New rising powers module for the third year IR 1 копия (2)

LOMONOSOV MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY
IN DUSHANBE
GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: THE RISE OF NEW POWERS
STUDENT’S BOOK
Dictionaries Online:
http://dictionary.cambridge.org Cambridge Dictionaries Online
http://www.macmillandictionary.com Macmillan Dictionary
http://www.ldoceonline.com Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English Online
http://www.collinslanguage.com Collins English Dictionary + Thesaurus + Cobuild
1. What comes to mind when you hear the word “leader”? What might it mean when referred to
countries in the world arena?
2. Do the words “leader” and “superpower” have the same meaning when it comes to countries
operating in the global world?
3. Look through the description of the two superpowers and identify the criteria they are based
on.
Soviet Union
a)Strong Communist state. Permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Strong ties with Eastern
Europe, anti-colonialist movements, labour parties, and some countries in Latin America, Southeast
Asia, and Africa.
b)Largest country in the world, with a surface area of 22.27 million km²
c)Press explicitly controlled and censored. Promoted, through the use of propaganda, its Communist
and Socialist ideal that workers of all countries should unite to overthrow capitalist society and what
they called the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and replace it with a socialist society where all means
of production are publicly owned.
d)Possessed largest armed forces in the world, an air force second in size to only the US, and one of
the world's largest navies. Also held the world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons for the second
half of the Cold War. Founder of Warsaw Pact with satellite states in Eastern Europe. Global
intelligence network with GRU and the First Chief Directorate of KGB. Ties with paramilitary and
guerrilla groups in the developing world. Large armament production industry with global
distribution.
e)GDP of $2.9 trillion in 1990. Second largest economy in the world.[38] Enormous mineral energy
resources and fuel supply. Generally self-sufficient using a minimal amount of imports, though
suffered resource inadequacies such as in agriculture. Marxist economic theory based primarily on
production: industrial production directed by centralised state organs leading to a high degree of
inefficiency. Five-year plans frequently used to accomplish economic goals. Economic benefits such
as guaranteed employment, free healthcare, free education on all levels formally assured for all
citizens. Economy tied to Eastern-European satellite states.
f)Had a population of 286.7 million in 1989, the third largest on Earth behind China and India (this
included all of the republics of the USSR, not just that of Russia).
United States
a)Strong capitalist federation/constitutional republic. Permanent seat on the UN Security Council plus
two allies with permanent seats. Strong ties with Western Europe, Latin America, Commonwealth of
Nations, and several East Asian countries.
b)Fourth largest country in the world (after the Soviet Union, Canada & China), with an area of
approximately 9.37 million km².
c)Maintained constitutional guarantees for freedom of speech and freedom of press, though the
ongoing Cold War did lead to a degree of censorship and oppression. Rich cultural influence in music,
television, films, food, art, and fashion.
d)Highest military expenditure in the world,[35] with the world's largest navy surpassing the next 13
largest navies combined,[36][37] and an army and air force rivaled only by that of the Soviet Union.
Possessed bases around the world, particularly in an incomplete "ring" bordering the Warsaw Pact to
the West, South and East. Largest nuclear arsenal in the world during the first half of the Cold War.
Powerful military allies in Western Europe (NATO) with their own nuclear capabilities. Global
intelligence network, the CIA. Ties with paramilitary and guerrilla groups in the developing world.
Large armament production through defence contractors along with its developed allies for the global
market.
e)GDP of $5.2 trillion in 1990. Largest economy in the world. Capitalist free market economic theory
based on supply and demand: production determined by customers' demands. Enormous industrial
base and a large and modernized farming industry. Large volume of imports and exports. Large
resources of minerals, energy resources, metals, and timber. High standard of living with accessibility
to many manufactured goods. Home to a multitude of the largest global corporations. U.S. Dollar
served as the dominant world reserve currency under Bretton Woods Conference. Allied with G7
major economies. Supported allied countries' economies via such programmes as the Marshall Plan.
f)Had a population of 248.7 million in 1990, at that time the fourth largest on Earth.[39]
4. Which of the above criteria do you consider most important for the country on its way to
become a superpower? Give reasoning.
5. Do you think that the description below might refer to a superpower? Why/Why not?
Since the OECD’s first Economic Survey of Russia in 2005, Russian economy has continued to
expand rapidly, driven to a large extent by the development of the private sector. Exports were hit
hard by the global crisis and activity slowed down sharply over the course of 2008. However, prompt
and vigorous policy actions, as well as swift adjustment in the labour market, helped growth pick up
by the second quarter of 2009, putting Russia in the lead of the global recovery. Going forward,
Russian importance in the world economy is set to increase further, as are living standards within the
country. In fact, Russia already has the world’s second-largest economy in purchasing power parity
terms, and is expected to shortly achieve the same rank at market exchange rates. It already has the
world’s second-largest manufacturing sector and is the world’s largest exporter of goods. Growth will
likely continue to be driven largely by investment and a trend shift out of low-productivity
agriculture, as the urbanisation rate, which is approaching 50%, continues to rise. While the size of
the labour force is not projected to increase much, education levels have soared since the early 1980s,
which will support future productivity growth.
6. Skim through the above text once again. Does it sound true? Why/Why not? Can we change it
so that it does sound true?
7. Under what circumstances the information from the text above could be applicable to Russia?
Complete the following sentences:
If Russia was … , it/there could …
If Russia had … , it/there might …
But for … , Russian economy would …
8. Project: Conduct a research and make a suggestion on what new rising powers have the
potential to become global leaders. Write an analytical report and submit it at the end of the
module.
9. Read the article from The Financial Times below. The author invites comments. Discuss the
ideas from the article and submit your comment expressing your opinion on the issue discussed.
Write about 70 words.
Beijing’s foreign policy
By David Pilling
Published: January 19 2011 23:30 | Last updated: January 19 2011 23:30
No one would still accuse China of hiding its light. After years of obeying Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of
restrained foreign policy as the best means of advancing its peaceful rise,an emboldened Beijing now
appears more comfortable about brandishing its strengths and achievements. Whether it is greeting
visiting dignitaries with stealth fighters, encouraging the adoption of its currency abroad, or allowing
retired generals to designate the South China Sea an area of “core interest”, the days of China as a
shrinking violet are behind us.
The question is, what kind of foreign power will China become as its confidence grows and as its
economic interests from south-east Asia to Africa and Latin America pull it deeper into world affairs.
Unlike Japan, the world’s second-largest economy until last year, China will not be America’s
shadow. In the phrase of Paul Keating, former Australian prime minister, the international order is
returning to a more normal state in which the world’s second most important power is no longer a
“client state” of the first.
Even at this early stage of a process that may take 30 years or more to fully unfold, it is possible to
make out the contours of China’s foreign policy. One stark difference between it and the US, where
Hu Jintao, China’s president, finds himself this week, is that China is unlikely to be a proselytising
power. America was founded on ideas and documents. That, coupled with its Christian roots,
produces a strong evangelical streak. Whether in regard to its constitution or the merits of its liberal
democracy and free-market ideology, much of the US discourse assumes it has fashioned a superior
system. America has often led by example and through the attractiveness of its model. But it has not
shied away from using force – through coups in Latin America or war in Vietnam and Iraq – in an
effort to impose its vision on the world.
China, by contrast, lacks such ideological compulsion. Beijing is not blind to the utility of soft power.
Dozens of Confucian Institutes around the world are spreading the Chinese language, and its state
media has stepped up efforts to spread a “Chinese view” of the world. But at bottom, China’s political
system and its pragmatic, mixed economy are not ideologically driven. They are a means to an end,
the end being the creation of a rich and strong nation. “Americans are the evangelical nation,” says
Orville Schell, head of the Asia Society’s Center on US-China Relations. “China wants respect and
admission of stature.”
