize these factors, as well as the other factors relevant to all Socialist countries, and to determine the specific reasons for both the existence and the changes of regional inequality in particular countries. Appendix Sources and Notes to Tables Sources Bulgaria. Tsentral'noStatisticheskoUpravlenie,Statisticheskigodishnik za NarodnaRepublikaBulgaria,1959 (Sophia, 1959), pp. 279, 283; St. god. 1969, pp. 405, 419. Czechoslovakia. Calculated on the basis of indexes and the percent distributionfrom Statni Statisticesky~ 'Lad, StatistickarodenkaC.S.S.R., 1967 (Prague, 1967), pp. 108, 205; Ustredni Komise Lidove Kontroly a Statistiky, ScitaniLudu,Domua Bytu v CeskoslovenskeSocialistickeRepublikek 1.Breznu 1961 (Prague, 1965), pp. 312-13; Stat. roc. 1969, pp. 134, 238. 84 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions I. S. Koropeckyj East Germany. Staatliche Verwaltung fir Statistik, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1955 Der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Berlin, 1956), pp. 29, 178, 278; Stat. Jahrb. 1969, pp. 1, 40, 62-63, 105. Hungary. K6zponti Statisztikai Hivatal, Statisztikai evkdnyv, 1968 (Budapest, 1969), pp. 478-516. Poland. Population, industrial output, and industrial employment from Gl6wny Urzqd Statystyczny, Rocznik statystyczny 1968 (Warsaw, 1968), p. 28; Rocz. stat. 1969, pp. 41, 57-78, 122-23; G.U.S., Przekroje terenowe 1945-1965 (Warsaw, 1967), pp. 290-92; Rocz. stat. 1961, pp. 114-15. The NMP per capita was calculated in the following way. A study by G.U.S., Analiza tworzenia i podzialu dochodu narodowego Polski wedlug wojewodstw, Seria Studie i prace statystyczne, No. 20 (Warsaw, 1969), gives the percent distribution of the NMP by wojewodstwo for the years 1961, 1965, and 1967 and also the absolute data for the total (pp. 14, 87). Population from Rocz. stat. 1965, p. 14, Rocz. stat. 1968, pp. 5-76. Romania. Directia Centrala de Statistica, Anuarul Statistic al Republici Socialiste Romdnia 1960 (Bucharest, 1960), pp. 70-73; An. Stat. 1969, pp. 67, 128. USSR. The NMP was calculated in the following way. A. I. Vedishchev, "Soizmerenie urovniei khoziaistvennogo razvitia ekonomicheskikh raionov S.S.S.R.," in Ekonomicheskie problemy razmeshchenia proizvoditel'nykh sil S.S.S.R., ed. A. A. Ivanchenko (Moscow, 1969), p. 82, gives the indexes of NMP per capita by union republics for 1965. These data with the data for population, growth rates of NMP for union republics, and the absolute figure of NMP for the USSR (Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Narodnoe khoziaistvo S.S.S.R. v 1965 g. [Moscow, 1966], pp. 9, 589, 590; Nar. khoz. 1964, p. 9; Nar. Khoz. 1967, p. 9; Nar. khoz. 1968, pp. 9, 570) were used for the estimation of NMP per capita by republics for 1958 and 1968. The industrial output by republics was estimated by using the absolute data for 1960 from Paul K. Cook, "The Administration and Distribution of Soviet Industry," in Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 704-32, adjusting it for boundary changes, and expanding it for other years with the help of official indexes. See my study in Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union, appendix tables 1 and 2. For 1968, Nar. khoz. 1968, pp. 12, 189. Employment data from Nar. khoz. 1965, p. 141; Nar. khoz. 1968, p. 206; Vedishchev, p. 63. Yugoslavia. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, Statisticki Godis•njakJugoslavifi 1963 (Belgrade, 1963), p. 339; Stat. god. 1969, pp. 332, 361. Notes Bulgaria. 