Политическая экономика - Российская экономическая школа

Константин Сонин
Российская экономическая школа
Политическая экономика
Откуда берутся и почему так устойчивы плохие институты? Почему демократические
государства проводят плохую экономическую политику? Зачем (и кому) нужно
регулирование? Почему политики не выполняют своих экономических обещаний? Чем
плохо неравенство? Почему веймарская республика просуществовала столь недолго?
Может ли быть неэффективная децентрализация? Курс политической экономики
посвящен ответу на эти и другие вопросы.
Книги:
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1998) The Grabbing Hand, Harvard Univ. Press.
Barzel, Y. (2002) A Theory of the State, Camb. Univ. Press
Дополнительно:
North, D. (1981) Structure and Сhange in Economic History, Norton.
Roland, G. (2000) Economics and Transition: Politics, Markets, and Firms, MIT Press.
1. Введение: экономика и политика
2. Политики и фирмы
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1994) Politicians and Firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994,
995-1025.
Glaeser, E., Shleifer, A. (2003) The Curley Effect, Quarterly Journal of Economics, to
appear.
3. Неравенство и перераспределение
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2001) Inefficient Redistribution American Political Science
Review, 95: 649-61
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2001) A Theory of Political Transitions, American Economic
Review.
Glaeser, E., Sheinkman, J., Shleifer, A. (2002) The Injustice of Inequality, Journal of
Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1993) Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?
American Economic Review, 83, 409-14.
Polishchuk, L., Savvateev, A. (2001) Spontaneous (Non) Emergence of Property Rights,
mimeo.
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Sonin, K. (2003) Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights, Journal of
Comparative Economics, forthcoming.
4. Политэкономия регулирования
Djankov, S. et al (2002) Regulation of Entry, mimeo.
Glaeser, E., Shleifer, A. (2003) The Rise of Regulatory State, Journal of Economic
Literature, to appear.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. (1993) Corruption, Quartely Journal of Economics 108, 599-612.
5. Происхождение институтов
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. (2001) The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development, American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J., (2000) Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy,
Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 11671199.
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. (2001) Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective, mimeo.
Barzel, Y. (2002) A Theory of the State, Camb. Univ. Press, главы 1-2.
Glaeser, E., Shleifer, A. (2001) Legal Origins, Quarterly Journal of Economics, to appear.
Engerman, R., Sokoloff, K. (2001)
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999: “The Quality of
Government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 222-279.
6. Конституции и избирательные системы
Alesina, A., Aghion, P. (2002) Endogenous Political Institutions, mimeo.
Myerson, R. (2000) Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster, mimeo.
Person, T., Roland, G., and Tabellini, G. (1997) Separation of Power and Political
Accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 4, 1163-1202..
7. Экономика и политика федерализма
Enikolopov, R., Zhuravskaya, E. (2003) Influence of Political Institutions on the Effect of
Decentralization, mimeo.
Inman, R., Rubinfeld, D. (1997) Rethinking Federalism, Journal of Economic Perspectives,
11(4), 43-64.
Lambert, A., Sonin, K., Zhuravskaya, E. (2003) Capture of Law: Economics and Politics of
Russian Bankruptcy, mimeo.
Sonin, K. (2003) Provincial Protectionism, mimeo.
Qian, Y., Roland, G. (1998) Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. American Economic
Review, 1143-1162.
Weingast, B. (1995) The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving
Federalism and Economic Growth. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, v. 64, 131.
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Zhuravskaya, E., (2000) Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods, Journal of Public
Economics 76 (3), 337-368.
8. Политическая экономия реформ
Shleifer, A., Treisman, D. (2000) Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in
Russia.
Roland, G. (2000) Economics and Transition: Politics, Markets, and Firms, MIT Press.
Hellman, J. (1998) Winners Take All: the Politics of Partial Reform, World Politics 50, 203234.
9. Долгосрочная политика
Acemoglu, D. (2003) Why Not A Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment
and Politics, mimeo.
Schwarz, M., Sonin, K. (2003) War and Peace, mimeo.
Полтерович, В. (2000) Институциональные ловушки, препринт РЭШ.
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