China’s official foreign policy doctrine is non-intervention. Beijing deals more or less evenly with
Burmese generals and elected western politicians alike. It has shown limited interest in influencing the
domestic political agenda of other nations. Its preference for non-intervention will, nevertheless, be
strained as its interests become more deeply entangled with the rest of the world. An initial test could
come in Sudan, where China’s thirst for oil has led it to do business with Khartoum, but will now
require it to build fences with the oil-rich south. Elsewhere, what would happen if there were violent
backlashes against ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia or Malaysia? It is increasingly hard to
imagine China standing idly by. And how would Beijing react if an African government nationalised
Chinese-owned mineral deposits or if a democratic government in Burma reneged on deals struck
with Beijing by the generals?
Beijing has made much, too, of its supposedly non-expansionary nature. General Ma Xiaotian last
year quoted Mao Zedong saying: “Fifty years from now, China’s territory will remain 9,600,000
square kilometres ... Should we seize one inch of land from others, we would make ourselves
aggressors.”
Of course, all states have been expansionary in their past or they would still be confined to villages
and valleys. Qing Dynasty China was considerably larger than Ming Dynasty China. But if you accept
China’s definition of the Middle Kingdom – incorporating Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan – then its
assertion does not ring entirely hollow. Historically, China has preferred hierarchical, tributary
relationships with “lesser” powers to outright territorial conquest. For example it never conquered the
Ryukyu Kingdom, which paid tribute to it for centuries. Japan, which in the 19th century took on
board western notions of the sovereign state, absorbed Ryukyu (now Okinawa) and went on forcibly
to incorporate much of Asia into its short-lived empire.
Christopher Ford, author of The Mind of Empire, argues that China “lacks a meaningful concept of
co-equal, legitimate sovereignties”. As its strength grows, he predicts: “China may well become much
more assertive in insisting on the sort of Sinocentric hierarchy its history teaches it to expect.”
Michael Wesley, head of Australia’s Lowy Institute, predicts China will, in time, try to push US
forces away from its maritime borders, the better to exercise authority over smaller neighbours. There
may already be a hint of this. Beijing has become more insistent in asserting rights over the entire
South China Sea, even though these waters also adjoin several other nations, including Vietnam,
Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia.
Mr Schell of the Asia Society says China will increasingly seek to reinvent the old tributary system.
Other countries will not have to emulate China ideologically. But they will have to show respect – if
necessary through concessions. China wants to “let everyone know it doesn’t have to trim its jib to
maintain relations with others”, says Mr Schell. “From now on, others are going to have to trim their
jib.”
http://www.ft.com
10. You are going to read a newspaper article. For questions 1-6 choose the option (A-D) which you
think fits best according to the text.
US democracy has little to teach China
By Francis Fukuyama
Published: January 17 2011 19:54 | Last updated: January 17 2011 19:54
The first decade of the 21-century has seen a dramatic reversal of fortune in the relative prestige of
different political and economic models. Ten years ago, on the eve of the puncturing of the dotcom
bubble, the US held the high ground. Its democracy was widely emulated, if not always loved; its
technology was sweeping the world; and lightly regulated “Anglo-Saxon” capitalism was seen as the
wave of the future. The US managed to fritter away that moral capital in remarkably short order: the
Iraq war and the close association it created between military invasion and democracy promotion
tarnished the latter, while the Wall Street financial crisis put paid to the idea that markets could be
trusted to regulate themselves.
China, by contrast, is on a roll. President Hu Jintao’s rare state visit to Washington this week comes at
a time when many Chinese see their weathering of the financial crisis as a vindication of their own
system, and the beginning of an era in which US-style liberal ideas will no longer be dominant. Stateowned enterprises are back in vogue, and were the chosen mechanism through which Beijing
administered its massive stimulus. The automatic admiration for all things American that many
Chinese once felt has given way to a much more nuanced and critical view of US weaknesses –
verging, for some, on contempt. It is thus not surprising that polls suggest far more Chinese think their
country is going in the right direction than their American counterparts.
But what is the Chinese model? Many observers casually put it in an “authoritarian capitalist” box,
along with Russia, Iran and Singapore. But China’s model is sui generis; its specific mode of
governance is difficult to describe, much less emulate, which is why it is not up for export.
The most important strength of the Chinese political system is its ability to make large, complex
decisions quickly, and to make them relatively well, at least in economic policy. This is most evident
in the area of infrastructure, where China has put into place airports, dams, high-speed rail, water and
electricity systems to feed its growing industrial base. Contrast this with India, where every new
investment is subject to blockage by trade unions, lobby groups, peasant associations and courts. India
is a law-governed democracy, in which ordinary people can object to government plans; China’s
rulers can move more than a million people out of the Three Gorges Dam flood plain with little
recourse on their part.
Nonetheless, the quality of Chinese government is higher than in Russia, Iran, or the other
authoritarian regimes with which it is often lumped – precisely because Chinese rulers feel some
degree of accountability towards their population. That accountability is not, of course, procedural;
the authority of the Chinese Communist party is limited neither by a rule of law nor by democratic
elections. But while its leaders limit public criticism, they do try to stay on top of popular discontents,
and shift policy in response. They are most attentive to the urban middle class and powerful business
interests that generate employment, but they respond to outrage over egregious cases of corruption or
incompetence among lower-level party cadres too.
Indeed, the Chinese government often overreacts to what it believes to be public opinion precisely
because, as one diplomat resident in Beijing remarked, there are no institutionalised ways of gauging
it, such as elections or free media. Instead of calibrating a sensible working relationship with Japan,
for example, China escalated a conflict over the detention of a fishing boat captain last year –
seemingly in anticipation of popular anti-Japanese sentiment.
Americans have long hoped China might undergo a democratic transition as it got wealthier, and
before it became powerful enough to become a strategic and political threat. This seems unlikely,
however. The government knows how to cater to the interests of Chinese elites and the emerging
middle classes, and builds on their fear of populism. This is why there is little support for genuine
multi-party democracy. The elites worry about the example of democracy in Thailand – where the
election of a populist premier led to violent conflict between his supporters and the establishment – as
a warning of what could happen to them.
Ironically for a country that still claims to be communist, China has grown far more unequal of late.
Many peasants and workers share little in the country’s growth, while others are ruthlessly exploited.
Corruption is pervasive, which exacerbates existing inequalities. At a local level there are countless
instances in which government colludes with developers to take land away from hapless peasants.
This has contributed to a pent-up anger that explodes in many thousands of acts of social protest,
often violent, each year.
The Communist party seems to think it can deal with the problem of inequality through improved
responsiveness on the part of its own hierarchy to popular pressures. China’s great historical
achievement during the past two millennia has been to create high-quality centralised government,
which it does much better than most of its authoritarian peers. Today, it is shifting social spending to
the neglected interior, to boost consumption and to stave off a social explosion. I doubt whether its
approach will work: any top-down system of accountability faces unsolvable problems of monitoring
and responding to what is happening on the ground. Effective accountability can only come about
through a bottom-up process, or what we know as democracy. This is not, in my view, likely to
emerge soon. However, down the road, in the face of a major economic downturn, or leaders who are
less competent or more corrupt, the system’s fragile legitimacy could be openly challenged.
Democracy’s strengths are often most evident in times of adversity.
However, if the democratic, market-oriented model is to prevail, Americans need to own up to their
own mistakes and misconceptions. Washington’s foreign policy during the past decade was too
militarised and unilateral, succeeding only in generating a self-defeating anti-Americanism. In
economic policy, Reaganism long outlived its initial successes, producing only budget deficits,
thoughtless tax-cutting and inadequate financial regulation.
These problems are to some extent being acknowledged and addressed. But there is a deeper problem
with the American model that is nowhere close to being solved. China adapts quickly, making
difficult decisions and implementing them effectively. Americans pride themselves on constitutional
checks and balances, based on a political culture that distrusts centralised government. This system
has ensured individual liberty and a vibrant private sector, but it has now become polarised and
ideologically rigid. At present it shows little appetite for dealing with the long-term fiscal challenges
the US faces. Democracy in America may have an inherent legitimacy that the Chinese system lacks,
but it will not be much of a model to anyone if the government is divided against itself and cannot
govern. During the 1989 Tiananmen protests, student demonstrators erected a model of the Statue of
Liberty to symbolise their aspirations. Whether anyone in China would do the same at some future
date will depend on how Americans address their problems in the present.
The writer is a fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.
His latest book, The Origins of Political Order, will be published in the spring.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb6af6e8-2272-11e0-b6a2-00144feab49a.html#axzz1BIHTXYAb
1. Author is of the opinion that
A. the US economic model has always played a greater role than their political one on the
international scene.
B. the US international politics has undermined their economic model’s efficiency.
C. the prestige of a certain economic and political models is highly dependent on its international
policies.
D. a country’s political model can gain international weight due to the success of its economic
model.
2. According to the author, the recent change in the public opinion in China regarding their political
course is due to
A. a more critical vision of the US economy.
B. their getting through global recession more or less successfully.
C. considerable disappointment in US products.
D. decrease in the popularity of American political system.
3. Chinese political system’s major advantage is down to
A. sensible economic policy.
B. government’s ability to fight corruption.
C. government’s ability to put their decisions into practice.
D. their rulers’ unlimited authority.
4. The author does not believe that Chinese government will choose a democratic political model
because
A. it has got richer and more influential.
B. they think it can undermine political stability.
C. they don’t think their people are ready for this.
D. they feel confident about the efficiency of their own political system.
5. The author is sceptical about
A. democratic approach to problem-solving in internal politics.
B. authoritarian approach to problem-solving in internal politics.
C. the possibility of social uprising in China in the near future.
D. Chinese government’s legitimacy.
6. The author argues that the main drawback of American political system is
A. lack of flexibility
B. being too militaristic
C. inability to regulate its economy efficiently.
D. inability to impose will.
11. Read the article again and discuss which ideas, if any, are relevant for the project. Give reasons.
12. Examine the facts below and say if they might be useful for the project. Explain how by interpreting
the facts. Discuss your ideas in groups.
China’s lending hits new heights
By Geoff Dyer and Jamil Anderlini in Beijing and Henny Sender in Hong Kong
Published: January 17 2011 22:15 | Last updated: January 17 2011 22:15
China has lent more money to other developing countries over the past two years than the World
Bank, a stark indication of the scale of Beijing’s economic reach and its drive to secure natural
resources.
China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank signed loans of at least $110bn (£70bn) to
other developing country governments and companies in 2009 and 2010, according to Financial
Times research. The equivalent arms of the World Bank made loan commitments of $100.3bn from
mid-2008 to mid-2010, itself a record amount of lending in response to the financial crisis.
TB: The volume of overseas loans by the two banks indicates how Beijing is forging new patterns of
China-led globalisation, as part of a broader push to scale back its economic dependency on western
export markets.
TB: The financial crisis allowed Beijing to push the commercial interests of its energy companies by
offering loans to producer countries at a time when financing was hard to come by.
The agreements include large loan-for-oil deals with Russia, Venezuela and Brazil, as well as loans
for an Indian company to buy power equipment and for infrastructure projects in Ghana and railways
in Argentina.
The World Bank has been trying to find ways to co-operate with Beijing to avoid escalating
competition over loan deals. China itself has been one of the biggest recipients of World Bank loans
in the past. “One of the topics I have been discussing with the Chinese authorities is how we can work
with them to share our mutual experience to support other developing countries, whether in south-east
Asia or Africa,” Robert Zoellick, World Bank president, said on a visit to China last year.
CDB and EximBank provide more preferential terms than the World Bank and other lenders for
certain deals that are strongly supported by Beijing, but offer terms that are closer to international
standards for less politically sensitive deals. They also tend to impose less onerous transparency
conditions.
TB: The flurry of Chinese lending to oil producers has already caused some anxiety in the US about
energy security. According to Erica Downs, a China expert at the Brookings Institution, the impact on
US interests is mixed. “CDB’s [energy] loans indicate that Chinese lenders are likely to be more
concerned about good economic policymaking in recipient countries and they are not reducing the
amount of oil available to the US,” she said. “On the other hand, CDB’s loans are empowering antiAmerican regimes in Latin America.”
Beijing has also used offshore lending by CDB and EximBank, which have a mandate to further the
interests of the Communist Party and the Chinese state, to accelerate its goal of making its currency
more international. For example, half of the $20bn loan it extended to Venezuela was denominated in
renminbi and intended for purchases of Chinese goods and equipment. In other cases, the foreign
currency in the loans has come directly from China’s foreign exchange reserves.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/488c60f4-2281-11e0-b6a2-00144feab49a.html#axzz1BfAuGK00
13. Watch the video and compare your ideas with the opinions expressed by the speakers. Add
relevant ideas to your project mind map.
To watch the video, go to:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/488c60f4-2281-11e0-b6a2-00144feab49a.html#axzz1BfAuGK00
14. Read the text and compare Chinese approach to managing its economy in the 10th century and
now.
China was a pioneer in bureaucratic modes of governance. In the tenth century, it was already
recruiting professionally trained public servants on a meritocratic basis. The bureaucracy was the
main instrument for imposing social and political order in a unitary state over a huge area.
The economic impact of the bureaucracy was very positive for agriculture. It was the key sector from
which they could squeeze a surplus in the form of taxes and compulsory levies. They nurtured it with
hydraulic works. Thanks to the precocious development of printing they were able to diffuse best
practice techniques by widespread distribution of illustrated agricultural handbooks. They settled
farmers in promising new regions. They developed a public granary system to mitigate famines. They
fostered innovation by introducing early ripening seeds which eventually permitted double or triple
cropping. They promoted the introduction of new crops — tea in the T’ang dynasty, cotton in the
Sung, sorghum in the Yuan, and new world crops such as maize, potatoes, sweet potatoes, peanuts
and tobacco in the Ming.
Agricultural practice compensated for land shortage by intensive use of labour, irrigation and natural
fertilisers. Land was under continuous cultivation, without fallow. The need for fodder crops and
grazing land was minimal. Livestock was concentrated on scavengers (pigs and poultry). Beef, milk
and wool consumption were rare. The protein supply was augmented by widespread practice of
small–scale aquaculture.
Agriculture operated in an institutional order, which was efficient in its allocation of resources and
was able to respond to population pressure by raising land productivity. Landlords were largely non–
managerial rentiers. Production and managerial decisions were made by tenants and peasant
proprietors who could buy and sell land freely and sell their products in local markets.
http://www.oecd.org
15. You are going to read a newspaper article. Seven paragraphs have been removed from the
article. Choose from the paragraphs A–H the one which fits each gap (1–7). There is one extra
paragraph which you do not need to use.
A strategy to straddle the planet
By Geoff Dyer, David Pilling and Henny Sender
Published: January 17 2011 21:01 | Last updated: January 17 2011 21:01
Anil Ambani was in ebullient mood last
October when he arrived at a luxury hotel in
Shanghai to sign one of the biggest business
deals of the year. The Indian billionaire’s
Reliance Power had just agreed to purchase
$10bn of power generation equipment from
the state-owned Shanghai Electric.
“It is the largest order in the history of the
power sector,” proclaimed Mr Ambani, “and
the largest single business relationship
between India and China.”
The size of the deal was not its only notable
aspect. Shanghai Electric was offering its
equipment at about 30-40 per cent below the
cost of an equivalent turbine from General
Electric of the US. With the generous
financing
deal
offered
by
China
Development Bank and a group of other
Chinese banks, the discount was in fact
closer to 60 per cent.
Welcome to a new era of globalisation,
China-style. As the financial crisis recedes,
one of the big fears is that the process of
increasingly closer links among big
economies worldwide will go into reverse as
governments and countries look inward. The
message coming from the world’s secondlargest economy for the past year has been
clear: China wants to accelerate the
integration of the global economy, but on its
own terms.
1
Coming out of the crisis, China wants to
forge a new phase of globalisation where
many of the roads – financial, commercial
and perhaps eventually political – converge
on Beijing. China is not seeking a rupture
with the international economic system
(although some foreign companies are fearful
of a technology grab). But it is looking to
mould more of the rules, institutions and
economic relationships that are at the core of
the global economy. It is trying to forge postAmerican globalisation.
2
With the help of its considerable financial
firepower, China is deepening these links.
Beijing is establishing trade relationships that
allow it to sell not just clothing and consumer
products but more sophisticated goods such
as power equipment. Its banks are helping to
expand infrastructure and energy supplies in
other developing countries in ways that will
accelerate their growth, boost two-way trade
and bind them closer to the Chinese
economy. Beijing is also looking to establish
a role for its currency in the international
monetary system, in part at the expense of
the dollar.
“China will boost its role at the centre of a
growing web of economic and financial
connections. These links are gradually, but
inexorably, integrating east Asia,” says Evan
Feigenbaum, head of the Asia practice at
Eurasia, a consultancy. “China will continue
to seek to reshape the region’s trade and
investment architecture, largely on a panAsian basis and without the US.” It is not just
Asia: Africa, Latin America and the Middle
East are all being touched by China’s global
push.
3
Development by design
Run by Chen Yuan – son of Chen Yun, one
of the country’s most powerful officials in
the 1980s – CDB is a unique hybrid of the
Chinese party-state: a “policy” bank whose
mission is to assist the development goals of
the nation but which has managed to forge an
enviable record of profitability and
commercial savvy. When Mr Chen took the
helm in the late 1990s, CDB’s lending had
been so abused by local governments that its
bad debt ratio approached 43 per cent. Last
year Dragonomics, a Beijing consultancy,
described it as “China’s best-managed bank”.
Ahead of the crisis, Mr Chen flirted with
several big investments in western banks
(and CDB did buy a small stake in Barclays
of the UK). But over the past two years, he
has thrown the bank’s weight behind
investments in other developing countries,
especially those that are energy or
commodity-rich. “Everybody is saying we
should go into the market and buy up lowpriced [financial] assets,” he told an
interviewer last year. “But I think we should
be thinking about partnerships in natural
resources.”
To organise its global push over the past
decade, CDB designated each of its branches
as having responsibility for a different part of
the world. The Henan branch thus took on
southern Africa and the Chongqing office
was told to develop contacts in the Balkans.
By the end of 2009, the bank had teams in
141 countries, including all but a handful of
Africa’s 50-plus nation states.
In a book about his experiences working
overseas for the bank, Shi Jiyang recalls
looking at a map of the world in his office in
Shenzhen in 2006 and wondering if he would
ever get a chance to visit South America: a
month later, he was sent there to find new
business. “South America is going to be the
hot spot for Chinese investment in the
coming 10 years,” he writes. “Entrepreneurs
who want to ‘challenge the blue ocean’
should be ready to go to South America.”
In the process, CDB and EximBank have
operated at a scale and speed that cannot be
matched by most other financial institutions.
Brazil’s Petrobras signed a $10bn loan
agreement with CDB in 2009, shortly after
agreeing with the US Ex-ImBank on a $2bn
line of credit. According to José Sergio
Gabrielli, Petrobras chief executive, it was
considerably easier to secure credit from the
Chinese than the Americans. The US needs
to think much more about its strategic
interests, he adds.
4
In the Reliance case, the combination of lowcost finance and competitive Chinese
manufacturing is helping India to expand its
creaking energy network faster than would
otherwise have been possible – and has
enabled Mr Ambani to gain an edge over
more cautious rivals. Reliance Power is
buying 30,000 megawatts of boiler, turbine
and generator packages, which Shanghai
Electric will provide over three years. Banks
in India are reluctant to lend beyond five to
seven years but Reliance has won terms as
long as 12 years under the China deal.
Reliance Communications, another of Mr
Ambani’s companies, is using a $1.9bn loan
from Chinese banks to pay down more
expensive Indian debt.
Chinese policymakers see this sort of deal as
the start of a powerful trend that will deepen
integration with the rest of the developing
world. “China is now working closely with
all these fast-growing emerging market
economies and I see a big future,” says Li
Daokui, an adviser to the People’s Bank of
China, the central bank. “All the forces are
working in the same direction. They have
resources and need capital. We have extra
capital to invest. So why not?”
Beijing’s global push is helping to open new
markets for Chinese goods and also serves a
broader strategic goal for Beijing, reducing
dependence on the US. The American
consumer may still be one of the main
driving forces in the global economy, but
about half of China’s exports now go to
developing countries. The big ticket loans
also further China’s efforts to diversify
foreign exchange reserves away from the
dollar.
5
But among Chinese officials and scholars,
there is a widely held view that the US has
been abusing its position as controller of the
main reserve currency by pursuing
irresponsible economic policies. Nor do they
hide the underlying geopolitical objective of
the currency push – to place limits on the
role of the dollar in the international
monetary system. “The financial crisis ... let
us clearly see how unreasonable the current
international monetary system is,” Li Ruogu,
head of China EximBank, said last year.
Jiang Yong, at the China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations, puts it
more starkly: ending US dominance of the
monetary system is “as important as New
China’s becoming a nuclear power”.
6
One Indian executive reflects that his country
ships plastic pellets to China that are then
made into buckets. If India cannot even make
plastic buckets competitively, he implies, its
battle will be tough.
Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s new president, has
meanwhile indicated that one of her first
priorities will be holding talks with China
about its currency and trade policies. “This is
an issue not only for Brazil but for all
emerging
countries,”
says
Fernando
Pimentel, her new trade minister.
China’s investment largesse also risks
sparking a backlash. In some resource-rich
nations, such as Australia, its form of state
capitalism raises fears that the mining sector
will be the Trojan horse that leads to
Beijing’s control of commodity prices. In
Africa, where China has done deals with
some of the weakest governments, there are
signs of a backlash by groups protesting at
corruption or poor working conditions.
“Western companies [in Africa] have cleaned
up their act in the past decade, but China is
turning the clock back,” says Paul Collier, an
Oxford Africa expert. “It is no defence to
say: ‘You plundered the poor, so now it is
our turn’.”
7
Vietnam invited the US navy to hold a joint
drill in the South China Sea last summer.
During a bruising diplomatic dispute
between Japan and China in the autumn after
the Japanese coast guard arrested a Chinese
fishing boat captain, China appeared to halt
exports of rare earths to Japan. For the rest of
Asia, it was a chilling reminder that their
economic links with China could leave them
exposed if they have a political falling-out
with Beijing.
For all the economic optimism coursing
through Asia at a time when much of the
developed world is still struggling, it is worth
A. Some of China’s post-crisis objectives
represent a more explicit challenge to US
leadership of globalisation. Take, for
instance, China’s long-term plans to
internationalise its currency, which have
been sharply accelerated over the past
year. The immediate goal is to make the
renminbi the main currency for trade in
Asia, reducing costs for Chinese
exporters. Some of the loans to Mr
Ambani’s empire are in renminbi – with
the Chinese offering to help hedge the
currency exposure.
reflecting on another important difference:
while defence spending is under pressure in
the west, in Asia it is rising strongly. China is
the reason for that, too.
undervalued against those of many of its
emerging peers.
E. Central to a great deal of this activity is
China Development Bank, which has
become the financial muscle in the
country’s overseas drive. In the energy
sector alone, CDB has awarded loans to
other developing country governments or
companies of more than $65bn in the past
two years, according to Erica Downs at
the Brookings Institution in the US.
Including China’s EximBank, Beijing has
made more than $110bn in long-term
loans to developing countries over that
period, a number that exceeds the World
Bank’s lending.
B. Stephen Green, an economist at Standard
Chartered, said the overall Chinese
loanbook remains under control. "If you
add up all the loans you get a figure that
equals around 80pc of GDP, which in an
economy that is growing by 10pc a year
is survivable. There are problems at the
micro level. Some local governments
have accumulated more than they can
handle, but nationally it is not that bad,"
he said.
F. Over the past few decades, China has
benefited hugely by hitching itself to a
process of globalisation where the rules
were written in Washington and the
American consumer was the buyer of last
resort. China prospered by making first
the socks, then the washing machines and
finally the iPods sold at Walmart.
C. In recent years, a range of important
countries have found that China rather
than the US is their principal trading
partner, from neighbouring Japan and
South Korea to commodity-rich Australia
and Brazil. At times over the past year,
Chinese imports of oil from Saudi Arabia
have exceeded Riyadh’s shipments to the
US.
G. Some of these loans are helping to
accelerate the integration of the rest of
Asia with China through energy and
infrastructure projects – such as oil
pipelines from Russia, Kazakhstan and
Burma, which are under construction or
already operating, or railway lines linking
Vietnam, Laos and Burma with southwest China.
D. Yet several obstacles could derail this
new phase of China-led globalisation. For
a start, India and many other developing
countries are aware of the risk of being
steamrollered by China’s manufacturing
machine, especially when it is bolstered
by a quasi-mercantilist economic strategy
that keeps the Chinese currency
H. Perhaps the biggest risk to China’s
ambitions lies in the security tensions
they are provoking in its own backyard.
Just as quickly as Asian countries are
integrating with China’s economy, they
are also rushing into the arms of the US
for military protection against a more
assertive Beijing.
16. Analyze the management and business activity of the bank and explain its contribution to the
recent rise of China as a global political power.
17. Compare and contrast the positions of the guest speakers on the issue discussed.
VIDEO 1
China must match foreign policy to global role
Jan 18 2011 Academic Yan Xuetong says China must adapt its "low profile" foreign policy to its
increasing global role. The director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University tells
China bureau chief Geoff Dyer that, because of their nuclear weapons, there is no danger of war between
the US and China, and that the tensions in 2010 between China and other Asian countries were "only
slight'. But he sees growing tension with the US as inevitable. (11m 26sec)
To watch the video, go to:
http://video.ft.com/v/754267310001/China-must-match-foreign-policy-to-global-role
VIDEO: 2
China’s 'shock and awe' & the arms war threat
Jan 17 2011 In a rare video interview, Yoichi Funabashi, editor-in-chief of Japan’s Asahi Shimbum
newspaper, tells FT's David Pilling about China’s newfound "shock and awe" tactics in territorial and
commercial disputes, the threat of a new arms war and a possible return to the "rule of the jungle" in the
Asia Pacific region. (10m 20sec)
To watch the video, go to:
http://video.ft.com/v/753437011001/China-s-shock-and-awe-the-arms-war-threat
APPENDIX 1.1
http://web1.iseas.edu.sg/?p=2723
Key obstacles to China becoming a global leader
By David Koh,10 March 2011
China just announced last week an increase of its defence budget by 12.7 per cent over 2010. It appears
the 2011 budget is being inflated by new equipment purchase and adjustments to salaries to meet the
demands of inflation. Western nations continue to harp on the lack of transparency in Chinese defence
spending, and the aircraft carrier that China is building is a rumour that has not gone away. China has also
recently demonstrated indigenous advances in fighters and missile technology.
What do all these mean for Southeast Asia?
China is a significantly much larger country than all Southeast Asian countries put together, not just in
terms of population but also in terms of economic potential and output. Everyone now speaks of China as
possibly the next global leader.
The common characteristics of leadership of the global order by any country or nation come in mainly
four forms. First, the leader would have economic might; its economy is open and it trades with the rest
of the world; it welcomes investments and is an important contributor to global economy via its own
foreign investments and business activities. To a certain extent its currency is also well-used, and there is
speculation that the China Renminbi could one day be used together with the US dollar as a currency of
international trade. China can be said to be well on its way to achieving global economic leadership.
The second dimension of this global leadership is presence and key roles in key international institutions,
such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and key global and economic
forum. Again, there have been calls for changes to the structure and leadership composition of these
institutions, and China has been a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council since its
inception. This shows that the UN’s founders believed China would always play a pivotal role in global
affairs.
The third dimension of global leadership is hard power – that of military might. However, the use of
military power comes with an important proviso – the military power must be used to serve purposes that
are either in self-defence, or in defence of the global community and is sanctioned by it. The difference
with which the international community looked upon American military action in Kuwait and
Afghanistan, and Iraq, would be the classic illustration.
As alarm bells go off on Chinese defence spending, we are basically dithering in between the issues of
capability and intent. Thus we come to the fourth dimension – that of national values and national
strategy, which comprise the intention.
Global leaders such as the USA have been at the top of the pecking order over the last six decades
because they aligned regional interests and self interests. In the case of the USA, anti-communism was in
its self-interest but its help to Europe through the Marshall Plan remains the most unsordid act any one
nation has done for others. Here in this region, many non-communist Southeast Asian countries still
remember the great effort the USA, and to a certain extent the UK, Australia, and New Zealand and other
western nations – exerted to keep the non-communist part of the region stable and free from the
communist threat. These action came in many forms – aid and grants, technical expertise, economic
advice, investments, and trade with the helping countries – all contributed to a stable order behind the
battlefront in Vietnam and Cambodia. Now that the Vietnam and Cambodian conflicts are long over, bad
memories are fading.
It is with these Western powers that China’s rise, in particular its economic and military activities, would
be compared to. Unfortunately, China is not a faraway country but a neighbour to Southeast Asia, and
had in the past invaded or colonized parts of Southeast Asia. Memories of this unpleasant past still
persist, at least in Vietnam. The last military confrontation between Southeast Asia and China – Vietnam
and China – is not the war they fought in 1979, but the naval war they fought in 1988.
As countries share border and may have conflicting national interests, from time to time disputes and
quarrels would happen. This is not unusual. However, it is the use of military violence to settle matters
that are abhorrent. This is also against the spirit of ASEAN and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of
ASEAN, to which China has acceded.
The difficult task for China is to convince Southeast Asia thoroughly that it would never resort to military
solutions to solve problems between it and Southeast Asian countries. Here is where the South China Sea
poses a strategic dilemma for China: to enhance its global leadership, the support of Southeast Asia
covering the wide expanse of the maritime approach towards China is necessary, yet it is having disputes
with a few Southeast Asian countries over islands and isles in the South China Sea. To what extent
assertive Chinese military action in the long and recent past – whether disguised in civilian clothes or not
– is for self-defence is a moot point, particularly because Chinese action to enforce claims in the Sea are
on islands and isles (some are just rocks) that are also claimed by other countries in the
region. Connected to this is a second dilemma: China’s improvements in military capability may well not
be for the purpose of domination of the South China Sea but could be aimed at other great powers, but the
use of force in the South China Sea in the recent past have revved up perceptions of a coming China
domination and the new capabilities are for exactly that purpose. It is always difficult, if not downright
wrong, to try to decipher a country’s strategic intentions by simply looking at its military capability. But
China’s record is not totally clean, at least not in the last twenty years.
What is worse, the claims in the form of the nine dotted lines that basically make more than 80% of the
South China Sea an internal water of China is absurd because it denies other countries the right to their
claims to their Exclusive Economic Zones as well as their continental shelf. As if this is not already bad,
Chinese views expressed at meetings or conferences about the validity of the nine dotted lines often erect
a wall and are unable to offer any explanation, let alone justification, of the nine dotted lines. A refusal to
discuss the dotted lines openly or to define these claims quickly are reinforcing a view among the people
of Southeast Asia that China plans to be the only winner by subjugating the claims of other countries to
its own. No global leader that is respected will do such a thing; yet aspirant China appears to be doing so.
The South China Sea disputes and the way forward to resolve these disputes contain the seeds of success
of Chinese emergence as a respected and legitimate global leader, or the beginnings of the building of a
wall that will block China from ever reaching the apex of the global pecking order. China should remind
itself that global respectability starts from its immediate neighbourhood. It should continue to press its
own claims in the South China Sea but it should do so in a non-violent and non-military way, and come to
an agreement with regional countries on the way forward to resolve the disputes.
What is the way forward for China? It should work with regional countries to conscientiously implement
the Declaration of Conduct, and seek compromises with regional countries on issues of clarity in claims,
as well as an inclusive approach in exploiting natural resources and freedom to navigate in the South
China Sea. And China should stop framing the South China Sea as a nothing but a bilateral issue
between it and individual Southeast Asian countries because while sovereignty of the islands are mostly
bilateral disputes, in fact many other issues are multilateral in nature because the South China Sea is a
common sea for all Southeast Asians and their friends to use. In fact, the South China Sea should be
renamed Southeast Asia Sea. Given that sovereignty issues will never be resolved, exploitation of
resources must be open to all who have a claim.
Leaders on this globe of sovereign nations never take all and leave nothing for others. They in fact let
their followers have their say and seek win-win solutions in ways that enforce respect and legitimacy as
leaders, and offer material help where it is necessary. Violence and stridence are the least preferred and
are self-destructing methods of aspirants to global leadership.
David Koh is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. This article contains his
personal opinions and do not reflect those of the Institute.
APPENDIX 1.2
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm
New Russian world order: the five principles
By Paul Reynolds
World affairs correspondent BBC News website
In the aftermath of the Georgian conflict, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has laid down
five principles that he says will guide Russian foreign policy.
The new Moscow rules are not a blueprint for a new "Cold War". That was a worldwide ideological and
economic struggle. This is much more about defending national interests.
Going back to the 19th Century?
The principles, with their references to "privileged interests" and the protection of Russian citizens, would
probably seem rather obvious to Russian leaders of the 19th Century. They would seem rather mild to
Stalin and his successors, who saw the Soviet Union extending communism across the globe.
In some ways, we are going back to the century before last, with a nationalistic Russia very much looking
out for its own interests, but open to co-operation with the outside world on issues where it is willing to
be flexible.
President Medvedev's principles do not, for example, necessarily exclude Russian agreement to
continuing the strong diplomatic stance against Iran. And energy contracts are not necessarily threatened.
Above all, what they tell us is that the Georgia conflict was for Russia, in Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov's words, a "long-cherished moment of truth", which has created a new "clarity".
Here are the principles, in the words which President Medvedev used in an interview with the three main
Russian TV channels (translated by the BBC Monitoring Service).
1. International law
"Russia recognises the primacy of the basic principles of international law, which define relations
between civilised nations. It is in the framework of these principles, of this concept of international law,
that we will develop our relations with other states."
2. Multi-polar world
"The world should be multi-polar. Unipolarity is unacceptable, domination is impermissible. We cannot
accept a world order in which all decisions are taken by one country, even such a serious and authoritative
country as the United States of America. This kind of world is unstable and fraught with conflict."
3. No isolation
"Russia does not want confrontation with any country; Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will
develop, as far as possible, friendly relations both with Europe and with the United State of America, as
well as with other countries of the world."
4. Protect citizens
"Our unquestionable priority is to protect the life and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are. We will
also proceed from this in pursuing our foreign policy. We will also protect the interest of our business
community abroad. And it should be clear to everyone that if someone makes aggressive forays, he will
get a response."
5. Spheres of influence
"Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions where it has its privileged interests. In these
regions, there are countries with which we have traditionally had friendly cordial relations, historically
special relations. We will work very attentively in these regions and develop these friendly relations with
these states, with our close neighbours."
Asked if these "priority regions" were those that bordered on Russia he replied: "Certainly the regions
bordering [on Russia], but not only them."
And he stated: "As regards the future, it depends not just on us. It also depends on our friends, our
partners in the international community. They have a choice."
The implications
Those therefore are the stated principles. What implications do they have?
To take them in the order he presented them:
The primacy of International Law: This on the face of it sounds encouraging. But Russia signed up to
Security Council resolution 1808 in April this year, which reaffirmed "the commitment of all Member
States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia... " - and has since abandoned
that position.
It argues that a Georgian attack on South Ossetia on 7/8 August invalidated its commitment and required
that it defend its citizens there. But it perhaps cannot proclaim its faith in international law and at the
same time take unilateral action.
This principle therefore has to be seen as rather vague.
The world is multi-polar: This means that Russia will not accept the primacy of the United States (or a
combination of the US and its allies) in determining world policy. It will require that its own interests are
taken into account.
The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov hinted at what this really means. "There is a feeling that
Nato again needs frontline states to justify its existence," he said in a speech. He was putting down
another marker against the extension of Nato membership to Ukraine and Georgia.
Russia does not seek confrontation: Again this sounds hopeful but it is based on the requirement that
Russia's needs are met first. If the world agrees to its demands, then it is happy to be friends. But if not...
therein lies the warning.
Protecting its citizens: The key phrase here is "wherever they are". This was the basis on which Russia
went to war in South Ossetia and it contains within it the potential for future interventions - over Crimea,
for example, populated by a majority Russian-background population yet owned by Ukraine only since
1954. If Ukraine looked set to join Nato, would Russia claim the protection of its "citizens" there?
Privileged interests: In this principle President Medvedev was getting down to the heart of the matter.
Russia is demanding its own spheres of influence, especially, but not only, over states on its borders. This
has the potential for further conflict if those "interests" are ignored.
Paul.Reynolds-INTERNET@bbc.co.uk
APPEDIX 1.3
Why is Putin backing North Korea? To build up Russia as a great power.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/26/why-is-putin-backing-north-koreato-build-up-russia-as-a-great-power/?utm_term=.38b4de140d06
By Samuel Ramani
July 26, 2017
On July 6, the Russian delegation to the United Nations released an official statement, criticizing
Washington’s handling of the North Korean crisis. In their statement, Russian diplomats disputed U.S.
allegations that North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile against Japan on July 4, saying
rather, that Pyongyang had launched an intermediate-ranged rocket. Russia also opposed U.N.
proposals for tighter economic sanctions against Pyongyang.
Numerous Western analysts, like Bloomberg View columnist Leonid Bershidsky and Council of Foreign
Relations fellow Van Jackson, have attempted to explain Russia’s conduct by highlighting Moscow’s
economic and geopolitical links to Pyongyang.
But there’s more. Moscow defends North Korea in a way that’s designed to get both the Russian public
and the international community to see Russia as a great power.
My doctoral research focuses on how, during international crises, Kremlin elites remind audiences that
Russia is a great power. The goal is to rally public support for their policies and increase Moscow’s
international position as a credible counterweight to U.S. hegemony.
You can see this in two ways: first, in Russia’s attempts to showcase itself as more effective at resolving
conflicts in the Korean Peninsula than the United States; and second, in Russia’s efforts to lead an
international coalition against Washington’s coercion of North Korea.
According to a confidential assessment by the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea will
be able to field a reliable, nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile as early as next year. (The
Washington Post)
Since Vladimir Putin’s third term started in 2012, Kremlin policymakers have often stepped in to settle
conflicts. That’s to remind the world that Russia is a great power. Russia often reminds the world of its
lead role in diplomatic settlements, as with the 2013 Syrian chemical weapons disarmament deal. The
point is to show the international community that Russia can solve problems the United States cannot.
Further, whenever any country asks Moscow for help in mediating a conflict, the Russian state media
trumpets that heartily. These requests show off Moscow’s international influence to nationalists at
home, and refute Western perceptions that Russia is diplomatically isolated.
We can see both of these approaches in Russia’s response to North Korea’s ballistic missile tests.
Since North Korea’s April 2017 ballistic missile tests, Russia has consistently argued that its strategy of
maintaining favorable relations with both North and South Korea is more likely to peacefully resolve the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) crisis than Washington’s aggressive posturing toward
North Korea.
For instance, in May, Russian President Vladimir Putin told South Korea’s special envoy Song Young-gil
that he would be willing to dispatch a Russian diplomatic delegation to the Korean Peninsula to
mediate between the DPRK and South Korea (ROK).
During that phone conversation, Putin also criticized Washington’s THAAD (Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense) missile system, designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate range ballistic
missiles, which has begun to be deployed in South Korea. Putin justified this criticism by arguing that
THAAD actually worsens tensions with North Korea and threatens Russia’s security, while failing to
adequately defend South Korea against North Korean artillery.
South Korea’s decision to suspend a major THAAD deployment on June 8 reveals that some senior
members of South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s left-wing coalition agree with Russia. That amplifies
Putin’s ability to promote his message that Russia is better at conflict resolution than the United States
and helps him convince other countries of Russia’s indispensability in world affairs.
You can see this in the Russian state media’s enthusiastic and oft-repeated coverage every time an
international leader praises, however slightly, Moscow’s involvement in the North Korean crisis.
For instance, the Russian state media has repeatedly mentioned Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s
consultation with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on the crisis and, has showcased public
statements by leaders, like Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who have backed Russia’s support for a
political solution to the North Korean crisis.
All that is aimed at the Russian public — and shows that Kremlin elites pay a great deal of attention to
how their citizens perceive Russia’s role in the world. The importance of public opinion in shaping
Russian foreign policy is also revealed through analyzing polling data. The Levada Center’s survey
revealed that in 2011, 47 percent of Russians saw their nation as a great power. By 2016, as Russia has
gotten increasingly involved in regional conflicts, that number had jumped to 64 percent.
As Russia takes an increasingly assertive approach to world affairs, it reminds its citizens of the Soviet
Union’s status as a superpower that could influence conflicts worldwide. In this respect, Russia’s
increased attention to North Korea is much like its military intervention in Syria, and its expanded
diplomatic presence in Libya and Afghanistan. Through active involvement in international crises in the
Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region, Moscow is trying once again to project itself as a global
power.
But Russia wants to be recognized as a global leader not just within its own borders but among the
international community as well. And so its position on North Korea is linked to its desire to lead an
informal coalition of countries that believe that the United States is trying to overthrow the North Korean
regime. This leadership role would strengthen Russia’s claim to be a great power and would bolster its
claim to be the leading international counterweight to the United States.
[Are sanctions pushing Russians to “rally round the flag"? Not exactly.]
And so when China halted energy exports to the DPRK, Russia has stepped into the gap left — and has
since positioned itself as the rogue country’s leading international ally. Toward that end, the Kremlin
has invested in the North Korea’s infrastructure and in technical cooperation with Pyongyang.
As a result of these investments, Russia has drawn support from a number of traditionally anti-Western
countries, like Cuba and Iran — which sided with Russia on Syria and backed its 2014 annexation in
Crimea. Putin’s North Korea strategy helps him expand and cement Russia’s network of allies.
In short, Russia wants to be, and be seen as, a great power. It wants to lead the nations that resist
Western power and influence. In defying the United Nations and supporting North Korea, Russia
bolsters that status at home and abroad.
And so Moscow’s alignment with North Korea will likely get stronger in the near future.
Samuel Ramani is a PhD candidate in international relations at St. Antony’s College, University of
Oxford, and a journalist. Follow him on Twitter @samramani2.
Appendix 1
Lead-in. Criteria of a superpower. Soviet Union, US, China.
1. Permanent seat Coll –
2. a surface area of Coll/prep 3. explicitly controlled Coll/ Spell - /ɪkˈsplɪsɪt/
4. censorship Term/Wf - /ˈsensəʃɪp $ -ər-/
5. propaganda Spell - /ˌprɒpəˈɡændə/
6. to overthrow capitalist society Term/Coll - /ˈkæpɪtl-ɪst/
7. replace it with Prep 8.
bourgeoisie Spell -
9. stockpile of nuclear weapons Coll 10. satellite states Term - A satellite state is a country that is formally independent in the world, but
under heavy political, economic and military influence or control from another country.
11. Global intelligence network Term – международная информационная сеть
12. ties with paramilitary and guerrilla groups Prep/Coll - /ˌpærəˈmɪlətəri/
13. self-sufficient Term/Spell 14. inadequacies Wf/Spell - /ɪnˈædəkwəsi/
15. to accomplish goals Coll -
16. inefficiency Wf – /ˌɪnəˈfɪʃənsi/
17. guaranteed employment Coll 18. free healthcare Term 19. Commonwealth of Nations Term –
20. a degree of Prep 21. Highest military expenditure – Coll/Term 22. surpassing Spell - /səˈpɑːsɪŋ/
23. navy Term/Spell 24. nuclear arsenal Term/Coll –
25. nuclear capabilities Term/Coll –
26. armament production Coll 27. global market Term/Coll 28. supply and demand Term 29. High standard of living Coll/Prep –
30. accessibility Wf/Spell - /əkˌsesəˈbɪləti/
31. to serve as Prep 32. reserve currency Term/Coll -
33. Marshall Plan Term - The Marshall Plan was an American initiative passed in 1948 for foreign aid to
Western Europe. The United States transferred over $12 billion in economic recovery programs to
Western European economies after the end of World War II.
34. to expand economy Coll 35. to a large extent coll - /ɪkˈstent/
36. to slow down sharply Phr/Coll 37. the labour market Term/Coll
38. prompt and vigorous policy actions – /ˈvɪɡərəs/ немедленное и решительное действий,
39. putting Russia in the lead Prep 40. pick up Phr - rise
41. to be set to Prep – to be ready to (do sth)
42. purchasing power parity Coll/Term - паритет покупательной способности , if
two currencies have purchasing power parity, an amount of one country’s currency needed
to buy particular goods there will buy the same amount of goods in another country
when exchanged into the currency of that country. This is used to see if currencies are
correctly valued against each other on the CURRENCY EXCHANGE markets.
43. to be expected to Prep
44. manufacturing sector Coll 45. likely Wf
46. the labour force Term/Coll
47. to be projected - to be planned to happen in the future, (project to say what
the amount, size, cost etc of something is likely to be in the future, using the information you have
now)
48. levels have soared Coll - /sɔː $ sɔːr/
49. productivity growth Coll - рост производительности труда
Beijing’s Foreign Policy
1. to accuse (China) of –PREP
2. to hide one’s light – IDIOM
3. to brandish strengths and achievements – COLL
4. (to encourage) the adoption of its currency(to adopt one’s currency COLL)
5. (an area of) “core interest” – TERM/LSP
6. a shrinking violet – IDIOM
7. world’s second-largest economy – COLL
8. to be sb’s (America’s) shadow – IDIOM
9. “client state” – TERM/LSP
10. to make out the contours – PHR V
11. contours SP
12. stark difference – COLL
13. evangelical streak – COLL
14. streak - SP
15. in regard to – PREP
16. liberal democracy –TERM/LSP
17. free-market ideology –TERM/LSP
18. To shy away from – PHR V
19. coup – SP
20. to impose (its vision) on - PREP
21. by contrast – PREP
22. to be blind to – PREP
23. soft power – TERM/LSP
24. to step up efforts – COLL/PHR V
25. at bottom – IDIOM
26. a means to an end -IDIOM
27. (admission of )stature – SP
28. non-intervention – WF/SP/LSP
29. (become more deeply) entangled with – PREP
30. thirst for oil – PREP
31. violent backlashes – COLL
32. to stand idly by – IDIOM
33. to renege on sth -PREP
34. to strike (struck) a deal – COLL
35. expansionary – WF expand – expansion;
36. to be confined to – PREP
37. to ring (entirely) hollow – IDIOM
38. hierarchical –SP
39. Sinocentric hierarchy -LSP
40. tributary relationships – COLL
41. outright territorial conquest – COLL
42. conquest– WF conquer – conquerer
43. to pay tribute – COLL
44. to take on board – IDIOM
45. empire – SP
46. assertive in insisting on – PREP
47. in time – IDIOM
48. to push US forces away from – IDIOM
49. maritime borders –COLL
50. to exercise authority over – COLL/PREP
51. to assert rights over (the entire South China Sea) – COLL/PREP
52. to emulate China – COLL
53. through concessions – PREP
54. concessions WF – concede – concessional
55. to trim one’s jib – IDIOM
56. to maintain relations – COLL
US democracy has little to teach China
1. dramatic reversal of fortune COLL
2. reversal WF
3. on the eve IDIOM
4. to hold the high ground IDIOM
5. to sweep the world COLL
6. to fritter away PHRV
7. to put paid to smth IDIOM
8. to be on a roll IDIOM
9. the weathering of the financial crisis ( to weather the financial crisis) COL
10. vindication of a system SP
11. state-owned enterprises TERM
12. in vogue IDIOM
13. to give way to IDIOM
14. verging on contempt PREP
15. mode of governance LSP/ TERM
16. To be up for smth IDIOM
17. put into place IDIOM
18. to be subject to blockage PREP
19. to object to government plans PREP
20. on one’s part PREP
21. (degree of) accountability towards one’s population LSP
22. rule of law LSP
23. to shift a policy in response to IDIOM
24. to be attentive to smb PREP
25. respond to smth PREP
26. outrage over PREP
27. egregious cases of corruption COLL
28. to calibrate (a sensible working) relationship COLL
29. to escalate a conflict (over the detention) COLL/PREP
30. in anticipation PREP
31. anti-Japanese sentiment LSP
32. to undergo a democratic transition COLL
1. to secure natural resources COLL
2. to sign loans of ($110 bn) COLL/PREP
3. to make loan commitments COLL
4. a record amount of lending COL
5. escalating competition over PREP
6. a recipient (of a World Bank) WF
7. to provide (more preferential) terms COL
8. onerous SP/WF
9. offshore lending LSP
10. to further the interests COL
11. to extend a loan to smb PREP
12. foreign exchange reserves TERM
33. to cater to smth (the interests)PREP
34. to build on one’s fear PHRV
35. fear of populism TERM
36. genuine SPELL
37. ironically SP
38. of late IDIOM
39. pervasive SP
40. to exacerbate inequalities COLL
41. to collude with PREP
42. a pent-up anger COLL
43. responsiveness WF
44. social spending LSP
45. to boost consumption COLL
46. to stave off (a social explosion) PHRV
47. unsolvable problems WF
48. on the ground IDIOM
49. come about PHRV
50. down the road IDIOM
51. in the face of smth IDIOM
52. (a major) economic downturn LSP
53. fragile legitimacy SP/WF
54. inherent legitimacy COLL
55. in time of adversity IDIOM
56. to own up to PHRV
57. misconception SPELL /WF
58. outlived WF
59. to pride oneself on PREP
60. constitutional checks and balances TERM
61. to distrust centralised government WF/TERM
62. ideologically rigid COLL
63. at present IDIOM
64. Reaganism TERM
China’s Lending Hits New Heights
1.
To hit (new) heights IDIOM
EX 14 page 9
1. Meritocratic basis SP
2. Squeeze a surplus LSP
3. compulsory levies LSP
4. diffuse best practice techniques COLL
5. mitigate famine COLL
6. to foster innovation COLL
7. compensate for land shortage PREP
8. to augment SP
9. to raise land productivity COLL
A strategy to straddle the planet
1. To deepen links COLL
2. to expand infrastructure , energy supplies COLL
3. To accelerate growth/ the integration (of the global economy) COLL
4. To boost two-way trade /one’s role COLL
5. To bind smth (closer) to PREP
6. at the expense of PREP
7. to reshape one’s architecture(the region’s trade and investment)COLL
8. pan-Asian basis TERM
9. a unique hybrid SP
10. to award loans COLL
11. an enviable record of profitability WF
12. profitability SP
13. To take the helm IDIOM
14. bad debt ratio TERM
15. Energy-rich / commodity-rich countries COLL
16. To be the hot spot for smth IDIOM
17. a $2bn line of credit TERM
18. to secure credit COLL
19. to gain an edge over smth COLL
20. To be reluctant to lend SP
21. driving forces ( in the global economy) LSP
22. Big ticket loans IDIOM
23. To further one’s efforts COLL
24. to diversify away from PHR V
25. To pursue policies COLL
26. Irresponsible policies COLL/WF
27. To spark a backlash COLL
28. Trojan horse IDIOM
29. To clean up one’s act IDIOM
30. turn the clock back IDIOM
31. in one’s own backyard IDIOM
32. to hold a joint drill LSP
33. rare earths LSP
34. To have a political falling-out IDIOM
Key obstacles to china becoming a global leader
1. To harp on sth PHR
2. Defence spending LSP
3. Economic/political might COLL
4. Pivotal role COLL
5. Since its inception SP
6. Proviso SP
7. As alarm bells go off IDIOM
8. To dither in between( Be indecisive) PHR
9. Pecking order IDIOM
10. To align SP
11. The Marshall plan LSP
12. Unsordid act SP
13. Fading memories COLL
14. Naval war COLL
15. Abhorrent SP
16. To accede WF
17. To resort to smth PREP
18. Enhanse leadership COLL
19. Moot point COLL
20. Military capability/expenditure LSP
21. To rev up (perceptions) PHR
22. To decipher one’s intentions COLL
23. Reinforse a view COLL
24. Validity of lines WF
25. To reach the apex of COLL
26. Respectability SP
27. To press one’s claims COLL
28. To Seek compromises COLL
29. To have one’s say IDIOM
30. Win-win solution LSP
31. Stridence SP
32. Aspirants to global leadership WF
Appendix 1.2
1. In the aftermath IDIOM
2. To lay downPHR
3. To extend the Communism across the globe PREP
4. To look out for one’s interests IDIOM
5. A strong diplomatic stance against LSP
6. The primacy of the basic principles of international law LSP
7. Unipolarity LSP/ WF
8. Impermissible WF
9. Fraught with conflict PREP
10. To make aggressive forays IDIOM
11. To border on PREP
12. On the face of smth IDIOM
13. To abandon a position COLL
14. To invalidate a commitment COLL
15. To determine world policy COLL
16. To put down a marker against IDIOM
17. To look set to do IDIOM
18. To get down to the heart of the matter IDIOM
Why is Putin backing North Korea? To build up Russia as a great power
1. to release an official statement COLL
2. proposals for (tighter economic sanctions) PREP
3. to rally public support for COLL
4. a credible counterweight to LSP
5. coercion SP
6. to field a reliable, nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile COLL
7. to step in PHR
8. chemical weapons disarmament deal LSP
9. to strengthen Russia’s claim LSP(COLL)
10. to bolster its claim COLL
11. to halt energy exports COLL
12. the rogue SP
13. toward that end IDIOM
14. to side with PHR
15. to expand and cement Russia’s network COLL
16. to resist Western power and influence COLL
17. to defy the United Nations COLL
18. alignment with North Korea PREP
19. state media LSP
20. to trumpet smth heartily COLL
21. show off PHR
22. to refute Western perceptions COLL
23. aggressive posturing LSP
24. to dispatch a Russian diplomatic delegation COLL
25. to shoot down PHR
26. short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles LSP
27. to worsen tensions COLL
28. to amplify Putin’s ability COLL
29. indispensability WF
30. to showcase public statements COLL
31. to perceive Russia’s role COLL
32. polling data LSP
33. to take an increasingly assertive approach COLL
34. to project itself as a global power LSP