1968 population, 8,370 thousand; area, 42,823 sq. mi.; twentyseven Okryza: (1) Blagoevgrad, (2) Burgas, (3) Varna, (4) Veliko Tyrnovo, (5) Vidin, (6) Vratsa, (7) Gabrovo, (8) Kyrdzhali, (9) Kiustendil, (10) Lovech, (11) Mikhailovgrad, (12) Pazardzhik, (13) Pernik, (14) Pleven, (15) Plovdiv, (16) Razgrad, (17) Ruse, (18) Silistra, (19) Sliven, (20) Smolian, (21) Sofia, (22) Stara Zagora, (23) Tolbukhin, (24) Tyrgovishte, (25) Khaskovo, (26) Shumen, (27) lambol. Czechoslovakia. 1968 population, 17,781 thousand; area, 49,370 sq. mi.; two republics, Czech and Slovakian; eleven Kraj: (1) Praha, (2) Stredo'esky, (3) Jiho'esky, (4) Zaipado'esky, (5) Severo'esky, (6) Vichodo'esky, (7) Jihomoravsky', (8) Severomoravsky, (9) Zaipadoslovensky, (10) Stredoslovensky, (11) Vychodoslovensky. 85 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Economic Developmentand CulturalChange East Germany. 1968 population, 17,084 thousand; area, 41,816 sq. mi.; fifteen Bezirk: (1) Berlin, (2) Rostock, (3) Schwerin, (4), Neubrandenburg, (5) Potsdam, (6) Frankfurt, (7) Cottbus, (8) Magdenburg, (9) Halle, (10) Erfurt, (11) Gera, (12) Suhl, (13) Drezden, (14) Leipzig, (15) Karl-Marx-Stadt. Hungary. 1968 population, 10,236 thousand; area, 35,919 sq. mi.; twenty Megye: (1) Budapest, (2) Baranya, (3) Bacs-Kiskun, (4) Bek6s, (5) Borsod-Abauj-Zempl6n, (6) Csongrnd, (7) Fejer, (8) Gy6r-Sopron, (9) HajduBihar, (10) Heves, (11) Komairon, (12) N6grad, (13) Pest, (14) Somogy, (15) Szabolcs-Szatmair, (16) Szolnok, (17) Tolna, (18) Vas, (19) Veszpr6m, (20) Zala. Poland. 1968 population, 32,456 thousand; area, 120,319 sq. mi.; seventeen Wojew6dstwo: (1) Bialystok, (2) Bydgoszcz, (3) Gdanisk, (4) Katowice, (5) Kielce, (6) Koszalin, (7) Krak6w, (8) Lublin, (9) L6dz, (10) Olsztyn, (11) Opole, (12) Poznani, (13) Rzesz6w, (14) Szczecin, (15) Warszawa, (16) Wroclaw, (17) Zielona G6ra. Romania. 1968 population, 19,721 thousand; area, 91,699 sq. mi.; sixteen Regiunea in 1959: (1) Bacau, (2) Baia-Mare, (3) Bucuresti, (4) Cluj, (5) Constanta, (6) Craiova, (7) Galati, (8) Hunedoara, (9) Iasi, (10) Oradea, (11) Pitesti, (12) Ploesti, (13) Stalin, (14) Suceava, (15) Timisoara, (16) Maghiard. In 1968 Romania was divided into forty Judetuls. In order to make two benchmark years comparable, the 1968 distribution was combined back into sixteen regions of 1959, as follows: (1) Bacau, Neamt; (2) Maramures; (3) lalomita, Ilfov, Teleorman, Bucuresti; (4) Bistrita-Ndsaud, Cluj, Silaj; (5) Tulcea, Constanta; (6) Dolj, Gorj, Mehedinti, Olt; (7) Braila, Galati, Vrancea; (8) Alba, Hunedoara; (9) lai, Vaslui; (10) Bihor, Satu-Mare; Vilcea; (12) Buzau, Dimbovita, Prahova; (13) Brasov, Sibiu; (11) Arge,, Suceava; (15) Arad, Caras-Severin, Timis; (16) Covas, Harghita, (14) Botosani, Mures. USSR. 1968 population, 237,816 thousand; area, 8,649,489 sq. mi.; fifteen Union Republics: (1) Russia, (2) Ukraine, (3) Belorussia, (4) Uzbekistan, (5) Kazakhstan, (6) Georgia, (7) Azerbaidzhan, (8) Lithuania, (9) Moldavia, (10) Latvia, (11) Kirghizia, (12) Tadjikistan, (13) Armenia, (14) Turkmenia, (15) Estonia. 26 Union Republics and Economic Regions: (1) Northwest, (2) Central, (3) Volga-Vyatka, (4) Central Black Earth, (5) Volga, (6) North Caucasus, (7) Ural, (8) West Siberia, (9) East Siberia, (10) Far East, (11) Donets-Dnieper, (12) Southwest, (13) South and remaining 13 republics (without Russia and the Ukraine). Yugoslavia. 1967 population, 20,154 thousand; area, 98,766 sq. mi.; six Republics: (1) Bosnia and Hercegovina, (2) Montenegro, (3) Croatia, (4) Macedonia, (5) Slovenia, and Serbia is broken down into (6) Serbia proper, (7) Voivodina, (8) Kosovo and Metohija. 86 This content downloaded from 178.250.250.21 on Mon, 08 Feb 2016 17:45:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions